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UNITARIANISM

INCAPABLE OF VINDICATION:

A REPLY

TO

THE REV. JAMES YATES'S

VINDICATION OF UNITARIANISM.

BY RALPH WARDLAW,

AUTHOR OF THE "DISCOURSES ON THE SOCINIAN CONTROVERSY," WHICH OCCASIONED THE "VINDICATION."

"——Admoneri nos decet, ut DOCILITATE, magis quam acumine, in istam questionem incumbere, curæ sit."—CALVIN.

"The MEEK He will guide in judgment, the MEEK will He teach his way."
PSAL. XXV. 9.

ANDOVER:

PUBLISHED AND FOR SALE BY MARK NEWMAN.

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FLAGG AND GOULD....PRINTERS.

1817.

TO

WILLIAM WARDLAW, Esq.

Dear and Honoured Sir,

I feel peculiar satisfaction in inscribing this Volume to you, without your privacy, as a slight acknowledgment of obligations, which, I am fully sensible, can never be discharged. To you, under Divine Providence, I am indebted, for all that a son can owe to an affectionate and pious father:—especially, for the inestimable blessing of early religious instruction, imparted with tender solicitude, sanctified by fervent prayer, and recommended by the force of consistent example. During a long and checquered pilgrimage, you have oft experienced the cheering influence of those blessed truths, which, in this and a former Volume, I have endeavoured to defend;—and have been enabled, "without rebuke," to exemplify their practical efficacy, in the faithful discharge of all the personal and relative duties of public and private life.

May the God whom you have served from childhood to age, gladden the evening of your days with "the light of his countenance!"—and, when the hour shall arrive,—may it yet be distant!—that shall close the period of your residence on earth, receive you, in peace and triumph, to that celestial home, which has so long been the goal of your hopes and desires, where the sorrows of time shall give place to the unmingled joys of eternity!

With every sentiment of filial reverence and love—I am,

Dear and honoured Sir,

Your dutiful Son,

and humble Servant,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THIS Reply has swelled in its progress to a degree which I did not anticipate. There are few things, indeed, to which the phrase "*crescit eundo*" is more strongly applicable, than to a defensive work in theological controversy:—and, besides the extension of the work itself, various engagements and circumstances, in the detail of which the public could have no interest, have contributed to delay its appearance so unexpectedly long.—My wish being to make it a final answer, and, as far as possible, to preclude the necessity, on my part, of any prolongation of the discussion, I resolved, some time after having begun, to allow myself freer scope than I had originally intended; conceiving that it would not be justice, either to myself or to my subject, to omit illustrations or reasonings, which might, in any material degree, contribute to the elucidation and settlement of the questions at issue. An assertion may be made in a single sentence, which it may require pages to refute; while the brevity and imposing confidence with which it is made, may increase, instead of lessening, the necessity for its refutation. But the ground on which I would chiefly rest, in vindicating this amplitude of discussion, is, the paramount importance of the questions themselves, and the infinite magnitude of

the consequences dependent upon their just decision;—a consideration, surely, which ought to be sufficient to secure an attentive examination to arguments even much more extended.

Not that I consider the perusal and examination of complicated critical disquisitions as necessary to enable any reader to resolve these questions for himself, in an enlightened and satisfactory manner, from the word of God. To use an expression of my opponent, in his Sermon on the duty and manner of deciding religious controversies,—"On questions so important and fundamental, the language of revelation cannot be ambiguous:" and neither, on the same principle, can it be dark, and difficult to be understood. "To the poor the gospel is preached:"—and the holy Scriptures, like the preaching of our Lord and his apostles, are adapted, in their phraseology, not to the learned few, but to the unlearned many;—not to "the wise and prudent," but to "babes." The way of salvation, as might, *a priori*, have been presumed, is made known there with so much plainness, that "the way-faring man, though a fool, shall not err therein." But, when attempts are made, by the pride of philosophy, misnamed theology, to pervert these Scriptures from their obvious and simple meaning, and to make the common people jealous and distrustful, on the most momentous subjects, of that translation of the Bible, in which they have been accustomed to confide, as a faithful exhibition of the mind of God; when Unitarian geographers endeavour, by the discovery of false readings, false renderings, and false interpretations, to lay down a map of the way to heaven, entirely different from the one which is there so distinctly delineated:—it becomes an imperious duty, rightly to appreciate the pretensions of those, who are thus "confident that they themselves are guides of the blind, lights of them who are in darkness, instructors of the foolish, and teachers of babes:"

to expose, as far as we are able, the unsoundness of their specious criticisms, and the fallacy of their high-minded reasonings; that, by this means, the faith of the steadfast may be confirmed, the confidence of the wavering restored, and those reclaimed from their wanderings, who may unhappily, have been induced to forsake "the good and the right way."

The last of the "Discourses on the principal points of the Socinian Controversy," closed in the following terms: "If it shall be found that these objects," (namely, the glory of God, and the eternal interests of men) "which are in their nature inseparable, have been, in the smallest degree, promoted;—that the faith of God's people has been strengthened, or the minds of the wavering settled;—that, in any one instance, the gainsayer has been convinced, or the careless sinner awakened, and 'turned from the error of his way;'—I shall consider my reward as obtained, and my labour as infinitely more than compensated." It has afforded me sincere gratification, I trust from higher and purer principles than those of a merely selfish nature, to learn, from different quarters, that my labour has not, in these respects, been entirely fruitless.—Among the accounts of this description, not the least pleasing has been from the other side of the Atlantic. In America, particularly in the State of Massachusetts, the same controversy has, of late, been exciting unusual attention. During its progress, a copy of the "Discourses" having been carried out from this country by an American minister, a large edition was published in Andover; which, I am given to hope, has not been without some small service to the cause of Christ. It was followed, on the part of the Unitarians, by the republication of Mr. Yates' "Vindication," with Notes, and an Appendix. The letters conveying these notices, (which were from eminent ministers of the gospel, although personally strangers to myself,

and which pleasingly indicate the effect of the "one faith" in knitting the hearts of strangers, however distant, in the bonds of Christian affection)—were accompanied with copies of the various publications which had then issued from the American press, in the course of the recent controversy. As this volume is likely to reach the same quarter, it may not be improper to say, that at first I felt inclined to take some notice, in an Appendix or otherwise, of the contents of these publications. But, besides the propriety of confining myself, as much as possible, to the field which my own adversary had marked out for me, as well as of avoiding longer delay in the publication of this reply, want of leisure prevented me from giving them a deliberate examination; nor did there appear, indeed, to be any sufficient call for entering the lists among the Transatlantic combatants. The arena is already well occupied. There are hearts there burning with unquenchable love to the Divine Redeemer, associated with understandings fully adequate to do justice to their zeal. We heartily bid them "God speed." And, although they should be grieved there, as we have been here, by seeing some "depart from the faith:" yet "those who are approved will be made the more manifest," and the truth, which is mighty, shall ultimately prevail.

In the course of this work, I have occasionally referred, with approbation, to "Strictures on Mr. Yates' Vindication of Unitarianism," by the Rev. John Brown of Biggar. These Strictures are very creditable to the critical talents of their author; although, from the peculiar form in which they are written, (having been originally intended "as an article in one of the periodical journals,") they are necessarily limited, and, in some measure desultory. There is in a few parts of them, a degree of sarcastic asperity, which will be condemned by some,

and, perhaps, justified by others; and which I am myself timid to censure, because, in the composition of the following work, the trial of temper has at times been such, as to render it not improbable, that, in spite of my introductory remarks, and good resolutions, on the spirit of controversy, Mr. Brown may find some occasion for retorting upon me, with the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself." I should very gladly have allowed these Strictures, together with the Reviews (some of them long and able) to which this controversy has given rise, to have sufficed as antidotes to the poison of Unitarian error, in Mr. Yates' work, and, desisting from my labour, have devoted my time to other departments of study:—but, having publicly taken up the cause, I felt that I should leave a sting in my conscience, if I did not attempt, with the same publicity, to meet the reasonings of my opponent with a more full and formal refutation; and by this means, as well as by additional evidence, to settle still more firmly on the solid basis of Scripture testimony, those doctrines, which Christians have been accustomed to consider as the essential articles of revealed truth.

The favourable reception experienced by the "Discourses," has inspired a diffident hope, that the present volume may not be altogether unacceptable to the Christian public, or unaccompanied with the blessing of God. Without that blessing, I am deeply convinced, every expectation of good must be frustrated:—and no one who has read the epistles of Paul, and imbibed any portion of his spirit, will charge me with enthusiasm, in requesting, in order to its success, and to the success of all similar efforts, the prayers of my Christian brethren.

In a foot note, page 29th of this volume, a reference is made to note A. at the end. It was my intention to have inserted there some particulars relative to the theological sentiments of

Dr. Isaac Watts. To avoid, however, the awkward appearance of a solitary note, (having found no particular occasion for more) I now prefer making a reference to the pamphlet from which these particulars should have been extracted. It is entitled,— "Dr. Watts no Socinian; a Refutation of the Testimony of Dr. Lardner, as brought forward in the Rev. T. Belsham's Memoirs of the late Rev. Theophilus Lindsay, 'That Dr. Watts' last sentiments were completely Unitarian.' In a series of letters to the Rev. Joseph Smith, of Manchester. By Samuel Palmer.— 'Your glorying is not good.' 1 Cor. v. 6. London, 1813."

I commend this work, like the former, "to the blessing of God, and to the candid judgment of men."

R. W.

Glasgow, June 24, 1816.

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PART I.

OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS TOPICS OF PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION.

CHAPTER I.

Towards the close of his "Vindication of Unitarianism," Mr. Yates represents the "instances of carelessness, indiscretion, and misrepresentation, which abound in Mr. Wardlaw's Volume, and which he has been under the necessity of noticing, as sufficient *wholly to destroy its credit in the apprehension of all impartial judges*."—I will not venture, in "putting on my harness," to boast myself," as Mr. Yates has thus done in "putting it off." Depending, however, on Divine assistance, I address myself anew, with no diminution of courage, to "this great argument." I shall examine my opponent's work with all the freedom which a regard to truth requires; and shall then leave the decision betwixt us to those "*impartial judges*" to whom he has made his confident appeal.

It must be a matter of very small consequence to the public, how Mr. Yates and his opponent stand affected towards each other; whether they live in habits of intimate friendship, or merely on terms of mutual good will. From some expressions used in Mr. Yates' "Vindication," his readers might be led to suppose the former to be the case; for in various instances, in the course of his work, he strongly expresses his regard, and, with the emphasis of Italics, closes his volume by "joyfully erasing from the tablet of his memory every feeling of hostility, and wishing to behave henceforth toward his opponent, his *friend*, as his moral and intellectual excellencies prompt his esteem." (Page 291.) When Mr. Yates thus expresses his wishes respecting his behaviour to his friend "*henceforth*," his reader may naturally be disposed

to inquire, in what manner he *has* behaved towards him in this controversy. And in seeking, in Mr. Yates' book, an answer to this inquiry, he will find some things, I fear, hardly quite consistent with that cordial union of spirit, which is generally and justly understood to belong to the essence of true *friendship*. He will occasionally feel cause for considerable surprise; and may begin, perhaps, to suspect that surely Mr. Yates uses this term, as Unitarians do so many others, in a sense of his own. What sort of *esteem* and *friendship* must these be? he will say to himself. This author certainly does not treat his *esteemed friend* very graciously. He compliments him, it is true, and compliments him strongly and generously. But his eulogies seem to be more than neutralized, when he charges this friend of his with *management*, and *generalship*, and *manœuvring*, of various unworthy kinds;—with the artful *expedients*, and *low tricks*, of a *nibbling adversary;* —with *contumely*, and *petulance*, and *positiveness*, and *dogmatism;* as well as with *ignorance*, and *carelessness*, and *bitter misrepresentation*, and *overheated zeal;*—when he honours him with a place among "*crows, and chattering jays,*" in their impertinent pursuit of the bird of Jove;—and speaks of the "*feeble, diminutive accents of our worthy author*" in terms which could hardly be used without a certain scornful elevation of the upper lip, not extremely desirable in the countenance of a *friend*.—I am quite aware, however, of the different lights in which the same expressions will appear to a friend of the cause that is defended, and to an enemy. Where the former finds no ground of complaint in an author's general manner, but rather, perhaps, an excess of forbearance and gentleness, the latter will quickly discover the clearest symptoms of virulent animosity and insolent self-sufficiency. Certain words and phrases will be severely censured by the latter, as incontestable evidences of such tempers of mind; while by the former they will be justified and commended, as indicating no more than that the writer is not indifferent to the cause he has espoused, but, as he ought to be, "zealously affected in a good thing." It was certainly my wish to avoid the evils of which my adversary has so heavily accused me. In this wish it is possible I may have failed: yet I honestly declare I am not sensible of the failure; at least to any thing like the extent of

the indictment; nor, so far as I have had access to know the public voice, have my readers in general concurred in the accusations.

It may appear to some, perhaps, hardly generous, to bring these harshnesses forward into such prominent notice, after Mr. Yates has declared, towards the conclusion of his reply, the "special gratification it will afford him to expunge any expressions which appear disrespectful to Mr. Wardlaw." (P. 291.) But the truth is, I cannot persuade myself that Mr. Yates was not sensible of something disrespectful in such expressions as those which have just been quoted. And surely, if he was, the spirit, which would have been gratified by expunging them from the printed volume, should have previously gratified itself, by expunging them from the manuscript. *This* procedure is certainly much more like sincerity, than first to show the public, by offensive personalities, what smart things we can say, and then to bow at the close, and protest our readiness to cancel them. I have a similar observation to make respecting the severe accusations in Mr. Yates' letter to me, published at the end of his book. He says himself respecting that letter, "Some of the expressions in it are certainly harsh. I used them, that he might see the full extent of my accusations against him, and because *I always think it proper to speak of another in severer language to himself than to any one else.*" (P. 291.) Mr. Yates, then, intended this letter *for myself, and for no one else?* So, upon the principle which he states (an exceedingly good one) it ought to have been. But *so it was not.* Mr. Yates, while using these confessedly harsh expressions, "because he thought it proper to speak of another in severer terms to himself than to any one else," was, at the very moment, writing for the public, and avows his intention of saying to the world all that he was saying to myself:—"P. S. I shall probably prefix this letter to my Reply, that, if any disagreeable consequences do ensue from this controversy, the public may see that I am not chargeable with them."

Could I plead guilty to all the charges of my opponent, I should pronounce myself unworthy of *his* esteem, or of the esteem of any one else: and, what is of infinitely greater consequence than the forfeiture of the regard of men, I should feel myself ex-

posed to the frown of an offended Master. I know it is his command, that "the servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men; patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves." To this command—(a command to which he who was "meek and lowly in heart" himself set the example of perfect conformity)—it is my desire, by his grace, to adhere, in inward feeling, and in outward act and expression. If the violation of it be necessary to writing with *spirit*, let me rank with the dullest of the dull. I am no advocate for that facile complaisance, and simpering insipidity, which knows not how to be firm; which assumes a style between assent and denial, that can scarcely be known for the one or for the other; which minces truth, reduces and accommodates important differences, smiles when it ought to frown, and makes its courteous obeisance when it should stand erect in all the dignity of unbending decision.—But there is perfect harmony between decision and gentleness. If there were not, it were impossible that both should be commanded. We are in general, I fear, too little sensible of the *sin* that is committed by speaking or writing, whether against one another, or against the common enemies of our faith, under the influence of such tempers of mind, and in such a style and manner, as are inconsistent with the precepts and example of our "meek and lowly" Master. We are not sufficiently jealous of the deceitfulness of our hearts. We write with passion, and flatter ourselves that we are writing with becoming zeal. We indulge ourselves freely in violent invective, pointed sarcasm, and contemptuous ridicule, and, according to one of the most common modes of self-deception, that of giving gentle names to ungentle things, we call this writing with *spirit*.—Nay, such is our inconsistency, such our insensibility to our own failings, such our readiness to act the part of extractors of motes from the eyes of others, without being conscious of the beams that are in our own; that, in the very act of pronouncing our censure on another's fault, we are sometimes guilty, and that in a more flagrant degree, of the very fault which we are censuring. In reproving bitterness and virulence, we show the gall of our own hearts: we reprobate self-sufficiency and pride, in the very spirit of proud self-sufficiency: we are dogmatical in exposing dogmatism: we laugh to scorn

the claims of infallibility, and we ourselves are never in the wrong: we swell with secret self-conceit, while we are admonishing others "not to think of themselves more highly than they ought to think:" we conceive our adversary sets himself too high; we bring him down; but we are so pleased with ourselves for the feat, that we mount the throne from which we have dislodged him, and look around, *ex cathedra*, for admiration and homage.

That ignorance should be exposed, that sophistry should be detected, that artful reasonings should be refuted, malicious misrepresentations placed in their true light, and lofty and imposing pretensions sunk to their proper level; all this is very right and very necessary. But should not the truth of the gospel be maintained in the spirit of the gospel? Should we not implore the grace of Christ, that we may show less of ourselves, and more of our Master? Shall we willingly incur his frown, to please the corrupt likings of our fellow creatures? Shall we sacrifice his gracious smile for the laugh of the world; and "court a grin, when we should woo a soul?" While we establish the *truth* of his doctrine, shall we give a false and mischievous exhibition of its *nature*, and of its *influence* on the heart? Shall we encourage our fellow Christians in thinking lightly of tempers which they ought to dread and to deprecate, in considering questions relative to the fundamental articles of divine truth, rather as party distinctions, than as affecting the glory of Christ and the salvation of sinners? And, with regard to the adversaries of the truth themselves, shall we allow ourselves to forget that *they* too have souls, immortal souls at stake, and, instead of keeping steadily in view, their spiritual and eternal profit, their conviction and conversion to God, instead of seeking to satisfy their judgments by a clear and argumentative manifestation of the truth, and to win them to the acknowledgment of it by affectionate persuasion, shall we bring upon ourselves the deep criminality of rather doing what is in our power to harden them in opposition, by rousing into jealous exercise all the feelings of eager hostility; making them parties with ourselves in a personal quarrel; and encouraging, what of all things we ought to discountenance, a combat for victory instead of a controversy for truth?

It is my earnest prayer that the Holy Spirit may enable me to "keep my heart with all diligence," while engaged in defending the truth of the important doctrines revealed by his inspiration; and preserve me from every expression that would either indicate an improper temper in my own breast, or excite such a temper in the breast of any one of my readers.

I should reckon it a waste of time, to repel, by any lengthened defence, the charges before alluded to, which Mr. Yates has, either directly or indirectly, brought against my manner of conducting the controversy. The light in which these charges will be viewed by the reader will, I am quite aware, correspond with the predisposition of his mind, and the side which he has taken (if he has taken any) on the question under discussion. I must be allowed, however, a few brief remarks.

In his introduction, Mr. Yates thus expresses himself. (Page 4.) "Mr. Wardlaw affirms solemnly, that his only object is TRUTH; and doubtless the defence of the Calvinistic doctrines, which he believes to be true, was his only object. But there is a wide difference between defending a particular system, previously assumed as true, and pursuing truth independently of system; a difference which will materially affect the manner in which a man states his own arguments, and views the arguments of others. Mr. Wardlaw's whole style and language in this controversy show, that he has never put his mind into that state of calm and impartial deliberation, which is necessary to collect and arrange the proofs on either side, and to judge in favour of which the evidence preponderates."

In this, and some other parts of his Reply, Mr. Yates seems to proceed on the modest supposition, that at the time of preparing my Discourses the subject was quite new to me; that I had only then entered on the investigation of the truth of those doctrines, which, for ten years before, I had been preaching to others as the doctrines of the word of God. If this be disavowed by him; if he be ready to admit, that the Discourses may be an exhibition not of the process of investigation by which the writer first arrived at his conviction of the truth which he defends, but of the grounds on which a long established conviction rested; then is he very inconsistent with himself. For in a subsequent

page (42) we find him saying, at the close of a passage similar in its nature to the former,—"But although *this* kind of indifference is absolutely necessary in the *investigation* of religious truth, yet, when the truth is once discovered, when the controversy is terminated, then let fervent enthusiasm apply the theory to practice; then let generous, unabated zeal employ the weapons of divine truth to subdue the powers of sin and darkness; then let the eloquent tongue express all the tender and kind emotions of the bleeding heart; then adopt the penetrating, all powerful rhetoric of Paul, 'I have told you before, and now tell you even weeping.'"

When Mr. Yates here speaks of "the *controversy being terminated*," he certainly cannot mean to condemn all preaching of the fervent and animating kind which he so eloquently describes, till such time as the said controversy shall be finally settled to the satisfaction of all parties, till either Unitarians on the one hand, or Trinitarians on the other, shall come to be universally convinced of their errors, and shall consequently cease their opposition. If this be his meaning, it is not easy to predict the time at which we shall be justified in proceeding to our practical application. Our zeal, I fear, must be repressed, our eloquence tongue-tacked, and our hearts kept in an ice house, for an indefinite, and, in all probability, a long period. He must mean, "when the truth is once discovered" *to our own personal satisfaction*, "when the controversy is terminated" *in our own minds*, in consequence of fair and deliberate investigation. And if *this* be his meaning, I have just endeavoured to do, to the best of my ability, the very thing, to which my adversary, with so much propriety, and emphasis, and eloquence of expression, has given his hearty sanction. Which of the two convictions, Mr. Yates' or mine, is founded on the most deliberate and impartial investigation, it must be left to the reader, from a comparison of our respective reasonings, to decide.

I could not read without a smile, Mr. Yates' smart remarks on my unfortunate points of admiration. From what he says of my "frequent use" of them, in their "single, double, and treble form," (! !! !!!) his reader, if he had not previously perused my Volume, would expect, on his looking into it, to find them "*christ-*

ling" in every page, "like quills upon the fretful porcupine:" as numerous, and obtrusively remarkable, as breaks and dashes in the pages of my uncle Toby. I shall leave it to the reader, if he choose to be at the trouble, to turn over 440 pages, and ascertain the number of times that the double and treble notes of admiration occur. Possibly he may find half a dozen of the former, and half as many of the latter. As to single points of admiration, I have always understood them to be intended for use, and the employment of them in writing to be as legitimate, as that of the inflexions and intonations of the voice in speaking. But with these, indeed, Mr. Yates seems as seriously offended as with the other. I can only assure him, that the "*tones of astonishment*," of which he complains, were as far as possible from being "*affected.*" The astonishment expressed in them was, *bona fide, felt.* There may, possibly, be some advantage in that unvarying monotony, which leaves our hearers at full liberty to guess, whether the state of our minds be satisfaction or disgust, indifference or surprise; yet, on the whole, I am disposed to think the ordinary rule preferable, that the looks and tones of the speaker should correspond with his predominant feelings. And I cannot well account for Mr. Yates' having felt so *sore* under these "tones of astonishment," and prickly "bristles of admiration," (a misnomer indeed on the present occasion, as it was any thing but *admiration* they were intended to indicate,) on any other supposition, than that of a secret consciousness of there being in truth some little cause for the wonder which they were intended to express.

There are two other species of "*management* and *generalship*" and "*manœuvring*" such as "a votary of truth would scorn," which are laid to my charge in Mr. Yates' introduction. The first is my "making the best use" of the "*very few proofs*" which I had to adduce, "bringing them forward different times, dwelling upon them at great length, turning them about, and showing them in the most pleasing variety of lights;" and my professing to bring forward a *specimen*, and to proceed on the principle of selection, when I have nearly or entirely exhausted my store. That I endeavoured to make the best use of the proofs which I did adduce, I need not surely hesitate to admit. I should

have been a recreant to my cause had I failed to do so: but whether it has been done in the manner described by Mr. Yates, I must leave it to the candid reader of my Discourses to judge. The falsity of the latter part of the above charge is well enough known to every one who knows any thing at all of the subject; and I trust it will be sufficiently apparent to all my readers, before I have done with these remarks, that the stock of proofs is not quite exhausted, and that even Mr. Yates has unwittingly supplied a little to it himself.

The second *manœuvre* is thus described. (P. 5.) "Instead of presenting a fair and full view of the Unitarian system in its leading principles, and general aspects, he makes it his object to bring into notice every thing absurd or dangerous that was ever written by a Unitarian." This is a serious charge: and I distinctly deny its truth. We shall afterwards see the extensive sense in which Mr. Yates is pleased to use the appellation *Unitarians*. I was writing, however, against *Socinians*. In exposing what I deemed their errors, I took my extracts not from the writings of any contemptible scribblers, but from those of the "chief men of their synagogue." For where shall those, who are not themselves initiated, discover the distinguishing sentiments of the party, if not by reference to such men as Lardner and Priestley, and Lindsay and Belsham, and the Editors of the Improved Version of the New Testament? I know not what those "*minor topics*" may be to which Mr. Yates refers as opposed to the "few great principles" of Unitarianism; or what he means by "sentiments of individual Authors," to which "the great body would refuse their sanction." Particular sentiments of individuals, I may have occasionally introduced, to exemplify the tendency of the general principles of their party. But, Mr. Yates himself being judge, wherever he has given any thing like an enumeration of them, I have directed my attack fully and fairly against these general principles themselves; and I challenge him to the proof of the "*low trick*" he is pleased to ascribe to me, the trick of a "*nibbling adversary*," who "gravely refutes the fancies, mistakes, or hasty conclusions of individual writers, instead of considering the broad principles espoused by the whole party."

But of this imputation Mr. Yates has brought forward one proof. Let us examine it a little. If all his evidence should be like it, the reply will not be difficult. "Indeed," says he, "through zeal to collect all the offensive matter to be found in Unitarian publications, he has in one instance, at least as the passage will be applied by his readers, violated fact." I beg particular attention to the qualifying clause here, "*at least as the passage will be applied by his readers.*" It seems to indicate, that the writer was not very sure of his ground: that he could hardly so apply the passage himself. No, indeed, he could not. Mr. Yates possesses common sense. And I am bold to say that no reader, not entirely destitute of this precious commodity, could possibly interpret the passage as he supposes all my readers certainly must. "After some very excellent remarks," continues Mr. Yates, "on the impropriety of indulging a presumptuous rashness in the pursuit of truth, he quotes a passage from the Appendix to the Life of Priestley, showing with what indifference this fearless temerity enables a man to contemplate the conclusion *that there is no God.* If he had turned to the title-page of the Volume, and page iv. of the preface, he would have seen that the Author, *whose words he has quoted without mentioning any name except that of Priestley*, was Mr. Thomas Cooper, President judge of the fourth district of Pennsylvania; and if he had made the inquiry which became him before producing this passage as an illustration of the spirit cherished by Unitarians, he would have learned, that Judge Cooper is not a Unitarian." By the clause which is printed in Italics, I understand Mr. Yates to mean (and he has been so understood by others) that, from my having mentioned no name except that of Dr. Priestley, the unwary reader might be led to associate the words quoted with *his* name, and to affix to *him* the stigma contained in the note. But this is truly surprising. As the note referred to is short, I shall quote it at length. "The following striking and affecting instance of the *sang froid* with which this spirit enables a man to suppose and to contemplate even the conclusion *that there is no God*, is taken from No. 4. of the Appendix to the Memoirs of Dr. Priestley, vol. i. p. 423. Speaking of the doctrine of *equivocal* or *spontaneous generation*, in certain species of plants and

animals, as maintained by Dr. Darwin and impugned by Dr. Priestley, the latter of whom considered it as a direct introduction to atheism, the writer says: 'I do not see the *certain* tendency of this opinion to atheism; for this property of spontaneous production may have been originally communicated under certain circumstances, as well as any of the other properties of organized or unorganized matter; and the one and the other may be equally necessary parts of the pre-established order of things. But if it do lead to Atheism, what then? There can be no crime in following truth wherever it leads; and I think we have sufficient reason to believe, that the result of truth must be more beneficial to mankind than error.' " Such, reader, is the note. Is there any obscurity in it? "*The writer says*," respecting a doctrine which was "*impugned by Dr. Priestley, as being a direct introduction to atheism*,"---"*I do not see the certain tendency of this opinion to atheism*:" that is, (is it not?) *I do not see that this sentiment and apprehension of Dr. Priestley are well founded.* Can this "*writer*," then, be Dr. Priestley himself? Mr. Yates, like others of his sect, is in general willing enough to pay insinuating compliments to the understandings of his readers. As to *my* readers, he seems to have forgotten, on the present occasion, that they had understanding at all. For surely that reader "must have a most uncommon skull," a skull over which Drs. Gall and Spurzheim would search in vain for the organs of penetration, who could for a moment suppose, that Dr. Priestley, whom the end of one sentence had represented as *impugning* a particular doctrine *on account of its direct tendency to atheism*, should be "*the writer*," who, in the beginning of the next, says, "*I do not perceive this tendency at all.*" I think I might almost venture here on a point of admiration. I can solemnly assure Mr. Yates that I *had* looked at the title-page, and absolutely knew, while I was writing, that the person whose sentiment I quoted was Judge Cooper of Pennsylvania. But really the possibility of such a mistake, as he supposes to be not only likely but almost certain, never once entered my mind, till he suggested it; nor do I believe in it yet. And, were Mr. Yates to assure me that he knew instances of its having occurred, my inference

would be, not want of clearness in the note, but want of clearness *somewhere else*. As for Judge Cooper not being a Unitarian, "whatsoever he was, it maketh no matter to me." I had no reference, while writing that note, either to Unitarianism or Trinitarianism, but simply to the tendency of that spirit of arrogant self-sufficiency, on which I had been commenting in the text. Of this the sentiment quoted in the note is, without controversy, what I have termed it, "a striking and affecting instance." The spirit of it is the spirit of infidelity: and whether Judge Cooper was a *Trinitarian* infidel, or a *Unitarian* infidel, or

"A smart free-thinker, all things in an hour,"

was a matter of little consequence in itself, and totally irrelative to the object of the note.

CHAPTER II.

Mr. Yates has accused me of *management* and *generalship*. I will not retort the charge. There is one thing, however, for which I have felt it difficult to account, consistently with that manly openness and decision which I should have expected of him; I mean *the impossibility of discovering from his book, what his own sentiments are*. What he *is not*, he leaves us at no loss to find out. He is *not a Trinitarian*. It may be alleged that this negative position necessarily implies the opposite positive, He *is a Unitarian*. True. But what, according to Mr. Yates, is a Unitarian? Still the only answer which his book furnishes to this question is, It is *not a Trinitarian*: for under the appellation *Unitarian* he includes all the varieties of sentiment from the highest Arianism to the lowest Socinianism; and if, between these two extreme points (inclusive) you ask me the question, What is Mr. Yates? I frankly answer, So far as his book informs me, I cannot tell. Now why is this? Is Mr. Yates prepared to say, that he does not think the Scriptures have at all de-

cided, whether Jesus was a superangelic Being, created before all worlds, the instrument of the creation of all other beings, an inferior God ; or a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary, fallible and peccable like other men ? Does he think this wide difference on so interesting a subject, of so little consequence as to render it not worth while for the Divine Being, in revealing his truth to his creatures, to be at all explicit about it ? If so, I think he entertains very unworthy thoughts of Divine revelation. If, again, he intended by this proceeding to straiten the bond of brotherhood between his Arian and Socinian friends, I fear, in that case, that his attempt to please every body will end in pleasing nobody ; and that most, if not all, both of Socinians and Arians, will be dissatisfied with what they will consider as a compromise of important truth. Or has his object been to afford himself more convenient scope in his argument ? Whether this was his design or not, it is not for me to say ; but every reader of his book must have perceived how frequently it has served this purpose. By allowing himself this extensive range, whenever he feels a text pinch him on the Socinian hypothesis of the mere manhood of Christ, he has recourse to the Arian view of his pre-existence and superangelic nature ; and if in either he can find any thing like an answer to the argument for his divinity, he is satisfied.

It is not on account of any increased difficulty given to the general argument by this mode of procedure, that I complain of it : for the Arian hypothesis is not more tenable, on scriptural ground, than the Socinian ; and every proof of the supreme divinity of Christ militates with the same force and conclusiveness against the one as against the other. I feel no more apprehension at encountering Mr. Yates in his Arian than in his Socinian armour. But when a man takes the field, he ought, I think, openly to appear what he really is. If Mr. Yates believes Jesus Christ to have been a *mere* man, why has he not said so ? If he believes him to have been a *superangelic creature existing before all worlds*, why has he not said so ? I am satisfied, indeed, that if the supreme divinity of the Saviour is denied, it is a matter of comparatively small consequence what rank

we assign to him in the scale of created existence. "The glorious gospel of the blessed God" is as effectually subverted, the solid basis of my hopes as a sinner as thoroughly undermined by the Arian hypothesis as by the Socinian; by the scheme of Clarke as by that of Priestley and Belsham. Between these two, however, viewed in relation to each other, there is surely a very wide difference; the former considering Jesus as a kind of subordinate Deity, possessed of every divine attribute, except self-existence and independence, and the proper object of a certain undefined but inferior species of worship; the latter pronouncing him a mere mortal man, in all respects like other men: the former admitting, in words at least, the doctrine of atonement; the latter proscribing and ridiculing every thing of the kind. Is Mr. Yates still "halting between these two opinions?" Probably not. But, for reasons unexplained in his work, and best known to himself,* he has judged it proper to leave these differences out of view. "Another principle," says he, (p. 8.) "which I have laid down for myself, is to vindicate those doctrines alone, in maintaining which all Unitarians are agreed, without entering into the discussion of those subordinate questions, concerning which they differ among themselves." "This method," adds he, "is not only *necessary* in a work which professes to be a Vindication of *Unitarianism*: but it has the advantage of greatly abridging the labour both for myself and for my readers." Now, although I think it would have been more consistent with manly openness, to have explicitly avowed *his own* views of the person of Christ, and defended them accordingly; yet I am perfectly willing that he should make a virtue of this supposed necessity, and that he should enjoy the advantage of

* Since writing this, I have perused a paper of Mr. Yates' in the Monthly Repository, sent me for that purpose by himself, in which he assigns his reasons for employing the designation Unitarian with so much latitude. I saw nothing in that paper that induced me to make any alteration on what I had previously written; because that which I complain of here, is, not his extensive application of this term, which is a matter in itself of no consequence, and which Mr. Yates and his friends may be left to adjust among themselves to their mutual satisfaction; but it is his keeping his readers throughout his book utterly in the dark as to *what description of Unitarian he himself is.*

"*abridged labour*," and along with it the additional convenience already alluded to, of more extensive scope for evasion, by springing to every point that may best answer his purpose, between the highest Arianism and the lowest Socinianism.

Mr. Yates and his friends are far from being agreed as to the extent of meaning which should be attached to the appellation by which they are pleased to distinguish themselves. But it is not worth while to contend about a name. It has often been observed, that those who arrogate to themselves the exclusive title of *Unitarians*, design to convey by it the tacit insinuation that Trinitarians deny the Divine Unity. Let us not trouble ourselves, however, about the designation they have assumed : but, while we reject the charge which it implies, and which, in spite of all our explicit disavowals, we may still expect to be pertinaciously persisted in, let us give them their favourite appellation, attaching to it the only sense which, in strict fairness, it should be considered as bearing ; not that *we* deny the *Divine Unity* (for as to this essential article of faith we are Unitarians as well as they) but that *they* deny the *Divine Trinity*.* *Antitrinitarians* is their correct designation ; but we call them Unitarians, on the same principle as (in a case of infinitely inferior importance indeed, but precisely similar in kind) we give the title of *Baptists* to those of our Christian brethren whose proper denomination is *Antipædobaptists*. We are Baptists as well as they ; but we frankly give them the name they have chosen to themselves, notwithstanding that on *their* part it conveys a reflection against the propriety of our own practice.

There is another advantage, indeed, which I had almost overlooked, derived by Mr. Yates, from his comprehensive acceptation of the term Unitarian. It enables him to enlarge considerably his list of worthies. That list the reader may find in page

* The following does credit to the candour of the writer : "*Unitarian* is not opposed to *Tritheist* or *Polytheist :* it does not denote a believer in one God, as contradistinguished from a believer in three Gods, or in more Gods than one. It is opposed to *Trinitarian ; Tri-uni-tarian* only, and signifies a believer in, and a worshipper of, one God in one person, as contradistinguished from a believer in, and a worshipper of, one God in three persons." From "Plea for Unitarian dissenters," as quoted in the Monthly Repository for August, 1815. p. 480

180 of the "Vindication." Although Mr. Yates professes that he "presents this list of illustrious and venerated names, not for the sake of an empty boast, nor to decide the question in dispute by great human authorities, but simply to counteract the false impression which Mr. Wardlaw's treatment of Unitarian divines is adapted to produce;" yet it cannot fail to strike the considerate reader, what an anxiety there is to swell the list, not only by including Sabellians, Arians, Semiarians, and Socinians in all their variety of degrees, but by pressing into the service every one, in whose writings any thing is to be found that could attach to them the slightest suspicion of their verging towards a doubt of the ordinary doctrine of the Trinity. It is generally understood that the sentiments of the excellent and venerable Dr. Isaac Watts tended in his latter years towards Sabellianism: but how would he have been horrified to have seen his name enrolled with the names of those who degrade to the rank of a mere fellow mortal that blessed Redeemer, who was the object of his constant adoration, and who utterly deny that atonement on which all his hopes for eternity were founded, as well as the very existence of that Holy Spirit, to whose "quickening powers" he owed his spiritual life, and whose sacred and melting influences purified and warmed his heart, and tuned his harp to praise. Who, that was not bent on giving his system popularity and eclat, would ever have thought of classing together in the same theological list, the names of Dr. Isaac Watts, and Dr. Joseph Priestley? If ever there existed two men, antipodes in religious sentiment and religious feeling, these are the two. Dr. Watts's prayer on the subject of the Trinity is usually referred to by Unitarians, in support of the propriety of their classification of his name. That prayer is a most impressive and interesting one. It shows us a mind, a great mind, labouring with the vast importance of the subject about which it is engaged, humbly distrustful of its own faculties, feelingly alive to the danger of self-deception, tremblingly apprehensive of the smallest error, breathing desires intensely earnest after the discovery of truth, and glowing with a pure and fervent devotion kindled by a live coal from the altar of God. I

apprehend, if the spirit, by which this remarkable effusion of a pious soul is characterized, were more universally prevalent, we should have still fewer of the followers of Priestley than even the few he has unhappily found. The heart by which it was dictated had not a constitution for "the frigid zone of Christianity."*

Although the theological sentiments of Dr. Whitby were certainly in some points very different from those of Dr. Watts, yet the whole tenor of his works justifies us in questioning his *right* (in the *Irish* sense of the term---See Miss Edgeworth) to the place assigned him in the Unitarian brotherhood: if a brotherhood that may be called, of which the members are so strangely heterogeneous in their sentiments; some of them with hardly a feature that bears the slightest mark of family likeness; and some who, were they to rise from the dead, and chance to see Mr. Yates' list, would disown the relation with a frown of indignant astonishment, or with a sigh of heart-breaking grief, that any thing whatever should have been said or written by them, capable of being so perverted as to bring their names into such a catalogue.

I feel no particular anxiety to define the precise boundaries of agreement and difference between the various writers enumerated as the friends of Unitarianism. There are others of them, I am very sure, besides the two mentioned, that would not have been much better pleased than they with the classification. It is not, however, a very honourable means of giving authority and weight to a cause, to muster a host of imposing names. And this is done with a peculiarly bad grace by those who set themselves forward as of all men the warmest advocates of unshackled inquiry and liberty of thought, the sworn foes of prejudice, and of all subjection to human dictation. Mr. Yates is well aware, what a mighty army of "illustrious and venerated names" could be set in array on the opposite side, and that without pressing into the ranks any that belong to the camp of the enemy.

* The prayer may be found among "Fragments of Time," at the end of Vol. IX. of the last edition of the Doctor's Works. But see Note A, at the end of this Treatise.

It is vain to say, that such names are not enumerated with the intention of giving weight to the sentiments which they supported. The thing cannot be done without such intention. That Mr. Yates felt a secret conscious elation of mind in the list he had made out, an inward self-gratulation in mentally appending his own name to so honourable a roll, and a desire to give a certain dignity and respectability to the cause he was defending, his manner of expressing himself will not allow me to doubt. Now, I am far from wishing to detract from the merits of Unitarian writers. Let all of them have their due proportion of credit, for their attainments in various erudition, and for the services which they may have rendered to Christianity by their able defences of its general truth, on the ground of external evidence : and let it be frankly admitted, that the credit of some of them will, in both respects, stand eminently high. But, notwithstanding the indignant disdain which the observation formerly excited in the breast of Mr. Yates, I must repeat it, as an important truth, that a writer may most ably and successfully illustrate and establish the external evidences of Christianity, and yet entertain notions grossly and fundamentally erroneous of what Christianity is. Nay, the service which he renders in its general defence may sometimes be more than counterbalanced by the mischief which his efforts on the other hand produce, or tend to produce, in undermining the truth taught by the inspired apostles, depriving the religion of Christ of all its most essential peculiarities, robbing it of whatever entitles it to the name of Gospel, or good news to a guilty and perishing world.

" Whether the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures," says Mr. Yates, " be a doctrine of the Christian religion, is one of those questions, upon which Unitarians are divided in opinion. It would therefore be inconsistent with my present design to enter into the discussion. But it is totally foreign from the inquiry concerning the Trinity of persons in the Godhead, and the Divinity and atonement of Christ. When Unitarians endeavour to show, that the Scriptures do not contain these doctrines, they always suppose their Divine authority." (Page 19.)

They " *always suppose their Divine authority.*" For a few in-

stances of the manner in which the Divine authority of the Scriptures is "*supposed*" by the writers in question, the reader is referred to my sixth discourse, "on the test of truth in matters of religion." With these instances, however, Mr. Yates is not well pleased. They are, he alleges, a very partial selection. Yet Mr. Yates knew well enough, that the selection is taken from that particular description of writers, against whose tenets my Discourses were chiefly and avowedly directed. These were not the *Arians*, but the *Socinians*. And truly the laxity of *their* views respecting the plenary inspiration and universal authority of the Scriptures, is a matter of such flagrant and lamentable notoriety, that I feel no anxiety to defend myself on this head, against the charge of misrepresentation, to any who are at all acquainted with their writings. It is against the spirit and views of the more *modern* Socinians that it is especially needful to warn the public. If the sentiments of the ancient men of the sect were not so loose and licentious, on the subject in question, as those of its more modern leaders, this only shows, that Socinianism has been going on, agreeably to its natural tendency, from bad to worse, and increases the necessity for putting the unwary on their guard. In bringing forward his evidence of the regard paid to the Scriptures by Unitarians, Mr. Yates produces nothing from those moderns whose works supplied the examples of the contrary, which have been the occasion of awakening his jealousy on this point. He does not attempt *their* vindication from the charge brought against them; but only denies that it is justly made against the Unitarians as a body; and complains of my partiality, in referring to two or three individuals, and omitting to mention others whose sentiments and language were different. What, then, are the notable instances produced by Mr. Yates of the sacred veneration of Unitarians for the Holy Scriptures?

"'The Bible, the Bible, the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants,' that great maxim which Protestants have so often repeated with a noble indignation in reply to the pretensions of the church of Rome, is found in the writings of the ingenuous and high-minded Chillingworth, who having, in the ear-

ly part of his life, wavered, with a modest caution, between different religious sentiments, at length settled in the doctrines of Socinianism."

It is not worth while to inquire, at what time of his life, whether before or after he had "settled in the doctrines of Socinianism," Chillingworth wrote this famous sentence. For in truth, excellent as it is, when considered as directed against the pretensions of the church of Rome, it is nothing to the purpose for which Mr. Yates adduces it. It is a sentiment to which Dr. Priestley or Mr. Belsham, with all their low estimate of the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, would have put their signatures with as much readiness as Chillingworth himself, or any Protestant in the kingdom. For to what more, after all, does the sentence amount, than an explicit disavowal, in opposition to the Romish church, of the authority of its traditions, and the decrees of its Ecclesiastical councils? It expresses a sentiment, therefore, common to all *Protestants as such;* but it ascertains nothing as to the views of any class of Protestants by whom it may be adopted and used, respecting the plenary inspiration and universal authority of the Bible.

I have not at present the means of examining into the circumstances of the case referred to by Mr. Yates, of "some of the most learned Trinitarians, about one hundred and fifty years ago, having confessed that the doctrine of the Trinity was not founded on the Scriptures, but on the traditions of the Church." But first of all, of the fact, as thus stated, I avow myself incredulous. Secondly, If *any* Trinitarians made such a concession, they were fools for their pains, and traitors to their cause; and the Unitarians were clearly right, when they maintained, as a previous step to the establishment of their opinions, that "the Scriptures are the only infallible rule whereby to determine religious controversies," and when they declared their resolution to "prefer the infinite wisdom of God before the fallible dictates of human or angelic reason." Thirdly, This is only, after all, an appeal to Scripture in opposition to *tradition*, and does not, in the least degree, any more than the preceding maxim of Chillingworth, secure the Scriptures themselves from licentious free-

doms in the application of these principles to practice ; such freedoms as those which form " the broadest, foulest blot" in the theological and critical reputation of so many modern writers of the same school. In finding the answer to the question, " Hath the Scripture, that is, hath God said it ?" there is still ample room left for the discovery of interpolations and false readings, and for all the ingenuity of misinterpretation and evasion. The language, however, as used by Socinians, is certainly a curious and somewhat interesting relic. Reason does not appear here in so presumptuous an attitude and office as have since been assigned to her, enthroned as she has been as supreme and final arbitress of the dictates of Infinite Wisdom, to receive, reject, or question, as seemeth good in her sight. The expressions have certainly more of the general cast of Trinitarianism. But let us recollect, " *'Tis a hundred and fifty years since.*"

With regard to the beautiful and impressive saying of Locke, respecting the Holy Scripture, as having GOD FOR ITS AUTHOR ; SALVATION FOR ITS END ; and TRUTH WITHOUT ANY MIXTURE OF ERROR FOR ITS MATTER ;" far be it from me to detract from its real excellence. Let the sentiment of this great philosopher of the human understanding have its full impression on the mind of every reader. But was Mr. Locke a Socinian ? That he teaches doctrines inconsistent with " the gospel of the GRACE of God," as delivered in its simplicity by the inspired apostles, I am deeply concerned at being obliged to think. But of his Socinianism the proof remains to be produced. It may be deemed arrogant and presumptuous, to speak in these terms of a man so eminent as Locke. But, admitting the claim made in his behalf to a high rank among men of genius and exalted powers, this does not oblige me even to approve all his philosophy ; and far less does it bind me to receive his theology. I cannot forget him who said, " I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes : even so Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

Mr. Yates next pays his tribute of respect, on account of their exemplary regard to the Scriptures, to Dr. Jebb, the

Duke of Grafton, the Editors of the Improved Version of the New Testament, and Dr. John Taylor ; whom, for the present, I shall leave to the judgment of the reader ; and then closes the chapter with a defence and eulogy of " the honoured, injured name of Dr. Priestley."

From the place in which this defence and eulogy are introduced, it was naturally to be expected, that the sacredness of the Doctor's regard to the volume of Divine truth should have been the principal topic of his panegyrist's praise, and his vindication from every charge of the contrary, the chief object of his zealous defender ; that he should have appeared in Mr. Yates' *απολογια* as a decided asserter of its inspiration, and of the decisiveness of its authority above all the " fallible dictates of human or angelic reason ;" sitting at the feet of Jesus, with the humble, docile spirit of a little child ; subjecting his understanding, without gainsaying, to the instruction of heaven ; acknowledging the scripture writers as " holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit," and as therefore, on every rational principle, entitled to the entire deference of their readers. But no. Nothing like this is at all attempted. He is eulogized where I had never blamed him ; defended where I had never attacked him ; and left exposed in the only point in which any fault had been found with him. Never surely was defence, in this respect, worse conducted, and never was eulogy more gratuitous and uncalled for. Dr. Priestley was amiable in his character, gentle in his manners, cheerful, kind, and instructive in his conversation. I have not denied him any of these excellencies. Neither have I questioned the eminence and versatility of his talents, the extent and variety of his acquirements, the " wonderful activity and energy of his mind, his open frankness and simplicity in the expression of his thoughts," nor the unwearied perseverance of his investigations. I have neither " depreciated his attainments," nor " ridiculed his talents," nor " vilified his morals." According to Mr. Yates, however, I have " treated him throughout my volume with marked disrespect, and in one passage animadverted on him '*in the severest terms of reprehension.*' " (P. 25.)

The Italics contain my own phrase. It belonged to Mr. Yates to show that such terms of reprehension were undeserved and misapplied, in the particular case in which I conceived they would have been justified. That the reader may judge of this for himself, I have only to refer him to the passages in my Discourses alluded to by Mr. Yates. When he has read the extracts from Dr. Priestley, which are there adduced, he will, I apprehend, see sufficient reason to agree with me in thinking, as I still do, that the writer of them would have been more consistent, had he avowed himself a Deist; and that, so far as respects the authority of revelation (the only authority by which the points in question can be decided), "there is nothing to bind his conscience, nothing to convince his judgment; and that, having no common ground on which it is at all possible to determine the controversy, we must consequently, and of necessity, have done with him." Mr. Yates, in a quotation which he introduces from Dr. Parr, grants it to be right, that Dr. Priestley should be "confuted where he is mistaken; exposed where he is superficial; repressed where he is dogmatical; and rebuked where he is censorious." Have I, in any thing that I have said, exceeded this license? I am conscious to myself that I have "set down naught in malice," and, in matters of such infinite importance, I do not wish "in aught to extenuate." If Mr. Yates reckons those of Dr. Priestley's views which I have endeavoured to expose, amongst the "trivial errors of sentiment or expression which may be selected from his hundred publications," and "in petulant attacks upon which they, who have not sufficient vigour of intellect to comprehend what is truly important in his doctrines, exhaust their strength," I have only to say, that in my opinion he estimates them, I had almost said infinitely, too lightly. I am bold enough to think---(most frankly and strongly admitting the Doctor's vast superiority in talents, and in variety and extent of attainments,) yet---I am bold enough to think, that on *such* points, even "*a chattering jay*" (to use Mr. Yates' polite comparison) is a sufficient match for this "bird of Jove," with all the terrors of his beak, and talons, and forked thunderbolt: or, to change the allusion; that against this Goliath of

the Socinian host, the sling and the stone, seconded by Him who was David's help, are weapons of sufficient power, even although "*the staff of his spear be like a weaver's beam ;*" and although too, as on the present occasion, "*one bearing a shield goes before him.*"

CHAPTER III.

As I have no wish to lengthen out this Reply, either by enlarging on ground on which my adversary and myself are agreed, or by seizing, with hypercritical captiousness, on every minute point of difference, and every thing that is not expressed in the *ipsissima verba* which I might myself have chosen, I shall make no remarks on the *general principles* laid down in Mr. Yates' third chapter, "on the proper method of ascertaining the sense of Scripture." So far as relates to the simple statement of principles and rules, his observations on the three points treated of in the chapter—"the correctness of the Greek text; the mode of translating it into English ; and the mode of interpreting that translation ;" are such as cannot be found fault with, but ought to be impressed on the minds of all especially who are desirous of discharging their duty with fidelity as interpreters of the word of God to others. To the entire contents of the chapter, however, I cannot give my unqualified approbation.

In the course of it Mr. Yates bestows a well-merited tribute of applause on Professor Griesbach, and his edition of the Greek New Testament. Every scholar, although he may not adopt all the results of this eminent critic's learned and laborious researches, will yet most heartily unite in grateful commendation ; as well as in the compliment paid by Mr. Yates, in a previous chapter, to the Duke of Grafton, for his exemplary munificence, in defraying the expenses necessary to render the labours of the critic accessible to the religious public. The correctness of the

general principles of that particular classification of manuscripts which Griesbach has employed as the ground-work of all his critical emendations of the received Text, has, indeed, lately been called into question, by a competitor of no contemptible name in similar researches ;* and so far as I am able to judge, not without grounds that are more than plausible. Dr. Laurence illustrates the difference between Griesbach's principle of classification and his own, by an application of both to the disputed text in 1 Tim. iii. 16 ; where his own produces a conclusion precisely the reverse of that which had been yielded by Griesbach's. It were the height of unpardonable presumption in me to intrude into a field of discussion, in which men so eminent in Biblical learning differ in their decisions, and which I have neither ability nor opportunity to explore. It is not in the least degree necessary to my argument, that the authority of Griesbach should be shaken. Without expressing any *conviction* that he was right in the conclusion to which he had come with regard to the principal disputed texts on the subject of our Lord's Divinity, I formerly proceeded on the *supposition* of his being so ; for the sake of showing that these texts were not at all indispensable to the solid foundation of the orthodox faith. I wish still to occupy the same ground. Before proceeding, however, to notice Mr. Yates' strictures both on my *spirit* and *accuracy* respecting these texts, I must beg the reader's particular attention, to the effect produced on the mind of Griesbach himself, by those alterations which he felt himself constrained in conscience to adopt, by those canons of criticism, according to which his inquiries were directed, and his decisions formed. Considering the deservedly high opinion which Mr. Yates expresses of the judgment and candour of this eminent critic, the following most explicit and solemn declaration will surely be weighed by him with becoming seriousness. " Interim uni tamen dogmati, eique palmario, doctrinæ scilicet de vera Jesu Christi divinitate, nonnihil a me detractum esse videri posset

* Dr. Richard Laurence in a Tract entitled " Remarks on the Systematical Classification of Manuscripts adopted by Griesbach in his Edition of the Greek Testament."

nonnullis qui non solum locum illum celebratissimum 1 Joh. v. 7. e textu ejectum, verum etiam lectionem vulgarem loci 1 Tim. iii. 16. (ut et Act. xx. 28.) dubitationi subjectam et lectorum arbitrio permissam, invenient. Quare, ut iniquas suspiciones omnes, quantum in me est, amoliar, et hominibus malevolis calumniandi ansam præripiam, primum *publice profiteor atque Deum testor*, neutiquam me de veritate istius dogmatis dubitare. Atque sunt profecto *tam multa et luculenta argumenta et scripturæ loca*, quibus vera deitas Christi vindicatur, ut ego quidem intelligere vix possem, quomodo, concessa scripturæ sacræ divina auctoritate, et admissis justis interpretandi regulis, dogma hoc in dubium a quoquam vocari possit."* " Meantime it may appear to some persons that I have not a little impaired the evidence of one doctrine, and one too of prime excellence, the doctrine I mean of the proper divinity of Jesus Christ, when they find not only the celebrated passage, 1 John v. 7. thrown out of the text, but also the received reading of 1 Tim. iii. 16. (as well as of Acts xx. 28.) brought into doubt, and left to the judgment of the reader. Wherefore, that, as far as possible, I may remove all unfair surmises, and deprive ill-disposed men of every handle for calumny, I first of all publicly declare, and take God to witness, that I entertain no doubt whatever respecting the truth of that doctrine. And indeed the arguments and passages of Scripture by which the proper deity of Christ is established, are so numerous and so clear, that I am truly at a loss to conceive, how any person, granting the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, and adopting just rules of interpretation, can call this doctrine into question."

Such, then, was the value at which these reductions of evidence were appreciated in the mind of this critic himself, who was not indeed, by any means, the first to question the genuineness of the passages referred to in the above quotation, but to whose authority in setting them aside so much deference has been paid by the literary world in general, and especially, as might have been expected, by those of the Unitarian school. I feel

* Quarrel in Laurence's Remarks on Griesbach's Systematical Classification of Manuscripts, pages 3, 4.

highly gratified, in having it thus in my power to confirm the ground on which I proceeded in all my former reasonings, by a declaration from such a quarter, so full, so solemn, and so decided.

In speaking of the perpetual appeal of Unitarians to the authority of Griesbach, by which ignorant readers might naturally be led to conceive that Griesbach's New Testament was something entirely different from the one they were accustomed to use, I particularly stated, with a view to prevent any such mistaken conception, that there were only three texts relative to the great question of our blessed Lord's divinity which Griesbach had set aside; viz. 1 John v. 7. *as an interpolation*, and 1 Tim. iii. 16. and Acts xx. 28. *as erroneous readings;* and that, as I had declined insisting on these texts, to show that I did not consider my cause as at all requiring their aid, there was *not one* of all the passages which I *had* adduced that was "*in the slightest degree touched by this high and vaunted authority.*"

Mr. Yates objects both to the *spirit* and the *accuracy* of this passage. In the previous part of the sentence, I had admitted the text of Griesbach to be "on all hands acknowledged the most perfect." But the acknowledgment, says my opponent, is accompanied "with an angry sneer, which shows that he ill endures to see the implicit deference paid to the decisions of Griesbach by competent judges of all parties, and will never forgive him, for having, in obstinate conformity to his stupid rules, thrown down three main pillars of the Trinitarian system." While I am perfectly confident, that no candid reader of my work will discover in it any such anxious concern about these disputed passages, any such deadly resentment at finding my judgment compelled to relinquish them (which, in truth, I am far from being ready, with regard to all of them at least, to do) as will justify the sarcastic severity of this remark; I must, at the same time, assure Mr. Yates, that he is entirely mistaken as to the *object* of what he is pleased to term my "*angry sneer.*" I am not going to assert the perfect purity of the feeling which dictated the expression under censure. But, instead of being directed towards Griesbach, the immediate objects of it were

Mr. Yates himself and his brethren ; and it chiefly consisted, I honestly confess, of *indignant disdain* of that provoking, yet pitiful disingenuousness, which is forever, in the ears of the uninformed, vaunting of the authority of Griesbach ; making its incessant appeal, in terms of unqualified generality, and in tones of triumphant confidence, to the text of Griesbach ; the text of Griesbach ; as if no one could reasonably pretend to know any thing of apostolic doctrine, unless he were familiar with Griesbach ; as if the whole texture of the New Testament, warp and woof, had, on this subject at least, been thoroughly changed by him ; as if " Scripture and Scripture's laws lay hid in night," till " God said, Let Griesbach be, and all was light." Nothing can be more ridiculous than this—Griesbach himself being judge : for they who, with irksome repetition, appeal to his authority, are perfectly aware of the fact, as above stated, that only three, of all the texts in the New Testament usually quoted in support of the proper divinity of Christ, " are at all touched by this high and vaunted authority :" and that of these three there is only *one* which he appears to have felt *entire confidence* in setting aside.

But no, says Mr. Yates, this is not true. Besides censuring the *spirit* of my " angry sneer," he " has some fault to find with my *accuracy*." There is another text, which I have several times quoted, in different branches of my argument, which *is* touched by the authority of the eminent critic in question. I frankly admit the inadvertency. I had indeed overlooked the emendation of the passage in question ; and cheerfully submit to such measure of censure as the reader may think due for this sin of omission. But let us examine a little the passage itself. It is Rev. i. 8. " I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty." " But," says Mr. Yates, " the verse, as corrected by Griesbach, reads thus : I am Alpha and Omega, saith *the Lord God*, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty." " The emendation," he adds, " is of considerable importance, because it determines completely the reference of the passage to God, and not to Jesus Christ." (Page 36.)

On this statement let the reader observe, 1*st*. In one of the instances in which it is quoted in my Discourses, I have remarked respecting it, " Although I am fully satisfied that these are the words of Jesus Christ, yet, if any shall insist that they are spoken by the Father, the argument, it may be observed, will not, by the admission of this, be at all weakened. For, since the refusal to acknowledge them as the words of Christ proceeds upon the principle that the titles assumed in them belong exclusively to the only true God, this gives the greater conclusiveness to other passages, in which it is beyond a doubt that Christ does appropriate some of these titles to himself. In the 17th and 18th verses of the same chapter, he is introduced as saying to the beloved disciple : ' Fear not : I am the first and the last, and the living one ; and I was dead ; and behold I am alive for evermore ; and have the keys of hell and of death.' And at the 13th verse of the 22d chapter : ' I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last.' " (Discourses, p. 85.) 2*dly*, If from other passages, and from the tenor of Scripture in general, it be satisfactorily proved that Jesus Christ is truly Jehovah Elohim, *the Lord God*, and if the connexion in which the words in question stand, and the manner of the writer in other parts of the same book, naturally lead us to apply them to him, Mr. Yates speaks with an excess of confidence, when he affirms that Griesbach's emendation " *determines completely* the reference of the passage to God, and not to Jesus Christ." " The evidence that this verse is spoken by our Lord appears to us so strong, that, believing as we do that Christ is the Lord God, Jehovah Elohim, the single circumstance that this is a singular instance in the New Testament of calling him by the double appellation, while the simple appellations of which it is composed, are repeatedly given him, is not a sufficient reason for our abandoning this opinion ; and, retaining it, it follows of course, that the Griesbachian reading greatly strengthens the argument from this passage for the Divinity of Christ."* But 3*dly*, It will not, I presume, be deni-

* Strictures on Mr. Yates' Vindication of Unitarianism, &c. by John Brown, Minister of the Associate Congregation, Biggar.

ed by any Greek scholar, that the words under consideration, as amended by Griesbach, are, without the slightest degree of perversion or overstretching, susceptible of another rendering besides the one given by Mr. Yates. Λεγει Κυριος, is the most common phrase in the Septuagint for, "*saith the Lord.*" Taking it so in its present occurrence, the meaning of the verse will be: "I am Alpha and Omega, saith the Lord, *the God who is, and who was, and who is to come* (that is, the eternal, self-existent God,) the Almighty."*

Another instance of inaccuracy is, my having said, that to no one of the three passages before alluded to had I referred in proof of the doctrine which it had been my object to establish; whereas the fact is, that I *had* quoted 1 Tim. iii. 16. "God was manifested in the flesh," amongst my specimens of the "current language of the New Testament," and that I twice use the phrase *incidentally*, once with inverted commas, and once without them. That in *two* instances I should have used this expression incidentally, not in the way of proof (for one of the instances is in the Discourse on atonement,) but simply as a convenient phrase, suited to express my idea, will not, I apprehend, appear to the reader a very astonishing circumstance. And as to the quotation of the text among the specimens of the current language of the New Testament, the fact, to be sure, is as stated, and it is very simply accounted for. In Note C. at the end of my Discourses, the following statement is made: "When this discourse was delivered, 1 Tim. iii. 16. was introduced in this place, and the following remarks made upon it:" then, having given the remarks, "I was induced to omit this passage in the printed discourse, not by a decided conviction that these remarks were destitute of force; but because I was desirous of having it to say, that I had built no part of my argument on any passage which eminent critics had pronounced of doubtful authority." When this text, with the discussion of it, was left out of the discourse where it had been formally introduced, it ought at the same time to have been expunged from the

* Εγω ειμι το Α και το Ω, λεγει κυριος, ὁ Θεος ὁ ὢν, και ὁ ην, και ὁ ερχομενος, ὁ παντοκρατωρ.

list of passages adduced as proving the current language of the New Testament, *in a former discourse*. This, in the progress of the volume through the press, was, by an unlucky oversight, omitted. This omission is "the head and front of my offending;" and I am concerned that the printing of the second edition had proceeded too far before it was perceived, to admit of the erazure in it.

There are cases, in which we find it impossible to avoid understanding language according to the known sentiments and practice of those by whom it is used. A rule of interpretation, consequently, may in itself be quite unexceptionable, and may yet be expressed in terms so general and unqualified (perhaps unavoidably so), as to be capable of the most licentious latitude of application. Thus, among the directions laid down by Mr. Yates to be followed in fixing the true sense of a passage of Scripture, who can deny that "*in numberless instances the words of Scripture are to be understood figuratively?*" and consequently, that "*where we meet with a passage which, if literally explained, would be a manifest violation of common sense, or directly contradict what is asserted in other parts of the Bible, we must conclude that the words are not to be taken in their primary acceptation.*" But there is a wide difference between approving the rule, and approving the Unitarian application of it. Who, that knows any thing of the latter, can fail to be jealous of the phrases "*figurative language*" and "*common sense*" when used by a Unitarian? Every one that is at all acquainted with this controversy must be well aware, what a Unitarian has in mind, when he speaks of "*violations of common sense.*" And as to "*figurative language,*" it is one of the chief of those "besoms of destruction" with which they vainly attempt to "sweep away" the foundations of our hope. They resolve into *figure* the most important dictates of the sacred volume: and with all their boasted attachment to "*common sense*" theology, they impute figures to the sacred writers, which, inspiration out of the question, no man possessing common sense would ever have used. The rule, therefore, is, in itself, one of essential utility; but the Unitarian application of it to practice, is licentious and

mischievous in the extreme. " The law is good, if a man use it lawfully."

I am precluded the use of points of admiration; but the intelligent reader, I should fancy, will be disposed to supply a triad of them, when he finds Mr. Yates censuring Trinitarians for their non adherence to those "*severe and unaccommodating rules*" of interpretation which he has laid down. This from a Unitarian! Mr. Yates must excuse me; but I really could not read the charge without a smile. The unaccommodating severity of himself and his brethren, in their adherence to the legitimate rules of criticism and interpretation, forcibly reminds me of a saying of Dr. Samuel Johnson, to some person who was contending for a degree of latitudinarianism in ecclesiastical polity, to which he was an avowed enemy; " Sir, you are a *bigot to laxness*."

But what is the particular deviation from adherence to rule with which Trinitarians are charged? " Instead of having recourse to these severe and unaccommodating rules," says Mr. Yates, " it is very common with Trinitarians to adopt, without further inquiry, any explanations which excite their feelings, and please their fancy." The accusation is sufficiently severe; and I am myself specially included in the indictment. " To this convenient and captivating, but licentious and unprincipled, method of interpretation, Mr. Wardlaw has in many instances given the sanction of his example, not considering, that the meaning which appears to him grand, and interesting, and even obvious, may thus strike his mind only because it falls in with his preconceived opinions." (Page 40.) If the reader will do me the favour to look again (if he has looked before) into my second Discourse, from page 45 to 55, he will find a specimen of that sort of interpretation which Mr. Yates here so heavily censures. Others possibly he may recollect. When he has looked at the passage referred to, I must leave it to himself to judge between us, whether I have there made my appeal to the *fancy*, and not to the *understanding*; whether my inferences are those of a person, who is " seeking for something to rouse the feelings, and amuse the imagination, in proportion as it offends

the judgment." I cannot concede this point. My own heart, I trust, as well as the hearts of multitudes besides, has derived any spiritual warmth which it possesses (would that it possessed more!) from the blessed word of God; and not the word of God a factitious fire from the false fervour of a previously heated spirit. The hearts of the inspired penmen, kindled from the altar of Jehovah, dictated "thoughts that breathe," in "words that burn;" and are we to feel all fearful and apprehensive, lest we catch the flame, which the communication of these was intended—if any thing was intended by it at all—to excite in our bosoms? Mr. Yates will not deny, that if "the meaning which appears to me grand and interesting, and even obvious, may so strike my mind, only because it falls in with my preconceived opinions," it is possible, that his own preconceived opinions may occasion his being unawed by the grandeur, insensible to the interest, and blind to the obviousness, of that meaning. And, fully satisfied as I am, that the meanings which Mr. Yates and his friends are so anxious to explode, are the source of the purest, the happiest, the most elevated, and the most practical feelings of the renewed soul, even of all those feelings which are peculiarly *Christian*, I cannot but pity those, who immerse these passages of the divine word in the freezing mixture of a cold and heartless philosophy, or who play upon them the ether of a refined and spurious criticism, till they have cooled them down to the very zero of infidelity.

CHAPTER IV.

Mr. Yates' Chapter on Mysteries appears to me a very mysterious chapter: I mean, it is something *difficult to be accounted for*, that he should have written it. *In the first place*, it contains a good deal of matter that is equally irrelevant and common-place: 2*dly*, It is full of the confounding of things that differ, and of consequent sophistical reasonings: and, *lastly*, it annuls itself, by containing admissions of all that we want.

I shall endeavour to make good each of these positions.

1st. The chapter contains a good deal of matter that is equally irrelevant and common-place.

I refer here particularly to all that part of the chapter, in which Mr. Yates "explains the use of the term (mystery) in the New Testament:" of the whole of which it may well be said, "Who knoweth not such things as these?"

The word "*Mystery*," says Mr. Yates, is "there employed in a sense widely different from those given to it by modern Trinitarians." P. 53. Such language is apt to produce a very false impression on the reader's mind—as if modern Trinitarians, aware that the peculiar acceptation of the term *mystery*, in the New Testament, was unfavourable to their system, had been disposed to set it aside, and to affix to it, *as there used*, a more convenient sense. But this is not true. There is no dispute about the ordinary sense of the word μυστηριον, in the New Testament. The discussion of this point has not the slightest connexion with the argument; and, although I am far from saying that it has been introduced with that view, yet the only end it can answer, is, to dazzle and mislead the ignorant, by a useless show of learning. The thoughtless and unwary reader is led to conclude, that Mr. Yates' opponent has intentionally kept out of view the New Testament meaning of *Mystery;* that *this* meaning must surely be the only *right* one in a Scripture controversy;—and, consequently, that according to this meaning only, is it proper or incumbent to believe in mysteries. But this is entirely an illusion. There is no debate about the propriety, or the duty, of believing "things that were for a time unknown, but are now revealed." The question is about the belief of mysteries, in the *ordinary* sense of the term. It is in *this* sense that the word is used, when Unitarians object to the articles of the Trinitarian faith, on the ground of their mysteriousness. The controversy is not about *names*, but about *things*. Let the sense of *mystery* in the New Testament writings be what it may, will the particular use of the term there at all prove, that there actually is nothing in any of the doctrines revealed that is mysterious in the *common* acceptation of it? Is not the simple matter of inquiry, whether we

are called to believe *mysteries* in *this* sense of the word,—that is, to believe things that are "*difficult to be understood, or incomprehensible?*" If this be the simple state of the question, why perplex the minds of our readers, by a parade of common-place learning about uses of terms that are extraneous to the controversy? If I were to be told, that by something which I had said, Mr. Yates had been greatly *offended*,—I should be apt to understand the word *offended* in its common acceptation, as meaning that my opponent was greatly *displeased*. Suppose, then, that, instead of humbly considering whether there existed any just ground for his *displeasure*, I should entertain my informer with a critical disquisition on the meaning of the terms *offence* and *offend*, *in the New Testament*, and insist upon it that Mr. Yates was not, and could not be, *offended*, unless he had been *stumbled*, and *made to sin*; might I not justly be told, "This is drivelling: you know well enough that this is not the sense in which the word was used by me." I call by the same name all dissertations about terms, when we already *know well enough* their understood and established meaning *on the subject under discussion*. The meaning of terms cannot alter the nature of things.

It would be inconsistent with the spirit of these observations, to enter into any examination of what Mr. Yates has written on the New Testament use of the word *mystery*. I shall therefore dismiss this part of the chapter under review with one remark. "The mysteries of the Christian religion," he says, "are the secrets which were unknown to mankind until Jesus Christ came to reveal or discover them. But, being revealed, they are found to be plain and consistent truths, and contain *nothing* which is either *difficult to be understood*, or apparently absurd." (P. 54.) How will this be made to comport with the declaration of the inspired apostle Peter, respecting the writings of his fellow-apostle Paul, and the other Scriptures?—"Even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you: As also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things; in which * are some things *hard to be understood*,

* Rather, perhaps, "*among which*:" ἐν οἷς is the received reading, and the

which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, *as they do also the other Scriptures*, unto their own destruction."*

2dly. This chapter is full of the confounding of things which differ, and of consequent sophistical reasonings.

"We believe in revelation," says Mr. Yates, (P. 44.) "because the evidences which show it to be from God, far outweigh the objections which may be brought to evince its earthly origin. But supposing its doctrines to be irrational, this single circumstance would annul the whole body of evidence in its favour, and prove that it is not revelation." The truth of this, as a *hypothetical* proposition, (which the expression "*supposing* its doctrines to be irrational" implies it to be,) I am not disposed to question. The inquiry, however, immediately suggests itself, *How* are the doctrines of any pretended revelation to be *proved irrational?* It is very manifest, that the reason of any individual man can never be assumed as the standard of reason for mankind in general, and still less of reason in the abstract.—"The term *mystery* hath a *relative* sense, and implies a respect to that person's understanding to whom a thing is mysterious. It will appear from hence, that a doctrine is so far to any man *mysterious*, as he cannot, or does not, comprehend it. And if a mysterious doctrine be therefore false, these consequences will follow: That the knowledge of the most *ignorant* person is the standard of truth; that there can be no *real* difference in men's intellectual attainments; and no *real* progress made in knowledge. For if every mysterious doctrine be *false*, and if every doctrine not comprehended by the most *ignorant* person be *to him* mysterious; then every *such* doctrine is false. It follows, that *all* truth is by him comprehended, i. e. that *his* understanding is the measure of truth; that no one man can be *really* more knowing than another; and no man *really* more knowing at one time than another. So fruitful is one absurdity of many more."†

reading preferred by Griesbach, although αἷς is marked by him in the margin with a strong note of probability. If the received reading be retained, οἷς cannot agree with ἐπιστολαῖς, but with τουτων; in which case, it seems more natural to render ἐν, *among*.

* 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16.

† The Mysteries of the Christian Religion credible—a Sermon preached before

That, then, may be pronounced irrational by a Socinian, which may not appear so to a Trinitarian: who, in this case, is to decide? Could we ourselves construct a brain that should concentrate all the individual rationalities of the species, we might then possess an oracular standard of the reason of mankind. Yet, even if we had within the reach of our appeal this extracted essence of all human minds, there might still be articles of faith *above* its reach, although not *contrary* to its dictates: and, as an intellect so vast, would, we may presume, be proportionally humble, it would not reject the claims of a professed revelation from God, because in some points it might find its comprehension baffled.

"Accordingly," Mr. Yates adds, "those authors who have stated the evidence of the Christian faith have, in general, laid it down as an axiom, that even miracles cannot establish a doctrine which is in itself absurd, which is contrary to known facts, to the fundamental articles of natural religion, or to other doctrines of the same pretended revelation." An axiom is a self-evident proposition, requiring no proof, but perceived intuitively to be true. An axiom, the proposition now stated must be acknowledged to be. But it is in every respect a *merely hypothetical* axiom. First of all, it assumes our having previously ascertained and defined, what *is* "in itself absurd," what *are* "known facts," what *are* the "fundamental articles of natural religion," and what *are* "the other doctrines of the same pretended revelation." But more than this—It *supposes* a case which can never possibly be realized—I mean the case of *real miracles* (that is, "works such as no man can do, *except God be with him*,") of *such* miracles being wrought in confirmation of a doctrine of the description specified. But if there be any thing whatever of which we are warranted to affirm, that it is "*in itself absurd*," it seems to me to be this. I would rather state it as an axiom, that, *supposing the reality of the miracles clearly ascertained*, the doctrine attested by them *must be true*. Miracles are the seal of Heaven appended to the statements which

the University of Oxford, at St. Mary's, on Sunday. October 21st, 1722. By John Conybeare, M. A. &c.

they accompany : they are "*God bearing witness ;*" and He can bear witness to *nothing but truth*. If, therefore, on the other hand, falsehood, absurdity, and contradiction, were *made out* to be the qualities of any doctrine—to say that "miracles themselves would not prove it," is only to introduce the useless *supposition* of a greater falsehood, absurdity, and contradiction, than itself ; a supposition, of which all right notions of the moral character of God forbid the admission for a moment. The *proper* inference is, that *miracles cannot be wrought in its support ;* and that any which have been pretended to be wrought, have not been real, but only apparent. So that, if we are convinced that the Scriptures are a Divine revelation,—fully ascertained to be such by clear, and indisputable *miraculous evidence ;* even the above-supposed intellectual representative of our species, and standard of its rationality, would certainly pronounce it *unreasonable* not to bow, with implicit assent, to its plain and infallible decisions ; inasmuch as nothing which such a revelation contains *can be contrary* to *reason in general*, although it may be expected that some things in it should be *beyond the range of comprehension* embraced by the *reason of men*.

"Let it be remembered, then," says Mr. Yates, (the "*then*" refers to *my assent* to the important proposition which he is so anxious that his readers should keep in mind)—"Let it be remembered, then, that even the clearest declarations of the Scriptures would not authorize us to believe in *mysteries*, if mysteries be propositions which directly contradict first principles, known facts, or indisputable truths." (P. 46.) *Let* this be remembered, by all means. Let it be recorded as *an axiom*. *If* mysteries be such propositions—they should not be believed. This is tolerably clear. "It needs no seer to tell us that, Horatio ;" that we should not believe what is contrary to *known facts* and *indisputable truths*—i. e. that we should not believe *known falsehoods :* No, not even "*if*" they were asserted *in the Scriptures themselves*. This is another notable "*if*." It is perfectly true, however, that *if* this "*if*" were not a mere *if*, but a matter of fact, instead of the Scriptures warranting the reception of such mysteries, such mysteries would warrant the

rejection of the Scriptures. But "*let it be remembered*," that we know of no person who understands the word *mystery* in this sense—and that we do not believe the Bible to contain any mysteries of this sort.

"But besides being applied to doctrines which are understood and seen to be absurd, the term *mystery* is also used, to denote those which cannot be understood, and which, therefore, without the testimony of revelation, cannot possibly be proved to be either false or reasonable. In this sense the word appears to be employed by Mr. Wardlaw. He defines a mystery to be '*something that is either difficult to be understood, or entirely incomprehensible.*' I propose the following definition, as more exact, and also better accommodated to the general tenor of Mr. Wardlaw's reasoning and language: *A mystery is a proposition, to the terms of which no distinct ideas are annexed.*" (P. 45.)

That those doctrines which are denominated mysteries *by Trinitarians* "are understood and seen to be absurd" *by Unitarians*, we know: but who they are who apply the word *mysteries* to doctrines which are "understood and seen to be absurd" *by themselves*, we do *not* know. In the ear of a Unitarian *a mystery* and *an absurdity* may sound as synonymous. Most readers, however, will be able to discern a difference between them.

I should have been much obliged to Mr. Yates for his kind intention to make my definition and my reasoning more consistent with each other, and, by improving the former, to give greater force and conclusiveness to the latter: but "*timeo Danaos.*" I felt it difficult at first to understand, what my opponent could intend by his proposed alteration of the definition. It *seems* to transfer the mystery from the *subject* of the proposition, to the *terms* of it; and yet it depends on a very simple circumstance, whether *his* definition be not, after all, the very same with *mine*. The circumstance is, whether by "*the terms*" of the mysterious proposition, he means the terms *taken abstractly*, or the terms *as applied to the particular subject of the proposition*. If the latter be his meaning, his definition and mine are perfectly the same. For it is all one whether you say the mystery is in *the subject of the proposition*, or in *the terms considered*

with reference to that subject. From the illustrations which Mr. Yates presents of his meaning, it should seem that when he speaks of "affixing no distinct ideas to *the terms of the proposition*," he means the terms *taken abstractly.* "A man," says he, "may announce to me something *in an unknown tongue;* and, being assured of his general veracity, I may believe that he speaks the truth, and give my assent. Or a person may enunciate a proposition having a relation to the doctrine of porisms, the philosophy of Kant, or some other subject foreign to my studies; and knowing him to be well informed on the subject, I may be convinced that his assertion is true, without connecting any ideas with the terms employed." And again: "I may affirm, for example, in the hearing of a man ignorant of mathematics, that the ellipse is one of the conic sections. To these words he annexes no distinct conceptions. The proposition is to him a mystery." But the cases are not parallel. In the proposition "*God is one and three*,"—what is announced is neither *in an unknown tongue*, nor are the *terms themselves* at all *unintelligible*, or even *obscure.* The *mystery* is, beyond question, in the *subject;* or, which is the same thing, it is in the *terms, as applied to the subject.* In a word, if Mr. Yates means that the mystery lies in the *terms themselves* of the proposition, he means what is evidently *not true:* if he means, that the mystery lies in the terms, *as applied to the particular subject*, he makes a distinction without a difference; for this is perfectly the same with its lying *in the subject itself.* What is it which prevents our affixing distinct ideas to the *terms* of the proposition, but the mysterious nature of its *subject?*

Under the present particular, I must offer a few remarks on Mr. Yates' three observations relative to mysterious propositions.

"In the first place," he observes, "it appears scarcely possible, that a blind assent to an unintelligible proposition can be of any use in the regulation of the conduct, the amendment of the heart, or the alleviation of distress."

Does Mr. Yates mean by this to affirm, that we can derive no profit, and no comfort or satisfaction, from the assurance that

any thing *is*, unless we can distinctly comprehend *how it is?* Unless he means this, he means nothing to the purpose: and if he *does* mean this, he means what is, in innumerable instances, obviously false. I have no distinct conception of the *nature* or the *principle* of *gravitation*: yet the doctrine of gravitation is a very useful, and a very comfortable doctrine. The doctrine of the omnipresence of God involves in it difficulties which I am unable to explain: but am I to banish the sacred and salutary awe, and to renounce the peace, and confidence, and joy, which the faith of his omnipresence is fitted to inspire, because I cannot clearly comprehend *how* it is that the infinite Being is present, in the full possession and exercise of all his infinite attributes, in every part of space, in every successive moment of time?

Referring to my observations "on the unavoidable difficulty of conceiving the *manner* of the Divine existence," Mr. Yates says, that "whatever force is attributed to *them*, it must be allowed, that there is great force in the following remarks of one of the best Divines whose works enrich the English library. 'If,' observes Dr. James Foster, 'you say that you cannot account for the *manner* of God's creating the world, or for the *manner* in which he exists every where, of the general resurrection, and the like, I answer, IT IS NO PART OF YOUR RELIGION TO ACCOUNT FOR IT. WHERE THE MYSTERY BEGINS, RELIGION ENDS. Mysteries yield neither pleasure nor profit,'" &c.

Here we have a celebrated, and, among Unitarians, a favourite maxim, blazoned in all the emphasis of *capitals*: and when this *capital* maxim is taken *by itself*, it wears, no doubt, a very forbidding aspect towards every thing mysterious in religion. It *seems* to affirm, without qualification, that *religion* and *mystery* are incompatible. But taken *in its connexion*, and with Dr. Foster's own explanations, I am so far from being dissatisfied with it, that I am perfectly ready to adopt it, as a just expression of my own sentiments. "If you cannot account," says the Doctor, "for the *manner* of God's creating the world, or for the *manner* in which he exists every where, of the general resurrection, and the like, I answer, *It is no part of your relig-*

son to account for it." Perfectly right. But is it no part of the man's religion to *believe the facts*, that God created the world, that he exists every where, and that there is to be a general resurrection,—although of *creation out of nothing*, of *infinite presence*, and of the *identity of the resurrection body*, his ideas may be extremely indistinct, and perplexed with many difficulties? Where is it, in this case, that "MYSTERY BEGINS?" It is at the *mode* or *manner* of the facts. But this is precisely what is *not revealed*. To say, therefore, that "where mystery begins, religion ends," is neither more nor less than to say that "where WHAT IS NOT REVEALED begins, RELIGION ENDS:" a maxim, certainly, which no Trinitarian will feel any disposition to controvert. "We have no great objection," says Mr. Brown, "to apply the quotation to the Trinity, which Mr. Yates introduces with so absurdly exaggerated praise on its author, Dr. Foster. 'If you say, that you cannot account for the *manner of the existence of the one Divinity in Trinity*, I answer, *it is no part of your religion to account for it*. Where mystery (i. e. unrevealed mystery) begins, (which is equivalent to, where revelation ends) religion ends.'" *

"Mysteries," adds Dr. Foster, as quoted by Mr. Yates, "yield neither pleasure nor profit. For as with respect to the works of nature, all our pleasure arises from the *perception* of beauty, harmony, and usefulness; and however we may imagine innumerable secret beauties, which we have not discovered, yet, till they are *known*, they afford no real satisfaction, nor can we reap any advantage from them; 'tis just the same with respect to mysteries in religion; we can neither be delighted nor profited by them, because we do not understand them. The utmost that can be said is, that we are *confounded and puzzled*. And is there any pleasure in that, or any advantage merely *in being in the dark, and having no ideas?*"

Here there seems to be strange confusion. To take again Dr. Foster's own cases: Can we derive neither delight nor profit from the belief of God's having created the world, from the belief of the Divine omnipresence, or from the belief of the gen-

* Strictures, &c. page 24.

eral resurrection, without being able to comprehend the *manner* of these things? If these are matters in which the *fact* is believed, while the *manner* of it is not comprehended, are they not "*mysteries in religion*" in the very same sense, although not, perhaps, to the same degree, in which the *doctrine of the Trinity* is a "mystery in religion?" with respect to which, the case is perfectly alike, the *fact* being declared, while the *manner* of it remains an undiscovered and incomprehensible secret. In neither case does the pleasure or profit arise from "*being in the dark, and having no ideas,*" but from that which we *know*, and of which we *have* ideas; that is, from the *fact*, which *is revealed*, not from the *manner of it*, which is *not revealed.*

Mr. Yates' second general observation is, "that, if an incomprehensible proposition be inculcated in Scripture as an article of implicit faith, it must be delivered *in the very terms of the proposition.*"

Ah! here I seem to perceive something like a reason for my antagonist's desire to substitute a new definition of *mystery*, and to transfer the incomprehensibility from the *subject* of the proposition to its *terms.* If the *terms themselves* are *unintelligible*, Mr. Yates is clearly right; for in that case it would be impossible for us to substitute *other* terms, with any degree of certain assurance that we were enunciating the same doctrine. The man who knows not at all the meaning of the words *Ellipse*, *Conic*, and *Sections*, would in vain attempt to convey, in other terms than those in which it has been announced to himself, the proposition that "*An Ellipse is one of the Conic Sections:*" he must satisfy himself with repeating the *ipsissima verba.*

But in application to our subject of controversy, the observation seems to me unworthy of my opponent's good sense. The terms themselves here are *not* unintelligible. And although "reasoning" may be "out of the question," with any view to explain the *manner* of the existence of a Trinity in unity, reasoning (I mean "*reasoning from the Scriptures*") may be far from being out of the question, in proof of the *revealed facts*, that *God is one*, and yet that *the father is God*, that *the Son is God*, and that *the Holy Spirit is God.* Respecting the *manner*

in which Deity is at once *One* and *Three*, there is *no proposition whatever presented to us in the Bible, to be the object of our faith;* no proposition,—nothing which we are called to believe, *with regard to that in which the mystery properly lies.* But this leads me to

Mr. Yates' third observation, which is expressed in the form of a question: "We may ask respecting propositions, to the terms of which we annex no distinct conceptions, is it proper to give to such propositions the name of *Revelation?*"

I really expected Mr. Yates would have shown himself above having recourse to this trite and puerile objection. There never was a more complete instance of *playing with words.* How often must we be obliged to repeat, that all that we affirm to be *revealed* is the *fact;* and that the fact alone is, therefore, the object of our faith: that the plain answer to the question, so often put to us, How can a thing be *revealed*, and yet *mysterious?*—is, "the *truth* of the proposition is revealed; the *manner how* 'tis true, is not revealed." * "We think it evident," says Mr. Yates, "that subjects which we cannot understand or comprehend, *to us are not revealed.*" But are there no subjects (for the mystery after all, it seems, lies in the *subject*)—are there no subjects which we *do not comprehend* as to their *manner* or *modus*, while yet they are *perfectly well known* to us *as facts?* Mr. Yates is a believer, I presume, in the existence of *substance;* in the reality of *animal life;* in the law of *gravitation;* in *the connexion of body and mind.* But can Mr. Yates inform us what substance *is;* what the *principle* of animal life *is;* what the *nature of the power* of gravity *is;* or *how* body and mind are united?

It is affirmed by Mr. Yates (p. 51.) "Mr. Wardlaw intimates (page 19.) that if we make it a rule to understand the terms of a proposition before believing it, we must abandon some of the fundamental truths even of natural religion." And from this alleged sentiment of mine the most fearful results are conjured up to the apprehensions of the pious mind: the whole fabric of religion totters; its very foundations are in danger of giving way;

* Conybeare's Sermon on Mysteries, formerly quoted.

and a basis is laid for a system of universal scepticism. To *lay* these unreal phantoms, and calm the perturbed spirits of the reader, it may be enough to notice, that *I have said no such thing* as that which is here imputed to me. My words are: "If the mysterious nature of the doctrine in question be a sufficient reason for its rejection, then may this reason be, with safety, generalized, and reduced to a principle of universal application. The principle will be: *every thing that is mysterious and incomprehensible ought to be disbelieved.* Supposing, then, for a moment, the correctness of this principle, let us see what will become of some of the fundamental truths of natural religion." Such is the passage which Mr. Yates translates into—"*if we make it a rule to understand the terms of a proposition before believing it*, we must abandon some of the fundamental truths even of natural religion." But what is *in reality* said? that if we make it a rule, that before assenting to the truth of any proposition we must not merely understand *the terms in which it is expressed*, but comprehend clearly the *nature of the thing itself* which the proposition affirms; the rule will more than bring into doubt some of the fundamental truths of natural religion. The instance which I have adduced in illustration, is that of the *Divine omnipresence;* about which enough will come to be said in a future part of this work. I now refer it to the reader, whether the sentiment thus expressed gave any just occasion for Mr. Yates' entering his "*protest*," in terms of severe and sweeping censure, "against those *desolating pleas for religious mystery, which tend to sap the foundation of all human knowledge, and to introduce an irksome scepticism on every subject.*" (P. 51,) Nothing, indeed, can be more unfortunate than representing the sentiment in question as tending to scepticism. For it is the opposite sentiment that is the very principle and basis of scepticism; if it be proper to apply the term *basis* to a system of doubts. It is the sentiment that *nothing is to be believed that we do not fully comprehend;* it is *this* sentiment that leads to the scepticism which Mr. Yates so feelingly deprecates. It is this that unsettles the mind, and throws it loose from all sure belief and stable principle. There are so many things the nature of which is beyond the apprehension of

our limited faculties; so few, indeed, about which puzzling difficulties may not be started, that such a sentiment must necessarily leave us very little to believe. It is somewhat curious, that while Mr. Yates represents my views on the subject of mysteries in religion, as calculated to "introduce an irksome scepticism on every subject," I happen to have mentioned, in the very context of the passage which he quotes; or rather which he garbles and mistranslates; their tendency to *universal scepticism* as one of the evils of the sentiments which I was opposing. "Incalculable mischief has arisen from men's aspiring at knowledge beyond the reach of their own, or of any finite powers, and beyond the limits of the Divine declarations. Yet the attempt to comprehend the mode in which the Divine unity subsists in three persons, is certainly not more foolish, than it is to refuse credence to the fact, because it exceeds our comprehension. He who does so, on such a subject as this, must either, as we have seen, be guilty of the most palpable and glaring inconsistencies, or else the limits of his belief must be narrow indeed. *There is hardly a point, in fact, at which a man of this description can consistently stop, short of universal scepticism.*" (Discourses, p. 23.) The reader is left to judge, whether an humble readiness in the mind, to receive as true, on sufficient evidence, what yet it cannot comprehend, be a disposition likely to involve it in endless uncertainty and hesitation; whether *faith* is the direct road to *scepticism; belief* the high way to *doubt.* I might safely, indeed leave the respective tendencies of the Unitarian and the orthodox system, in this particular, to the decision of *fact.* On which side is it that the greatest measure is to be found of a *free-thinking* (I use the word *in malam partem*) and *sceptical* turn of mind?

Mr. Yates adopted his own definition of *mystery* in preference to mine, because it was "*better accommodated to the tenor of my reasonings.*" Erratum—for *tenor* read *subversion.* So, I doubt not, Mr. Yates thought it. He has substituted his own definition for mine; and has *made it mine*, by inserting it in my argument where mine should have stood. He has "made his opponent say what he would have him say, and then reasoned from his own misrepresentation,"* doing what lay in his power to make

* Brown's Strictures, p. 23.

me argue inconclusively, and to fasten on me sentiments widely different from those which my language expresses. His making me deny, without qualification, the propriety of "making it a rule to understand the *terms of a proposition* before believing it," arose from his having, "without leave asked or obtained," fathered his own definition upon me. For where is the proposition, of which I have denied the necessity of understanding the terms before believing it? He has pointed out none; and that for a very good reason, because there *is* none. There are propositions relative to the *fact* of the Trinity; and the *terms* used in these, as declarative of the fact, *are* understood. But *there is not* (as I have already noticed) *any proposition in the Scriptures, relative to that which we do* NOT *comprehend, namely, the* MODE *of the fact.* There is nothing on *this* point which we are called to believe. There is no room, therefore, for the "rule" of "understanding the terms of a proposition before believing it;" for there is no proposition to be believed; no terms to be understood.

3dly. I might perhaps have spared the reader the trouble of going through the preceding reasonings, by placing my *third* observation *first*: The chapter is futile and useless in the argument; because it admits all that I should reckon it necessary to plead for.

Thus, (p. 51.) "I have already stated the fact, which it would be the height of presumption to deny, that concerning every class of beings there are truths, clear to superiour intelligences, though seen indistinctly, or not at all, by us." If "concerning every class of beings;" most of all, surely, concerning the first and highest of beings. How will Mr. Yates prove, that the *mode* of the *Divine existence* may not be one of that description of truths to which he refers?—that superiour intelligences may have some clearer knowledge of it; and that such knowledge *we ourselves* may attain, in the higher state of our future existence? —that "what we know not *now*, we shall know *hereafter?*" Perhaps, indeed, it *may not* be so; for the *mode* of the Divine subsistence, may, for aught we can tell, be beyond the grasp of all finite intelligence: but still it *may be so;* and this is enough—

enough to silence the "presumption" that would refuse assent to an incomprehensible proposition (*incomprehensible in its matter*, not *unintelligible in its terms*) on such a subject.

Thus again: "Notwithstanding, therefore, the apparent force of these observations, I would still maintain an humble conviction, that my understanding is weak and deceitful; and hence I am prepared to admit the truth of any unintelligible proposition, which is supported by the authority of Scripture." (P. 51.) And again: "On all these subjects truths may be enunciated, so far as human language is adapted to convey them, which to inferior minds will appear difficult to be conceived, or entirely incomprehensible. Nothing, therefore, can be more unreasonable, than absolutely to deny a proposition because we attach no distinct conceptions to the terms in which it is expressed." (P. 45 and 46.)

Now, first of all here, what does Mr. Yates mean by assenting to the truth of an unintelligible proposition—i. e. of a proposition to the *terms* of which he affixes *no conceptions*, or no *distinct* conceptions? What is it, in this case, that he really believes? It is evidently *nothing expressed in the proposition itself*. There is a very material difference between *believing that a particular proposition contains some truth or other*, and *believing the truth which the proposition contains*. The former only is what a man believes, when a proposition is uttered to him *in an unknown tongue;* or, if he be entirely ignorant of mathematics, when he hears it said by a mathematician, that "*an ellipse is one of the conic sections*." Such alone could be our belief with regard to the Trinity, if the *terms* in which the doctrine is expressed were unintelligible. But "there is a vast difference between *unintelligible* and *incomprehensible*. That is, strictly speaking, *unintelligible*, concerning which we can frame *no* ideas; and that only *incomprehensible* concerning which our ideas are *imperfect*. It is plain, therefore, that a doctrine may be intelligible, and yet incomprehensible." * Is Mr. Yates, then, prepared to *give* his assent to what is *unintelligible*, and determined to *withhold* it from what is *incomprehensible?*—to admit the truth of propositions

* Conybeare's Sermon.

whose *terms* he does not understand, and to deny the truth of propositions, which affirm a fact in *terms perfectly clear and intelligible*, and which only leave unexplained the *manner* of the fact? to yield his assent to what is *not revealed at all* (for that certainly is not at all revealed, which is expressed in *terms* that cannot be understood,) and to refuse his assent to what is *partially revealed*, because it is *not revealed more fully;* when, for aught we know, the reason of the limitation may have been the impossibility of any thing further being so expressed as to bring it within the apprehension of the human faculties? I cannot suppose he will be so inconsistent. To the inquiry, On what grounds our assent should be yielded to mysterious propositions? he answers, with great propriety—that "our belief must arise solely from implicit reliance upon the *authority* which declares them." I need not hesitate to say, that it is on *this* ground I am a believer in the doctrine of the Trinity. I believe that in *one sense* Deity is ONE, and that in *some other sense* Deity is THREE. I believe it simply on the *authority* of God, who declares it in his word; and I durst not withhold my assent from the *fact*, that it *is so*, because he has not been pleased to tell me the *mode* of the fact, or *how* it is so.

To the above quotations, the following may be added: "A prophet who proves his Divine commission by miracles, may announce a doctrine in terms, to which I annex no distinct conceptions; yet I may believe that the prophet does, that angels and superior spirits may, that I myself may, in a more advanced stage of my existence; *in deference, therefore, to his Divine authority, I would yield my humble and entire assent.*" (P. 46.) Now the concessions made in these various extracts, of the propriety of believing even *unintelligible propositions* on the authority of the sacred records, being applicable, *a fortiori*, to *partially revealed truths*, appear to me to *nullify* the whole chapter about mysteries, converting it into a mere *logomachy*—a useless verbal dispute.

PART II.

DEFENCE OF THE REASONINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE TRINITY, AND OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST, AGAINST THE ANIMADVERSIONS OF MR. YATES.

CHAPTER I.

I HAVE now done with preliminary topics: and if any of my readers shall think that on those of them which are of a personal nature I have detained him too long, I have only to assure him for his comfort, that I have left unsaid a good deal of what I once intended to say. I conceive it to be not merely natural and pardonable, but, on various and important grounds, *obligatory* on every man, and especially on every man who occupies a station of public usefulness, to vindicate himself from misrepresentations and aspersions. But I trust I shall never be left to place myself and my cause on any thing like the same level in the scale of importance. Let what will of the mire of controversial disparagement adhere to me, I shall consider myself richly recompensed, if I shall, in any measure, succeed in clearing the cause of God and truth.

I have a slight objection to offer against the manner in which Mr. Yates announces the division of his subject, in the second and third parts of his work. In the former, he proposes to state the opinions and arguments of Unitarians; and in the latter, to consider the *objections* by which I have endeavoured to invalidate them. I demur at this. Trinitarians are not to be placed on the inferior ground of *objectors;* as if the opposite system were the generally received one, and theirs the exception. *Their* views are the views of ninety-nine hundredths of what is called the Christian world. Their opponents are the dissenters from the prevailing faith. They therefore are the objectors: they are the assailants. Trinitarians are entitled to

consider themselves in full possession of the field of Scripture, till this little band of enemies shall succeed in dispossessing them. To some of my readers this may appear a circumstance of trivial moment. I have no wish to attach more importance to it than it deserves. But I must insist on the presumption being decidedly *against* so very small a minority of the professed believers and investigators of the Bible; nor do I feel at all inclined to allow to those whom I consider as enemies of the truth of God, any higher ground than they are entitled to occupy.

Although I have closed my remarks on preliminary topics, I still find in my way a great deal of matter, that is entirely irrelevant to the points immediately in dispute.

Of Mr. Yates' Second Part, the first chapter is entitled—"The Evidence for the Unity of God from the Light of Nature;" and the second—"The Evidences for the Unity of God from the Testimony of the Scriptures." These are very good. And as we are not less desirous than Mr. Yates to establish the doctrine of the Divine unity, we are obliged to him for the concise and perspicuous view of the argument on this topic, especially in the former of these two chapters. Of the provokingly disingenuous representation given by Mr. Yates, in a subsequent part of his volume, of *my* reasonings relative to the unity of God, I shall have occasion to speak afterwards.

I pass over, in the mean time, the statements of Unitarian doctrine, and the reasonings used in support of them, contained in the remaining chapters of Part II; and proceed immediately to Part III, in which Mr. Yates professes to state the views, and to answer the arguments, of Trinitarians. How far he has done either, will by and by appear.

When we consider the powerful propensity which mankind have always discovered, to intrude into what has been left secret, and to exercise their ingenuity in attempts to explain what is beyond the reach of their capacities, it will not surely appear wonderful, that different opinions should have been formed, and different theories, and principles of explication, adopted, on such a doctrine as that of the Trinity. These varieties have afforded a handle to its adversaries, of which they have shown, as

might have been expected, abundant readiness to take advantage. They are also, without doubt, fitted to stumble sincere and serious inquirers. Of such inquirers I request the particular attention to the remarks which follow.

The varieties of opinion on this subject are reduced by Mr. Yates to three general heads. I have no particular objections to make to his classification. I have already, with sufficient distinctness, avowed myself to belong to the class which he places third in order, consisting of those who consider "the subject as so completely removed beyond the view of the human understanding, that it is impossible for us to form upon it any clear or accurate conceptions." I have made this avowal in the following, among other passages: "Of the precise import of the term *personality*, as applied to a distinction in the Divine essence, or of the peculiar nature and mode of that distinction, I shall not presume to attempt conveying to your minds any clear conception. I cannot impart to you what I do not possess myself: and, convinced as I am that such conception cannot be attained by any, it had been well, I think, if such attempts at explanation, by comparisons from nature and otherwise, had never been made. They have afforded to the enemies of the doctrine much unnecessary occasion for unhallowed burlesque and blasphemy. The Scriptures simply assure us of *the fact*: of the *mode* of the fact they offer no explanation. And where the Bible is silent, it becomes us to be silent also; for when, in such cases, we venture to speak, we can only 'darken counsel by words without knowledge.' The *fact*, and not the *manner* of it, being that which is revealed, is the proper and only object of our faith. We believe that *it is so*; but *how* it is so, we are not ashamed to say we do not presume even to conjecture."*

Mr. Yates may call this "an elusive representation of the doctrine," and hold me up to ridicule, as "striving to render the doctrine of the Trinity invulnerable by reducing it to a shadow." I cannot help this. I have no desire to go farther, on this or any other subject, than my Bible carries me. Explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity is the incessant demand of

* Discourse I. page 11.

Unitarians,; and an acknowledgment, fifty times repeated, that you do not pretend to explain, produces no abatement in the urgency of the demand. But the demand is a most unreasonable one ; and every attempt to satisfy it is foolish. For my own part, I am perfectly resigned to be the object of Unitarian pity for my weakness, in humbly submitting to the limits of Divine instruction, in believing *the fact*, as testified in the Oracles of Truth, and leaving the *mode* of the fact among the " secret things that belong unto the Lord,"—concealed in that " light to which no man can approach."

I most readily admit (for how can it be otherwise ?) that on this and on all similar subjects, it is difficult to select, on every occasion, such terms as cannot be perverted, and made to assume the *appearance* of inconsistency, by an acute and subtle disputant. I am not, however, sensible that any thing in my volume is *really* at variance with the sentiments of the above extract. When a man has once stated the sense in which he employs any particular term, he is certainly entitled to be understood accordingly, in his subsequent use of it on the same subject. In the preceding quotation from my first Discourse, it is explicitly declared, that when the terms *person* and *personality* are used, I would not be understood as pretending to any precise and definite conception of the nature of that distinction in Deity which these terms import. Was it, then, an unreasonable expectation, that my readers should carry this declaration along with them, through the remainder of my volume; that when the same terms are used again, they should be understood with the qualification previously affixed to them ; that when I speak of the persons in Deity as *distinct*, I should not be interpreted as pretending to comprehend clearly *how* they are distinct ? A generous disputant would certainly have felt himself bound to proceed on this reasonable principle. Yet, because I have not been perpetually repeating my explanation, Mr. Yates has thought fit to represent me as " through more than the latter half of my volume, treating the distinction of persons in the Godhead as a clear and intelligible doctrine ;" and he strives, in this way, to set the latter half at variance with the former.

This attempt to convict me of inconsistency and contradiction, is connected with an endeavour to fix upon me the usual charge of *tritheism*. The former, indeed, is involved in the latter, and forms part of the disingenuous means by which the charge is supported. It would have been very foolish in me, to expect to pass a Unitarian inquisition, without having this hackneyed libel preferred against me. Let us see how Mr. Yates goes to work in finding ground for it.

The first ground he finds, he makes for himself, by introducing a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity which is not mine. Finding it somewhat difficult, I presume, to attack me *directly* on the favourite charge of believing in three Gods ; disappointed at not being able to select any passage from my Discourses sufficiently gross and revolting to the reader's mind ; he brings in a quotation from Dr. Sherlock, possessing this quality in a degree quite to his satisfaction,—a quotation containing a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, such as he perfectly well knows I never could adopt ; no, nor one in hundreds, I am bold to say, of the Trinitarian body : and then he tries to make out that my sentiments are the same in substance, although different in expression. I say, *tries* to make out. For what is his proof? " Mr. Wardlaw," says he, " is no less explicit than Dr. Sherlock, in maintaining that the three persons in the Godhead are *distinct*." The whole weight of evidence by which he seeks to identify me with Dr. Sherlock, consists in my having used the term *persons*, and applied to these persons the epithet *distinct*, to which he gives the emphasis of Italics. But was not Mr. Yates perfectly aware, that, in using these terms, I had explicitly disavowed all pretension to understanding the nature of the distinction which is expressed by them ? and that therefore I considered all attempts at explanation, and all such language as that of Dr. Sherlock, to be the height of presumption, originating in self-sufficiency, and terminating in self-contradiction ? I am *explicit* in maintaining the persons in Deity to be *distinct*. And what then ? Is there any inconsistency in using this epithet, to distinguish my views from Sabellianism, and yet meaning by the use of it no more, than that in the

unity of the Godhead there is a distinction, which, while I believe it to exist, I cannot pretend to explain or to comprehend?

Remarks of a similar kind will apply to my use of the term *person*. I have employed it in compliance with established usage, and because I do not know that another could be devised more appropriate. But of its precise import, as applied to a distinction in the Divine essence, I have professed my own incompetency, and my conviction of the incompetency of others, to form any clear conception. But Mr. Yates alleges, that the whole of the latter part of my volume is at variance with this profession. "In his Discourse," says he, "on the Divinity and Personality of the Holy Spirit, he gives a most clear, ample, and correct account of the signification of the term *person*. 'What,' says he, 'do we mean by *a person?* By *a person* we mean that which *possesses personal properties*,'" &c. Such, in truth, is the amount of the "clear, ample, and correct account" of the signification of the term *person:* for as to the quotation afterwards introduced by me from Paley, the design of it is not at all to enumerate the particular properties, or kinds of properties, of which the possession is essential to personality; but merely to confirm the position, that the only possible proof of personality, is the proof of the possession of personal properties: which end it answers, by showing, that in the department of *natural religion*, we do not, and cannot, prove the personality of Deity from any knowledge we possess of his *essence*, but solely from the indications abounding in the works of nature, of certain properties possessed by their Author, from which his *personality* is necessarily inferred. When, after defining *a person* to be that which possesses personal properties, I proceed to show that, in the Scriptures, properties confessedly of this nature are ascribed to the Holy Spirit, the inference certainly is intended to be, that the Holy Spirit, as possessing these properties, *must be a person*. But does this imply my understanding, or pretending to understand, *how* the Holy Spirit subsists in personal distinction from the Father and the Son?—*in what manner* personal properties are possessed and exercised by each?—which is the same thing as, what the *nature* of the distinction is? The question is, Are

personal properties ascribed to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, in such a way as to indicate a distinction in the unity of the Godhead? I have affirmed, and endeavoured to prove, that they are. But further I have not presumed to go; because the volume of Revelation goes no further. Mr. Yates, therefore, would have spared his laboured attempt; an attempt which, I have no doubt, he himself thought peculiarly happy; to set in pointed contrast the first and second parts of my volume, had he only done, what justice and generosity alike required of him; had he taken along with him the qualifying explanation which I had given at the outset, and which I certainly intended should accompany to the close my use of the terms *distinct*, *subsistences*, *persons and personality*, in their application to Deity.

In the same connexion, in Mr. Yates' Reply, there occurs an instance of misrepresentation, which I hardly know whether to ascribe to carelessness or to design. After having endeavoured to fasten on me the view of Dr. Sherlock, as to the Holy Spirit being a distinct mind, or intelligent Being, he proceeds to say, "That he" (Mr. W.) "holds the same doctrine concerning the *second* person is equally manifest. He assigns as a reason for not proving Jesus Christ to be a person, that his personality, *in the sense in which the term personality is applied to the Holy Spirit*, was never disputed.* When, therefore, he calls the second of the three distinct subsistences *a person*, he means, that that subsistence is *a distinct mind*, or *intelligent being*." (Page 140.)

Now either Mr. Yates was nodding when he penned this, or he felt himself sadly pinched for proof, and calculated largely on the stupidity of his readers. The most effectual way to show this, will be to give at length the paragraph from which his garbled quotation is taken. "In the more direct discussion of this subject, I shall begin with the evidence of *personality*. To some of you this may, perhaps, appear preposterous. But by the proof of personality, on the present occasion, is meant, it should be observed, the proof *that the Holy Spirit is a person at all*. On our former subject, there was no necessity for our leading a proof of this nature; the personality of Jesus Christ, in

* The Italics are Mr. Yates'.

this sense of the term,* having never been disputed. The only question on *that* subject was, not whether he was a person, but whether he was a person *in the Godhead.* But in the argument now before us, the case is otherwise. The Holy Spirit is not considered, at least in general, by the opponents of his Divinity, as a creature, possessing distinct personal existence ; but as a quality, a power, an influence. In this case, therefore, the proof of personality is an important and essential step towards the proof of his Divinity. And, indeed, in many instances, the evidence of the former will be found to involve in it a proof of the latter." (Discourses, pages 270 and 271.)

The meaning of this does not seem to be very obscure. The *personality* of Jesus Christ, apart from his Divinity, Unitarians never have questioned. *He* has never been considered, like the Holy Spirit, as a mere influence, or energy, or attribute. No proof of *his* personality therefore, was necessary, prior to the demonstration of his Divinity. When I say, that " by the proof of personality on the present occasion is meant the proof *that the Holy Spirit is a person at all ;*" and then subjoin, that the personality of Jesus Christ *in this sense of the term* has never been disputed ; and add still further, that " the only question on *that* subject, (the personality of Christ,) was, not whether he was a *person,* but whether he was a person *in the Godhead ;*" if my meaning is not plain, I am at a loss to make it plainer. It obviously is, that the *mere* personality of Jesus Christ, the simple question whether he be *a person at all,* apart altogether from the doctrine of his Divinity, has never been disputed ? Well : and what does my interpreter make me say ? He first of all labours to show, that the term *personality, as applied by me to the Holy Spirit,* means nothing less than his being one of three *distinct, infinite, intelligent minds.* And then, to show that I consider Jesus Christ, " *the second of the three subsistences,*" in the same light, he represents me as saying, that *his* personality, " *in the sense in which the term personality is applied to the Holy Spirit,* WAS NEVER DISPUTED." That is, when I speak of Unitarians as never having disputed the *personality* of Jesus Christ, Mr. Yates makes

* The words alluded to by Mr. Yates.

me say, that they never have disputed his personality, *as one of the three distinct subsistences in the Godhead!*—nay more; that they never have disputed his being a person in the Godhead, even according to the explanation of Dr. Sherlock himself, as *a distinct, infinite, intelligent Mind, or Being!*—for this is the sense, in which he affirms, the term *person* is applied by me to the Holy Spirit. Such is the "generalship" by which Mr. Yates endeavours to identify my sentiments with those of Dr. Sherlock.

It may not be improper for me, once for all, to state in this place, a little more fully, what it is which the Scriptures require us to believe respecting the doctrine of the Trinity. And I shall avail myself of the language of two other writers, who have expressed themselves with that modest discretion, which is so becoming in creatures on all such subjects; but which is galling to the adversaries of the doctrine, because it does not furnish them with grounds sufficiently gross and palpable, to enable them to shock and horrify the minds of their readers, by burlesque, and ridicule, and bold unqualified asservations of the nonsense and absurdity of Trinitarianism:—

"The word *Trinity*," says Dean Swift, "is indeed not in Scripture; but was a term of art, invented in the earlier times, to express the doctrine by a single word, for the sake of brevity and convenience. The doctrine, then, as delivered in Holy Scripture, though not exactly in the same words, is very short, and amounts only to this: that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are each of them God, and yet there is but one God. For, as to the word *person*, when we say there are three persons, and as to those other explanations in the Athanasian Creed, this day read to you, (whether composed by Athanasius or not) they were taken up three hundred years after Christ, to expound this doctrine; and I will tell you on what occasion—" &c.—"God commands us to believe there is a union and there is a distinction: but what that union or what that distinction is, all mankind are equally ignorant; and must continue so, at least till the day of judgment, without some new revelation. Therefore I shall again repeat the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is positively affirmed in Scripture: that God is there expressed in

three different names, as Father, as Son, and as Holy Ghost; that each of these is God, and that there is but one God. But this union and distinction are a mystery utterly unknown to mankind. This is enough for any good Christian to believe, on this great article, without ever inquiring any farther. And this can be contrary to no man's reason, although the knowledge of it is hid from him."—"From what hath been said, it is manifest that God did never command us to believe, nor his servants to preach, any doctrine which is contrary to the reason he hath been pleased to endue us with; but for his own wise ends hath thought fit to conceal from us the *nature* of the thing he commands, thereby to try our faith and obedience, and increase our dependence on him. It is highly probable, that if God should please to reveal unto us this great mystery of the Trinity, or some other mysteries in our holy religion, we should not be able to understand them, unless he should at the same time think fit to bestow on us some new powers or faculties of the mind, which we want at present, and which are reserved till the resurrection to life eternal. For 'now,' as the Apostle says, 'we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face.' *Reason* itself is true and just; but the reason of every particular man is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed or turned by his interests, his passions, or his vices."*

"The doctrine of what is called the Trinity," says the late Rev. Mr. Venn, Rector of Clapham, "concisely stated, is this: that although there is only one God, this God is revealed to man as subsisting under three distinct names or persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are yet, in a sense to us mysterious and inscrutable, but one God."—"It is true that, on this subject, some persons may have spoken rashly and unwarrantably, in representing the three persons to be so absolutely distinct, as to be, in all respects, three different Beings," &c.—"The precise nature of the distinction here implied is not described in Scripture, nor perhaps is it conceivable by fallen man. It has, indeed, been agreed to express this distinction by the term '*person*:' and this term is perhaps as eligible as any other,

* Swift's Sermon on the Trinity; Works, Vol. II. old edition.

while it is understood not to convey any real idea of the nature of this distinction, but merely to affirm that it exists, and is not confined to a distinction of mere titles or attributes."—" It may be asked, What, then, do we in fact believe as to the Divine nature ? I answer, we believe that one and the same God is three, in a sense which we are able neither to express nor comprehend." —" Such, indeed, is the obscurity in which the Divine nature is necessarily involved, that it matters little what terms are employed by us to describe it. Change the terms; yet the obscurity remains. They would either have no meaning affixed to them, or be understood in precisely the same sense with those employed for the same purpose before. Had the very terms employed by us to express the doctrine of the Trinity been employed in Scripture, the revelation of the doctrine itself would not have been more distinct or intelligible. Language could not have made that distinct, which we have not the faculties to comprehend."—" You are required to believe, that these three terms, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are all applied in Scripture to the one Supreme God; that all the actions, offices, attributes, which are ascribed to any of these names, are plainly attributed to, and do truly belong to one and the same Divine nature; that there are such frequent and evident assertions in Scripture of the unity of God, and yet such plain distinctions signified by the terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as imply both a perfect unity of nature, and yet a distinction in the Godhead; and that this distinction, whatever it may be, is not the same with that which we conceive between the attributes of God, nor a mere distinction of name, office, or relation; but some other distinction, of which we have but a confused conception, and which we can express by no particular language. A more accurate acquaintance with spiritual beings, and especially with the nature of God, might develop the mysterious parts of this doctrine. Till then, we profess our faith in them only as mysteries."*

I am not sensible that there is any thing in my volume inconsistent with the modesty of such statements as these. If Mr.

* Venn's Posthumous Sermons, Vol. I. Sermon VIII.

Yates chooses still to say, this is " rendering the doctrine invulnerable by reducing it to a shadow," he is extremely welcome. If it be but a Scripture shadow, " seen as in a mirror, darkly," it has all the substance which the Divine Author of the Bible has thought fit to give it, and therefore all that, in our present state, we dare wish it to have. Nothing delights Unitarians more than when they prevail with Trinitarians to go beyond the limits of the Bible, and to try their wits in attempts to explain by fanciful comparisons, or to demonstrate by metaphysical argumentation, the doctrine of the Trinity. If Mr. Yates, then, will insist for explanations of what I have admitted to be inexplicable, he may. I shall follow the advice of the king of Israel, " Answer him not ;" at least till I have acquired, what it is my prayer to be enabled to avoid, a little more of Unitarian presumption. In the passage before quoted from my first Discourse, I have expressly condemned all such speculations, as worse than unprofitable. The following sentences from a subsequent part of the same Discourse, are of a similar complexion : " Were we to say, that the persons of the Godhead are one and three *in the same sense*, we should evidently affirm what is *contrary* to reason ; because such a proposition would involve in the very terms of it an irreconcilable contradiction. But so long as we do not pretend to know or to say, *how* they are one and *how* they are three : to prove that we assert what is contrary to reason, when we affirm that they are both, is, from the very nature of the thing, impossible. For what is it which is to be proved contrary to reason ? Upon the supposition made, *we cannot tell :* it is something which we do not know ; of the nature and circumstances of which we are left in total ignorance. The truth is, we are lost, completely lost, whenever we begin, in any view of it whatever, to think about the divine essence. We can form no more distinct conception of a Being that never began to exist, or of a Being that is every where present, and yet is wholly nowhere, than we can of one essence, in which there are, and have been from eternity, three distinct subsistences."*

Mr. Yates, as a generous and manly disputant, *ought*, as I

* Discourse I. p. 22.

have already said, to have carried these qualifying explanations along with him, in interpreting the remainder of my Volume. Instead of this he has introduced another writer; he has attempted, by such perverse interpretations of my words as have been noticed, to make me chargeable with all the grossness and presumption of that writer; whose modes of expression I am so far from being disposed to adopt and to defend, that I consider them as in the highest degree indiscreet and unwarrantable, as (in the phraseology of the law) "*travelling beyond the record*:"—I should have said being *wise above what is written*, were it not that I should have appeared to fall into the common error, of quoting, as from the Bible, words which it does not contain.

CHAPTER II.

HAVING found such disingenuousness in the *statement* of our sentiments themselves, we need not be surprised, if we discover similar want of fairness in the comments on the *evidence* by which they are supported.

To these comments Mr. Yates proceeds in the beginning of the second chapter of his Second Part; and he commences them with the following most surprising sentence:—

I. "In the first place, he" (Mr. Wardlaw) "objects to the proof of the unity of God derived from the appearances of the material creation."

This is one of the many parts of Mr. Yates' work at which I felt the difficulty of repressing the risings of indignation. I could scarcely conceive it possible, that Mr. Yates seriously believed what he here affirms.—Did he really think, that, in my remarks on the part of the subject referred to, it was my object to invalidate the doctrine of the Divine *Unity*, for the sake of establishing that of the *Trinity?* If he did, then he must also have thought, that I, as well as himself, consider the two doctrines as inconsistent with each other, contrary to my own express and frequently

repeated declaration;—for which courtesy let the reader determine the extent of my obligation. But did not Mr. Yates know that *one* object of my first Discourse was to *assert and prove* the unity of God; although the general design of the series of Discourses rendered it unnecessary to enlarge on the argument in support of it? I have said in the Discourse referred to: "Whatever may be the views we entertain as to the extent of natural evidence in support of the unity of the Godhead, there can be no doubt that this doctrine forms one of the first and fundamental truths of Divine revelation. It is in many places of the inspired volume distinctly and plainly affirmed; and it appears pervading the whole, as one of those great leading principles, to which it owes the peculiarity of its general complexion, and to which all the subordinate parts of the system bear a constant reference:"—"That the unity of God is a leading doctrine of the Scriptures, and that this doctrine is pointedly affirmed in the text, as an admonition to the Israelites against the Polytheism of the surrounding nations, I need not, I apprehend, take time to prove:"—"The unity of the Godhead is proclaimed in the text in terms fitted to impress the vast importance of the doctrine on the minds of the Israelites," &c.

Now, suppose I *had* "objected to the proof of the unity of God derived from the appearances of the material creation," I have at least most decidedly declared my belief both of its reality and importance as an article of revelation. Does Mr. Yates, then, think his *friend*, his *dear friend*, capable of the abominable hypocrisy of endeavouring to strengthen the argument for the Trinity at the expense of the evidence for the Unity? and that too, at the very moment that he is affirming his belief of the latter as decidedly as his conviction of the former? I am free to say, that if I saw the doctrine of the Trinity to be inconsistent with the Divine unity, I should feel the necessity of renouncing the former for the security of the latter. But I fear I must, along with it, renounce those Scriptures, in which I am satisfied it is so clearly taught; and which are established to be a revelation from heaven by so "many infallible proofs."

With regard to the argument for the Divine unity drawn from

the appearances of the material creation, my object, in the few cursory remarks allotted to it, was merely to show, in rather an incidental way, that it was not without its difficulties; and especially, that, however conclusive it might be as handled by philosophers, it was, on different accounts, more recondite, and remote from common apprehension, than the proof from nature of the *existence* and *perfections* of Deity. Mr. Yates' illustration of the argument, however excellent, might yet be added to the extract I have given from Dr. Paley in my first Note (A.) in confirmation of the justice of this observation. I stated among other things, in just hinting the difficulties attending this argument, that *harmony of design*, even when fully established, does not *necessarily* and *at once* warrant the inference of *only one designer;* because "unity of counsel *may* subsist among a plurality of counsellors." Of Dr. Paley, from whom this limitation of the argument was taken, Mr. Yates says: "With respect to Dr. Paley, it should be recollected, that he was (at least professedly) a Trinitarian. His system of Christian faith would incline him to consider uniformity of plan as proving only unity of design maintained by three designers. He therefore carries the argument no further than to the proof of unity of counsel." (P. 147.)—Having adopted Dr. Paley's view of the argument, I of course feel myself involved in all this. Let us see what its plain meaning is:—it means,

1. That we are secretly convinced in our own minds, that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, after all, be maintained, in consistency with that of the Divine unity. This is false.

2. That, being much more strongly attached to the former of these doctrines than to the latter, we feel no great scruple at surrendering, or purposely weakening, the evidence of the latter, for the sake of supporting the former. "He *therefore*," says Mr. Yates, "carries the argument no further than to the proof of unity of counsel." This is equally false.

3. That we profess to believe both the doctrine of the Unity, and the doctrine of the Trinity, to be express articles of the Christian revelation; and yet our system of Christian faith inclines us to doubt and to deny the former, and to question, and

limit, and invalidate, those proofs from nature by which it is confirmed.

4. Dr. Paley was a Trinitarian, "*at least professedly.*" It is here insinuated, that his profession of Trinitarian principles was of at least doubtful sincerity. Be it so. It is very likely the suspicion is not entirely without foundation. Yet, one should think, it would require a person to be a very warm friend indeed to Trinitarian principles (on the *supposition* of their being at variance with the Divine unity) before he would, for the sake of them, intentionally introduce confusion and dubiety into any of the arguments for the fundamental doctrine of the unity of God.

5. After all, Mr. Yates has said nothing to show the incorrectness of Dr. Paley's view of the argument. Is it not true, that unity of counsel *may* subsist among a plurality of counsellors? Is it not, then, true also, that from the simple consideration of unity of design, it is impossible to infer, with conclusive certainty, the existence and operation of one designer? Mr. Yates answers such questions, by substituting an argument of a totally different description; namely "the competence of one omnipotent and infinite Designer to produce every effect which is discernible throughout the universe," connected with "the principle, that no more causes ought to be supposed than are necessary to account for the effects."

Now, supposing this ground of reasoning unobjectionable, still my remark would be well founded, that it is recondite, and far from obvious and palpable to the great majority of mankind. But further; though we may be able, from *other* considerations, to show the absurdity of supposing the existence of more than one infinite and Almighty Being; I am not sure, how far the inference is warrantable from *this consideration alone*,—viz. the *sufficiency of one such Being* to account for all discernible effects. The power of *one* man is *sufficient* to account for the existence of a watch. Yet we know we should be wide of the truth, were we to conclude that one such agent only was employed in the production of it. And numberless, indeed, among mankind, are the instances of such harmony of design and of effect, while there is a plurality of designers and efficient agents. How, then, is

the mind, and especially the untutored mind, that is a stranger to the reasonings of philosophy, to infer *with certainty*, the existence of only one almighty Agent, merely from the circumstance of one only being *necessary* to account for existing effects?

The remarks under this last particular are introduced merely by the way. They belong to the doctrine of the Divine *unity*; with that of the *Trinity* they really have no connexion. Mr. Yates may allege what he pleases about my system of Christian faith inclining me to consider uniformity of plan as proving only unity of design, maintained "by three designers:" but I feel myself entitled to be believed, both by Mr. Yates and by every other person, when I assure him, that when, in writing my observations on the proofs from nature of the unity of God, I introduced Dr. Paley's qualification of the argument derived from harmony of design, I had no thought of the doctrine of the Trinity in my mind; that the possibility never once entered my imagination, of Mr. Yates, or any other reader, mistaking or perverting my remarks on this point, in the manner he has done; that I am as firm a believer in the unity of God as Mr. Yates himself; that I hold, in connexion with this, the doctrine of a threefold distinction in the Divine essence, because the inspired records assure me of its existence; that, while I cannot pretend to explain *how* this distinction subsists, and *how* it is consistent with unity, I *believe*, on the authority which affirms both, that there *is* no contradiction between them, and reckon it quite enough, that, from the nature of the case, as one entirely beyond the comprehension of our minds, such contradiction *can never be proved.*

Mr. Yates next proceeds to the argument in support of a plurality of persons in the Godhead, from the plural termination of Aleim, Adnim, and other Hebrew names for God.

The force of this argument should be viewed as arising rather from the combined effect of the different considerations which I have so briefly touched upon. Mr. Yates takes them one by one, makes a distinct and formal argument for me out of each of them, discusses them in this insulated state, so as to prevent the reader from observing the support which they mutually afford to each other.

Let us take his remarks, however, as they stand.

He first of all thinks it necessary, formally to acquit me of any intention to *burlesque the Scriptures*, in giving as a "translation" or "version" of my text, "Hear, O Israel, Jehovah OUR GODS (Aleim) is one Jehovah." Now, surely Mr. Yates could hardly fail to be aware, that I never meant to propose this as a preferable *translation* or *version* of this and similar passages; but used the term *Gods* in the plural, for no other purpose than to show to the eye of the *mere English reader*, that the Hebrew *Aleim* was in that number. I had originally written it, and perhaps it would have been better to have kept it so; "Jehovah, our ALEIM (*Gods*) is one Jehovah."

Mr. Yates goes on to observe—"1. First, if the plural termination of ALEIM, &c. indicates plurality at all, it denotes not only a plurality of persons or subsistences, but a plurality *of Gods;* for on this supposition, Mr. Wardlaw's translation is undoubtedly correct, 'Jehovah, our *Gods*.' But this, I presume, is more than even Trinitarians will be disposed to admit." (P. 148.)

Yes, indeed. It *is* more, certainly, than *even* Trinitarians, with all their voracious credulity, are disposed to admit. My very first remark on the text was in these words: "*Unity and plurality are both here asserted; and the plurality is emphatically declared to be consistent with the unity.*" (P. 11.) The *unity* is not disputed. It is affirmed in the Scriptures: it is pointedly asserted in the very text on which the observations are founded: it is alike maintained by Trinitarians and Unitarians. The only inference that *can* be drawn, if any is to be drawn at all, from the plural name for God, is, that this unity is a unity of such a nature as admits distinction; that God is one, but that, at the same time, there is a plurality in the Godhead. The text itself, in which the Divine unity is so peremptorily affirmed, necessarily precludes all inference beyond this.

2. Mr. Yates next quotes a rule, as "resolving the whole mystery," from "that useful book the Hebrew Grammar." The rule quoted in this tone of sarcastic triumph is:—"Words that express dominion, dignity, majesty, are commonly put in the plural."

On this I observe, 1st. The rule, supposing it to *be* one, is, beyond all doubt, stated in terms by far too general. If it were a rule of any thing like *common* application, one should expect to find it in all the Hebrew Grammars. Now, although I find it in Wilson, and in Robertson, I do *not* find it in Parkhurst, nor in Pike, nor in an anonymous grammar used by the teacher from whom I got the rudiments of the language. This appears somewhat strange as to a *common rule of Syntax*.

2dly. All the instances adduced of the application of this rule, *in which the reference is to Jehovah*, must be set aside as not at all in point. It is from these that *we* derive our evidence: and therefore, to bring forward these, as exemplifications of a rule, which is alleged to subvert this evidence, is to beg the question in dispute. The rule, if established, must be established from other cases. Now the particular words enumerated by Wilson are, ALEIM, *Gods*, ADNIM, *Lords*, BOLIM, *Husbands*, *Masters*: and the exemplification of the rule which he adduces, is Isa. liv. 5. "For thy Maker (Heb. Makers) is thy Husband (Heb. Husbands) Jehovah (God) of hosts is his name," &c.—one of the very passages on which we ground our inference; and which, therefore, can never go to disprove that inference, until it has been otherwise shown, that the phraseology is common in Hebrew syntax, and that there is nothing at all peculiar in the case of its application to Jehovah. The remark applies to all passages similarly circumstanced.

3dly. If the rule were one of *common* application, we might reasonably expect to find frequent instances of all the words mentioned by Wilson occurring in the plural, with a singular application. Yet the only instances of BOL, when it signifies *a husband*, (and indeed of any of the different Hebrew words so translated in our common version,) occurring in the plural, are, so far as I have been able to discover, *two* in number, viz. Isa. liv. 5. already quoted, and Jer. xxxi. 32.; in both of which, it is rather singular, the application happens to be to *Jehovah*. As to the same word, when used to signify *a master* or *owner*, the instances of its occurrence, when considered as exemplifications of *dominion*, *dignity*, and *majesty*, are somewhat curious. It is

applied, Exod. xxi. 28. xxii. 11. to the "*owner*" of an ox, or an ass, or a sheep; and in Isa. i. 3. to the "*master*" of an ass: in which places it is in the plural number. I am not sure that the plural form of it occurs in this acceptation any where else. There is a high degree, no doubt, of *dominion*, *dignity*, and *majesty*, in being the proprietor of an ox, or an ass, or a sheep; a degree eminently worthy of a departure from the ordinary established principles of language to express it. I should think it, for my own part, more simple and reasonable to conclude, that since, throughout the context of the passages referred to, the word, *when not in construction with the pronoun suffix*, is in the *singular number*, and only assumes an apparently *plural* form, when *in* such construction, (a variation not readily accounted for on the principles of the *rule* in question; the *dominion* of the master over his ox or his ass, and his *dignity* as its possessor, continuing the same)—either that Boli is used as a singular form of the noun, when in these circumstances of regimen,* or that *owner* in the singular, and *owners* in the plural, are used promiscuously, because an ox, or an ass, or a sheep, may be the property either of one owner, or of more than one.

4thly. With respect to the word Adnim, to which Mr. Yates confines his examples of the rule; it is, first of all, to be noticed, that in no one of the instances which are adduced by him, does it occur in its full plural form, Adnim. It is, in every one of them, in a state of regimen with some pronominal affix, and

* Gousset, in his *Commentarii Linguæ Ebraicæ* (to which my attention has been directed since writing the above), in a long and ingenious defence of the argument for a plurality of persons in the Godhead from the plural form of Elohim, expresses, I observe, a similar opinion:—"Nam ad id," says he, "allegantur dictiones Boli, Adoni, constructæ sic aut cum affixis; sed dubitari potest annon sint vere singulares, quibus י, ex proprio quodam ingenio (ut præpositioni אלי אל) accrescat: (quod etiam infra ita se habere ostendatur:) hic autem, nullum de nominis Aleim pluralitate dubium est."—*Gussetii Comm. Ling. Ebr.* p. 51. Amstel. 1702. Wilson himself (p. 152 of his grammar) mentions the words for *Father*, *Brother*, and *Father-in-law*, as assuming Yot before the affixes; אביך *thy Father*, *his* אחיו *Brother*, חמיה *her Father-in-law*. May not Bol be another instance of the same kind? In a note, too, page 264, he says, "Yot is often added to prepositions and adverbs, *euphoniæ causa*." May not this be the case with other words besides?

appears in the form of ADNI. I am not quite such a Tyro as to be ignorant that the MEM of the plural termination is dropt in such circumstances. But I find ADNI considered by some Hebrew grammarians as a form of this noun in the *singular number*.

Thus, *Parkhurst*: "9. י postfixed is formative in some nouns, both substantive, as אדני, (ADNI) Lord, פרי fruit; and adjective," &c. Thus, too, *Pike*: "אדון, אדן, אדני, (ADNI) a Master, a Lord, a Sustainer." *Allix*, also, in his "Judgment of the Jewish Church against the Unitarians," (a scarce, and, in some respects, a valuable work) says: "This notion of plurality must have sunk deep into the minds of the Jews, seeing they have constantly read the word *Jehovah*, which is singular, with the vowels of the word *Adonai*, which is plural, instead of ADONI, *which is singular*." (Page 132.) See also, for the opinion of another learned Hebrean, the preceding *Note*.

The only instance in which I find *Adnim* in its complete and decidedly plural form, and yet translated by the singular (with exception of those which relate to Jehovah), occurs in 1 Kings xxi. 17. "These have no *master*," (Heb. *masters*:) in which case, although the expression refers to the fall of Ahab, we yet should not feel as if the sense were very palpably violated, as to the state to which his fall reduced the people, although the plural had been retained in the translation.

5thly. Had the rule in question been a *common* idiom of the language, we might very reasonably have expected to find it in application, in the case of such words as King, Prince, Ruler, and many others of a similar description, which convey the ideas of dominion, dignity, and majesty, surely much more impressively than the word used for the owner or master of an ox or an ass. No such instances, however, are adduced.

6thly. While the *commonness* of this rule or idiom is far from being established by the facts in the practice of the language, I almost wonder that it should not: because it appears to me, that an idiom of this kind would find an origin so natural, in the very circumstance of the name of the One God in three persons having a plural form. In him are concentrated all the ideas we can

form, and infinitely more, of dominion, dignity, and majesty. And, in these circumstances, it might have been highly natural for the Hebrews, to give a plural termination to other words in their language, expressive of similar qualities and attributes.

3. The last observation is applicable, with particular force, to the case of *false Gods*. It is surely not at all a surprising thing, that when the plural name has been applied to the true God, it should be used also in application to the idols of the heathen. There is nothing more wonderful in the name being so used *in the plural form*, than in its being so used *at all*. The same principle which accounts for the name God being given to heathen Deities *at all*, will equally well account for its being given to them in the particular form in which it is applied to the true God. "We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no other God but one." Yet the name of God is given to them in the Scriptures, in accommodation to the false conceptions and customary phraseology of their deluded worshippers. We never think of inferring that idols in general possess divinity, from their being called *Gods;* and neither do we infer, on the same principle, plurality in the particular idol, from the plural name of the One God being used in speaking of it. The circumstance of the plural name being applied to individual idols, does not, therefore, by any means "*show the futility*" of the reasoning against which Mr. Yates argues; because, if the name was first given to the true God, and then transferred in its application to false Gods, the cause of its assuming the plural form in its *primary* application, may, after all, have been what we allege, the threefold distinction in the Divine Unity. And, if these remarks be well founded, the reason which accounts for the use of the plural name of God, when a false Deity is spoken of, will, of course, account also for the occurrence, on such occasions, of any peculiarities of syntactical phraseology which arise out of it.

4. Mr. Yates mentions, that many of the most learned Trinitarians have rejected the argument from the plural form of the name of God. Who these *many* are, I am not at present very careful to inquire. The argument may be a tolerably sound one

after all; even although Calvin himself should have questioned it. "That celebrated man," says Mr. Yates, "had too much learning, and too much sense, to build his system on such a sandy foundation." The answer to this is, *So have we.* We do not *build our system* on this foundation. It is only one consideration among many, which mutually derive and communicate strength to one another. Even if Mr. Yates should make out this to be sand, we have abundance of solid rock besides. With respect to learning (that is, *Hebrew learning*—the only description of learning that has to do with the case) we have higher authorities on our side than Calvin.

The following is the conclusion to which Gousset draws his argument, in the learned work before referred to: "Ex his sequitur pluralem de Deo locutionem propriè ac in tota vi sua sumendam, ut idiomatis Ebraicæ linguæ obtemperetur; ideoque fatendum esse illam pluralitatem in Deo disertissimè et validissimè asseri." *Comm. Ling. Ebr.* p. 52.—"From these considerations it follows, that the plural form of speech concerning God, is to be taken strictly and in its full force, if we would comply with the idiom of the Hebrew tongue; and that therefore it ought to be acknowledged, that by this phraseology, plurality in Deity is most distinctly and strongly affirmed."—In the same connexion he expresses himself in these remarkable words —"At inquis, pluralitati isti obstat Dei natura. Ego, contra, quî scis? plus valet locutio Dei qui scit, quam ratiocinatio tua, qui nescis. Regeris, sunt aliæ causæ pluralis locutionis. Ego repono, propria et naturalis ejus causa est rerum insignitarum pluralitas: ex ea venire solet pluralis forma nominis, nec efficaciori modo illa indicari potuisset quam locutione ista et diserta et solenni. Omnis ergo humilis verbi Dei discipulus, quid ille dicat, bona fide, excipere studens acquiescat." *Ibid.* p. 52. "But you will say, This plurality is inconsistent with the nature of God. I ask, in return, How do you know that? The declaration of God, *who knows*, is of more weight than your reasoning, *who do not know.* There are other causes, you retort, of a plural form of speech. I answer, its proper and natural cause is plurality in the things signified. It is from *this* that the plural form of a noun

usually arises; nor could it have been indicated in a manner more effectual than by this description of phrase, at once elegant and consistent with use. Let every humble learner, therefore, of the word of God, settle it in his mind, to receive, in sincerity and truth, whatever he may dictate."

Kennicott himself, that master in Hebrew literature, maintains the validity of our argument. In mentioning the facts respecting the construction of ALEIM, when used as the name of the true God, I took for granted the correctness of the ordinary statement, that it is sometimes connected with *plural verbs*, as well as with plural adjectives and pronouns. In the following passage, Kennicott denies the accuracy of this statement, and places the argument in a different and interesting light:—"Marsilius Ficinus, qui etiam medio sec. 15. floruit, in tractatū de Christiana religione, cap. 30. ait—*se in disputationibus adversus Judæos translatione LXX. Interpretum libenter uti, ut eos egregiis illustrium Judæorum armis convinceret.* Hujus viri annotatio, quam statim proferemus, respicit rem consideratione dignissimam, quamvis eam ipse leviter attigerit. Est autem hæc—*Jungitur nomen Dei plurale verbo plurali in Reg. lib.* 2. '*Quæ est gens, ut populus Israël; propter quam* IVIT DEUS.' Veritas Heb. dicit IVERUNT DII. Dicere debuisset, tria dari loca in quibus *verbum* nunc *plurale* est, licet ibi nominativus ALEIM de *uno vero* DEO certissimè intelligendus sit. Tria loca sunt Gen. XX. 13.; XXXV. 7.; et 2 Sam. vii. 23. Notatu quidem dignum est, hanc differentiam fere semper observari; scilicet, quando plurale hoc nomen ALEIM de falsis diis usurpatur, verbum ipsi annexum *plurale* est; et quando de DEO adhibetur, verbum est *singulare*. Argumentum vero hac differentia nixum, sæpius adhibitum ad probandam *pluralitatem*, et tamen *unitatem*, in Numine Divino, non valet conclusè, nisi verba, in unum omnia, hoc modo annexa, *singularia* vel nunc sint, vel olim fuerint. Tum enim denique, quando probatum est, hanc regulam scribendi, prorsus peculiarem, ab omnibus Scriptoribus Divinis, et in singulis exemplis observari—tum denique, inquam, argumentum inde petes firmum, atque (uti videtur) minimè refellendum. Momenti igitur haud levis est, si notetur, tria verba, hujus regulæ exceptiones, pro certo esse corrupta: quum

liorum duo priora ab omnibus, quotquot reperiri potuerunt, Pentateuchi *Samaritani* exemplis corriguntur; tertiumque corrigitur a loco parallelo in ipso textu Hebraico 1 Chron. xvii. 21."—"Marsilius Ficinus, who also flourished in the middle of the 15th century, in a treatise on the Christian religion, chap. 30th, says, that in disputing against the Jews, he made liberal use of the translation of the Seventy, that he might overcome them with the excellent weapons of eminent countrymen of their own. The remark of this writer, which we are about to notice, respects a matter highly worthy of consideration, although he himself has touched it but lightly. It is this—In the 2d Book of Kings" (in our Bibles the 2d Book of Samuel,) "the plural name of God is joined to a plural verb—'What nation is like the people Israel, for which GOD WENT, &c.'—in the original Hebrew, GODS WENT. He ought to have said, that three passages are adduced, in which the verb is *now* in the plural number, although in all of them the nominative ALEIM is, without controversy, to be understood of the *one true God*. The three passages are, Gen. xx. 13.; xxxv. 7.; and 2 Sam. vii. 23. It is well deserving of notice, that the following distinction is almost invariably observed: namely, when this plural name ALEIM is used to signify *false Gods*, the verb connected with it is *plural;* but when it is a designation of GOD himself, the verb is *singular*. But the argument which rests on this distinction, frequently adduced to prove *plurality* and yet *unity* in the Godhead, is not conclusively valid, unless all the verbs, without exception, which are so connected, either *now are singular*, or *were so originally*. Then, however, when it has been shown, that this rule of writing, so entirely peculiar, is observed by all the sacred penmen, and in every instance; then, I say, you will obtain from the circumstance an argument, well founded, and, as it seems to me, incapable of refutation. It is, therefore, of no small consequence to observe, that the three verbs, in the cases of exception to this rule, are unquestionably corrupt readings; the two former being corrected by all the copies which have yet been discovered of the Samaritan Pentateuch; and the third by the parallel passage in the Hebrew text itself, 1 Chron. xvii. 21." (Dissert. Gener. p. 48. §. 100.)

Mr. Yates, with a contemptuous appeal to "those who have learned Hebrew," is pleased to school me for speaking of the plural name for God, and of certain constructions connected with it, as *anomalies*, or *irregularities*. (Page 152.) Does Mr. Yates, then, deny the existence of any principles of *general grammar?* If their existence is admitted, then peculiar idioms, even although uniform in their use in the particular language where they occur, are, with reference to such principles, in strict propriety of speech, *anomalous* or *irregular*. And it becomes a matter of curious and sometimes interesting speculation, to trace such idioms to their respective origins. Even if Mr. Yates had made it out that the constructions in question were agreeable to a *uniform* rule of Hebrew syntax, they would still be deviations from the principles of general grammar, and, in this view, anomalous. But we have seen that, so far from the rule which he quotes being uniform, he has not made it out to be even *common:* so that I am still warranted to say, that in Hebrew syntax itself the constructions in question are *anomalies*, or *irregularities*. In the latter of the two instances, indeed, in which he finds fault with me for so calling them, he fully admits that they are, after all, what he had just before denied them to be :—

"In the third place," says he, "Mr. Wardlaw argues for a plurality of persons in the Godhead, from the construction of the Hebrew names for God with *verbs*, sometimes in the singular number, and sometimes in the plural. This construction he calls an *anomaly* or *irregularity*. But those who have learned Hebrew know, that, when a *plural* noun is used to denote a *single* object (which is the case in various instances) the verb is sometimes put in the plural, out of regard merely to the plural termination of the noun." (P. 152.)—This is curious. He had before quoted with triumph the rule—"Nouns that express dominion, dignity, majesty, are *commonly* put in the plural." Now, we know that the occurrence, in the Hebrew Scriptures, of words expressive of such qualities, is *very frequent*:—yet here, in lieu of his *common rule*, we have the reduced and qualified phraseology; "it is the case *in various instances*." And with respect to the construction of such nouns with verbs in the plural, he says—"the verb is *some-*

times put in the "plural, out of regard merely to the plural termination of the noun." Now surely that which is done only *in various instances*, and *sometimes*, is admitted to be a deviation from the customary practice, or established usages of the language;—that is, to be an *anomaly* or *irregularity*.

I now come to Mr. Yates' strictures on the passages in which Deity is represented as speaking of himself in the plural number:—Let *us* make man in *our* image, after *our* likeness"—Let *us* go down, and there confound their language:"—"Whom shall I send, and who will go for *us?*"

My first remark here is, that Calvin, that "celebrated man," had neither so much learning, nor so much sense as to reject the argument for the Trinity derived from these. "Scio," says he, "multis nasutis ludibrio esse, quod ex verbis Mosis personarum distinctionem elicimus, ubi Deum sic loquentem inducit, *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram.* Vident tamen pii lectores quam frigide et inepte hoc velut colloquium induceret Moses, nisi subessent in uno Deo plures personæ. Jam quos alloquitur pater, certum est fuisse increatos: nihil vero increatum excepto ipso Deo, et quidem uno, &c."* "I am aware that our inferring a distinction of persons from the words of Moses, when he introduces God as saying, 'Let us make man in our image,' has been matter of mockery to many scoffers. The pious reader, however, will be sensible how tamely and inappropriately this would be introduced by Moses in the form of conversation, unless there subsisted a plurality of persons in the one God. Those whom the Father now addresses were without doubt uncreated;—but nothing is uncreated excepting God, and God is one," &c.

My next observation is, that when Mr. Yates represents us as setting these three texts in *opposition* to the "thousands and tens of thousands" of passages, which, by the use of *singular* pronouns, imply the unity of God, he forgets, or rather tries to make his reader forget, that we see no opposition between the thousands and the three:—that we consider the distinction implied in the three to be a distinction perfectly consistent with the unity implied in the thousands; and that we are as decided friends to the latter as to the former.

* Institutes, B. I. Ch. 13. Sect. 24.

Mr. Yates says, in another part of his work, (p. 67.)—"When God appears to Abraham, he thus speaks (Gen. xvii. 1, 2.) '*I* am the Almighty God; walk before *me* and be thou perfect: and I will make *my* covenant between *me* and thee? To represent the address of more persons than one, the following language would have been employed; *We* are the Almighty God (or Almighty Gods); walk before *us*, and be thou perfect; and *we* will make *our* covenant between *us* and thee." But this *supposed* language is precisely parallel to the language under discussion. *We* say that such language in the three passages in question *does* imply plurality of persons; while at the same time, the *unity* of God being so decidedly a doctrine of the same Book, we conclude that this plurality must (although in a way inexplicable by us) be consistent with unity. But what does Mr. Yates? He states the language which *would be used* if a plurality of persons were intended; and yet, when such language *is* used, he refuses to admit that it has any reference to plurality at all, and endeavours to explain it as *the language of majesty*. But alas! if this same language of majesty be also the language which would have been used, if three persons (by which Mr. Yates means *three gods*) had been intended; what a cloud would in that case have been thrown over the evidence for the fundamental article of the Divine unity, if the language of majesty had been uniformly employed by the Great Supreme!

In opposition to the Unitarian explanation of the three texts above quoted, I had alleged, in the first place, that "it is not consistent with fact, that the Supreme Being is ever represented in the Scriptures as using this particular style;" that is, the plural number as the language of majesty. "By this assertion," says Mr. Yates, "he (Mr. W.) only takes for granted the thing to be proved." (Page 155.) If the three passages themselves be considered as *included in the assertion*, Mr. Yates is perfectly correct; and I frankly admit the inadvertent inaccuracy of my expression. It is still true, however, that all the rest of the Bible is against the interpretation of these three passages as the language of majesty: for it is still true, that no other instances of this style of expression occur, and especially in those "most

sublime and solemn portions of Holy Writ, in which the Divine Majesty of heaven and earth is introduced as speaking;" where, surely, if any where, we might have expected to find it. The arguments, therefore, on this point, in a comparative view, stand thus: *We* can bring forward a multitude of passages from other parts of Scripture, which agree in proving that the Son and the Holy Spirit are God as well as the Father: that is, that there is in the Divine unity a distinction or plurality of persons: and we think it reasonable, to consider the particular expressions in question as arising also from the existence of this distinction, and as corroborative proofs of its reality. Our opponents, on the contrary, interpret these expressions as the language of majesty; but they can produce no other passages throughout the Scriptures, not even in those parts of them where it might most naturally be expected, in which the blessed God employs this style. Let the reader, then, determine between the two sides of the case.

I had said, in the second place, that "this was not, in point of fact, the style of the kings of the earth themselves in the time of Moses; and that no instance of it could be produced from the whole Bible."

In opposition to the latter part of this assertion, Mr. Yates produces the examples of Rehoboam, of Artaxerxes, of Christ, and of Paul. With regard to Paul, it is sufficient to observe, that when he uses the plural pronouns, *We*, *us*, *our*, in "expressing his own feelings and condition," he may naturally be supposed to include fellow-labourers as participating in those feelings and in that condition; such fellow-labourers as those whom he frequently associates with himself at the commencement of his letters: "Paul, and Sosthenes," 1 Cor. i. 1.: "Paul and Timothy," 2 Cor. i. 1.: "Paul and Timotheus," Phil. i. 1.: "Paul and Silvanus and Timotheus," 1 Thess. i. 1.: 2 Thess. i. 1. &c.

As to the instance adduced of Jesus Christ using the style in question, viz. John iii. 11. "*We* speak that which *we* know, and testify that which *we* have *seen*, and ye receive not *our* witness;" it is far from being a clear and decisive one. When Christ, in

this same sentence, addresses *an individual* by the pronoun *ye*, evidently including *others* along with *Nicodemus*, is it perfectly certain that in using the pronoun *we*, he does not include *others* along with himself? Some accordingly understand him as associating with his own the testimony of the Baptist: others conceive that he includes the testimony of the Father and of the Spirit: (compare John viii. 18.: xv. 26.:) while others still, think it more simple and natural to interpret the language as that of authority.* Something forcible might be said in support of each of these explanations: and, at the risk of having prejudice imputed to me as the source of my indecision, I profess myself at a loss to determine which of them should have the preference.

Mr. Yates' commentary on the case of *Rehoboam* appears to me quite inconsistent with the character of that foolish and self-willed prince, as developed by his conduct. In consulting the *old* men, he uses the singular number: "How do ye advise that *I* may answer this people?"—"But when he consults the *young* men," says Mr. Yates, "he assumes a higher tone, and says, 'What counsel give ye, that *we* may answer this people?'" Now it seems to me, on the contrary, that Rehoboam was aware of the prudence of these aged counsellors of his father, and had a pretty shrewd guess of the kind of advice he was likely to get from them. He did not like the old greybeards, and contemned the moderation of their counsels. He had more of the imperious self-will, than of the modest diffidence of youth. It is natural, therefore, to suppose, that, if he was stately to either, it should have been to these old men. With his young companions, who were brought up with him, with whom he was in habits of intimacy, who knew his character, and were aware what kind of advice would be most agreeable,—he probably, instead of assuming "*a higher tone*," assumed the style of *familiarity*, associating them with himself, and speaking of the answer he should give the people, as given by *them* as well as by himself, because given *by their counsel*. The reader may judge for himself between the two views.

The only remaining instance is that of *Artaxerxes*, Ezra iv. 18. "The letter which ye sent unto *us* hath been plainly read

* See Doddridge, Not. in loc.

before me." Although it is a circumstance somewhat singular that the Royal style should be assumed and relinquished within the compass of this short sentence, I shall admit this to be a solitary instance in the Bible, of the plural number being used by a king, when speaking in his own person; and shall give up, as *thus far* too unqualified, the assertion, that no one instance of this was to be found in the Scriptures. Here *is one*. *Valeat quantum valere potest.*

Unfortunately, however, for Mr. Yates, Artaxerxes did not live in the days of Moses; and therefore my other assertion "that the plural style was not the style of the kings of the earth in his time," which is the one immediately in point to the present argument, stands entirely unaffected by the instance. On *this* assertion, indeed, Mr. Yates attempts to make himself witty at my expense. But his wit falls very harmless—*telum imbelle, sine ictu.* My *documents*, as both he and every other reader were perfectly aware, are the writings of Moses himself. If the style was then in use, it might be expected we should find some traces of it there. But nothing of the kind is discoverable; and yet this writer is supposed to ascribe the words in question to Jehovah, on the principle of the plural style being the customary style of majesty; and even to introduce him as using them, when there was not a king or a human being in existence on the earth.

Mr. Yates closes his observations on these three passages in the following words:—"It is agreeable to the established usages of speech, for a single person to employ the plural pronouns, *we*, *us*, *our*, in order to denote his dignity and authority, whereas there is no rule, according to which several persons can speak of themselves by the use of the singular pronouns, *I*, *me*, *my*. Let the considerate and serious inquirer, therefore, make his choice; whether he will yield to the authority of thousands and tens of thousands of passages, which teach that God is only one person, and understand the three exceptions to the general language of the Scriptures as phrases employed to denote the majesty of the speaker; or whether he will, on the other hand, adhere to the literal meaning of these three passages, and conse-

quently set at defiance those thousands and tens of thousands of other passages, which cannot, by any rules of grammar, or canons of criticism, be reconciled to the orthodox doctrine of a plurality of persons in the Godhead." (Page 157.)

This is, no doubt, "the language of *majesty*:" but it wants a quality infinitely better, the quality of "simplicity and godly sincerity." How often must Mr. Yates be reminded, that the Divine *unity* is as essential an article of the "orthodox" faith, as of its opposite? Forget what he may, he never forgets to forget this. The serious inquirer need not "*set at defiance*" the thousands of passages, which assert or imply the unity of God. God forbid that he should! The denial of that doctrine would be an error of still more alarming magnitude, than the denial of the distinction of persons in the Godhead. According to the principles before laid down, he may hold both doctrines, as matters of Divine revelation, without pretending to comprehend the *manner* of their consistency. If our views of the Bible be just, the *unity* of God is not *rightly* held, unless it be held as a unity that consists with, and involves a threefold distinction; and, on the other hand, the doctrine of this distinction is essentially perverted, unless it be held in inseparable connexion with the Divine unity.

With regard to that remarkable text, Gen. iii. 22. which I cannot but consider as belonging to the same class with the other three, Mr. Yates disjoins it from them, and adopts a different principle of solution for the difficulty which it presents to his system:—

"Behold the man is become AS ONE OF US, *to know good and evil*."

On this text, Mr. Yates thus writes:—"The expression ONE OF US evidently alludes to more persons, or intelligent beings, than one. But to prove that they were persons *in the Godhead* is impossible. The only attribute which they are affirmed to possess is the knowledge of good and evil. If, therefore, it be conceded, that there are any intelligent beings, inferior to the supreme Deity, who resemble man in the capacity of distinguishing between good and evil, to them, we may reasonably suppose,

the allusion was made. That there are such beings is evident, among other passages, from the 5th verse of this chapter, which accords remarkably with that under review, and directly points to its true interpretation ; ' In the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be *as Gods*, (or angels) *knowing good and evil.*' The assertion, therefore, ' the man is become *as one of us*,' signifies, not that the man was become like one of the persons in the Godhead ; but that he was become like one of the persons *in the heavenly host*, resembling them in the knowledge of good and evil." (Pages 157, 158.)

On this singular passage I observe,

1st. It is here admitted (for how indeed could it be denied ?) that these words imply the idea of *plurality ;* and that they are incapable of being interpreted on the principle adopted for the three former texts, as being the language of *majesty*, used by *one person.*

2dly. The introduction, in this way, of a different principle of interpretation, is *arbitrary* in the extreme. The same persons who are represented as saying, " *Let* us *make man*," ought, on all reasonable principles of exposition, to be understood as also speaking here—" Behold the man is become *as one of* us." If the Creator speaks in the plural at the formation of man, why not the Lawgiver and Governor at the fall of man ? That system is surely suspicious, which obliges its supporters to have recourse to two different expedients, or grounds of solution, for the same phraseology, in the same context, and used by the same speaker.

3dly. I appeal to the common sense and to the piety of my readers, whether it be natural, or consistent with right impressions of the majesty of the Divine Being, to suppose him thus placing himself on a footing with his creatures ; taking them in along with himself, as belonging to the same class or description of beings ; speaking to his angels, in terms of familiarity, as if he were only *primus inter pares* :—" *as one of* us !"

4thly. While the circumstance of Mr. Yates' adducing a proof from the context of the existence of angels, lets us into a secret of his creed, in which, I believe, he differs from some of his bre-

thren; I mean the belief that there are such spiritual beings;—not only is the proof itself invalid, but the text from which it is drawn, so far from supporting his views as to Jehovah's including these spirits with himself, by the plural pronoun, is decisive in favour of the opposite. The text is—"the serpent said unto the woman, ye shall not surely die: for God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." So our translation stands. But there seems to be no propriety in rendering the same word (the name of God) in the *singular* number, and in its *supreme* sense, in the *former* part of the verse, and in the *plural* number, and *inferior* sense, in the *latter*. In my mind it admits of no doubt, that the true translation of the Devil's words is, "God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil." This gives the temptation all its force, and all its malignity; and at the same time preserves the same word (and a leading word too) from shifting its meaning in the same short sentence: a principle of grammar from which hardly any plea short of necessity can justify a deviation. Mr. Yates could not be ignorant that different critics and expositors had assigned this meaning to the word. I had given the translation myself, (although without any comment) in my first Discourse, within a few pages of the passage on which he was commenting. It is one which, I think, must commend itself to Mr. Yates' own judgment, if he allows his judgment its free and unbiassed exercise. And if it be well founded, then we have only to compare the expression "ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil," with the expression, "behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil," to determine irrefragably the validity of the argument derived from the latter, for a plurality of persons in the Divine unity. The two expressions, occurring in the narrative of the same event, are correlatives;—and ought to be interpreted as having the same reference, and the same extent of meaning. According to the interpretation just given, this is strictly the case. According to the other interpretation, it is far from being so. The *temptation itself* is, "ye shall be as *gods*,"

(or *angels;*) *the supreme God not being at all included:*—but in the record of the success and effect of the temptation, He *is* included. He does not then address his angels, and say, "the man is become as one of YOU;" which would have accorded with the language of the temptation, if *Aleim* meant angels; but he *goes beyond the extent of the temptation,*—by including *Himself:* "the man is become as one of US."

CHAPTER III.

MR. YATES goes on, in Chapter III. of Part III. to examine the evidence for a TRINITY of persons in the Godhead.

The first thing that strikes us here is what I must, however reluctantly, call by its proper appellation, a piece of shameful imposition on the inattentive and simple reader, arrayed too in all the pomp, and impressed with all the emphasis, of capitals: "In order that we may judge," says Mr. Yates, "whether the Scriptural evidence for the doctrine of the Trinity is such as this case seems to demand, it will be advisable to collect together into one view, all the passages which are commonly supposed to contain it." Then follows:

"A LIST OF ALL THE PASSAGES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT, WHICH ASSERT, IN TERMS MORE OR LESS DIRECT AND EXPRESS, THAT IN THE UNITY OF THE GODHEAD THERE ARE THREE DISTINCT SUBSISTENCES OR PERSONS, THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT." (Page 160.)

Subjoined to this title, which is, of course, intended to have, in the minds of the inconsiderate, all the effect of a pillory for the hapless Trinitarians, there are no fewer than *seven texts!* I have called this a shameful imposition. I should rather have called it an *attempt* at imposition: for he must be ignorant indeed of his Bible, and of the state of this controversy, with whom it can succeed. With every person possessed of the slightest knowledge of either, it must be utterly impotent. Did Mr. Yates feel no "*compunc-*

tious visitings" while he wrote this? Did no blush of secret shame suffuse his countenance? Did he venture to indulge a self-complacent satisfaction in the felicity and originality of the thought, and in fancying how it might *take* with his readers? I pity him if he did.

Mr. Yates has given (p. 65.) a *list* of passages asserting the Divine unity. Were any person to ask "Are these all? he could instantly confront the inquiry with *thousands and tens of thousands*," that teach the same doctrine by implication. On the same principle, I have said: "The argument in support of the doctrine of the Trinity is not, by any means, completed, when those passages of Scripture have been adduced, in which that doctrine is asserted or implied in its full extent; in which, that is, all the three persons of the Godhead are introduced together. The proofs of the divinity of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, form distinct portions of the same body of evidence; all bearing directly on the same great general truth." (P. 29.) The justice of this observation, Mr. Yates himself fully admits. After quoting it, he says, (p. 159.) "I agree with him, that all the passages which contain evidence of the divinity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit bear upon the subject. For if Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit be two intelligent beings,* each distinct from God the Father, and if each of them be proved to be infinite in all perfections, it will necessarily follow, that there exist three infinite and all-perfect minds, or, in other words, three persons in the Godhead." This is a distinct admission (although in such terms as might be expected from a Unitarian) of the pertinence to the establishment of the Trinity of all the proofs of the Divinity of Christ and of the Spirit. But what he immediately subjoins is truly surprising. "It would, however, be impossible," says he, "to reconcile this fact, supposing it proved, with a belief in one God only;" (very true, according to *his* statement of the fact;) "nor ought we to be satisfied with any attempts to establish a doctrine so obscure and so important as that of the Trinity, mere-

* It would be endless to be commenting, every time I quote such passages, on Mr. Yates' phraseology, which is uniformly and studiedly framed to convey to his reader's mind an erroneous conception of our sentiments.

ly by showing that the Scriptures assert, in *separate* places, the Divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as well as the Divinity of the Father." Here is self-contradiction with a witness. In the sentences first quoted, the proof under consideration is distinctly admitted to be valid and conclusive: if it can be brought and substantiated, "*it will necessarily follow*," says Mr. Yates, "that there are three persons in the Godhead." Yet in the sentences of the same paragraph last quoted, it is as distinctly denied that it is a kind of proof with which we should at all be "*satisfied*." That is, we should not be *satisfied* with evidence from which the conclusion *will necessarily follow*.

But the *reason* why we should not be satisfied is a very wonderful one. Although we should succeed in proving, from the testimony of the Scriptures, that the Father is God, that the Son is God, and that the Holy Spirit is God, we must not, it seems, believe, or at least, we are not bound to believe it to be so, because, forsooth, the proofs are in "*separate*" places of the Bible! Who is this that presumes thus to dictate to the Infinitely Wise the precise manner in which he must communicate instruction, before his creatures are obliged to receive it, and to be *satisfied* with it? Let Mr. Yates apply his own excellent remark, in another part of his volume: "if we study the Scriptures with true humility and piety: we shall be thankful for every portion of God's word *as it is*, and endeavour to improve it wisely."

Had Mr. Yates, then, been so ingenuous, as to give a true list of passages in support of the Trinity, it ought, even upon his own showing, to have consisted, not only of the texts which assert the doctrine fully, introducing formally all the three persons; but of all those which are adduced as proofs of the supreme Divinity of the Son and the Spirit. Let him present such a list; and while (as might be expected) there may be some of them fanciful and inconclusive, we shall not be fearful of his appeal to the "candid reader," to "peruse the list, and seriously ask himself, whether the passages here brought together, would at once strike the mind of an unprejudiced inquirer with a conviction, that the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead is laid down in the Holy Scriptures."

Mr. Yates arranges his seven texts in the order in which they occur in the Bible. In this way, it so happens, that the two with which he begins are passages which were introduced by me at the close of my *ninth* Discourse, after having gone through all the evidence I had thought it necessary to adduce in support of the Divinity of Christ and of the Spirit. The two passages are Num. vi. 23—26, and Isa. vi. 3.

"With respect to the two first passages on the list," says Mr. Yates, (the benediction pronounced by the Hebrew priests, and the solemn praise uttered by the Seraphim) "Mr. Wardlaw only produces them as containing 'a *tacit reference* to the Trinity of persons in the Godhead.' But how was it possible that this tacit reference could be perceived before the doctrine was clearly declared? Can we imagine a more preposterous inversion of ideas and evidences, than that which is attributed to the Author of revelation, by supposing the *references* to a doctrine to come first in order, and the explicit statement of it afterwards? However Trinitarians may surmount this difficulty, they must remember, that an allusion to a doctrine is not a proof of it." (Pages 161, 162.)

There is an art in giving a greater degree of prominence to an argument than it was thought entitled to by the opponent who adduced it; in making it appear in the light of a *principal*, when it was only brought forward as an *accessory*, and with an expressly specified *conditional probability*. I know not whether I am to reckon this a specimen of Mr. Yates' generalship or not. If it was so meant, it is by no means a master-stroke. He surely ought to have noticed the *place* and the *manner* of my introducing the text in question. My words are: "When such passages as our text," (viz. Matthew xxviii. 19.) "and the two on which I have now been commenting" (viz. 1 Cor. xiii. 14. and Rev. i. 4, 5.) "are considered, it becomes more than probable, that in the threefold benediction enjoined by Jehovah himself to be pronounced on the people of Israel, by the priests under the law, there was a tacit reference to the Trinity of persons in the Godhead: 'The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; the Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious to thee: the

LORD lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace !' and also, that same glorious doctrine is recognised in the solemn and impressive language of angelic adoration : ' Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty ! the whole earth is full of his glory.' " (Page 293.) Now Mr. Yates (although in terms abundantly wary) admits almost as much when he adds to the sentences quoted above : " If the doctrine of the Trinity were previously established, we might perhaps not irrationally presume, that the three persons in the Godhead were referred to in the threefold praise and benediction : but we cannot make such an application until we know that there are three persons in the Godhead." (P. 162.) The reader, therefore, is at liberty to form his own judgment of the mass of other evidence in support of the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead ; and then to interpret the phraseology of these texts, either as containing a *tacit reference* to that doctrine, or as designed only to give *intensity* to the sentiment, just as he may find his mind affected by the evidence.

But *tacit reference !* How, says Mr. Yates, can this be ? His reasoning in the above extract, considering its feebleness, is certainly couched in terms of sufficient confidence. It *ought* to be enough to remind Mr. Yates ; it *will* be enough, I presume, to remind my readers, that the whole of the ancient Mosaic economy was just a system of *tacit references*, or comparatively obscure allusions, to doctrines which were afterwards to be more fully developed.

With respect to Isa. xxxiv. 16. and Isa. xlviii. 48. Mr. Yates " cannot conjecture what my arguments from them could be, and therefore cannot answer them." I shall not pretend to divine the cause of his inability to conjecture ; but shall only say *negatively*, that I do not believe it to have been any obtuseness of intellect. " I shall only remark," he says, " concerning the former of these passages, that the pronoun MY, which he has printed in small capitals, and upon which therefore, I presume, his argument depends, as it appears to me, has nothing corresponding to it in the original Hebrew." It so happens, however, that it has all that corresponds to it in the original Hebrew, in every instance, so far as I have observed, in which the phrase

"*my mouth*" occurs. It is the common form of the phrase in that language. And Mr. Yates, as one of "*those who have learned Hebrew*," ought to have known this, and known the reason of it. With respect to Isa. lxviii. 16. let the reader consult the passage with its context. He will find a greater than the prophet evidently the speaker: and yet He speaks of himself as *sent* by Jehovah, and by the Spirit of Jehovah. And although Mr. Yates alleges that "the expression 'God hath sent me' cannot, without an almost profane violation of common sense, be considered as the speech of God himself," the reader will be at no loss for a solution of this difficulty, at no loss to account for a *Divine person* being *sent*, when he recollects, that Jesus, though in the form of God, took upon him the form of a servant; and that in the prophecies, in innumerable instances, he both speaks, and is spoken of, in this capacity.

Matth. xxviii. 19. I am disposed to admit, that my language, in affirming that this passage *necessarily* implies an act of worship, was too strong and unqualified. That it *does*, I still have no doubt. But I am satisfied that this arises, in a considerable degree, from my views of the nature of the ordinance of baptism, along with my previous conviction of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Mr. Yates, however, reasons as if the whole strength of my argument from the passage arose from this consideration alone: —"Does the expression 'to be baptized into a person or thing, or into the name of a person or thing,' signify that that object or thing is made an *object of worship*, or only that it is made a *subject of faith?* The former interpretation is advanced by Mr. Wardlaw, and rests upon his unsupported assertion,—&c." (page 164);—as if I excluded from my interpretation of the passage all idea of *profession of faith;* which does not seem very necessarily to follow, from my saying that the initiatory rite of baptism, prescribed in these words, "*involves in it*" an act of solemn worship. Indeed, so far is my argument from resting either solely or chiefly upon this circumstance, that when the passage is introduced by me the first time (which is in my first Discourse among the proofs of the Trinity in general) I have not so much as alluded to this view of it.

In his comments on the text, Mr. Yates has failed just in the point which it was most essential to his argument that he should prove. He produces no instance of *the name of a thing* being used as a phrase for *the thing itself.* "The name of a person," he says, "is an expression often used to signify the person himself;" and he produces *one* example from the 20th Psalm; along with instances, in which "*baptized into Christ*," and "*baptized into the name of Christ*," are used as parallels.—But no example, alas! of *the name* of an influence, or energy, or operation, used for the influence, energy, or operation itself. And, failing in this, he fails *entirely.* The question stands unanswered, "What are we to make of the phrase, '*the name of the Holy Spirit*,' if the Holy Spirit means an attribute, or a power, or influence?" Or, if it signify *miracles and spiritual gifts*, what parallel shall we find to such phraseology as *the name of miracles and spiritual gifts*, for the *miracles and spiritual gifts themselves?*—May I request the reader, after perusing Mr. Yates' strictures, to read again pages 15—18, and 266—269, of my former volume, and judge for himself, how far, after allowing the slight deduction which I have myself made above, the reasoning is at all invalidated.

Mr. Yates makes the meaning of the appointed formula to be, "go and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them as a testimony *of their belief* in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit:" (P. 166.) and afterwards he approves the view given from the baptismal service of the English Church, which he thus sums up:—"The Catechumen, before being immersed in water, avowed his faith in the doctrines of the Christian religion, first, concerning the Father, secondly, concerning the Son, and thirdly, concerning the Holy Spirit." (P. 168.)—He then concludes his remarks on the passage in these words: "If therefore, Mr. Wardlaw would have taken the trouble to inquire into the application of the phraseology in the other parts of Scripture, and into the sense attributed to the words by all the primitive Christians, he might have spared his ridicule of Dr. Lardner's most excellent paraphrase of this passage." (Page 168.) Dr. Lardner's paraphrase is repeated in a note:—"Go ye, therefore, into

all the world, and teach or disciple all nations, baptizing them into the profession of faith in, and an obligation to obey, the doctrine taught by Christ, with authority from God the Father, and confirmed by the Holy Ghost." Now it is a little curious to observe, that, while Mr. Yates in *his own* paraphrase, makes the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in the text, the *subjects* of the faith professed in baptism, and expresses his agreement in this with Whitby, and Tillotson, and the English Catechism; the *most excellent paraphrase* of Dr. Lardner does no such thing, but is constructed on a totally different principle. There is nothing in it about being baptized into the faith of the doctrine *concerning* the Father, and *concerning* the Son, and *concerning* the Holy Spirit; but of the doctrine *taught by* the Son (whatever the subjects of it might be) with authority from the Father, and confirmed by the Holy Spirit. The Son here is not at all introduced as the *subject* of the faith himself, but as the *teacher of the doctrine* which *is* the subject of faith; the Father, in like manner, is not a subject of faith, but the *source of authority;* nor is the Holy Spirit a subject of faith, but the *witness* (or rather the *evidence*) *of the doctrine* taught. These two paraphrases, therefore, are far from being alike. Yet Mr. Yates takes it for granted, that if I had well considered the former, I could not but have admitted the *excellence* of the latter.

The truth is, the instances adduced by Mr. Yates, to show the sense in which the words were understood by Trinitarian commentators, and by primitive Christians, viz. as meaning a profession of faith in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, are perfectly consistent with their holding this faith in the Father, Son, and Spirit, as faith in *one God, subsisting in three persons.* And Dr. Lardner's paraphrase, is a paraphrase which no one of those to whom Mr. Yates makes reference—neither Whitby, nor Tillotson, nor the Church of England, nor the primitive Christians, would have at all admitted: the interpretations quoted from them by Mr. Yates are entirely different.

In a note, page 164, Mr. Yates refers to Schleusner, and says, "This immensely learned critic, though a Trinitarian adopts the interpretation of Matth. xxviii. 19. which I have de-

fended." The words of the critic, under βαπτιζω, are—" βαπτιζειν εις το ονομα του πατρος, &c. h. e. baptismi ritu obstringere aliquem, doctrinæ de Deo, Messia, et Spiritu Sancto, a Christo ipso et per apostolos traditæ, ut legitur Matth. xxviii. 19."—and, under ονομα,—" βαπτιζειν εις το ονομα του πατρος &c. pro εις τον πατερα &c. But it is mere trifling to bring the authority of this " immensely learned critic" against me, when the explanation which he " adopts" is one which I have never denied. Schleusner believed the *Holy Spirit* to be a *person in the Godhead*, and therefore, when *he* speaks of being baptized into *the name of* the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, as equivalent to being baptized into the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, he speaks correctly. But this " immensely learned critic" had, as Mr. Yates says of Calvin, too much learning, and too much sense, to speak of being baptized into the *name* of *influence*, or *energy*, or *miracles*. Besides, who ever denied that the form of baptism included, and chiefly included, the idea of initiation into the Christian faith—into the faith of the doctrine concerning the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit? I certainly never thought of denying this. Nor do I yet see the inconsistency of holding this view, and considering the form, at the same time, as *involving* an act of solemn worship. But I complain of Mr. Yates, that he has expended the whole of his reasoning against this latter idea, as if the argument from the passage depended upon it alone. He saw, no doubt, that this was the weakest point of attack, and, like a skilful general, he brought his troops to bear upon it. But unfortunately, it is a point of attack, which, even when it has been gained, affords no entrance into the citadel.

On 2 Cor. xiii. 14. Mr. Yates says, (p. 169.) " Paul only expresses, in one sentence, three devout wishes for his fellow Christians, one relating to the favour of Christ, the other to the love of God, and the third to their participation in spiritual blessings."

On this passage, I must take the liberty of transcribing a paragraph or two from my eleventh Discourse, which Mr. Yates has overlooked:—

" Two inquiries, then, present themselves on this part of the

subject:—What is meant by '*having* the Spirit of Christ?'—and, What is the legitimate scriptural evidence of the possession?

"In answer to the first of these inquiries, it may be observed, that our '*having* the Spirit of Christ' is obviously of equivalent import with his '*dwelling in us*.' The simple comparison of the preceding clause of the verse with the latter, which forms our text, is sufficient to show this: 'But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit: if so be that the Spirit of God *dwell in you*: now if any man *have not* the Spirit of Christ'—(the same Spirit, observe, called the *Spirit of God* in the one clause, and the *Spirit of Christ* in the other)—'if any man have not the Spirit of Christ,' (that is, *dwelling in him*) 'he is none of his.' Similar expressions are not uncommon in the New Testament. 'Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God *dwelleth in you?*'*—'What! know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, *which is in you*, which ye have of God?'†—'I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, that he may *abide with you* forever: even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him; for he *dwelleth with you*, and *shall be in you*.'‡

"Such expressions (especially those last quoted, from the lips of Jesus himself) serve to throw a clear and simple light on an apostolic phrase, to which I had occasion formerly to refer, in proof of the Divinity and Personality of the Spirit—'*the communion of the Holy Ghost*.'§ The idea expressed by the word *communion*,—or *fellowship*—accords precisely with that conveyed by our Saviour's words—'that he may *abide with you*,'—'he *dwelleth with you*,'—'he *shall be in you*.' The apostle wishes, in behalf of the Corinthian believers, the fulfilment of this gracious promise of their Lord. It is the same word that is used,‖ when Christians are described as having fellowship with the Father, and with the Son: 'That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have *fellowship* with us:

* 1 Cor. iii. 16. † 1 Cor. vi. 19. ‡ John xiv. 16, 17.
§ 2 Cor. xiii. 13. ‖ Κοινωνια.

and truly our *fellowship* is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ.'* And in using this language, John seems evidently to have had in mind the words of his Master, as recorded by himself, in the same Discourse with those formerly quoted in reference to the Holy Spirit, and in immediate connexion with them: 'Jesus answered, and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and *we will come unto him, and make our abode with him.*' "†

In these various passages, from the gospel and first epistle of John, we have brought before us "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit." Jesus himself, although about to leave his disciples, declares that he would still be with them in the intimate fellowship of mutual love. In this he associates himself with his Father, in terms which we cannot suppose a mere created messenger of God to have used, without the most offensive presumption: "He shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and WE will come unto him, and make OUR abode with him." And in language precisely similar, he promises the Holy Spirit, as another comforter, who was to *come to them*, to *abide* with them, to *dwell* with them, to *be in* them.

"'The communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all,' implies," says Mr. Yates, (p. 171.) "that the Holy Spirit does not, in this instance, signify God, or any *person*. What can possibly be intended by the *communion of God?* Is God divided? Can we *partake* of God, or of any *person?* No; but we may partake of *powers*, *energies*, and *influences;* we may enjoy a communion of *spiritual gifts*."—We may enjoy a communion OF gifts WITH persons: but a *participation of a person* is an idea which cannot enter the mind." But the Apostle Paul was not so scrupulous. He speaks of Christians as "being made *partakers of Christ*." Here is *participation of a person;* and the phrase surely expressed an idea that was *in* his own mind, and was intended to "*enter the minds*" of those to whom he wrote. The expression is never imagined to disprove the *personality of Jesus Christ:* neither therefore does the other expression (however confidently

* 1 John i. 3. † John xiv. 23.

and scornfully Mr. Yates may affirm it) disprove the personality of the Holy Spirit. For, supposing "the communion of the Holy Spirit" to mean a participation of *Divine influences*, these influences may still be the influences OF the Holy Spirit, just as being "*partakers of Christ*" signifies enjoying a participation, not of himself personally, but of the effects of his mediation.

With regard to Mr. Yates' *parallel passage*, which he seems to consider as so incontrovertible a proof that the text in question contains no evidence of the Divinity of Christ and of the Spirit; namely the conclusion of Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians; he first writes the verses thus—"The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all; *my love* be with you all in Christ Jesus;" and then he thus comments: "Here we find coupled together in the same manner 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,' and 'the love *of Paul*.' If therefore the conclusion of the second epistle, in which Jesus Christ, God, and the Holy Spirit, are mentioned in conjunction, proves the divinity of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit, the conclusion of the *first* epistle, in which Paul is in like manner associated with Jesus Christ, proves the divinity of Paul."—This is, no doubt very smart; and a Socinian may possibly think it very conclusive;—a perfect Q. E. D. But for my own part, I do not feel at all surprised that Mr. Yates should, on this occasion, have *complained* of his being "expected to bring a passage of Scripture to refute every criticism of his opponent, however groundless and unreasonable," when (to use a courteous expression of his own) he felt himself obliged to have recourse to such "*egregious trifling*." But what more could he do, than produce the best he could find, and *make the best of it? This* he certainly has done. By the substitution of a *semicolon* for a *period*, he contrives to bring the "grace of the Lord Jesus Christ" and the "love of Paul" into as close contact as possible, thus to give the two passages the nearer resemblance;—and then adds, "Here we see the grace of Christ and the love of Paul coupled together *in the same manner*." Yes; as nearly in the same manner, as, by this *little* manœuvre of the semicolon, could well be managed. But, in spite of all the arts of punctuation—"The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be

with you"—"My love be with you all in Christ Jesus," *will* remain *two distinct sentences*, and in this respect can never be parallel with the other. They are pointed as distinct sentences by Griesbach, and in every version, I presume, except that of Mr. Yates.—But there is another respect in which the parallel necessarily fails, to the entire prostration of Mr. Yates' confident conclusion.—When Paul says, "My love be with you all in Christ Jesus," he cannot be considered as uttering *a prayer*, or even as expressing a *wish or desire*. His words relate to feelings of which he was at the moment conscious in his own bosom, and contain a *declaration* of his affectionate regard and attachment to the believers at Corinth. This discrepancy in the sense renders the separation of the sentences still more complete, and the connecting virtue of the semicolon the more inefficient, in the attempt to unite them. In the other case on the contrary, there is evidently the utterance of a *wish*, a *desire*, a *prayer*,—of *one* prayer, in *one* sentence, consisting of *three distinct yet connected parts*. It may gratify the reader, to hear the comment of *Faustus Socinus himself* on this alleged parallel; which, after I had written the foregoing remarks, I found in his Disputation with Francis Davidis on the invocation of Christ. His opponent had said, in the same style with Mr. Yates: "Imo et ipsum Paulum nos invocare oportet, contra mentem et voluntatem ipsius, qui sibi talem tribui honorem noluit: 1 enim Cor. xvi. inquit, charitas mea sit cum omnibus vobis." To this Socinus (who, although holding Jesus Christ to be *a mere man*, most strangely argued, not for the *duty* indeed, but for the *liberty* of Christians to invoke or pray to him, on principles which we may hereafter notice)—to this Socinus replies:—"*In illis* verò, *Charitas mea sit cum omnibus vobis in Christo Jesu*, reponis ex tuo sensu verbum *sit*. In textu enim legitur, *Charitas mea cum omnibus vobis in Christo Jesu*. Veresimilius verò multum videtur, subaudiendum esse hoc loco verbum *Est*, quam *Sit;* ut sit sensus—*Diligo vos omnes in Christo Jesu;* id est, (ut explicat auctor eruditissimarum illarum litteralium annotationum in Novo Testamento a Roberto Steph. anno 1545 Lutetiæ edito, seu mavis in Bibliis Vatabli) *Diligo vos omnes propter Christum*, vel quod Christi

sitis. Qui sensus est planissimus et appositissimus. Quòd si verbum *sit* subaudias, vix conveniens sententia elici inde poterit; nisi dicimus, Paulum precare ut ament se mutuo in Christo Jesu, ea charitate qua ipse præditus erat."* "But in those words '*my love be with you all in Christ Jesus*,' you must throw out from your interpretation the verb *be*. For in the original text we read simply, '*my love with you all in Christ Jesus*:' and it seems much more likely that *is* should be applied, than *be*, so as to make the sense '*I love you all in Christ Jesus*;' that is, *I love you all for Christ's sake*, or, *because ye are Christ's*; which is a sense most simple and apposite. Whereas, if you supply the verb *be*, it is not easy to make out a suitable meaning, unless we suppose Paul to pray, that they might mutually love one another, with the same affection wherewith he himself was inspired."

I further refer the reader to what I have before written in my Discourses—pages 16, 17; 120; 139, 140; 290—292, &c.;—and then, let Mr. Yates' parallel have all the weight in his mind to which he may think it entitled.

Mr. Yates disposes of the next passage, Rev. i. 4, 5. with greater brevity, but, if possible, with still worse success. I had said on this passage, that "'*the seven Spirits of God*' is evidently an emblematical expression for the Holy Spirit."—Who the "many eminent Trinitarian critics" may be, who "are of a contrary opinion," I do not reckon it needful to inquire. But when Mr. Yates, on such an occasion, urges against me my own objection to many Unitarian interpretations of Scripture; namely, that the language is, on this supposition, "unnatural and affected," there is a variety of considerations of which he seems entirely to lose sight:—

1st. The Book of Revelation is full of emblematical representations;—and, in a book, expressly constructed on this principle, such language is so far from being *unnatural*, that we reasonably *expect to find it*, and should be sensible of a kind of incongruity were it otherwise. The same consideration sufficiently

* De Jesu Christi Invocatione Disputatio, &c. &c. Secunda Editio Racoviæ 1626—page 53.

accounts for the seven spirits being "*before the throne;*" which, without indicating inferiority of *nature*, *does* signify, that, in the economy of redemption, the Holy Spirit, in the exercise of all his various influences, proceeds from Him that sitteth on the throne, and from the Lamb.

2dly. Not only does the number *seven* frequently indicate *fulness* and *perfection;* but the correspondence between the *seven* churches, and the *seven* angels of these churches, with the *seven* Spirits of God, imparts (as I have observed on the passage in my Discourses, although Mr. Yates has not thought the circumstance worthy of notice) a peculiar beauty and interest to the emblem, as significant of the "fulness and sufficiency of his influences for the supply of the seven churches, (and, by obviously intended inference, of *all* his churches) with all needful grace."

3dly. Whatever Mr. Yates makes of the "*seven spirits*," there must, *at any rate*, be a figurative or emblematical representation. That *Divine influence* should be denominated "the seven spirits before the throne," does not seem to be a vast deal more simple and natural, than the sense which Mr. Yates rejects as unnatural and affected.

4thly. When Mr. Yates asks (p. 172) "If St. John meant to express a wish of favour from the Holy Spirit, why does he not say so," in plain terms? we answer, If he did *not* mean this, then what *did* he mean? He most certainly does express a *wish* (or a *desire* or *prayer*) in behalf of the churches, for "*grace and peace* to them, *from* the seven spirits before God's throne." What then *are* these seven spirits? are they, as usual, the Divine influence? If they be, then observe, in the *first* place, we have in the passage a wish or prayer for the same blessings, from *a person*, from an *influence* or *influences*, and from *another person*. This may seem natural enough to Mr. Yates. It does not seem so to me. In the *second* place, this interpretation identifies the second part of the prayer with the first. According to Mr. Yates on a former text, "the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you," means, "may you all share the gifts, and manifest the dispositions, which arise from the extraordinary influence of

God upon the members of the Christian church." Now, if, in the passage before us, "the seven spirits before the throne" signify also the Divine influence, or "the extraordinary influence of God upon the members of the Christian church," then we are tempted to ask, In what possible manner could grace and peace be to them from Him who is, and who was, and who is to come," that is, from God the eternal Father, *otherwise than by his influence upon them?* The second part of the prayer becomes, on this hypothesis, a mere *repetition* of the first. In the *third* place, the truth is, that this text is still more obviously conclusive in our favour than the former. In the former, the expressions were varied;—the *grace* of Christ, the *love* of God, the *communion* of the Spirit: but in this, the *same blessings* of "grace and peace" are specified, and they are desired or prayed for, in the same form, *from* the Father, and *from* the Spirit, and *from* the Son.

5thly. Mr. Yates seems to have felt the difficulty of this passage. Unfortunately for his own consistency, while, in the eighth chapter of his second part, he labours hard to prove, that whenever the phrase "Holy Spirit" is used in a *personal* acceptation, it means "the one true God, the Father;" and that, in its other occurrences, it signifies the Divine influence, either simply, or under the figure of personification; he appears to have been sensible that neither of these senses would do here, and yet that, after all, it must mean *a person;* for he closes his brief comment on the text in these most unexpected, and, on his principles, unaccountable terms: "Lastly, allowing it to be as evident as Mr. Wardlaw asserts, that the Holy Spirit is meant by the seven spirits before the throne of God, a wish of favour from the Holy Spirit, and from Jesus Christ, would only denote that they have the power of bestowing that favour; a power, as we learn from other parts of Scripture, conferred upon them by God the Father." Here we find Mr. Yates "*learning from other parts of Scripture,*" that the Holy Spirit is, equally with Jesus Christ, *a person*, receiving from God the Father power to bestow certain favours and gifts. Truth *will* sometimes force a way for itself, and be out. Let Mr. Yates only "learn from the Scriptures," further, that Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit are,

without inferiority of nature, represented as receiving such power *officially, in the economy of grace*, and he will be "not far from the kingdom of God."

Some of my readers may think that I have dwelt too long on these passages. My apology is, that as our faith on all such subjects must rest on the testimony of the Scriptures, I was desirous, once for all, of confirming my former exposition of them, and rescuing them from misinterpretation and sophistry.

CHAPTER IV.

I WISH to finish the consideration of Mr. Yates' replies, before going on to the more direct reasonings adduced by him in support of his system. Pursuing this plan, I come now to his statement of the orthodox doctrine respecting the person of Christ.

"Before we begin," says he, (p. 174.) "to examine the evidence for the orthodox opinion concerning the nature of Christ, it is necessary to know what that opinion is. Nothing could indicate greater irreverence for a question of such vast importance, than to argue and dispute, without even understanding what we wish to prove. It is, therefore, matter of no small satisfaction, that Mr. Wardlaw's statements are clear and intelligible."—They are *clear and intelligible!* Yet in the next page, Mr. Yates takes care most thoroughly to misunderstand them. I wish, from my heart, that this were all; but I have a heavier charge to bring against him,—the charge of *wilful and deliberate misrepresentation*;—a charge, which he has not left, in this instance, to be made out by inference; but of which he has directly convicted himself. The charge, I admit, is a serious one. Now, then, for the proof of it:—

"By the *nature* of any thing," says Mr. Yates, "we always mean its *qualities*. When, therefore, it is said that Jesus Christ possesses both a Divine and a human nature, it must be meant

that he possesses both the qualities of God, and the qualities of man. But if we consider what these qualities are, we perceive them to be totally incompatible with one another. The qualities of God are *eternity, independence, immutability, entire and perpetual exemption from pain and death, omniscience and omnipotence.* The qualities of *man* are *derived existence, dependence, liability to change, to suffering, and to dissolution, comparative weakness and ignorance.* To maintain, therefore, that the same mind is indued both with a Divine and a human nature, is to maintain that *the same mind* is both *created* and *uncreated*, both *finite* and *infinite*, both *dependent* and *independent*, both *changeable* and *unchangeable*, both *mortal* and *immortal*, both *susceptible of pain* and *incapable of it*, both *able to do all things* and *not able*, both *acquainted with all things* and *not acquainted with them*, both *ignorant of certain subjects* and *possessed of the most intimate knowledge of them.* If it be not certain that such a doctrine as this is false, there is no certainty on any subject. It is vain to call it a *mystery:* it is an *absurdity*, it is an *impossibility.* According to *my* ideas of propriety and duty, by assenting to it, I should culpably abuse those faculties of understanding, which have been given me to be employed in distinguishing between right and wrong, truth and error. According to the maxims laid down as the guides of our inquiry, and acknowledged by Mr. Wardlaw as fundamental principles, this doctrine could not be established even by the clearest declarations of the Scriptures. For the testimony of the Scriptures would not prove it to be true: on the contrary, its occurrence in the Scriptures would prove them to be false." (Pages 175, 176.)

Now in all this I have the happiness of most entirely and cordially agreeing with my opponent. If the orthodox doctrine be what he here represents it, let it be rejected and proscribed as it deserves, and branded with every epithet that implies impiety and folly. But *it is not so.* And, what is more, Mr. Yates *knows it is not so;* and knew it at the moment when he was sketching and filling up this most hideous picture. Whether *any* Trinitarian has sat to him for the portrait I know not:—if any one has, we deny the family likeness;—we do not recognise

a single feature of consanguinity. But the truth is, Mr. Yates on this occasion, for reasons best known to himself, preferred the pencil of the caricaturist to that of the faithful portrait painter, and he has certainly shown with what dexterity he can wield it. —Having finished his picture, he exhibits it to the public as the object of their disgust and aversion. But on the painter must alight the indignation and the scorn of every one who is capable of comparing the portrait with the professed original. "Is it like?—Like whom?" it has no prototype in nature. It is the monstrous production of a malicious fancy.

But I am forgetting the proof of my charge. It is not far off.—In the account given by Mr Yates, in the latter part of his work, of the origin and progress of the Trinitarian error, he says, (pp. 281, 282.) "In 431 another council was held at Ephesus, in which it was voted that the two natures of Christ make but one person; and in 451, another was held at Chalcedon, to determine, *that notwithstanding their personal union, the Divine and human natures of Christ continue distinct. Thus the doctrine was gradually brought to the state in which it has been since received by the reputed orthodox.*"—Mr. Yates then was perfectly aware, that in the system of the "*reputed orthodox*," the Divine and human natures in the person of Christ, continue "*distinct*;" that is, (as the word is explained by themselves in this connexion) that they are *united* but *not confounded;* that the peculiar properties of the former are not communicated to the latter, nor those of the latter to the former; —that the union "did not consist in the transmutation of the Divine into the human nature, or in the blending of the one with the other; but in the assumption of the human nature into a close and mysterious conjunction with the Divine, which produced no alteration in either, but united them, in a manner to us incomprehensible, as one principle of operation in the accomplishment of redemption."* Mr. Yates knew this. He could not but know it; for it is most distinctly and carefully stated in the confessions and creeds of the Protestant churches. Why, then, has Mr. Yates, in the above extract, sacrificed truth for the sake of pointed antithesis? Why has he given there a state-

* Sermons by the Rev. John Dick, D. D. just published, Sermon III. P. 63.

ment of the views of his opponents diametrically opposite to what he knew to be the views they hold? He has enumerated the properties of God, and the properties of man; and then, instead of keeping them *distinct*, he has represented the system of Trinitarians as ascribing these opposite and incompatible properties to the *same mind:* as if they held the doctrine of the *human soul* of Jesus possessing the attributes of his *Divine nature*, or his *Divine nature* the qualities of his *human soul*.—Mr. Yates has accused me of "*bitter misrepresentation*." I leave it with the reader to judge, whether, "having searched all my stuff," he has been able to produce any thing comparable to this.—It became Mr. Yates to take up our doctrine *as it really is;*—to prove it absurd and contradictory if he was able:—but, instead of this, he has framed a doctrine for us, and tried to make his thoughtless and ignorant reader (for it could succeed with no other) gape with astonishment and horror at the creature of his own imagination. He has laid on his blows lustily; but they light on a shadow. No Trinitarian can feel them. The only wound they inflict, is making the heart bleed, in pity for the man who could act so unworthy a part.

That Mr. Yates was fully conscious at the time, that the view he was giving was a false one, appears pretty clear even from some parts of the context of the strange extract quoted above. In the conclusion of that extract, he says: "According to the maxims laid down as the guides of our inquiry, and acknowledged by Mr. Wardlaw as fundamental principles, this doctrine could not be established even by the clearest declarations of the Scriptures. For the testimony of the Scriptures would not prove it to be true; on the contrary, its occurrence in the Scriptures would prove them to be false." Yet in the next paragraph on the same page, he thus expresses himself: "Nevertheless, if we find in the Scriptures the unintelligible proposition, that 'in the person of Christ Jesus, a Divine was united with a human nature,' or if this assertion be uttered in these terms, and declared to express a truth, by an accredited prophet, we shall give our implicit assent, presuming that it is understood by the prophet who pronounces, the apostle who writes, or the

God who dictates it." Now, what is this but to say, *If the Trinitarian doctrine be asserted in the Scriptures, we will believe it?* Is Mr. Yates then prepared to give "*implicit assent*" to a proposition, "the occurrence of which in the Scriptures would be sufficient to prove them false?" It does not belong to me to make out his consistency. I presume, however, that we must apply the *former* of these two passages to the Trinitarian doctrine, *as Mr. Yates found it convenient to represent it;* (in which case I have already expressed my concurrence with him in all he can say of its absurdity)—and the *latter* to the *same* doctrine, *as he knew it in reality to be held.*

Before proceeding to Mr. Yates' observations on the Scripture evidence of this point, I shall take this opportunity of offering a few remarks on the *philosophy* of the case. I had said, (Discourses, pages 32, 33.) "How that which is infinite can be united with that which is finite; the infinite nature of Deity with the finite nature of a creature; of a mortal man; is at once admitted to be beyond our comprehension. But let us see here, as in the former case, whether there be not, in some of the Divine perfections, of the existence of which we are accustomed to speak without even the slightest measure of doubt, something quite as incomprehensible; felt to be so, whenever we attempt to make it the subject of fixed thought, or of distinct conception. I refer to the same attribute of Deity, from which I took my illustration formerly. We ascribe *omnipresence* to God. We say that God is *here*. But *how*, I ask, is he here? How *can* that which is *infinite* be *here?* What is the nature of that connexion, which subsists between a Being who is infinite, whose existence is boundless, and any particular limited portion of space? As soon as our opponents have answered *this* question, we shall be able, I think, to answer theirs, What is the nature of the connexion between the infinite nature of Deity, and the finite nature of 'the man Christ Jesus?' The principle which affords a satisfactory answer to the one, will afford an answer equally satisfactory to the other. That is, they are both alike unanswerable: for I do not introduce the one case, as furnishing any explanation of the other, so as to render it more easily comprehensible; but

only to show, how apt we are, in one instance, hastily to assume impossibility and contradiction, while in another, in which the difficulty is equally great, we are accustomed to speak as if we were not sensible that there exists any difficulty at all."

Of this reasoning Mr. Yates takes no notice on this particular subject. To similar reasoning on another subject, he does refer, (page 52.) in the following terms:—"As an example of his maxim, that we cannot always understand even the fundamental truths of natural religion, Mr. Wardlaw produces the attribute of omnipresence. He affirms, that we use the expression 'God is here,' and say, 'that he is at the same moment equally present in the remotest part of the universe,' without annexing to these words any distinct ideas. 'Have we,' he asks, 'ever endeavoured to analyze *the conceptions which these modes of expression appear to convey? Is God*,' *he continues*, '*a spiritual substance infinitely extended?* Against this notion of infinite extension there have been advanced powerful, perhaps insurmountable, objections: and the truth is, that, if we imagine we possess any conception at all of the *mode* of the Divine omnipresence and omniscience, we really deceive ourselves.' Thus Mr. Wardlaw appears to me to renounce his belief in the Divine omnipresence. Theologians, in treating upon this subject, have made a distinction between the *virtual* and the *actual* omnipresence of God. His *virtual* omnipresence is the attribute by which he is able to *produce effects* in every part of space. His *actual* omnipresence is the *extension of his substance* through every part of space. The former Mr. Wardlaw appears to allow, but to deny the latter. But in the latter, as well as the former, all sound Theists believe: The notion of *a spiritual substance infinitely extended*, is too *vast* to be fully embraced by our understandings. It is, however, a clear and distinct idea, nor is there any force in the objections urged against it."

"*Nor is there any force in the objections urged against it.*"—In this summary and easy way does Mr. Yates sometimes get over objections. He thinks it enough to say, he sees no force in them. There may, however, be *some* force in them notwithstanding. I reckon it necessary to remind the reader, that such

queries as the following are intended merely to show, how utterly incomprehensible this matter is by our limited faculties; and that the difficulty of comprehending it does not arise *only* from the *vastness* of the idea. I premise this observation, lest he should think such queries hardly consistent with the awful sacredness of whatever relates to the nature and perfections of Deity.

In once conversing with Mr. Yates on the same subject, he said, he saw no difficulty in it,—that the spiritual substance of Deity pervaded space, just *as air filled a room.* Now, in the first place, I ask, does this give us *any idea at all* of what the spiritual essence or substance of Deity *is?* Air is a fluid, possessing the properties of weight and elasticity, and susceptible of condensation and rarefaction. We cannot surely for a moment associate such ideas with the pure spirituality of the Godhead. I ask again, on the supposition of an infinitely extended substance, must not *a part* be in *one* place, and *a part in another?* a part only of God in heaven, and a part on earth? Then, if this spiritual substance be thus divisible, a part here and a part there, must we not also have *a part* of the Divine *knowledge* and *power* in one place, and a part in another? Or, if this be objected to, and it be alleged that divine attributes are incapable of subdivision; then, is every point of the extended substance of Deity possessed of infinite perfections?—every point omniscient and omnipotent?—every point possessed of equal power and intelligence with the whole? Describe *a sphere*, of whatever dimensions you please, from a foot diameter to a thousand leagues, (for they bear the very same proportion to infinitude;)—I ask, Is God *there?* Is he *entirely* there? Or is it a part only of God, —a portion of his infinitely extended substance that is there?— Mr. Yates possibly may profess to be greatly shocked by questions such as these. I do not wonder that he should. I am shocked by them myself. Yet there is no impiety, in asking questions which make us to feel our weakness and incompetency on such subjects: no impiety, in thus impressing on men's minds, that they cannot by searching find out God. The immediate bearing of the questions on the particular point in hand,

will be sufficiently obvious to every discerning reader. I still insist upon it, that there is *nothing more incomprehensible in the idea of the divine nature being associated with the human in the person of Jesus Christ, than there is in the idea of the infinite God being present in any limited portion of space.* If a Socinian shall say, How can it be, that the infinite nature of God should be united with the finite and limited nature of a man? I freely answer, I cannot tell: but I meet the question with another, and ask again, How can it be, that the infinite nature of Deity should be present in every point of space?—should be present, in the full exercise of all its infinite perfections, within the little area bounded by the walls of the room in which I sit? I still insist upon it, that, when Socinians shall have found an answer to the latter question, they will have furnished us with a principle on which to answer the former: and that the circumstance of the former being beyond our comprehension, is no more a sufficient reason for disbelieving it, than the same circumstance of incomprehensibility in the latter. Its being altogether inconceivable by us, "is no more a proof against its being fact, than" (to use the words of Dr. Guyse on another, but similar subject) "the inconceivableness of the *manner* how the whole Divine Being and all its essential attributes, are always at once entirely in heaven, and on earth too, is a proof against God's omnipresence. Though such omnipresence may seem impossible to us, yet we must allow it to be real, it being the most monstrous and absurd notion of God to suppose, that only a part of God, a part of his Being, a part of his attributes, is in heaven, and another part of God is on earth. And *if we must believe the puzzling incomprehensible in one case, why should we startle at it, and for that reason alone reject it in the other!*"* It has often been remarked, that a child may ask questions, which the shrewdest philosopher shall be unable to answer. And there is no subject on which this is more true, than the nature and perfections of God.

* Guyse's Sermons on the Constitution of the person of Christ, and the Divinity of the Holy Spirit: page 245, Glasgow edition, 1790.

CHAPTER V.

Of a very considerable proportion of Mr. Yates' reasonings on the passages of Scripture adduced in support of our Lord's Divinity, I might satisfy myself with saying, that they have been answered by anticipation in the work to which he professes to reply. The vindication of this scriptural evidence, however, from the objections by which he has attempted to invalidate it, is a matter of so much importance, that, while I shall study brevity in my remarks as far as the case will *admit*, I must be excused for taking all the scope which it may seem to *require*. It shall be my endeavour to adhere as strictly as possible to what is immediately connected with the argument. To enter at large on points, which are introduced in the way of incidental illustration, but which do not enter into the pith and marrow of the controversy, (although a number of such points had been marked for animadversion in the perusal of Mr. Yates' book) would carry me beyond all due bounds, and would at the same time, only perplex the reader, and impede his progress to a satisfactory conclusion.

Mr. Yates finds fault with what I have said respecting the "current language of the New Testament."—"It is worse than useless," he says, "to bring forward not twice as many *verses* as the New Testament contains *books*, and to say that these are a specimen of its '*current* language,' although they have been generally regarded as the *capital proofs* of the doctrine in question." (Page 178.) It is enough to say, in reply to this, that the current language of any book, on any particular subject, can only mean its language *when that particular subject is spoken of, or alluded to*. When we speak of the current language of the New Testament on the subject of our blessed Lord's Divinity, we mean, that, in many instances, his Divinity is plainly and explicitly declared, as well as that it is interwoven with the scheme of doctrine, and with the general texture of the phraseology.

In Chapter V. of Part III. Mr. Yates examines "the passages in which the PECULIAR TITLES of Deity are supposed to be ascribed to Jesus Christ."

"First. Mr. Wardlaw maintains," says he, "that the 'NAMES AND TITLES *belonging exclusively to the true God*, are in the Scriptures ascribed to Jesus Christ. He informs his readers, that, 'agreeably to the plan of selection which he has prescribed to himself,' he will confine their attention to two of these, *viz.* GOD and JEHOVAH. He seems to forget, that, even by his own subsequent concessions, 'GOD' is not a name which belongs 'exclusively' to the Supreme Being." (Page 132.) It is not a very auspicious circumstance for a reasoner, when the first step he takes in his argument is a *quibble*. Mr. Yates was surely quite well aware, that when I mentioned the names GOD and JEHOVAH, I meant the former (as I have always said) in its *proper*, or its *highest* acceptation. There was no "*forgetting*" in the case. My expressions throughout, are such as to keep the sense in which the name is understood, constantly present to the reader's mind.

Of the inferior sense of the name ALEIM—God—Mr. Yates produces from the Old Testament Scriptures *seventeen* instances. This number, however, may be very considerably reduced.—On Gen. iii. 5. see pages 94, 95, of this volume.—Exod. vii. 1. "I have made thee a God to Pharaoh,"—means, "I have made thee GOD to Pharaoh;" its import being evidently the same with that of the 16th verse of the fourth chapter of the same book, where God says to Moses respecting Aaron, "He shall be to thee instead of a mouth, and thou shalt be to him *instead of God*."—Exod. xv. 11. "Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the GODS." In this passage, as in many others, *idols* are called gods, agreeably to the appellation given them by their deluded worshippers. The comparison is between the only living and true God, and the false gods of the heathen;—a comparison very often made in the Holy Scriptures.—Exod. xxi. 6. "Then his master shall bring him unto the *Judges*," literally "unto the GODS." But is this clearly right? Parkhurst says—"Then his master shall bring him to *the Aleim*, i. e. to *Jehovah Aleim*, to

the door of the sacred tabernacle. So the LXX. προς το κριτηριον του Θεου, *to the tribunal of God.*" See Lex. on the word ALEIM. The same dubiety attaches to Exod. xxii. 8, 9. where the very same phraseology occurs, and where the *Seventy* render it in the same way.—Exod. xxii. 28. "Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the *ruler* of thy people." In introducing this as an instance of the inferior sense of the name *Aleim*, it is taken for granted, that "*the ruler of thy people*," is explanatory of "*the gods.*" But we ask with Parkhurst, "Why should not ALEIM here retain its usual meaning, and the text be understood as nearly parallel to that of Saint Peter, 1 Ep. ii. 17. 'Fear *God*, honour *the king?*'"—Deut. x. 17. Psal. xcvii. 9. In these passages it is used of the idols, or false gods of the heathen—to all of which the infinite superiority of Jehovah is emphatically affirmed.—1 Sam. ii. 25. "If one man sin against another, the *judge* (literally, the *God*) shall judge him." The comment of Parkhurst is:—"'If man sin against man, *the Aleim*' (i. e. GOD) 'shall judge him: but if a man sin against Jehovah, who shall intreat for him?' Is not this very good sense, and much to the purpose?"—Psal. lxxxii. 1. "God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the gods." "The Aleim stand in the congregation of God, (i. e. in the assembly of Israel; compare Numb. xvi. 3: xx. 4: Josh. xxii. 16.) in the midst (of this congregation namely) the Aleim will judge, or judgeth. So Symmachus, 'Ο Θεος κατεστη εν συνοδῳ Θεου (in cœtu Dei, Hieron.) εν μεσοιη Θεος κρινων." Parkhurst.—In these instances, then, it is at least dubious, whether they are at all to Mr. Yates'-purpose.—There remain 1 Sam. xxviii. 13. where the name is applied to Samuel; "I saw *gods* (or *a God*) ascending out of the earth:—Psal. lxxxviii. 6. "I said ye are gods;" where it signifies magistrates, the Jewish rulers:—Psal. viii. 5. "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels," literally, "than the *gods*;" where it is used for created angels, as we learn from the quotation of the words by the apostle, Heb. ii. 6:—Psal. xcvii. 7. "Worship him, all ye gods;" which the same inspired writer teaches us to interpret in the same way.—I feel myself, therefore, *still* warranted in affirming, that the clear and decisive in-

stances of the inferior sense of *God, are few in number*, as well as of a kind that can never mislead the most careless reader.

But, in proof of the fact that the term *God* is used in an inferior sense, " Unitarians," says Mr. Yates, " appeal to no less an authority than that of Jesus Christ himself, who affirms that *in the Scriptures those persons are called gods, unto whom the word of God came*, John x. 35." He then adduces the *seventeen* passages which have just been noticed, as instances in illustration of our Lord's words. Having done this, he proceeds in the following terms: " Here are seventeen cases (and I think it probable that there are more) of the use of the word God in the sense affixed to it by our Saviour. It is therefore undeniable, that the name may be given, agreeably to the practice of the sacred writers, to all persons, whether angels, prophets, or judges, *to whom the word of God comes*, or, *who are authorized, commissioned, and inspired to declare the will of God to mankind. In this sense* all Unitarians admit and maintain, that Jesus Christ was A GOD. The mere application to him of this title consequently proves nothing. As a learned Unitarian author observes, ' The question is not, whether Christ is called God in Scripture, for that is undeniable; but *in what sense* the word is to be understood.'* The established principles of criticism require, that we should prefer that interpretation, which is agreeable to the clear and universally acknowledged doctrine of the Scriptures, before that which is contrary to any known truth, or which is attended with any considerable difficulties. Since, therefore, it is a fact, about which there is among Christians no dispute, that Jesus was a person ' unto whom the word of God came;' since we know, that he vindicated the application to himself of the title GOD, taken in *this* sense (John x. 34, 35.); and since we do not know, until it be proved, that the title belongs to him in any *other* sense; we ought thus to understand it, wherever we find it applied to in the sacred Scriptures, *unless there be some particular circumstances in the mode of application, which point him*

* H. Taylor's Considerations on Ancient and Modern Creeds, compared, p. 124.

out as THE SUPREME GOD, THE ONE LIVING AND TRUE GOD, THE GOD OF GODS, OR THE GOD WHO IS ABOVE ALL." (Pages 183, 184.)

As the passage, John x. 34, 35, is the great support on which Mr. Yates here places his reasoning,—the fulcrum on which the whole power of his argument turns, the destruction of which will render the power inefficient; it will be necessary to enter somewhat fully into the consideration of its true meaning.

Our blessed Lord had just used, in conversation with the Jews, the following remarkable words: "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me. And I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any one pluck them out of my hand. My Father who gave them me is greater than all; and no one is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. I and my Father are one."—The effect of these words was, the exasperation of the Jews, so that "they took up stones again to stone him. Jesus answered, Many good works have I showed you from my father: for which of those works do ye stone me? The Jews answered him, saying, For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy, and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God." To this our Saviour made the following reply:—"Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken; say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not: But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him."—The effect of this reply was, that "they sought again to take him." John x. 27—39.

On this remarkable passage, I offer to the reader the following observations:

1. It is surely a very singular thing, on the Unitarian hypothesis of Jesus being a mere human prophet, that *his* language alone, of all the prophets by whom "God, at sundry times, and in divers manners, had spoken," should ever have misled the

hearers of it into the conception of his claiming *equality with God.* In the case of Jesus, this took place on various occasions; and, so far as we learn, no such mistake was ever fallen into in the case of any other prophet whatsoever. How should this greatest of the "teachers sent from God" have been so peculiarly unfortunate in his forms of speech?—Exalt him as highly as you please; still there must have been an infinite distance between him and the Most high that gave him his commission: so that on the Arian and the Socinian hypotheses the difficulty alike remains.

2. It is not only singular that he alone should have used language that produced this impression;—it is, if possible, still more singular, that, when the impression had been made, he never, in any instance, contradicted it in terms so explicit as effectually to remove it from the minds of his hearers. Even on *this* occasion, to which Unitarians appeal with so much confidence, whatever explanation we may give of the language of his answer to the charge of blasphemy, the *fact* is clear, that it was language which *did not effectually take off*, if indeed it at all diminished, the impression which his former words had produced. Notwithstanding his reply, they "still sought to take him; but he escaped out of their hands."—In attending to the language itself, we shall see that it was neither fitted, nor could be intended, to remove the conception they had formed:—but at present, I take the *fact alone* that it *did not* produce this effect; and I ask, first, Could any thing be more easy than to give a plain and distinct denial of the charge that he "*made himself God?*"—and, secondly, this being the easiest thing imaginable, is it for a moment to be conceived, that, on the supposition of the falsehood of the charge, it should not have been done—and done with peremptory decision, in terms that could not be mistaken? A mere human prophet is charged with having claimed equality with the God that sent him—with "making himself God:" and this prophet, instead of being anxious to disown the imputation in explicit terms, and to erase from the minds of his hearers, every vestige of an impression so foul and so false, continues to employ, in his reply to the charge, language of equivalent, or even (let it be supposed) of ambiguous import, and leaves the impression as he found it!

—Unitarians may enlogize the character of Jesus Christ:—but a supposition such as this must shock the mind of every considerate reader, as in fact attaching such a stain to it as "all Ocean's waters" could not wash out.*

3. The question, then, is, Does Jesus, in this reply, disavow the interpretation put upon his words by the Jews, and declare himself the *Son of God* in the same sense in which they were called *gods* "to whom the word of God came?"—In answer to this question, let it he observed, in addition to the preceding general remarks—

1st. In the passage quoted—Psalm lxxxii. 6. "I said, Ye are gods," the persons addressed are not *prophets*,—nor in any one of the instances adduced by Mr. Yates is it to prophets that the name is applied. They are the Jewish rulers; the Judges of Israel. These are the persons to whom "the word of God came;" or, as Bishop Pearce explains the phrase, "with whom the judgment of God was:"—they had their commission to govern Israel according to the divine law, being especially appointed by Jehovah, as his representatives, and as types of his anointed.

2dly. What Mr. Yates says of Christ "vindicating the application to himself of the title GOD" in this passage, is not true. It is not this title that he here takes to himself. He vindicates his calling himself "*the Son of God*," from the circumstance of the Jewish rulers having been called "*gods*" in the language of ancient inspiration. The passage, therefore, whatever might be the ground on which the title *gods* was applied to *them*, furnishes no proof of the application of this title, in the same inferior and subordinate sense, to *Christ;* since this is not at all the designation to which he here asserts his right. In *this* view, it is nothing to Mr. Yates' purpose.

3dly. When Jesus says "I and my Father are one," the preceding context explains his meaning to be, *one in purpose and in power*. No one was able to pluck the sheep out of *his* hand; and no one was able to pluck them out of *the Father's* hand: and the *reason* assigned for this is, that he and his Father were *one*—i. e. one in will and affection, and purpose, and one in the

* See further on this subject, Discourses on the Socinian Controversy, pages 96, 97.

possession of power to accomplish that purpose :—power alike superior, in himself as in the Father, to all the power of creatures that could oppose it. This unity of purpose and power, expressed in such terms, justifies the inference to unity of *nature* :—or else, *unity of nature* is the thing directly expressed, as *accounting for* the possession and exercise of equal power. So the Jews, we have seen, understood him. And can we for an instant suppose, that by such strong and pointed language, he meant no more than a *merely official* connexion with the Father, and the possession of a title to the appellation "*Son of God*" in a sense entirely the same in kind with that in which Jewish magistrates were called "*gods?*" On such a supposition, the previous language is most unaccountable. It is such as seems hardly susceptible of any consistent interpretation, short of that which the Jews put upon it; such as no prophet of God ever used before him; and *why* such terms should have been employed to express a claim so simple, and so very far below what they *seemed* to express, it belongs to Unitarians to show.

4. Let us try, then, if we can find the true meaning of the reply of our Lord to the charge of blasphemy.

1st. Some have conceived that Jesus here reasons *on the assumption* that the Jews were right in viewing him as no more than a man,—not *admitting* this, but *supposing* it; and then, having taken them on their own ground, putting it to them, how they could *convict* him of blasphemy in calling himself the *Son of God*, when they knew that *mere men*, the Judges of Israel, had been called in their own Scriptures by the appellation "*gods*, and *children*—or *Sons—of the Most High.*"*—This has too much of the *appearance* at least of *evasion*.

2dly. The more common interpretation is derived from the typical character sustained by those rulers who receive in the passage quoted, the title of *gods*. That title, it is alleged, belonged to them on account of their typical relation to the Messiah. He was to be *in reality* what they were *typically called*. Their designation foreshadowed the *true dignity* of Him whom they represented: and, as "the Scripture cannot be falsified," the

* See Poole's Annotations.

meaning of the designation required to be fulfilled, by the *Antitype* possessing *in reality*, what the *Type* possessed only *in name*. He, therefore, could not be justly charged with blasphemy, for claiming to himself that Divine dignity which had been pre-intimated in this typical designation.*

3dly. The true *point* of our Lord's answer appears to me to be somewhat different. It is to be found, I think, in *the authority being the same* for his applying to himself the title *Son of God*, in a sense implying equality with the Father, with that which had given the title of *gods* to the Jewish rulers.

In the first place, it is very obvious that there could be *no blasphemy* in the case, if, in assuming a title and mode of speech which implied his equality with the Father that sent him, he intimated only what was *true*; i. e. if he really was *more than man*. —The reference, then, is first to the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures. These called the Jewish rulers *gods;* and "the Scripture cannot be broken," that is, the language of these inspired records cannot be excepted against. But *these Scriptures* warranted him, as Messiah, to use a title implying equality with the Father; for they had represented him as a person who was to sustain this high dignity. Thus in Psalm ii. 8: cx. 1: Isa. ix. 6: with vii. 14: Psalm xlv. 6: Jer. xxiii. 6. &c.—How,

* See Scott, Guyse, and others, on the passage. The following explanation, suggested by a learned, critical friend, while these pages were passing through the press, is somewhat different from either of those mentioned. I introduce it here, because, in such circumstances, it becomes me to be diffident of my own judgment. The question for the reader to determine will be, in what way the argument of our Lord is most fully and consistently brought out?—"In Psalm lxxxii. 6. I am inclined to think that *Christ* is the *speaker;* that he owns he had called Judges of Israel '*sons of God*,' as types of Messiah; that he, however, disowns the 'assembly of the wicked which was to enclose him,' which he prophetically addresses, and predicts their rejection and fall.—The argument in John x. I think is—If *he* (the prophetic Messiah) called *his types* '*Gods, or sons of God*,' (and the language of Scripture ye cannot condemn) do ye charge with blasphemy 'him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world,' (the Messiah now come, and approved among you by miracles, &c. to be the same that spoke in the Psalms) because *he* applies the *same language to himself* (*the Antitype*)?" In this explanation, as in the second of those given in the text, it is understood, that the *Antitype* possessed a claim to the titles in question *in a higher sense* than the *Type*.

then, could he be justly charged with blasphemy, if the Scripture cannot be broken, and he used no higher title, no title of higher import, than the Scripture, which they acknowledged to be the word of God, assigned to the Messiah? There could be *no blasphemy* in *using Scriptural appellations in their Scriptural sense*, in speaking of himself in terms perfectly in unison with the representations of prophecy.

In the second place, he had presented abundant and most decisive evidence that "the Father had sanctified and sent him into the world," i. e. had set him apart to his high office, and given him his commission. Now in mentioning this so particularly here, the sentiment which he intended to express, does not seem to be, that the Father's having sanctified and sent him into the world, *entitled him to the appellation Son of God*, but rather, that it *entitled him to credit in the representations he gave of himself.* His commission from the Father, established by so "many infallible proofs," placed his word, in point of authority, on a level with the testimony of their own inspired records. He, whom "the Father had sanctified and sent into the world," instead of being charged with blasphemy, ought to have been believed in what he said of himself, on the evidence of his Divine commission. If they admitted, that "the Scripture could not be broken," that, being of divine authority, its language was not to be excepted against, they ought also to have admitted that *his* language respecting himself was not to be excepted against, seeing his declarations were proved to be of Divine authority,—proved to be the declarations of one whom "the Father had sanctified and sent into the world," by evidence even more abundant and irrefragable than that on which they received the Old Testament Scriptures. On this principle, he is not to be considered as at all reducing the high import of the title by which he called himself, and of what he had said respecting his union with the Father, but as admitting that the sense in which his hearers had understood him was the right sense, and asserting, on the ground of his Divine commission, his title to confidence and to belief.

In the third place, in full consistency with this view of his words, we find him immediately appealing to the evidence by

which his Divine mission was established; and making this appeal, with a particular reference to what he had just said of himself:—"If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works; *that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him.*" Do not these words mean, in the connexion in which they stand—"that ye may know and believe, that what I have just said of myself, which has incensed you thus against me, *is true?* that 'I and my Father are' indeed 'one?'" His words had been interpreted in a sense which, if he was a mere created messenger of God, must have been infinitely offensive to his mind. Yet he thus affirms the truth of them in terms of equivalent import; terms which confirmed the misunderstanding, and maintained the zealous fury of his hearers:—"*Therefore*," i. e. on account of what he had last said, which they perceived to be nothing different in meaning from what he had said before,—"*therefore* they sought again to take him." Surely had the Jews understood him (as Unitarians insist he ought to be understood) as *entirely disclaiming* their inference, they would not thus instantly have offered violence to him again, such as made it necessary that he should "escape out of their hands."

I cannot but consider the particular connexion in which the words—"that ye may know and believe *that the Father is in me, and I in him*," are here introduced, as an evidence that we do not misinterpret such phraseology, when we number it among the proofs of the Saviour's Divinity. This is a point, however, on which a few additional remarks may be necessary.

The passage usually adduced in opposition to this inference, is John xvii. 21. "That they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." It is argued from this passage, that the union declared to subsist between Christ and the Father, is no other in kind than the union of his people with himself, and with the Father, and with one another. But before this conslusion be admitted, let the following things be considered—

First. There are *two* meanings of which the language of the

passage is equally susceptible. It may express *sameness*, or it may express only *similarity* or *resemblance*. We must adopt the one most consistent with the tenor of the Scriptures. Before we adopt the *first*, and consider it as expressing the *sameness* of the union between the Father and the Son, with the union of the people of God in the Son and in the Father, we must set aside all the mass of evidence by which Jesus Christ is proved to be God, equal with the Father, and therefore one with him in a higher sense.

Secondly. It is no uncommon thing to use the language of comparison, when we mean to intimate resemblance, *only in so far as the compared objects admit of resemblance*. Were I, for example, to say, respecting two very intimate friends, that they are one, *as a husband and his wife are one*, it would not, I presume, be difficult to understand, that the specialties of the conjugal union were not included in the comparison: nor would any person be so foolish as to infer, that the one union was not at all different *in kind*, but only *in degree*, from the other. The idea expressed, every one would perceive to be, that there subsisted between these friends a unity of affection, of feeling and desire, of interests and enjoyments, *like* that which distinguishes the closest and tenderest of earthly connexions. So in the case before us. There may subsist a *unity of essence* between the Father and the Son, and yet this may not be in the contemplation of the speaker; but only a unity of mind, and heart, and counsel, and joy, between the people of God and their Father and Redeemer, and one another, *resembling* that perfect unity of pure and everlasting love, of holy purpose, and of infinite, and necessary, and immutable happiness, which subsists among the THREE who are ONE.

Thirdly. The preceding observations go no farther than to show, that the Unitarian inference from the words of Christ's intercessory prayer, is not a valid one. But we may go a step beyond this. The language appears to me to be such as it is difficult to conceive any human prophet, or any mere creature, to have used. It is language, on this supposition, of strange and unexampled familiarity.—"That they also may be one in us:"

—"that they may be one, even as WE are one." Surely our minds must revolt from the idea of a mere human prophet thus familiarly associating himself with the Most High. We can hardly imagine, indeed, any creature, feeling his infinite distance, to express himself thus to the Great Supreme, in those terms of easy intimacy which characterize the intercourse of equals. A similar observation was before made on John xiv. 23. I know not how it may affect the reader's mind. On my own, I confess, it presses with great force. Should this be imputed to prejudice, I cannot help it. I hope it has a higher and purer source; some small measure of that sentiment of "reverence and godly fear," that awful sense of distance, which, instead of diminishing, must increase in the direct ratio of the elevation and holiness of the creature by whom it is felt. I consider the language of this passage as parallel to Gen. i. 26. "Let US make man:" Gen. iii. 22. "Behold the man is become as one of US:" Gen. xi. 7. "Let US go down, and their confound their language:" and Isa. vi. 8. "Who will go for US?"

We have thus seen that the passage, John x. 34, 35, to which Mr. Yates so repeatedly and confidently refers, instead of warranting his conclusion that wherever we find the name *God* applied to Jesus Christ, it ought to be understood in its inferior sense, as meaning "one to whom the word of God came," is itself a powerful evidence of the contrary. An exception, indeed, is made by Mr. Yates hypothetically,—"*unless their be some particular circumstances in the mode of application*, which point him out as THE SUPREME GOD, THE ONE LIVING AND TRUE GOD, THE GOD OF GODS, OR THE GOD WHO IS ABOVE ALL." But the manner in which certain texts answering to this description are disposed of, when they *are* brought forward, will satisfy every one acquainted with this controversy, that, be the "circumstances of the application of the name," or the epithets accompanying it, what they may, no passage will be left without some attempt to invalidate and destroy its evidence in support of the obnoxious truth.

An instance of the justice of this remark occurs immediately in Mr. Yates' strictures on Isa. vii. 14. "Behold a virgin shall

conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel:" and Isa. ix. 6:—"For unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called—THE MIGHTY GOD:"—the two first texts on which he proceeds to comment. Respecting these he thus writes:—"If, as I have shown above, the title GOD belonged to all 'unto whom the word of God came,' these two passages would present no obstacle to our belief in the Unitarian doctrine, even though it were certain that, in each instance, the original text is uncorrupted, the English translation correct, and the designations 'IMMANUEL' and 'MIGHTY GOD' really intended to be descriptive of the *nature of Christ*. These titles would only convey the same ideas which were expressed by the inhabitants of Jerusalem, when they exclaimed, 'A GREAT PROPHET is risen up among us; and by the two disciples (Luke xxiv. 19.) who described Jesus of Nazareth as 'A PROPHET MIGHTY *in deed and* word.'" (Page 185.)

According to this comment, "IMMANUEL," even supposing it a designation descriptive of Christ's person, "would only convey the idea" of "A GOD WITH US,"—that is, "A PROPHET WITH US:"—and the title "MIGHTY GOD," on the same supposition, would naturally convey the same idea, of "A MIGHTY PROPHET." —The appellations "*would only convey these ideas*." To a mind predisposed to admit the ideas by attachment to Unitarian principles, it is possible enough they might. But I ask the reader, whether Mr. Yates has made out a sufficiently strong case, respecting the application of the name of God to the prophets, to warrant his making this assertion with so much easy confidence? His venturing such an assertion makes me very hopeless of his conviction: because, even if it were shown that such designations as "*the supreme God, the one living and true God, the God of Gods*, or *the God who is above all*," are given to Jesus Christ, it might, with equally good reason, be alleged, that such designations should be considered as given to him *in virtue of his commission*, as one "*authorized, and inspired to declare the will of God to mankind*," appearing, therefore, as *his representative*, and, in this capacity, bearing his names and epithets of dignity. This

(however unreasonable) would be very much of a piece with the remark, that, even if all critical difficulties were removed from the latter of the two passages "just quoted, still, at the very utmost, the application of the title '*mighty God*' to Jesus of Nazareth would only prove him to be a person 'unto whom the word of God came.'"

With respect to Isa. vii. 14. compared with Matth. i. 22, 23. I shall only remark,

In the first place, that it would be uncandid to question the justice of Mr. Yates' observation relative to the "singular manner in which *proper names* were formed and applied by the ancient Hebrews;"—that "it was common among them to give to their children names, which were in reality short sentences, expressive of some Divine favour, conferred at the time of the child's birth."—Of this he produces an instance or two; and others will occur to every mind familiar with the Old Testament records.

In the second place, on this ground, I frankly admit, that the mere circumstance of the Messiah being called by this name, (Immanuel) would not of itself, in absence of other evidence, be at all a conclusive proof of his Divine dignity.—That it *does* imply his possessing this dignity, I entertain no doubt;—but, taking it by itself, I should find difficulty in proving it. From the peculiar circumstances in which the prophecy is introduced, and the length of discussion to which a full consideration of these would necessarily lead, I formerly declined any criticism on the passage; and I am disposed to follow the same course still. For a distinct and satisfactory elucidation of the prophecy, I may refer the reader to Mr. Ewing's Essays addressed to Jews on the authority, scope, and consummation, of the law and the prophets, Vol. II. pages 6—16.—I shall satisfy myself with one observation only, the truth of which must be obvious to every reader of the entire prophecy, from chap. vii. 1. to chap. xi. 7. that the child named "IMMANUEL" in chap. vii. 14. is the same with the "child born" and "Son given," whose name, in chap. ix. 6. is called—"THE MIGHTY GOD;" so that if the latter appellation can be shown to express his divinity, this alone should go far to settle the true meaning of the former.

1. I had remarked (Discourses, p. 86.) that "the phrase in the original, as well as in our translation, is precisely the same with that which occurs in verse 21st of the tenth chapter of the same book: 'The remnant shall return, even the remnant of Jacob, unto THE MIGHTY GOD.' And there can be no doubt, that it is a characteristic designation of the true God, in which, by the attribute of omnipotence, he is distinguished from the idols of the heathen, which could 'neither do good nor do evil; which were all vanity, and their work of nought.'" Of this parallel passage, and its force in the argument, the only notice taken by Mr. Yates, is:—"To illustrate the sense in which the title 'MIGHTY GOD' is applied," (viz. in Isa. ix. 6.) "he compares it with Isa. x. 21. where the same phrase occurs: 'The remnant shall return, even the remnant of Jacob, unto the MIGHTY GOD.'" P. 185. This is all. It is sufficiently summary; but to readers who seek for *argument*, not, I should think, very satisfactory.

2. In a subsequent part of this work, when the same passage occurs as a proof of Christ's *almighty power*, he makes two remarks upon it, in addition to those he had offered before: namely, that "the doctrine to be proved is, not that our Saviour was MIGHTY, (for this is granted,) but that he was ALL-mighty, that his will was irresistible, and his power underived, unlimited, and independent:" and—"that the epithet MIGHTY, upon which the argument depends, is applied in more than a hundred passages of the Old Testament to mere human beings. (See Taylor's Concord. v. GEBER.)"

To these two remarks, *one* remark shall suffice in reply; and it is one in which, as in some others, I have been anticipated by Mr. Brown:—"We have only to say, in reply, that the 'force of the argument' does *not* lie in the word GEBER simply, but in the compound epithet GEBER AL, 'the mighty God.' Even Mr. Yates would be ashamed to say he had *proved* that the latter of these words is not in the text. If he could have brought forward a passage of Scripture, in which the compound appellation was given to a mere human being, it would indeed have answered his purpose." Strictures, p. 59. To this it may be added, that, in certain connexions and associations, the inferior word may

have all the force of the superior. Thus, Jehovah is, on different occasions, called by Isaiah, *the* MIGHTY ONE *of Israel.* The word generally used on these occasions, is one, which, like GEBER, is frequently applied to creatures. Yet, in such connexions, it has all the force of the higher word AL-*mighty.* Although, however, Jesus Christ were denominated *the* "*mighty One of Israel,*" as, in the text under discussion, he is called "*the mighty God,*" we might upon the same principle on which Mr. Yates' remarks on this text proceed, be met with a reference to "Taylor's Concordance, v. ABER," and a statement of the number of times in which the word is applied to "mere human beings," or to brute animals.

3. It is worse than trifling to conjure up all the difficulties and conjectures that have ever been started about a text, unless these are such as really to affect our own convictions relative to its correctness or to its meaning. Mr. Yates represents this text as "produced by the ignorant with the most triumphant and unreflecting confidence;" and then he brings forward, without being so "*presumptuous*" as to attempt to settle any of them, his list of difficulties and conjectures:—"Whether AL be a genuine part of the Hebrew text;"—does Mr. Yates himself doubt this?—"Whether, supposing it genuine, it should not be translated a 'RULER,' since this is a very common acceptation of the term;" but where are the instances of AL signifying a ruler? and especially, where is the instance of the phrase AL GEBER for "*a mighty Ruler?*" does Mr. Yates himself doubt, after comparing it with Is. x. 21. whether "*mighty God*" be the correct and legitimate translation?—"Whether the titles contained in the verse were not intended to describe, at least according to their primary signification, the character of Hezekiah, or some other distinguished person, born at the time when the prophecy was uttered;" does Mr. Yates himself think this possible—after comparing, as he surely must have done, Isa. vii. 14. with Matth. i. 23. Isa. ix. 1, 2. with Matth. iv. 14—16. and Isa. ix. 7. with Luke i. 32, 33? Will he indeed adopt this *Jewish* way of solving difficulties respecting the prophetic descriptions of the Christ? It is not at all wonderful, that every method should have been taken to

bring doubt and uncertainty on such a passage; a passage which contains, in the minds not merely of "the ignorant and unreflecting," so clear and decisive a proof of the Saviour's supreme Godhead; which "asserts in the clearest and strongest manner of which language is capable, his real incarnation, his essential divinity, and his mediatorial kingdom and glory." Ewing's Essays, &c. Vol. II. p. 16.

John i. 1. "THE WORD WAS GOD." On this passage I might simply request the reader to re-peruse my former observations upon it, and to ask himself, in candour, how many of them Mr. Yates has fairly met. I cannot afford to be repeating the same things: it would both swell my reply beyond all proper bounds, and be an imposition besides on the possessors of my former volume. Let it therefore be remembered, that what is *now* said must be taken in connexion with what *has been* said; my present object being only to notice Mr. Yates' own criticisms, and his objections to mine.

1. Mr. Yates admits, that "the *rules of criticism*" lead to the translation of the last clause of the verse—"*the Word was a God.*" This is an admission of some consequence, because it confines the field of argument, fixing us down to one point, namely, whether the word *God* be here used in its *proper* or its *inferior* sense.

2. Mr. Yates remarks—"We are assured by abundant and irrefragable proofs, both that the term *God* is used in Scripture to signify 'any person that is authorized, commissioned, and inspired to declare the will of Jehovah to mankind,' and also that our Lord Jesus Christ was such a person. This explanation of the passage, therefore, is free from every objection. On the contrary, we do not know that Jesus Christ was Jehovah, and consequently we are not justified in understanding the phrase as implying such a doctrine." P. 190. These "abundant and irrefragable proofs" have before been considered; and we have seen the use made by our Lord of the appellation "*gods*" being given to those "unto whom the word of God came," in repelling from himself the charge of blasphemy. To the last sentence of the preceding extract, I think it quite enough to reply, that we *do*

know that Jesus Christ is Jehovah, from proofs certainly not less "numerous and irrefragable" than those produced for the inferior sense of God; of which the chief, John x. 37. we have seen to be a convincing evidence of the very doctrine which it is brought to refute.

3. Mr. Yates introduces Origen and Eusebius, "most illustrious and learned men, who used the Greek language as their vernacular tongue," as giving their judgment in favour of the inferior sense of Θεος, on account of the absence of the definite article. He produces the following quotation in a note: "Σαφως δε παριστη οἱος τις ην (scilicet ὁ Λογος) επισυναπτων ἑξης και λεγων 'Και Θεος ην ὁ Λογος·' δυναμενος γαρ ειπειν, 'Και Ὁ Θεος ην ὁ Λογος,' μετα της του ἀρθρου προσθηκης, ει γε ἑν και ταυτον ἡγειτο, τον πατερα ειναι και τον νἱον, αυτον τε ειναι τον Λογον τον επι παντων Θεον." &c.—*that is*, "The Evangelist has clearly shown what is the nature of the Word, by subjoining, 'And the Word was *a God*;' although he might have said, 'And the Word was GOD,' with the addition of the article, if he had thought that the Father and the Son were one and the same, and that the Word is GOD OVER ALL." Euseb. de Eccles. Theol. L. II. c. 17. "From the argument of the venerable Father in this passage, it is plain that he perceived no violation of the rules of syntax in the addition of the article; and upon a matter of this kind it is impossible that he could be mistaken. The observations of Origen, in his commentary on John, are precisely to the same purpose. They are too long to quote; but may be seen in De la Rue's edition, Vol. IV. pp. 50, 51."

Taking for granted the correctness both of the quotation and the commentary, and without consulting the originals of Origen and Eusebius at all, I find enough in Mr. Yates to confute his own reference. One should have expected, that, having brought forward these "most illustrious and learned men" with all the pomp of courtly ceremony, pronouncing not merely my opinion, but even Dr. Middleton's, and, by consequence, that of all the scholars who agree with him, to "be in opposition to them, not worth a rush;" he would hardly have felt quite at liberty to dissent from these high authorities himself, and to relinquish *their* decision for *his own*. Yet this, strange as it may seem, he has

certainly done. In the quotation from Eusebius, as above transcribed from Mr. Yates's note, that writer says, that if the Evangelist had wished to express the sentiment which *we* allege he *has* expressed, he would have said "Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ΗΝ Ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ." This, is the phrase, which, according to Eusebius, would have expressed our sentiment *without ambiguity*. Well: and does Mr. Yates acquiesce in his decision? Quite the contrary. "The sentiment 'the Word was *a god*," says he, "could not be expressed in any other way than that employed by the Evangelist (θεος ην ὁ λογος;) whereas the sentiment 'the Word was GOD,' might have been expressed without ambiguity by the introduction of the article (thus, ὁ λογος ην ὁ θεος;) and this arrangement would have been indisputably correct and grammatical." P. 192. Eusebius' *unambiguous* expression, then, for "*the Word was God*," is "Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ΗΝ Ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ; but Mr. Yates' is precisely the reverse, "Ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ ΗΝ Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ." Now both of these cannot be right. Yet, in quoting the authority of *Eusebius*, Mr. Yates affirms it was "*impossible he could be mistaken;*" and when he gives *his own* way of it, he is equally confident, that it is "*indisputably correct and grammatical.*" In the cause "Origen and Eusebius, versus Middleton and Wardlaw," Judge Yates pronounces the following verdict: "Mr. Wardlaw's assertions, and even Dr. Middleton's, are not worth a rush: the mere names of ORIGEN and EUSEBIUS will be sufficient, in the ears of all who have the slightest tincture of theological learning, to drown at once the feeble, diminutive accents of our worthy author." P. 191. What, then, are we to say, when the cause comes to be "Origen and Eusebius, versus Mr. Yates himself?" Must we pronounce the same verdict? The truth is, if any further evidence were wanting to show that neither of the two former is free from ambiguity, we have it in the fact of Eusebius pronouncing the one to be so, and Mr. Yates the other. Both forms are convertible; and so is every form constructed on the same principle. The sense, in such cases, remains to be determined by the connexion.

4. As the clause stands in the original, it is *not* convertible, even on Mr Yates' own admission, according to "the just rules

of criticism:" (See Obs. 1.)—and, having now before us Mr. Yates' own example for the deadly sin of differing from Origen and Eusebius, we still maintain, that the Evangelist has expressed the sentiment, "THE WORD WAS GOD" in true grammatical form—and, with regard to the question whether ΘΕΟΣ is to be understood in its *proper* or in its *inferior* sense, it should be determined by these two considerations;—*first*, that, even in its proper and highest sense, it ought, in the circumstances of construction in which it here stands, to be without the article; and, *secondly*, that it is used without the article, to signify the supreme God, *four* times within the first eighteen verses of this very chapter.*

5. I shall close my remarks on this text with the judgment of a writer, whom Mr. Yates holds in high and deserved reputation, I mean GRIESBACH. We have formerly seen, how explicit his testimony is in favour of the Divinity of Christ being a plain and incontrovertible doctrine of the Bible; his language is not less explicit on the particular text now before us: It is introduced, indeed, as a specimen of the "loca multa et luculenta" to which he refers: "In primis locus ille Joh. i. 1, 2, 3. *tam perspicuus est, atque omnibus exceptionibus major*, ut *neque interpretum neque criticorum audacibus conatibus* unquam everti atque veritatis defensoribus eripi possit."—"That passage in particular, John i. 1—3, is so clear, and so much above all exception, that it never can be overthrown, and wrested from the defenders of the truth, by the daring attempts of either commentators or critics."

Mr. Yates' comment on the address of Thomas to Christ, John xx. 28. is one of the most extraordinary in his volume. "Leaving every reader," says he, "at full liberty to judge for himself"—(a liberty which we certainly wish every reader to use, and entertain no apprehension of the result)—"and retaining the right of changing my opinion, if at any future time I shall see fit;" we hope that subsequent reflection may bring him

* An instance, in which GOD is the *predicate of the proposition*, and where the article is accordingly *awanting*, occurs in 1 Kings xviii. 24. in the LXX. which may illustrate the case before us; και εσται Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ὃς αν επακουση εν πυρι, ΟΥΤΟΣ ΘΕΟΣ· "And the God that answereth by fire, he shall be God."

nearer the truth)—" I only remark upon this passage, without stating all my reasons, that these words appear to me to have been addressed by Thomas *to Christ*, and may be justly considered, both as *an exclamation*, expressive of his wonder and delight, and also as *a confession* that Jesus was his Lord and his God." P. 194. This is candid; and the concession is one of considerable importance. For, if the words be addressed *to Christ*, and contain " a confession that Jesus was his Lord and his God," there *ought to be* no difficulty or hesitation in drawing the inference. But alas! what will not attachment to a system effect in warping the judgment? Mark the remainder of Mr. Yates' commentary: " But it is needless to dispute, that, when Thomas addressed Jesus as his Lord, or Master, and his God, he might mean only, that Jesus was *his inspired instructor in matters of religion*. Agreeably, therefore, to the principles which have been before stated, his words ought to be understood according to this simple and reasonable interpretation."—" *It is needless to dispute*" this. It *is* needless indeed. For the commentator who can be satisfied with it must himself be hardly susceptible of conviction; and my readers, I hope, have more understanding and freedom from prejudice than to be misled by it. According to this " simple and reasonable interpretation," not only is that taken for granted which has never been proved, that " *a god*" was a usual synonyme for a *prophet* or *inspired religious instructor;* but the appellation given by Thomas to Christ is no higher than the disciples in general might have given *to himself*. He too was one " to whom the word of God came;" and so were the other apostles and prophets of the New Testament church: and if " *my God*" means no more than " my inspired religious instructor," they were all alike entitled to the same appellation. Let parallel cases, then, be produced, of prophets and apostles being thus addressed, and we will be satisfied. Every man must judge for himself of *simplicity* and *reasonableness;* but till this is done, I must be allowed to consider it as the very opposite of both, as an unexampled and arbitrary departure from the established meaning of words, betraying a system lamentably pressed for support. If any reader is prepared to admit, that when

Thomas, addressing Jesus, said, "MY LORD AND MY GOD," he meant no more than "my Master and inspired instructor;" there is not much at which he will need to stop: he must be tolerably well initiated already in the *thorough-going* principles of Unitarianism, if he has come to consider this as a "*simple and reasonable interpretation.*"

Rom. ix. 5. "Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came; who is OVER ALL GOD BLESSED FOR EVER."

"If there were any evidence," says Mr. Yates, "that this translation is correct, here would be a case in point: the words of the apostle would present a clear and valid argument for the supreme divinity of Jesus Christ." P. 195.—All that we have to do, then, with regard to this text, is to establish the correctness of the translation.—Mr. Yates is of opinion that "the utmost that can be said to vindicate this rendering is, that it does not violate the rules of grammar, or the idioms of the Greek language, and therefore *may possibly* be the true translation:"—and the reasons which he assigns for preferring the translation of the latter words of the verse as a doxology, "God, who is over all, be blessed for ever!"—"appear to him to have so much weight, that if he were not checked by a regard to the opinion of those learned men, who have embraced different views, he would consider the passage as *scarcely even ambiguous.*" Here, then, we are entirely at issue: and, referring the reader to what I have before written in support of the established translation, I shall now offer a few brief strictures on those "*reasons*," which Mr. Yates considers as so cogent.

"1st. Because such ascriptions of praise are very frequent in the Old and New Testaments, and in all Jewish compositions."—I do not recollect these "*very frequent*" instances of such abrupt ascriptions of praise at the close of sentences as are supposed in the Unitarian translation of this verse. At all events, they are nothing like so frequent as the texts which affirm or imply our Lord's supreme divinity:—so that even on this ground,—a calculation of probability from the comparative number of texts on either side, proceeding on the assumption that the phraseology of the verse is equally capable of the one translation

or of the other,—we should not feel ourselves at all at a disadvantage.—But the *proper construction of the words* in the text, is the very point in controversy; and with this the mere *frequency* or *infrequency* of ascriptions of praise, has obviously no connexion; unless it could be shown, that such ascriptions of praise are usually expressed in the same manner as here.

"2dly. Because they almost uniformly *want the substantive verb* (εστω or εἰη) as in this instance."—Suppose it so; what then? What does this prove, except that the mere *absence of the verb* does not disqualify the sentence from being considered as a doxology? and who ever said that it *did?*—Further; Is there any thing at all wanting in the verse on *our* interpretation? While the absence of the substantive verb may accord with the usual practice in doxologies, does this, or does the absence or the presence of any other word in the sentence, in any degree disqualify it from bearing the ordinary translation? We shall find Mr. Yates, in his *sixth* reason, resting on one solitary instance of exception from an otherwise universal practice; and yet *here* he rests on a practice as "*almost uniform*" while the exceptions to it are more numerous:—See 1 Kings x. 9: 2 Chron. ix. 8: Psal. cxiii. 2. If he thinks *one* exception of avail against others, how far should *three* go against himself? But even that *one* we shall afterwards see to be more than dubious.

"3d. Because the periphrasis here used as a name of Deity, 'THE GOD WHO IS ABOVE ALL,' (ὁ ων επι παντων Θεος) or phrases almost exactly the same with it, (such as ὁ επι παντων Θεος, and ὁ επι πασι Θεος) are expressions of perpetual occurrence in Greek writings upon religious subjects, which are universally understood as designations of the supreme Deity, and are employed to distinguish him from all the beings to whom the name (θεος) *God* was applied in a subordinate sense."—But what is *this* to the purpose? Is the circumstance that "*the God who is above all*" is an appellation uniformly appropriated to the supreme Deity, in distinction from all other beings, to be considered as any reason why it should *not* be applied to Jesus Christ? The reader will at once perceive, that it cannot be so considered, without having first *begged the question*. *We* admit what is stated as to the

peculiarity of the designation, and rejoice in the admission; because it is this very circumstance that renders the text so decisive a proof of the doctrine which we maintain. This *third* reason, therefore, is a mere *assumption* of the very point which should have been *proved:* an assumption of the Unitarian dogma that Jesus Christ is NOT the supreme God.

"4th. Because, in all such ascriptions of praise, the words '*for ever*,' or the equivalent expressions, if introduced at all, are placed *at the end of the sentence*, as in this example."—This, truly, is making the most of it. Was there any likelihood of the words "*for ever*" being placed any where else than at the end of the sentence, on the supposition of *our* rendering being the right one? If not, this can be no ground of preference to the other; —and it is mere trifling to mention it.

"5th. Because the position of these words at the end of the sentence, naturally, though not necessarily, draws the participle (ευλογητος) *Blessed*, which they qualify, *to the same quarter.*" —This must be settled by an appeal to facts. Among the doxologies in the Old Testament Scriptures, in which the words "*for ever*," or equivalent phrases, occur, I do not find any instance of this *drawing* of the participle to the end of the sentence. See, in the LXX. 1 Chron. xvi. 36: Psal. xli. 13: lxxii. 19: cvi. 48. And when no parallel cases can be produced, in the ordinary practice of the language, we are not satisfied with Mr. Yates' admission that this "*drawing*" is *not necessary;* we cannot concede to him that it is even *natural.* Mr. Yates may *fancy* it to be so. But no phrase can with any propriety be denominated *natural*, unless it corresponds with the customary usage of the language in which it occurs. The idioms of one language must not be made the standard of what is natural or unnatural in another.

"6th. Because, in Psalm lxviii. 19. (Κυριος ὁ Θεος ευλογητος) the participle is placed *in the latter part of the sentence* by the Septuagint translators, contrary to the assertion of Dr. Whitby in his commentary." Dr. Whitby's assertion is:—"The phrase occurs twenty times in the Old Testament, but in every place ευλογητος goes before, and the article is annexed to the word Θεος."

To this assertion Mr. Yates, like others, has discovered *one* exception. We have found him, above, in his *second* reason, resting his conclusion on the general form of the doxologies in scripture, as "*almost uniformly* wanting the substantive verb." I have referred to *three* exceptions to this: and it does not seem very consistent, as has been already hinted, for Mr. Yates to rest there on the *general practice*, in opposition to *three* exceptions; and then here to question the validity of *our* argument from a practice, to the uniformity of which he can produce no exception but *one*.—But I go farther. I think it is more than doubtful, whether, after all, this exception will stand. In the LXX. the 18th and 19th verses of Psalm lxviii. stand thus: 18. Ανεβας εις ὑψος, ηχμαλωτευσας αιχμαλωσιαν· ελαβες δοματα εν ανθρωπῳ, και γαρ απειθουντες του κατασκηνωσαι. 19. Κυριος ὁ Θεος ευλογητος, ευλογητος κυριος ἡμεραν καθ' ἡμεραν, κ. τ. λ. Without attempting a translation of these words, which it would not be very easy to give, I request the attention of the English reader to the verses as they stand in his own Bible:—"18. Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive, thou hast received gifts for men, yea for the rebellious also, that THE LORD GOD might dwell among them. 19. Blessed be the Lord who daily loadeth us with his benefits, &c." In the original Hebrew, the words יה אלהים, corresponding to Κυριος, ὁ Θεος in the beginning of ver. 19. in the LXX. are the concluding words of verse 18. and are rendered in the established version accordingly, "that THE LORD GOD might dwell among them." In the LXX. these words have been transferred, at the expense of sense and syntax, from the end of the 18th to the beginning of the 19th verse; and this has given rise to the insulated and anomalous phrase ΚΥΡΙΟΣ Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ΕΥΛΟΓΗΤΟΣ, in the beginning of the latter. There seems good reason, therefore, for thinking that this is only an instance (and it does not stand alone) of confusion and anomaly in the Septuagint version, and that the *proper* doxology *begins with the second* ευλογητος in verse 19. Ευλογητος ὁ Κυριος κ. τ. λ; which brings this case into agreement with the established practice of the language, and, in so far as the phraseology of the Scriptures is concerned, renders it *invariable*.

"7th. Because although the participle comes *first* in every

other instance, a sufficient reason for its being so placed, may, in almost all these cases, be assigned, viz. that the name of God is connected by the relative pronoun (ὁς) with one or more clauses, the interposition of which would remove the participle to too great a distance from its noun, if it were thrown back to the end of the sentence." The answer to this is obvious. 1st. There is a considerable number of cases, in which there are no such subsequent clauses, yet the arrangement is still the same. If it were indeed on account of these clauses that the participle is thrown to the beginning, how comes it to be still thrown to the beginning when no such reason exists? 2dly. When such clauses *do* exist, connected with the noun by the relative pronoun, there is no necessity for the participle, on the supposition of its following the noun, following also the clauses which describe or qualify the noun, and being thrown *to the end of the sentence*. There is another arrangement, which produces neither obscurity nor inelegance. The participle may *follow* the noun, and yet *precede* the relative, and the clause or clauses connected with it. This may be illustrated by the following instance, in which the use of the substantive verb with the participle makes no difference as to the principle:—1 Kings x. 9. Γενοιτο Κυριος ὁ Θεος σου ευλογημενος, ὁς ηθελησεν εν σοι δουναι σε επι θρονου Ισραηλ· κ. τ. λ. which suits equally well the idiom of our own language:—"Let THE LORD THY GOD *be blessed*, WHO delighted in thee to set thee on the throne of Israel," &c. In the circumstances, then, described by Mr. Yates, the participle may, in this manner, come *after* its noun, without being at all "removed to too great a distance from it." These circumstances, therefore, cannot be the true reason for its being placed *before* it.

Such are the grounds which appear to Mr. Yates "to have so much weight" as to render the passage "*scarcely even ambiguous*." The reader must judge of them for himself. To me they appear weak and flimsy in the extreme: and in such a case as this, weakness on the one side of the argument is so much additional power on the other.

But Mr. Yates proceeds:—"Further, where the opinions of the writer are unknown, the best method of ascertaining the sense

of a dubious expression is, to inquire how it was understood by those persons *to whom he directly wrote*. In the present case, we have unusual advantages for the determination of this question." P. 197. "These unusual advantages" consist of a quotation from the epistle of Clemens Romanus to the church at Corinth :— "From them came all the priests and Levites, who minister at the altar of God; from him (Jacob) as concerning the flesh came the Lord Jesus (εξ αυτου ὁ Κυριος Ιησους το κατα σαρκα;) from him came kings, and rulers, and leaders, in the line of Judah." A Unitarian must surely feel his resources to be very scanty, when, with all due formality, he introduces this quotation as "affording unusual advantages." I may be told that "there are none so blind as those who will not see." I can't help it. I certainly *do not* see that there is any "*clear allusion*" in the words of Clement to the passage before us. It is a sentence which any person might have written, without having the most distant thought of the passage in his mind. And, even if the allusion were as clear as Mr. Yates thinks it, the inference from the allusion is merely presumptive; and the alternative of the presumption is, whether it was *natural* for a writer, in alluding to a particular sentence, to allude to it *in whole* or *in part:* a question, as to which, (considering the endless variety of circumstances by which a writer's mind may at the moment be influenced) we are surely most incompetent judges.

Mr. Yates further refers to "many of the most eminent christian writers of the first four centuries." I make no pretensions to intimacy with the fathers; nor do I feel any particular anxiety to cultivate it. A question which we cannot determine for ourselves from the Bible, will be but poorly determined by a reference to *them*. While Mr. Yates, following Wetstein, makes confident appeal to "*many*" of them, on one side of the question: Dr. Whitby on the other, asserts, "that the reading we follow is certainly the true reading, because it has the general consent *omnium ferme patrum*, of almost all the fathers, who have thus cited it from the second to the sixth century:" and then he enumerates *his* authorities. I leave it to those who choose to be at the trouble, to balance these accounts. As the fathers differ from

one another, and sometimes, I fear, hardly agree with themselves; I see little good to be got by reference on disputed points to *their* authority.

Mr. Yates concludes his strictures on this passage in the following terms :—" The various evidences, which I have here brought together, to determine the true method of translating this verse, leave in my mind not the smallest doubt, that instead of ' WHO IS OVER ALL GOD BLESSED FOR EVER,' the translation ought to be, ' GOD WHO IS OVER ALL BE BLESSED FOR EVER.' If this is the meaning of St. Paul, how bold, how rash, are Mr. Wardlaw's animadversions. He affirms, that the clause, so translated, is ' deprived of all force and meaning whatever,' and ' converted into a useless and unnatural pleonasm, which adds weakness instead of strength and propriety to the expression and the sentiment." P. 199.

Now, in the first place, this is *absolutely false;* and Mr. Yates, in writing this paragraph, must have been guilty of the most inexcusable carelessness. Of " the clause so translated" I have said no such thing as, with the charge of " boldness and rashness of animadversion," he here imputes to me. The words which Mr. Yates quotes were used by me with exclusive reference to the phrase "*as concerning the flesh.*" They stand thus : " But besides these considerations as to the construction of the words in the original, there is something in the *antithetical* form of the sentence, which clearly indicates the same thing, and confirms, if such confirmation were necessary, the common translation. I allude, as you will perceive, to the phrase ' *according to the flesh.*' Is not this expression evidently intended to *distinguish* what he was *thus*, from what he was *otherwise?* Does it not immediately suggest the question ' What was he else? What was he *not according to the flesh?*' The ordinary translation of the phrase in question conveys the precise meaning of the original :—' *as concerning the flesh;*' that is, ' *as far as respects the flesh,*' or ' *as to his human nature;*' which is thus contrasted with that higher view of his person, according to which he was the possessor of underived and independent existence. Remove from the words this idea of antithesis, and you deprive them of

all force and meaning whatever: you convert them into a useless and unnatural pleonasm, which adds weakness, instead of strength and propriety to the expression and the sentiment."—This reasoning Mr. Yates has thought proper to pass unnoticed. In a Note, indeed, he refers to a subsequent remark of mine, condemnatory of the translation of the clause in the "Improved Version of the New Testament," where it is rendered, "*by natural descent.*" Speaking of the extract from Clement, quoted above, he says: "The expression κατα τον Ιουδαν, 'in the line of Judah,' in the last clause, assists to explain το κατα σαρκα, '*as concerning the flesh*,' in the second clause; and, so far as I can judge, justifies the translation '*by natural descent*,' which is given in the Improved Version. Mr. Wardlaw, however, affirms, that to understand the expression in this sense, is taking 'a most arbitrary freedom with the words themselves, which is utterly inadmissible and deserving of the severest reprehension.'" (Page 198.)

Will Mr. Yates venture to stake his credit as a Greek scholar on the soundness of this criticism? He knows too well, I should think, the effect of the *prepositive article* in such phrases. —"Το κατα σαρκα—Act. Apost. ii. 30. *Quantum ad carnem attinet.*" *Vigerus.*—"Interdum το absolute ponitur, et vertendum est *quantum ad, ad illud quod attinet, nempe*, Rom. ix. 5. το κατα σαρκα, nempe quoad humanam ejus naturam." Schleusner.—"Rom. ix. 5. το κατα σαρκα, for κατα το κατα σαρκα χρημα, *in respect of the flesh.*"—Parkhurst.

The reasoning, then, from the antithetical form of the sentence, stands in all its force.—Acts ii. 30. referred to by Vigerus, furnishes a strong confirmation of it:—"Therefore, being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him, that of the fruit of his loins *according to the flesh* (το κατα σαρκα) he would raise up Christ to sit upon his throne." What is the meaning of the phrase here? If Jesus possessed no other nature than the ordinary nature of a man, was it not enough to say that he was to be of the fruit of David's loins? How could he spring from the loins of David otherwise than after the flesh? Why, then, the *qualifying* clause—*in respect of the flesh?* unless it was intended to exclude a higher nature,

which entered into the constitution of his person, but according to which he was *not* descended of David—not his SON, but his LORD.—On this principle, it appears to me that the occurrence of the phrase—εξ αυτου ὁ Κυριος Ιησους ΤΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΑΡΚΑ—in the extract from Clement, is a much stronger evidence in support of the Trinitarian view of the person of Christ, as held by that Father, than any fancied allusion to Rom. ix. 5. without quoting the part of the verse which directly affirms his divinity, can furnish against it.

"Wherever that phrase '*according to the flesh*' occurs, it implies some other aspect under which the thing or person may be contemplated. Paul had *other brethren* besides those who were sprung by natural descent from Abraham (Rom. ix. 3.);—there was *another Israel*, besides that distinguished by the name on account of fleshly birth (1 Cor. x. 18.);—Christ might be viewed in *another* aspect than according to his descent from David (Acts ii. 30.);—and finally, there were *other masters* than masters according to the flesh (Eph. iv. 5.); else this form of expression could not, in the passages referred to, with propriety have been used."*

It is truly surprising to hear Mr. Yates assert (page 196.) that "the utmost that can be said to vindicate this rendering" (the rendering in our English Bibles) "is, that it does not violate the rules of grammar or the idioms of the Greek language, and therefore *may possibly* be the true translation." This, I say, is truly surprising. The ordinary translation is admitted to be unobjectionable on the ground of grammar or of idiom: And, indeed, supposing the Apostle to have meant to say, what we affirm he *did* mean to say, it is just the manner in which we

* "Ubicunque enim locutio illa κατα σαρκα reperitur, indicatur simul alia rei aut personæ facies, quæ considerari potest. Paulus alios habuerit αδελφους quam hos Abrahamo oriundos; alius sit Israelis populus quam is tantummodo qui propter natales hoc nomine insignitur; alio intuitu possit considerari Christus, quam quatenus natales ejus ex Davide repetuntur; alii denique sint κυριοι quam κατα σαρκα, necesse est, si L. C. L. (Rom. ix. 3. 1 Cor. x. 18. Acts ii. 30.) "et Eph. vi. 5. ea loquendi forma usurpari potest." Hermanni Royaards, Diatribe de divinitate Jesu Christi vera. P. 139.

should have expected him to express it.*—But this is a great deal more than can be said for the Unitarian version. Mr. Yates "has no doubt" (p. 196.) "that a person familiarly acquainted with the Greek, and free from any previous bias to the Trinitarian doctrine, would without hesitation understand the last clause *as an abrupt ascription of praise to the God who is above all.*" And yet he is obliged to admit, that the words, so interpreted, are differently arranged from what is the uniform practice in the Old and New Testament Scriptures, with *one solitary exception*, and even that one, we have seen, more than doubtful. On what reasonable principles of cirticism, then, can it be affirmed of one translation that it "*may possibly* be the true one," and that this is "*the utmost that can be said*" for it, although it is admitted to be quite consistent with syntax and with idiom; while the preference is given to another, in which the idiom, or customary practice of the language, is acknowledged to be violated?

In concluding my remarks on this text, I adopt, with Dr. Middleton, the words of Michaelis:—"I for my part sincerely believe, that Paul here delivers the same doctrine of the divinity of Christ, which is elsewhere unquestionably maintained in the New Testament."

The next passage which Mr. Yates, with other Unitarians, endeavours to set aside from the list of proofs of our Lord's divinity, is Heb. i. 8. "But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O GOD, is for ever and ever."

1. It is amusing to observe, how Mr. Yates puffs off his high

* "Illud ὁ ὢν ad neminem nisi ad Christum potest referri. Id docet ipsa loquendi forma: ea enim permutatur cum altera ὃς ἐστι. Ita Rom. i. 25. dicitur τὸν κτισαντα ὃς ἐστιν εὐλογητος εις τους αιωνας: sed 2 Cor. ii. 31. ὁ θεος—ὁ ὢν εὐλογητος εις τους αιωνας: et usurpatur, quum plura de eo dicuntur de quo sermo erat; ita Joh. i. 18. ὁ μονογενης υἱος ὁ ὢν εις τον κολπον του πατρος, et Joh. iii. 13. ὁ υἱος του ανθρωπου ὁ ὢν εν τῳ ουρανῳ, adeoque ea de re dubitari plane nequit: eo minus, quoniam illud antegressum το κατα σαρκα Christum certa quadam in ratione collocat, et manifesto docet, eum alio etiam intuitu considerari posse." Royaards, Diatribe, &c. P. 138.

authorities against me, accusing me of the most impudent effrontery, in venturing to bring any charge against them, and then,

"With hesitation admirably slow,"

humbly presumes to differ from them himself. We have had one instance of this. Here we have another.—"Grotius, Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Mr. Pierce, with many other learned men, have remarked," it seems, "that this passage may, with equal propriety, be translated, 'God is thy throne forever and ever.'" Now, the *propriety* of a translation of any phrase must be estimated by various considerations; such as, its consistency with the grammar and idiom of the language *from* which the translation is made; its consistency with the grammar and idiom of the language *into* which the translation is made; and its consistency with the connexion and scope of the passage where the phrase occurs. The learned men who prefer the translation "God is thy throne," had, no doubt, all these considerations present to their minds in giving the preference. Mr. Yates, however, in opposition to Grotius, and Dr. Clarke, and Mr. Pierce, and all the other eminent men to whom he refers, "is inclined to prefer the common translation" on account of "*the want of a parallel form of expression.*" Were these "most learned and respected Theologians that ever wrote" not aware of this want?

2. By "the want of a parallel form of expression," we are not, I presume, to understand him as meaning, the want of a parallel form of *Greek construction*. For he says, "there is no disputing the observation of the learned men above referred to, that the original may, with equal *grammatical* propriety, be translated '*God is thy throne*;'" and he brings forward two instances, which have "come in his way incidentally while writing his treatise," requesting me "to say as to them how the article got into the predicate of the proposition." The passages are, Rev. xix. 10. ἡ γαρ μαρτυρια του Ιησου εστι το πνευμα της προφητειας: and 1 Cor. xi. 3. παντος ανδρος ἡ κεφαλη ὁ Χριστος εστι. Mr. Yates "advises any of his readers who thinks that he understands Greek, to look at these passages; and then," says he, "he may consult Dr. Middleton and the Eclectic Review, *if he pleases.*" P. 200.

It may be worth the reader's while to consult Dr. Middleton, notwithstanding this contemptuous sneer. He will there find the former of these two texts classed among *convertible propositions*, which he elsewhere defines to be "such, that of either term taken as the subject the other may be affirmed as the predicate."* As to the latter text, (which is part of a verse) it is somewhat remarkable, that the very same verse furnishes two instances of the general rule that the predicate of the proposition should be anarthrous :—"κεφαλη δε γυναικος ὁ ανηρ κεφαλη δε Χριστου ὁ Θεος." On that clause, which is considered as in opposition to the rule, Dr. Middleton's Note is as follows :—"V. 3. παντος ανδρος ἡ κεφαλη· We have not here a real, though an apparent, breach of the rule of regimen : for παντος ανδρος is equivalent to του ανδρος, using the article in the hypothetic or inclusive sense. Besides, παντος του ανδρος would have a different meaning. The next κεφαλη wants the article, which could not be admitted."†

3. Should it be alleged that the text in question, understanding ὁ Θεος to be in the nominative case, may be a convertible proposition too, we answer, No. Mr. Wakefield, indeed, seems to have thought that it might. He translates the words, with Unitarians in general, "*God is thy throne for ever and ever :*" but in his History of Early Opinions, to which, in his note on the text, he refers the reader, he subjoins ;—"Or, perhaps, *Thy throne is the everlasting God.*" Without insisting on the absurdity of the translation "*the everlasting God,*" which is sufficiently exposed in Dr. Middleton's remarks on the text; I observe, that, if the Unitarian rendering, "*God is thy throne,*" is justified on the principle of *ellipsis*, the meaning of the phrase being "God is *the stability of* thy throne," what will become of the ellipsis when the arrangement of the words is reversed? Had it been a *metaphor*, such a reversal might possibly have been made without producing any material alteration of the sense. But a metaphor it is not pretended to be : and surely "*Thy throne is God,*" for, Thy throne is established or supported by God, is something still

* Middleton on the Greek Art. page 674, and page 77.

† Ibid. page 476.

farther beyond the range of common sense than the other. It cannot be said, that it is more entirely *without parallel;* for no expression can have fewer parallels than *none at all.*

4. That the phrase "*God is thy throne*" for "God is the supporter of thy throne" is without a parallel, is admitted, we have seen, by Mr. Yates; and on this ground he prefers the common translation. I should have, therefore, spared my remarks on that which he gives up, had it not been for the severity of his observations on my "*unhesitating dogmatism*," in presuming to say a word against the high authorities by whom it was sanctioned. In allowing that ὁ Θεος is here in the vocative case, and that the clause is rightly translated "*Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever*," Mr. Yates agrees with Wetstein, who also assigns the same reason for approving the common version:—"Quinam," says he, "ita interpretantur, Deus est thronus tuus, i. e. Deus fulcit et erigit thronum tibi. *Isto vero sensu cum nusquam scriptura hac phrasi utatur*, simplicius multo est intelligere vocem Deus in casu vocandi: O Deus, Dei Filius, thronus tuus est a seculo in seculum, regnabis æternum. Luc. i. 32, 33. Thren. v. 19."—"Some interpret thus:—God is thy throne, i. e. God stablishes and upholds thy throne. But *as the Scripture no where employs this phrase in such a sense*, it is much more simple to understand the word God in the vocative case: O God, Son of God, thy throne is from generation to generation, thou shalt reign for ever." Luke i. 32, 33. Lament. v. 19.* This critic, indeed, not only considers it as in the vocative here, but conceives that, in the subsequent part of the quotation, where ὁ Θεος occurs twice, and is rendered "*God even thy God*," it should, in the first of these occurrences of it, be rendered in the vocative too. His words are:—"ὁ Θεος] Prius vocandi casu iterum intelligendum est, ut commate 8. Cum enim in eo sit Paulus, ut honorem et dignitatem Christi adserat, magis consentaneum est, ut Dei nomen illi hic tribui credamus,"—"God] In its first occurrence in this verse is again to be understood in the vocative case, as in verse 8. For since in it the object of Paul is to assert the honour and dignity of Christ, it is more consistent to consider the name

* Wetstein's Greek Testament, Notes on the Text.

of God as here given to him."* According to Wetstein, therefore, the whole would stand thus :—"Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity; therefore, O God, thy God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows."

5. But it seems the words "*unto the Son he saith,*" do not denote an address to the Son. "I shall have occasion," says Mr. Yates, "in the latter part of this chapter to show, that the words with which the quotation is introduced '*unto the Son he saith,*' do not denote an address to the Son." P. 200. This observation, as appears from the latter part of the chapter, is founded on the circumstance, that the preposition rendered "*unto*' (ΠΡΟΣ) often signifies *with reference to*, or *concerning*, and that it is used in this sense in the preceding verse, where it is rendered "*of* the angels," that is, "*concerning* the angels he saith." These observations are accompanied with the following formal statement :—"Without fear of being contradicted by any accurate scholar, I affirm, that the exact sense and only allowable translation, of the inspired author's words is as follows :—

Και μεν προς τους αγγελους

Verse 7. And, on the one hand, concerning the angels,

Λεγει

he saith, who maketh his angels spirits, &c.

Δε προς τον υιον

"Verse 8. But on the other hand, concerning the Son," &c. Page 212.†

* Ibid.

† In a note, Mr. Yates had gone so far as to express a doubt, "whether προς is *ever* used to denote *an address* to any one, this being signified by the dative case without any preposition." Subsequent examination, however, suggested possibly by Mr. Brown's remarks on that note, in his "Strictures," has convinced him of his mistake; and he has candidly acknowledged it by inserting, on the back of the title-page of his Sermon on "the duty and manner of deciding the principal religious controversies," the following notandum, along with two or three other "inaccuracies of statement in his 'Vindication of Unitarianism,' which he takes that opportunity of correcting :"—"P. 197. erase the *Note*. See Schleusner, V. Προς. No. 2."

Now, granting all this with the utmost readiness, what is it to the purpose, as to the present quotation? Nothing can be more futile than this formal appeal to all accurate scholars, about the "exact sense and only allowable translation" of the words with which the quotation is introduced. For what, after all, shall we make of the quotation itself? It bears the form of an address; "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever;" and, translate πρὸς in any way you please, an address it will inevitably remain. Nothing else can be made of it. The translation of the preposition cannot alter the nature of the thing. It *is* an address;—and an address *to the Son*.

6. "At present," adds Mr. Yates, "the only question to be determined is, whether the word 'God' is here to be understood *in its highest sense*, as denoting the supreme Divinity, or in its *inferior sense*, as signifying a person authorised, commissioned, and inspired to declare the will of God to mankind. In order to remove every doubt upon this subject, it appears only necessary to bring forward the entire quotation."—Having done this, he proceeds:—"Can the all-perfect Jehovah be *anointed?* Can any thing be imparted to him, or his eternal glory receive any increase? Is there any being in existence who can be called HIS GOD? Can the God who is supreme over all have a superior? —Either these questions must be answered in the affirmative, to the subversion of piety, as well as common sense, or it must be conceded, that the invocation 'O GOD' is to be understood according to the inferior sense of the name." Pages 200, 201.

We have, first of all, in this singular passage, the admission, that the words quoted by the apostle *are* an address *to the Son;* so that, in as far as *this* quotation is concerned, the criticisms on the import of ΠΡΟΣ have no application whatever. How little they have to the quotation which follows it, we shall afterwards see.——But further: we have here a remarkable instance of what is a common practice with our author. He states, in terms of the utmost confidence, difficulties attending the interpretations of Trinitarians: difficulties involving, according to him, "the subversion of piety and common sense," without ever so much as adverting, any more than if he never had heard

of such a thing, to the great principle of their system, by which such difficulties are solved—I mean, the double view of the person and character of Christ,—as being God in our nature, and as sustaining the voluntarily assumed relation of a servant of the Godhead, fulfilling a work, and receiving his mediatorial dominion in reward of it. "Ita et de Christo," says Calvin, "Scripturæ loquuntur: attribuunt illi interdum quæ ad humanitatem singulariter referri oporteat: interdum quæ divinitati peculiariter competant: nonnunquam quæ utramque naturam complectantur, neutri seorsum satis conveniant. Atque istam quidem duplicis naturæ conjunctionem, quæ in Christo subest, tanta religione exprimunt, ut eas quandoque inter se communicent; qui tropus veteribus ἰδιωνιωμα κοινωνια dictus est." Instit. p. 123.—"So also the Scriptures speak of Christ: sometimes ascribing to him properties which belong exclusively to the human nature; sometimes such as are peculiar to the Divine; and, occasionally, such as embrace both, not being sufficiently appropriate to either of them by itself. And, indeed, that union of two natures, which subsists in Christ, they express with so much scrupulosity, that they even at times impute, reciprocally, the properties of the one to the other;—a figure of speech, which is called by the ancients ἰδιωματων κοινωνια—communion of properties."—Let the reader assume the correctness of this principle, and he will find no difficulty in conceiving, how Christ should be addressed as possessing the Divine nature, and yet, in the character of Mediator, and in the form of a servant, as *anointed;* as having the Father for *his* God; and as *receiving* "dominion, and glory, and a kingdom." From this single consideration, he may appreciate the value of Mr. Yates' confident assertion, that, in order to remove every doubt" that the name *God* is to be understood in the inferior sense, "it is only necessary to bring forward the entire quotation."

1 John v. 20. "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding that we may know him that is true; and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. THIS IS THE TRUE GOD, and eternal life."

Of Mr. Yates' strictures on this text too (which is the text of

my Discourses on the Divinity of Christ), I might simply say "*answered by anticipation.*" The extreme confidence of his assertions, however, which is here, as in some other cases, in the inverse ratio of the strength of his argument, renders a few remarks necessary.

1. On the question whether the pronoun "*this*" refers to the near or to the remote antecedent, Mr. Yates first tries to get a *near* antecedent more suitable than the existing one to the Unitarian hypothesis, by observing, that Griesbach marks as *doubtful* the words "*Jesus Christ.*" "Now," says he, "if these words be omitted, the nearest antecedent is the word (αυτου) '*his*,' which refers to *God*," (P. 202.)—Had Mr. Yates felt perfect confidence in the validity of his subsequent principle of interpretation, by which the pronoun is made to refer to the *remote* antecedent, he would hardly, I should think, have condescended to notice this. For, in the first place, Griesbach not only does not reject the words "*Jesus Christ*" from the text, (which of itself should have been enough to prevent Mr. Yates from founding any thing on their "uncertainty")—he is so far from rejecting them, that the particular mark, which he affixes to them, is one which implies, that *had they been absent from the received text*, he would have *inserted them as having been ommitted;* only marking them with a certain sign, to indicate to the reader that this had been done, from a preponderance of evidence in their favour. In the second place, their omission would, after all, make no difference whatever in the argument. The words would run thus, —"and we are in him that is true, *even in his Son. This* is the true God, and eternal life:"—και ημεις, εσμεν εν τω αληθινω, ΕΝ ΤΩ ΥΙΩ ΑΥΤΟΥ· ΟΥΤΟΣ εστι ο αληθινος Θεος, κ.τ.λ.—ΑΥΤΟΥ, Mr. Yates alleges, thus becomes the immediate antecedent to ΟΥΤΟΣ: and, no doubt in point of *mere local position* so it is. But let the reader judge, how low he reduces himself in the argument, when he chooses for his antecedent the most unemphatic word in the whole preceding sentence—the *he* that is involved in the possessive *his*. I am fully persuaded, that, even on the supposition made, any reader, free from prejudice, will consider ΤΩ ΥΙΩ ΑΥΤΟΥ as still the immediate antecedent.—I am not sur-

prised that Mr. Yates should have taken no notice of the *second* of the cases mentioned by me as justifying the reference of the demonstrative pronoun to the *remote* antecedent;—namely, "when the *immediate* antecedent holds no prominent place in the sentence, but is introduced only incidentally, the remote being obviously the chief subject, having the entire, or greatly preponderating emphasis, in the mind of the writer." Discourses, p. 36.—He could not well question the correctness of the rule; but it would certainly have ill comported with this criticism of his.

The *first* of the two cases mentioned by me, of warrantable exception to the general rule of connecting the demonstrative pronoun with the *immediate* antecedent, was—"when obvious and indisputable necessity requires the contrary;" and on this I observed as follows:—"But in the instance in our text, no such necessity can be pleaded, except on the *previous assumption* of the certainty that Jesus Christ *is not* the true God. Were this antecedently demonstrated, it might justify a deviation from ordinary practice. But to proceed on such an assumption, is to beg the question in dispute." Now, what says Mr. Yates to this? Why, with the utmost calmness and confidence, without so much as deigning to notice the observation, he just *proceeds on this very assumption*. He first of all refers to those passages (two of which I had noticed in a note, as usually adduced by Unitarians,) namely, 2 John 7. Acts iv. 11. vii. 19. dwelling particularly on the first of them,—"Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an Antichrist." He then goes on thus:—"But, replies Mr. Wardlaw, the sense of these passages is clear; because, by supposing the pronoun to refer to the near antecedent, you make the Scriptures speak nonsense. True, my dear friend; and so do you, when you assert that 'THIS *is the true God*' means '*Jesus Christ* is the true God.' A person, not previously instructed in the doctrines of Trinitarianism, would at the first glance perceive this sentiment to be so false and absurd, that he would immediately refer the pronoun to the more remote antecedent, forming an instantaneous judgment, that the Apostle

did not intend to represent Jesus Christ as '*the true God*' any more than to describe him as '*a deceiver and an Antichrist.*' The primitive Christians, who were equally strangers to both of these impossibilities, would without hesitation refer the pronoun to the more remote antecedent in both cases alike. I maintain, therefore, with Mr. Belsham, that the cases are '*similar*;' though by so doing I incur that most unreasonable charge which you have directed against him, of want of candour." Pages 202, 203.

Here we have a tissue of abundantly bold *assumptions*, without one pennyweight of argument.—We have, in the first place, the assumption, that we Trinitarians, in making the Scriptures affirm Jesus Christ to be *God*, make them affirm as great nonsense as if we should make them affirm Jesus Christ to be *a deceiver and an Antichrist*. This of itself is a tolerably fair specimen of Unitarian confidence. But further: whatever be Mr. Yates' ideas of *sense* and *nonsense*, the question is a simple matter-of-fact one: Do the Scriptures affirm Jesus Christ to be God—or do they not? The foregoing assumption, therefore, implies another, namely, that there is just as much evidence in the Bible that Jesus Christ is "a deceiver and an Antichrist," as there is that Jesus Christ is God. Now, is this Mr. Yates' *bona fide* conviction? I *cannot* believe that it is: because, before I can believe it, I must not only suppose him destitute of *all candour*, but bereft also of understanding, or given up to "strong delusion." Judging from the volume before me, I do *not*, I must honestly say, reckon *candour* among the cardinal virtues of his character; but of *understanding*, I *know* that he has been endowed with more than an ordinary share. May God dispose him, on this occasion, to make a proper use of it! But we have not yet done with his assumptions. He *assumes* still further, that the primitive Christians (that is, the Christians to whom John wrote, the Christians of apostolic times) were as entire strangers to the doctrine of Jesus Christ being the true God, as they were to the self-contradictory absurdity of his being a deceiver and an Antichrist. I say, he *assumes* this; for he does no more than barely assert it; and the assertion, like what precedes, is a mere *begging of the question in dispute*. Yet, instead of saying as he ought to have said.

"To beg I am ashamed," he does it with all possible composure and *nonchalance*, without the slightest symptom of "confusion of face."

"The second argument," says Mr. Yates, "advanced to prove that the person here asserted to be 'the true God' is Jesus Christ, is, that the same God is also called '*eternal life*.' The expression will be allowed by all to be figurative. It means, that the person so called was *the giver*, or *the promiser*, of eternal life. It is maintained by Unitarians, as a great and leading principle of their system, that all the blessings communicated to mankind *through Jesus Christ* originate in the wisdom and goodness *of the one true God*. Agreeably to this general maxim, they assert, that the Father promises and gives eternal life *through Jesus Christ*. *The Father*, therefore, is *properly* 'the eternal life:' Jesus Christ is also 'the eternal life,' *but in an inferior sense*. Hence St. Paul observes, that 'eternal life is *the gift of God* THROUGH Jesus Christ our Lord.'" Page 203.

I cannot be filling up my pages by transcribing long paragraphs from my former volume. If the reader will take the trouble of looking over page 38th of that volume, he will at once perceive, that, in the extract just made, Mr. Yates has thought proper *entirely to evade* my argument; which is derived from a comparison of the text in question with the opening of the Epistle. He does not so much as look near it; although it is mentioned by me as "the circumstance which in my mind placed the matter beyond dispute."—What reason Mr. Yates might have for this, I leave the reader to conjecture. I leave him also to compare for himself any remaining reasonings on this text; as I dread the imputation of repetition and tediousness.

For the same cause, I must decline entering into any enlarged additional discussion of the particular usage of the Greek language respecting the definite article, on which the argument for our Lord's divinity is founded, which is deduced from such passages as Tit. ii. 13. and 2 Pet. i. 1. I shall dismiss this part of the subject with two or three brief observations.

1. Mr. Yates wraps up the argument in terms of such vague generality, as pretty clearly to show, that he felt himself at a

loss for any passages of the same construction with those in question, to confront with them, as evidences that they ought to be, or at least might be, rendered according to the common version: "We find in the New Testament," says he, "*numerous passages, in which God and our Lord Jesus Christ are mentioned in conjunction.* While they resemble one another in this one circumstance, they *differ in an endless variety of ways respecting* THE USE OR THE OMISSION, and also THE ARRANGEMENT *of articles, pronouns, and adjectives.* Owing to these irregularities, some of them are, *considered by themselves, ambiguous.* But *others* can only be translated in such a manner as to make *a clear and marked distinction between God and our Lord Jesus Christ.* I conceive, that the *unambiguous examples* ought to serve as our guides towards the just interpretation *of those passages in which the sense is not fixed by the grammatical construction.* "For these reasons, the received translation ought to be followed in the passages in question, even though no regard were paid to the doctrines of the Divine unity and the inferiority of Jesus Christ." Pages 205, 206. Now, Mr. Yates would have done more to his purpose, had he produced a few texts, in which the construction, with regard to the use of the article, is the same as in Tit. ii. 13. and 2 Pet. i. 1. while they contain, notwithstanding, "a clear and marked distinction between God and our Lord Jesus Christ." Whatever varieties he may find in the use, omission, and arrangement of articles, pronouns, and adjectives, unless he can bring forward indisputable instances of the kind I have described, these varieties (which, however, with respect to *the article*, I do not believe to be *endless* as he represents them) can avail him nothing. In the verse immediately following 2 Pet. i. 1. there is *a marked distinction* between "*God*" and "*Jesus our Lord*:" but it is worthy of notice, that the construction is changed. In the first verse, we have, "εν δικαιοσυνῃ του Θεου ἡμων και Σωτηρος Ιησου Χριστου;" in the second, "εν επιγνωσει του Θεου, και Ιησου του Κυριου ἡμων." On the other hand, the precisely parallel construction, adduced by me from the eleventh verse of the same chapter, and rendered by our English translators agreeably to the principles of syntax contended for, is left by Mr. Yates un-

noticed. In both verse 1st and verse 11th, the *position* of the pronoun ἡμων (our) appears to me to render the received translation *quite unaccountable*. Had the words been του Θεου και Σωτηρος ἡμων Ιησου Χριστου, we should still have maintained, even from this arrangement, the validity of our argument. But the case is still more decisive from the real order of the words, του Θεου ΗΜΩΝ και Σωτηρος Ιησου Χριστου. Surely, on all the principles of Greek construction, the possessive pronoun belongs here, in the first instance, to του Θεου. To *disjoin* it from του Θεου, which precedes, and *connect* it with και Σωτηρος ἡμων, which follows, as our translators have done, is, I should think, without a parallel. It *must* belong to του Θεου; and if it does, it *must* belong also to Σωτηρος ἡμων: for any instance of the phrase του Θεου ἡμων και Σωτηρος Ιησου Χριστου, meaning "*of* OUR *God, and* THE *Saviour Jesus Christ*," is, I presume, as little to be found as the other.

2. With regard to Tit. ii. 13. Mr. Yates ought to have adduced not only texts of the same construction, yet requiring a different translation from that maintained in our argument: but also instances of *the appearing of the Father* being mentioned in Scriptures as the object of Christian hope, along with the *appearing of Jesus Christ*.

3. With regard to Mr. Belsham, the particular part of his strictures on this subject, to which I applied the strong epithet of "*shamefully disingenuous*," was solely that in which he makes the supposition of the controversy on the great doctrine of our Lord's divinity being "*reduced to this*."—Mr. Belsham could not but be aware that such language was nothing better than empty gasconade; and that those against whom he thus writes were as far as possible from bringing forward their criticisms on the use of the article, from any consciousness felt by them of their *necessity* to the support of their system, in consequence of the failure of other arguments.—On this ground, I am not disposed to think the remarks on Mr. Belsham in Note E. overstrained. If any of my readers, however, shall reckon them unduly severe, I am quite contented to class Mr. Belsham's language among those "*strong* statements, or perhaps *over*-statements, to which every man is liable, in defending his own side of an interesting question."

Having made these brief remarks, I leave the reader to re-peruse my observations on this class of texts, in Discourse III.; to compare them with those of Mr. Yates; to consult also, if he has the opportunity, my *references* in Note E. along with those of Mr. Yates and Mr. Belsham; and, with his Greek Testament before him, to form his own judgment.

I proceed to Mr. Yates' animadversions on the instances in which the name JEHOVAH is given to Christ.

He admits, that, "in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, JEHOVAH is used as the peculiar and appropriate name of the one supreme God."—In this case, therefore, there is not as there was in the former, any *inferior sense* of the name:—all that we have to do is, to ascertain the fact, that the name *is given* to Jesus Christ.

Mr. Yates, as before, is determined not to be satisfied with any testimony on this point produced from the Bible, unless it be expressed in the direct *ipsissima verba* of his own dictation. —"Instead of *direct scripture testimonies*," he says, "Mr Wardlaw only brings forward *remote deductions*, formed by the comparison of one set of passages with another." We might reply," he immediately adds, "that arguments so complicated are not the proper kind of evidence to establish such an awful, stupendous, and infinitely important doctrine." (P. 208.)—It belongs to the reader to judge, how far the instances thus characterized as "*remote deductions*," and "*complicated arguments*," deserve to be so denominated. To me they appear, on the contrary, to be such as the simplest and most untutored mind must be able instantly to apprehend. "A person is called Jehovah in the Old Testament. The passage in which this person is spoken of is, in the New Testament, expressly referred to Christ: therefore he is Jehovah. To be deduction at all, we can conceive nothing further from being *remote*."*

The first instance of the application of the name Jehovah to Jesus Christ, and which Mr. Yates classes among *remote deductions*, is found in a comparison of Luke i. 16, 17. with Isa. xl. 3. John i. 23. Matth. iii. 3. John iii. 28. John i. 31. and Mal. iii. 1.;

* Brown's Strictures, p. 55.

for the illustration of which I refer the reader to pages 73—75, of my former volume. Let us see for a moment the *remoteness of the deduction*, the *complexity of the argument*, in this instance. The prophets predict the *coming* of One, to whom they give the name of JEHOVAH: They call him, at the same time, "*the Lord* whom the people sought,"—"the *Messenger of the Covenant*, in whom they delighted;" and they testify that he should come to "*his* temple." It is also predicted, that a messenger should *go before him*, to *prepare his way*. In due time, John the Baptist makes his appearance; and he comes in the character of a *precursor*, a *preparer of the way*. That he is the person referred to by Isaiah and Malachi, is admitted. He, then, before whom—before whose face—John the Baptist came, is, "*the Lord*, the *Messenger of the Covenant*," the object of Jewish expectation, who was to come to "*his* temple," the temple of JEHOVAH. Now, John came to introduce THE CHRIST—to prepare for his "*manifestation to Israel*." John i. 31. He speaks of himself as "*sent before him*," John iii. 28; and of Jesus under the emphatic designation, "*He that cometh after me*:" and it is remarkable how the terms in which he speaks of Christ accord with the elevated and Divine appellations previously given him by the prophets:—"This is he of whom I said, after me cometh a man who is preferred before me; for he was before me." John i. 30. I am aware that the words ὁτι πρωτος μου ην &c. have been proposed to be rendered "for he was *my chief*," or "*my superior*." But, without disputing the *possibility* of the words bearing this rendering, it is most unnatural to suppose John to have used the *past tense*, if such was his meaning:—"He *is* preferred before me, for he *was* my superior." The use of this tense fixes the phrase to the meaning given it by our translators; and then we have, in John's words, a clear and striking declaration of the pre-existence of Christ. He *came after* John; and yet he *was before* him: a pointed, and obviously designed *antithesis*. In all this there is perfect harmony. Jesus Christ is the person *before whom*, *before whose face* the predicted messenger is sent: He is "*the Lord*, *the Messenger of the Covenant*, who was to come to *his* temple"—"*Jehovah*, whose way was to be prepared." I

appeal to the impartial reader, if this be a "*remote deduction*," or a "*complicated argument*." Mr. Yates alleges, that the *principle* of my argument is "*that it is impossible for the same thing to be asserted in Scripture concerning two different beings.*" P. 210. He shows thus how logically he can generalize, and, by "*remote deduction*," infer a universal principle from a particular case, as if it could not be made out, *in that particular case*, that the thing asserted is asserted of the same person under different appellations, unless the universal impossibility stated in his general principle is admitted, that *in no case* can the same things be affirmed of two different beings.

On this ground however, Mr. Yates thus reasons:—"The argument may be thus summed up. John went before Jehovah; and John went before Christ; therefore Christ is Jehovah.—1 Sam. ii. 12. '*The sons of* ELI *were sons of* BELIAL;' *therefore* ELI was BELIAL. Exod. xx. 2. and Deut. v. 6. *He who brought the Israelites out of Egypt was* JEHOVAH: but, by Exod. xxxii. 7. xxxiii. 1. *He who brought the Israelites out of Egypt was* MOSES; *therefore* MOSES was JEHOVAH. Such are the endless absurdities which would be derived from the Scriptures by proceeding upon the principle of Mr. Wardlaw's argument, *that it is impossible for the same thing to be affirmed in Scripture concerning two different beings.*" P. 210.

I have said, "Mr. Yates *reasons*:" But I believe I have used a wrong word. There are some things which are *so very* unreasonable, that it is difficult to show them to be so. There is the same difficulty in refuting a self-evident absurdity as there is in demonstrating a self-evident truth. If the reader is convinced by Mr. Yates' wit, (in which, if there is any salt, it wants the Attic poignancy) I cannot help him. I shall only say in the words of Mr. Brown,—"It is almost unnecessary to remark, that the true principle of Mr. Wardlaw's argument is, *and it is strange that his opponent did not perceive it*, that if it is plainly said in the New Testament that Jesus Christ is the person mentioned in a particular passage of Old Testament Scripture, the name used in that passage properly belongs to him." (Strictures, p. 56.)—Whether it be not "*plainly said in the New Testament*," that

JESUS CHRIST WAS THE PERSON before whose face, according to the prophets, the messenger was to be sent, to prepare his way; and whether the various designations and names by which that person was prophetically distinguished, and JEHOVAH among the rest, do not fairly and evidently belong to him, I leave the reader to judge. The figurative nature of the language used by some of the prophets, on which Mr. Yates enlarges, in pages 210—212, has nothing whatever to do with the argument.

The next passage is Heb. i. 10. "And, thou, LORD, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands."

With regard to this passage, Mr. Yates makes the following important admissions:—"I shall grant to Mr. Wardlaw, that the word LORD ought here to be considered as equivalent to JEHOVAH; nor am I disposed to consider this passage as a sudden *apostrophe* to God, because, although this interpretation is very suitable to the idiom of *our* language, I know of nothing parallel to it *in the Scriptures*. The only question, therefore, is, whether this quotation was intended by the writer *as an address to Christ*." P. 211.

I am satisfied that the question should stand as thus stated. The sole reason assigned by Mr. Yates for *not* understanding the words as, in the application of them by the apostle, *an address to the Son*, is what I have already noticed, page 155, with regard to the meaning of the preposition ΠΡΟΣ in verse 8. Taking my observations on that criticism of Mr. Yates along with him, let the reader now remark:

1. The former quotation, as was then noticed, in whatever way you render ΠΡΟΣ, *is* an address to the Son, and *can be nothing else*. It is admitted to be so by Mr. Yates, who translates it, "Thy throne, O God," calls it an "*invocation*," and contends that in this invocation of the Son, *God* is used in its *inferior sense*. Such is the ground he takes as to the *first address*.

Now, the second quotation *is an address too*. Is "LORD," then, to be also taken in its inferior sense? No. Mr. Yates admits that it means JEHOVAH. He says, the words are an "*address to Jehovah referring* to the government of Christ." P. 234. Mr.

Yates shows us in this, how well he can at times satisfy himself with a "*remote deduction*." The words of the quotation, under the form of an address to Jehovah, contain no more than a simple declaration of his *power* in the creation of heaven and earth, of his *immutability*, and his *eternal existence*. To the *government of Christ* there is, *in the words themselves*, no sort of reference, direct or remote. Socinian ingenuity has framed a reference, by connecting the power, and immutability, and eternity of Jehovah with the perpetuity of the reign of Christ; and this they think quite natural and easy. But it is *bringing out of* the passage what is *not in it*. The reference is entirely gratuitous. It is truly a "*remote deduction*." But besides, such an interpretation deprives the passage of all peculiarity of application to the apostle's purpose. His purpose is, to show the superiority of Christ to angels. But, unless the words quoted are considered as *addressed to Christ*, what are they to this purpose? How is a declaration that JEHOVAH created the heavens and the earth, that he is immutable, and everlasting, to be made to bear upon this point? For my own part, I can see nothing in the words, on this interpretation, to prevent them being prefaced with "*concerning the angels he saith*," with just as much propriety as "*concerning the Son he saith*."

Mr. Yates adopts the ordinary Unitarian method of setting aside that most plain and convincing proof of JESUS being JEHOVAH, derived from comparing Isa. vi. 1—5. with John xii. 37—41. He may, if he please, call it a "*remote deduction*" by which this proof is obtained. I still deny, as before, that it *is* a deduction *at all*. It is as plain and pointed a declaration as the Evangelist could have made, that the GLORY OF JEHOVAH, seen by the prophet, on the occasion referred to, was the GLORY OF CHRIST. "He saw his glory," says the Evangelist, "and spake of him." Let the reader look at Isa. vi. and he will find in it a description of the GLORY which, on the occasion referred to, the prophet *saw*. But, according to Mr. Yates and his brethren, the glory, which the Evangelist says Isaiah saw, was not at all the glory which Isaiah describes as having been seen by him, but something entirely different;—and something too, it is remarka-

ble, of which there is no mention whatever made in the whole of the vision there recorded. "He contemplated," says Mr. Yates, "the future glory of Christ displayed in the performance of miracles." *This*, it seems, was the glory which he "*saw*,"—i. e. which he "*foresaw*." Yet of *this* glory no notice is taken by the prophet in the passage:—not a word is said about it.

Can any thing, then, be more arbitrary than this? Isaiah tells us of the *glory* which he *saw*,—viz. the glory of JEHOVAH; and the Evangelist says, "These things said Esaias when he *saw his glory*." Yet we must not suppose the *glory* mentioned in the two passages to be *the same;* but the glory mentioned by John to be something *entirely different;* and glory too, which the prophet does not in the passage represent himself as having seen *at all!*—Yet these are the interpreters of Scripture, who reprimand us for our "remote deductions;" who represent us as "*contriving* to deduce an argument" for the divinity of Jesus from "a mysterious and far-fetched interpretation of the Evangelist's words. I pity the man who, on weighing the comparative claims of the two interpretations, can satisfy himself with pronouncing ours a "*patched-up argument*," and giving it the *go-by* with a constrained admission that "*certainly the coincidences are a little remarkable*, but that they afford *not the shadow of a proof that* JESUS *is* JEHOVAH."—I repeat, with increased confidence, that "there is no evading the inference which the comparison of these passages forces upon our minds."

Mr. Yates' translation of Jer. xxiii. 6, "This is the name whereby he shall be called, JEHOVAH IS OUR PROSPERITY," seems a very unaccountable one. That "*righteousness*" is the usual, and the proper, rendering of the word which he translates "*prosperity*," is beyond question. Indeed, I know not of any instance in which it has the signification he annexes to it. Blayney translates the verse—"And this is the name by which JEHOVAH shall call him, "OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS;" and he apologizes, on the ground of his obligation to faithfulness as a critic, for the offence which might be taken by some, at being deprived of this proof of the divinity of Christ. There is more plausibility in this version. Yet there does not appear to be any sufficient ground for

departing from the ordinary translation. "JEHOVAH OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS," is an appellation which precisely corresponds with the phraseology of other passages—such as, for example, Isa. xlv. 24, 25. "Surely shall one say, IN JEHOVAH HAVE I RIGHTEOUSNESS: In JEHOVAH shall all the seed of Israel BE JUSTIFIED, and shall glory:" And the established version of the text seems to be quite as consistent as the other with the syntax and idiom of the Hebrew language.

With respect to the parallel passage in chap. xxxiii. 16. "This *is the name* wherewith she shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness," the mere English reader will observe that the words "*is the name*" are supplementary. The verse is translated by Blayney, in consistency with his view of chap. xxiii. 6. "And this is he whom JEHOVAH shall call OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS." He says, the pronominal affix, (rendered *she* in our version) is not the *feminine* affix, but the *masculine* in the *Chaldee form*. Assuming this as correct, the words might be rendered, (and, as the same person is spoken of in both passages, under the same titles, it seems reasonable to harmonize them, when it can be done so simply)—"This is he whom they shall call (or who shall be called) Jehovah our Righteousness." Others, however, considering the pronominal affix as feminine, would render the words—"*This person* who shall call her, is "Jehovah our Righteousness."—"It is generally agreed," says Dr. Guyse, "that this" (viz. the ordinary version) "is a very odd translation of that text, which ought to be rendered, 'He who shall call her, is Jehovah our Righteousness.' And so the Lord, or Jehovah, our Righteousness, is descriptive of Christ by that name, which it was said in the 23d chapter he should be called by."* If, however, after all, the common version shall by any be retained, the meaning will be, on comparing it with chap. xxiii. 6,—that the grand characteristic distinction of the church of God is, that all his constituent members trust and glory in HIM who is there named "JEHOVAH THEIR RIGHTEOUSNESS;" that the doctrine of justification by the righteousness of Jehovah in the human na-

* Sermons on the Divinity of Christ; Sermon III. near the end.

ture, is a fundamental article in its constitution, in the charter of its privileges and hopes; that "JEHOVAH OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS" is the song and the boast of all the followers of the Captain of Salvation, the motto on the banners of the church militant;—banners which shall at length be suspended in the temple above, retaining their appropriate inscription, when the warfare of the church shall terminate in everlasting peace.

With regard to Zech. xiii. 7. "Awake, O sword, against my Shepherd, and against THE MAN THAT IS MY FELLOW, saith JEHOVAH OF HOSTS:" I am fully convinced myself, notwithstanding the authorities produced by Newcome to the contrary, that the passage refers to the sufferings of Christ, and to their consequences as to the nation of the Jews, and the true Israel:—and that the proper sense of the appellation "MY FELLOW" is, "the companion, equal, compeer, of the Lord of hosts; the Son of the Father; the 'Word that was with God, and was God;'"*—the same SHEPHERD" who is called "THE LORD GOD," in Isa. xl. 9—11. But as the word translated "*Fellow*," is one which does not of itself *necessarily* imply *equality*, it might be difficult, on grounds merely critical, derived from the phraseology of the text itself, to establish the justice of this interpretation to the satisfaction of those, who are not previously convinced of the great and blessed truth for which I am contending. Mr. Yates says, that, "to produce this passage as one in which 'the name Jehovah is directly given to Jesus of Nazareth,' proves nothing but the exigency of the case." (P. 215.)—But the case is as far as can be imagined from being a case of *exigency;* and therefore, although I have seen nothing to shake my established opinion of the object and import of the text, I feel no solicitude to *press* it, and shall leave it to the judgment of the reader.

For similar reasons, I have omitted Zech. xi.12,13. in the enumeration of passages in the 2*d edition* of my Discourses. The passage, with its application by the evangelist Matthew,† (chapter

* Scott's commentary on the text.

† The words of the Evangelist are: "Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremiah the prophet, saying, And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did

xxvii. 9, 10.) is, in various respects, obscure and difficult. Newcome says, on the words 'a goodly price that I have been prized at by them:' Jehovah calls the price of his prophet his own price; and commands that it should not be accepted, but given to another;—and to the potter, to foreshadow the transaction related Matth. xxvii. 7." (Minor Prophets, Note on the text.)—But might not JEHOVAH call the price *his own* price for a different reason than its being the price of *his* prophet?—the price paid, on the occasion referred to by the prophet, being intended to foreshadow the payment of *the same price* afterwards, for the life of *the Son of God;* for JEHOVAH, when he appeared for their salvation, in the person of Jesus Christ?

The argument derived from the comparison of Rom. xiv. 10, 11. with Isa. xlv. 23. stands in its full force, unaffected by Mr. Yates' Unitarian gloss. Let any reader peruse the verses in Rom. xiv. with the preceding context. He will there find that

value, and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me." With the difficulty as to the *name of the prophet*, for which different solutions sufficiently satisfactory have been proposed, we have at present nothing to do. Neither is it my intention to discuss the various observations of critics and commentators, made with the view of bringing the quotation in the Evangelist to a correspondence with the words of Zechariah. I merely wish to suggest for consideration a thought that has occurred to me respecting the verse in Matthew, which may not, after all, be new. May not those words in the verse, which are not to be found in the prophet, and from which one of the chief difficulties relative to the quotation arises, be intended by the sacred historian, not as a part of the quotation, but as a *parenthetical explanation of his own?* On this supposition the verse would stand as follows: "Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Zechariah the prophet, saying, 'And they took the thirty pieces of silver'—(the price of him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did value)—'and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me.'" In the parenthesis, the historian makes a general reference to the transaction related by the prophet. The quotation will then be, "They took the thirty pieces of silver, and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me:"—between which and the words of the prophet, the difference is not very wide: "And I took the thirty pieces of silver, and cast them to the potter in the house of the Lord." The substitution of εδωκα for εδωκαν would nearly complete the harmony. But for this, although it has a place among the various readings, the authority does not appear at all sufficient. For another view of the passage, I refer the reader to Dr. Campbell's translation of the Gospels.

CHRIST IS THE MASTER whom Christians *serve;* the LORD, *to* whom they *live*, and *to* whom they *die*, in opposition to living and dying *to themselves—whose they are* in life and in death, and *to whom* they must render their final account. To impress on their minds the remembrance that this Lord is not a mere man, —a mere fellow-creature like themselves; having reminded them that "we shall all stand before the judgment-seat of CHRIST," he quotes, *in proof of this*, Isa. xlv. But the whole force of the argument, and appropriateness of the quotation, depend on the circumstance of the speaker in that passage being the same with CHRIST. The speaker speaks in his own person: "As *I* live—every knee shall bow to *me*," &c. Now, unless this be CHRIST, what evidence at all does the passage contain, that we are to stand before *his* judgment-seat?—"The whole force of the apostle's argument," says Dr. Guyse, "stands on this, that it was the Son, inclusively at least, who 'swore by himself,' or, 'as I live,' 'every knee shall bow to me,' &c. For if we suppose it to be the Father, exclusive of the Son, who said, 'I sware by myself,' or 'as I live,' every knee shall bow to me,' &c. this would have been so far from proving, as the apostle intends and argues, that 'we shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ,' that it would have proved just the contrary; because Christ is not that God who there sware by himself, and consequently not that God, whom by that oath we are obliged to stand before, and bow the knee, and confess to. But if Christ is that God who there 'sware that every knee should bow, and every tongue confess to him,' then the proof is cogent and unanswerable, that we all shall stand before his judgment-seat."*

On 1 Cor. i. 30, 31. compared with Isa. xlv. 25. Mr. Yates simply says, "That the title LORD is here equivalent to JEHOVAH, is evident from the passage of Isaiah alluded to by the apostle, Isa. xlv. 25. The meaning evidently is, *that men should glory in God, by whom Christ has been made unto them wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption.*" Page 217. But this is not by any means so very clear. Christ is, in the 30th verse, designated as our "*righteousness*," (which, as distin-

* Sermons on the Deity of Christ, Sermon III.

guished from *sanctification*, means our *justification*;"—The passage in Isaiah says, "IN THE LORD (JEHOVAH) shall all the seed of Israel be JUSTIFIED." CHRIST, then, is "JEHOVAH, in whom all the seed of Israel ARE JUSTIFIED, and in whom they glory."

The application of the title "MY LORD," in Psal. CX. 1. to CHRIST, made by Christ himself, and particularly noticed by me, in closing this branch of the subject, Mr. Yates passes over *sub silentio*. He must either have *felt* it *too much* for him, or *thought* it *too little*. The Pharisees of old were in the former predicament.

CHAPTER VI.

IN CHAPTER VI. Mr. Yates examines "THE PASSAGES IN WHICH THE PECULIAR ATTRIBUTES OF DEITY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE ASCRIBED TO CHRIST."

1. Eternal existence.

His remarks on the passages adduced under this particular, strikingly shew the imbecility of his cause.

John viii. 58. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am." No attempt is made to invalidate my reasoning on this text. "Mr. Wardlaw remarks," says Mr. Yates, "concerning this passage, 'Our Lord expressly affirms, that he existed before Abraham.' The truth of his observation will be admitted probably by all Unitarians who believe in the *pre-existence* of Christ." Page 218. Is Mr. Yates himself, then, one of these? He does not say. The words of Jesus must mean something. What then does he understand to be their meaning? He does not tell us. And such is his way. When he thinks he can make any text to comport with the simple manhood of Christ, he tries it. When he feels himself pinched by any text on *this* hypothesis, he takes refuge behind that of his *pre-existence*, as the first of creatures. We are left thus to conclude, that Mr. Yates considers it as a matter of little or no consequence, whether Jesus was the first and most exalted of creatures, or a mere

man, the offspring of Joseph and Mary; and the Scriptures as leaving this point quite unsettled. No matter what he be, it should seem, provided it can be shown, that he is *not God.*

"After sounding his shrill clarion," Mr. Yates continues, "through three pages, over the Socinian expositors, he observes, The idea, which has often been suggested, *is far from being destitute of probability*, that there was in our Lord's words an *allusion*, perceived by the Jews, *and rendered*, PERHAPS, *emphatical by his manner*, to the words of God to Moses, 'I AM THAT I AM.' As our Author here expresses himself with becoming hesitation and modesty, I only wonder that he has introduced this passage among the '*direct and immediate proofs* of our Lord's divinity." P. 218. This is *partial quotation.* The circumstance on which the probability is chiefly grounded is left out of view. The Jews conceived our Lord, in using the words, to be guilty of *blasphemy.* This is clear from their *taking up stones to stone him.* But there was no blasphemy in calling himself *the Messiah;* nor any blasphemy in the simple affirmation of his pre-existence as a creature. The blasphemy, on this, as on other occasions, consisted in that "*he being a man made himself God.*" And when we recollect, that he spoke to them *in their own language;* that they had the *look*, and *emphasis*, and *manner* of the speaker, to enable them to understand his meaning; and that our blessed Lord did not at all undeceive them, which every idea we can form of his character constrains us to think he must have done, had he perceived them to be actuated by a mistake so gross, and so unutterably revolting to his heart; we have the strongest reason to believe, that they were *right* in their interpretation of his words, although *wrong* in accounting them *blasphemous.*

Heb. i. 10. Mr. Yates briefly repeats the view of this text which we have already considered, pages 167, 168.

Col. i. 17. "In the 15th verse of this chapter," Mr. Yates observes, "Christ is called 'the first-born of every creature,' which is a direct testimony that he was not an eternal, but a created being. Nor is this assertion contradicted by the phrase 'he is before all things.' For even if we suppose it to mean, not 'he *is*,' but 'he *was* before all things,' and if we were to grant

that '*before* all things' signifies pre-existence *in time*, and not pre-eminence *in dignity*, still it could only signify, that he existed before all things except himself and God. It proves, therefore, at the very utmost, nothing more than our Lord's existence before the creation of the universe." P. 219.

Here is the same *indecision* as before. We have in this text, it seems, a *direct testimony* that Christ is not an *eternal* but a *created* being. But, if it be at all a direct testimony *against* his *eternal* existence, it must be *as direct* a testimony *for* his *pre*-existence; his existence before all other creatures. We ask again, then, Does Mr. Yates believe this testimony? But we ask in vain. *Cautus horrescit.* He sets out upon the principle of never saying what he thinks Christ *is*, but only showing what he *is not*. And, to do him justice, he keeps it up.

But let us examine his positions. And, to take the last first: Although it were granted, it seems, that "*before all things*" signifies pre-existence *in time*, and not pre-eminence *in dignity*, still it could only signify "that he existed before all things, except himself and God." I shall not dispute the position implied in these words, that no being can exist *before himself*. But if the words "*before all things*" have any specific meaning at all, they must mean, "before all *created* things;" in which case, they exclude the person spoken of from being himself a creature. If he were of the number of *created things* himself, he could not be "*before all things*," for the very reason contained in the indisputable proposition that he could not exist *before himself*. Of no being but an *uncreated* being can it, with strict propriety, be said that he is "*before all created things*."

But in the expression, "*the first-born of every creature*," in verse 15th, we have, it is alleged, "a direct testimony that he was not an eternal but a created being."—The phrase πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως appears here however, most naturally to mean the supremacy to which he is exalted, as the "appointed HEIR of all things,"—the "LORD OF ALL;" which *the Heir* is described to be, Gal. iv. 1.—In Psalm lxxxix. 27, Jehovah, speaking of the Messiah, says, "Also I will make him MY FIRST-BORN, higher than the kings of the earth;" of which the meaning is, that he

would invest him with pre-eminent dignity and authority, "putting all things under his feet."—This agrees well with the subsequent context in the epistle:—"And he is the head of the body, the church; who is the beginning, the first born from the dead; that in all things he might have the pre-eminence;"—as it does also with Heb. i. 2, 3. where Jesus is spoken of as "HEIR *of all things*," and at the same time as "the brightness of (the Father's) glory, and the *express* IMAGE *of his person*;" just as in Col. i. 15. he is called "the IMAGE of the invisible God," and "the FIRST-BORN of the whole creation."—Schleusner says, "Christus vocatur πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως, princeps et dominus omnium rerum creatarum:"—and Parkhurst: "Christ is called, Col. i. 15. Πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως, *the First-begotten, or First-born of the whole creation*, because he was begotten to be *heir and Lord of all things;* (comp. Heb. i. 2, 8. Acts. x. 36.) and *in all things*, or *over all persons, to have the pre-eminence.* (Comp. Psal. lxxxix. 27.) And because all things were created ΕΙΣ αυτον, FOR *him*, as well as δι' αυτου, *by him*, in the same view he is styled absolutely TON πρωτοτοκον, THE *First-born*, Heb. i. 6."

Rev. i. 8.; i. 17.; xxii. 13.—On these three passages I refer the reader back to pages 40—42.

Having repeated Griesbach's version of the first of these texts—"*saith the Lord* GOD," instead of "*saith the Lord*," Mr. Yates here says:—"Since St. John attributes these words to *the Supreme God*, they cannot prove any thing respecting *Jesus Christ.*"—If the reader is prepared to allow to Mr. Yates' *bare assertions* the force of *conclusive proofs*, he may be satisfied with this *begging of the question.*

According to Mr. Yates, "when the Almighty is said to be 'the first and the last,' the meaning is, that he is contemporary with the earliest and the latest events in that chain of causes and effects, by which he accomplishes his stupendous counsels. This remark is beautifully adapted to the series of occurrences referred to by the prophet Isaiah. It appears equally suitable at the commencement of a prophetical narration of the successes and calamities which were appointed by the Almighty for the

Christian church." Page 220. In the passage referred to, however, in the prophecies of Isaiah, JEHOVAH applies the epithets to himself, in distinguishing himself from the false gods of the heathen; and they are evidently intended to describe him as, in opposition to these "Vanities," the LIVING and ETERNAL GOD. The prophet Jeremiah contrasts Jehovah with idols in the following terms; and if the reader will compare with them the language of Isaiah in the passages referred to, especially chap. xlviii. 12, 13. he will at once perceive their parallelism and equipollence:—"But the LORD (JEHOVAH) is the true God, he is THE LIVING GOD, and an EVERLASTING KING:—thus shall ye say unto them, The gods that have not made the earth and the heavens, even they shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens. He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, he hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion;" Jer. x. 10—12.—The following exposition of the language in Isaiah xli. 4. is as just as it is elegant:—"*Ego* Jehovah PRIMUS et CUM ultimis IDEM SUM.] Attributum est veri Dei insigne, quod in sequentibus non semel repetitur. Sensus utique est, non esse se Deum nuper natum, cujusmodi debantur Dei inferioris ordinis ex hypothesi gentium; sed esse Deum *αἴδιον*, *æternum*, cujus existentia naturæ essentiæque suæ summa perfectione involvitur; omnium rerum causam et principium; omnis alterius existentiæ ac substantiæ basin ac fundamentum; nunquam ortum, nunquam interiturum." —"This is a glorious attribute of the true God, which is afterwards more than once repeated. The meaning clearly is, that he is not a God lately come into existence, like the gods of inferior rank, according to the heathen mythology; but that he is the *eternal* God, *αἴδιον*, whose very existence is involved in the absolute perfection of his nature and essence; the cause and origin of all things; the basis and foundation of every other existence and substance; without beginning,—without end."

When *the same epithets* are given to Jesus Christ, they ought surely to be understood in *the same sense*. That the expression "*I am* THE FIRST," should mean "I am contemporary with the earliest events of the Christian dispensation," is a specimen of

Socinian ingenuity; but it furnishes evidence of nothing else. "I am *the first*," suggests the question, "the first *of what?*—of *creatures?*" It cannot mean this when applied *to* JEHOVAH; and neither, on principles of fair interpretation can it mean this when applied *to* CHRIST. "I am the first,"—is, "I am the first OF BEINGS."

It is difficult to repress indignation at the singular disingenuousness of such a remark as the following. Speaking of the two passages, Rev. i. 17, 18. and Rev. xxii. 13, Mr. Yates says, "In both cases, the application of the words 'first and last' to our Lord, is so guarded as to exclude the idea of his supreme Divinity. In the *first* chapter, after being described as 'the first and the last,' he is immediately stated to have died. This shows, that he is not the Being who alone hath immortality." Page 221. With such obstinate determination does Mr. Yates persist in forgetting the simple principle, that the same person, possessing two natures, *may* speak of himself, nay *cannot but* speak of himself in terms that will *seem* contradictory, if the distinction of natures is not kept in view. It so happens, however, that in this passage of the first chapter, Jesus applies to himself a *third* epithet, which fixes the meaning of the other two, and renders still more striking and conclusive the correspondence between what is thus said of HIM, and what is said of JEHOVAH in the Old Testament Scriptures, as before referred to: "I am the first and the last, and THE LIVING ONE," (εγω ειμι ὁ πρωτος, και ὁ εσχατος, και Ὁ ΖΩΝ. This shows "that He *is* the Being *who alone hath immortality*." Rev. xxii. 13. will come to be noticed afterwards.

II. ALMIGHTY POWER.

On the appellation "Mighty God" given to Christ, In Isa. ix. 6. the reader is referred to pages 132—137.

Rev. i. 8. "THE ALMIGHTY."

"If any credit," says Mr. Yates, "is due to the assertion of the sacred writer, these were the words of '*the Lord God*,' and not of *Jesus Christ*." This is Mr. Yates' favourite style of logic —*begging the question*. We simply answer, that, giving all credit to the assertion of the sacred writer, and to Griesbach's

version of his language, we believe these words to be the words of *the Lord God*, and yet the words of *Jesus Christ* notwithstanding.

Those who wish to judge of the correctness of Mr. Yates' assertion, about its being "generally agreed by the fathers of the first four centuries, that the word (παντοκράτωρ) here translated *Almighty*, is the peculiar designation of the *Father*," (p. 222.) may consult the works that have been written, to ascertain the opinions of the early fathers. For my own part, as I have no idea of settling such a question by an appeal to the fathers, or founding my faith in "the wisdom of men;"—I satisfy myself with repeating on this text what I have before said in my Discourses; and the observations made upon it in former parts of this Treatise will add force, it is presumed, to the conclusion: "The connexion in which the words stand, and the manner of the writer in other parts of the same book, concur to show, that Jesus is the speaker. And even if it were otherwise, the clear and frequent application of a part of these expressions to Christ is sufficient to justify us in the application of the whole. He who is 'the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last,' 'the Living One,' we may be well assured is also THE ALMIGHTY." Pages 86, 87. As Mr. Yates, however, has occasionally appealed to Origen, the reader is presented with the following sentence from that celebrated father, as *his* opinion of the passage under discussion. I give it as it is introduced by Jones, on the Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity:—

"Origen, who certainly was no *Arian*, though often represented as such by some who would be pleased to have the vote of so celebrated a genius, has the following observation: "Ut autem unam et eandem omnipotentiam Patris et Filii esse cognoscas, sicut unus atque idem est cum Patre Deus et Dominus, audi hoc modo Joannem in Apocalypsi dicentem: Hæc dicit Dominus Deus qui est, et qui erat, et qui venturus est, omnipotens. Qui enim venturus est omnipotens, quis est alius nisi *Christus?*" "Now, that you may know the omnipotence of the Father and the Son to be one and the same, as he is one and the same God and Lord with the Father, hear what St. John has

said in the Revelation. ' These things saith the Lord, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty.' For who is the Almighty that is to come but Christ ?"*

On Phil. iii. 21. after quoting my words, that " such language cannot with propriety be used respecting any being who is not possessed of omnipotence," Mr. Yates says :—" The reader must make his choice between this unsupported assertion, and the declarations of Paul in other parts of his epistles, that the same God who raised Jesus from the dead, will also raise mankind, *through the instrumentality of Jesus*, and that it is God who shall put all things under his feet ; (2 Cor. iv. 14. 1 Cor. xv. 27.)" But the judicious reader will perceive, that it is only on Unitarian principles that he requires to make any *choice* in the case. A *choice* supposes the cases stated to be incompatible with each other. But, on Trinitarian principles, there is no inconsistency between the Father raising up the dead " *by Jesus*" *as Mediator*, and the Mediator himself being, at the same time, possessed of Divine power.

" I have formerly observed," Mr. Yates concludes, " that the question respecting the power of Christ is, whether it belonged to him originally by his own Divine nature, or whether it was conferred upon him by a superior. By producing in order all the passages in the New Testament which relate to the power of Christ, I proved the Unitarian doctrine, that it was *given*. Mr. Wardlaw has not even attempted to prove the contrary." (Page 223.)

It would not be very reasonable in Mr. Yates, to expect me to argue *against myself*. That *power was conferred upon Christ*, is not with us a matter of question. It is a necessary part of what we conceive to be the Scripture scheme of redemption, that, having finished his work, he was, in his mediatorial capacity, invested with " all power in heaven and in earth." We see no inconsistency between this, and his, at the same time, possessing the inherent power of Deity. We reckon the admission of *both* these views the only principle, on which the consistency and

* Jones on the Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity, page 12th, 8th edition.

harmony of the language of the Scriptures respecting Christ can possibly be maintained. *I* may say, with truth, that Mr. Yates "*has not even attempted to prove the contrary;* for this general principle, which it would have been most of all to his purpose to undermine, he has, throughout his work, left untouched. But more of this, when we come to notice Mr. Yates' ideas about derived and communicated power. I only further observe at present, that his assertion, "Mr. Wardlaw has not even ATTEMPTED *to prove the contrary*," must have looked, when he saw it fairly down upon his paper, very much like—something that should have made him blush, and blot it out. Whatever success Mr. Yates may think he has had, in proving the attempt abortive, he knew that the attempt *had been made;* that I had brought forward *direct proofs* of Christ's possessing inherent Divine power, as "the *mighty God*," "*the Almighty;*" and that *all* the evidences of his *Supreme Divinity* together were proofs of the same thing.

3. OMNIPRESENCE.

Mr. Yates' strictures on this part of the subject, form one of the most curious "morsels of criticism" in his volume. The passages on which he animadverts are so plain, that he may run who reads them. Let us see how he contrives to involve them in obscurity.

1. "In treating of omnipresence as an attribute of *Christ*, Mr. Wardlaw seems to have forgotten, that he has *no distinct conception* of it as an attribute of *God*. So far as can be inferred from his language, he believes only in the *virtual* omnipresence of *God*, or in his power of producing effects in every part of space. In the same sense, I presume, he understands the doctrine of the omnipresence of *Christ*. If so, he is not far from Scripture truth." P. 223.

On the subject of the *Divine omnipresence*, enough has already been said; and I had not at all "*forgotten*" it, when I wrote of the omnipresence of Christ. Without resuming the subject before discussed, I have now only to ask, Is Mr. Yates a believer in the *virtual omnipresence of Jesus?* The expressions just quoted nearly imply as much: and we are justified in the

conclusion by what he afterwards adds. He considers the words of Christ, Matth. xxviii. 20. and xviii. 20. when "*properly understood*," as "a promise that, wherever any of his disciples assembled to offer up their prayers to God, or in whatever part of the earth they were employed in the service of the gospel, Jesus would accomplish their requests, and supply them with all requisite encouragement and support:" P. 223. and again (on the former passage) "as an assurance that, during their whole ministry, Jesus would watch over them with a tender guardianship and affection, and that his care would extend to them in every place, preserving them from the dangers to which they would be exposed, and enabling them to exhibit the miracles by which the truth of their preaching would be irresistibly confirmed." P. 225. He admits that it was *Christ's power* that "*wrought with the apostles*," "confirming their word by signs following." One should think that such concessions go far towards an admission that Jesus Christ is GOD. I have been accustomed to consider *omnipresence*, whether virtual or actual—(in supposing that I disbelieve the latter, Mr. Yates is mistaken)—as being one of the distinguishing perfections of Deity. It is sufficiently obvious, even from its appellation, that *virtual omnipresence* is, *in regard to the effects resulting from it*, the same thing with *actual* omnipresence; that the possession of the latter communicates to the Being who possesses it no greater measure of *knowledge*, or of *power*, than is implied in the possession of the former. Yet a mere man, it seems, may be made to possess the former, although not the latter; that is, a mere man may become GOD in *knowledge* and in *power*, only not in *extension*. Mr. Yates may say what he will about *mysteries:* but this is a mystery; and a pretty considerable one too. He indeed alleges, that "this virtual presence is *merely the exercise of power*." But in so saying, he only blinds his reader. The virtual presence, of which he speaks, implies an unerring knowledge of all that is passing in every part of the world at the same instant, and the power of producing effects in every part of the world at the same instant; and this, too, in the case of Christ, at immeasurable distances from the place where the Being exists by whom the knowledge

and power are possessed. This, I repeat, is one of the *mysteries of Unitarianism;* and it certainly is as near an approach to the doctrine of the union of the divine with the human nature in the person of Christ, as we can well conceive Unitarianism to make.

Mr. Yates may allege, that he does not argue from Christ's virtual *omni*-presence, but only for his virtual *presence* with his disciples in every part of this world. But, if we can conceive of a creature, although at an immeasurable distance, as present, in the exercise of knowledge and power, every successive instant, in every part of this world where there is a believer in his name; we have only to suppose the capacities of this creature further expanded, to produce what, on Mr. Yates' principles, will not at least involve a contradiction, *a creature, virtually* omnipresent and *actually* omniscient and omnipotent.

Further: It is curious to observe, how Mr. Yates contrives to make the two parallel passages, Exod. xx. 24. and Matth. xviii. 20. comport with his system. Of the former ("in all places where I record my name, *I will come unto thee*, and I will bless thee,") he says, "It is evident, that this expression describes only a *virtual* omnipresence. A spirit, extended through all space, and present every moment in every part of it, cannot with any propriety be said to *come* to a person." P. 224. But in the latter there is nothing about *coming*. The phrase is—"where two or three are gathered together in my name, 'THERE AM I in the midst of them.'" Yet according to Mr. Yates, this too must mean only *virtual* presence; for it is *Christ* that speaks. Where, then, shall we find the phrase for *actual* omnipresence? It is surely not less incongruous for *a creature*, whose existence is *limited to one spot*, to speak of his *being with* his people in every place, than for the Infinite Spirit to speak of his *coming to* his people in every place. It is, therefore, singular, that the *former* should be the phrase used by JESUS, and the *latter* by JEHOVAH. Had the case been reversed; had Christ used to his disciples the words of Jehovah to Israel, and Jehovah to Israel the words of Christ to his disciples, the former would no doubt have been interpreted of Christ's *coming to his people, in the exercise of the power conferred on him to bless them;* while the latter would,

without hesitation, have been understood of the *actual omnipresence of the infinite God.* So jesuitical are the principles of Unitarian exposition. Mr. Yates says, *justly*, that our Lord "having," in the preceding verse, "assured his disciples of the fulfilment of their united petitions to heaven, assigns a *reason* why their request should be granted; 'FOR where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.'" (P. 224.) But two questions immediately suggest themselves:—The first is, How comes it, that Jesus should use such an expression as "*there am I in the midst of them*," to signify, not his being present with them at all, but simply his possessing power to confer blessings upon them? And the second is, Does his "*power of conferring the blessings* for which they prayed," form, *exclusively, the only possible reason* for their requests being granted? Does not the *reason* hold *equally good*, when we unite with his power of conferring blessings, the assurance of his *presence with them*, to hear their petitions, to know their circumstances and wants, and to accomplish their desires? If the reason, so far from being weakened, is strengthened by this interpretation, and the interpretation itself accords with the plain and obvious meaning of the words "THERE AM I," &c. is it not the one which ought to be preferred? I believe, after all, I might have left the reader simply to compare the two passages, Exod. xx. 24. and Matth. xviii. 20; and to say, whether they are not "equally clear declarations of omnipresence;" whether "the reasoning which would set aside the one, would not as effectually invalidate the other;" and whether "any being could make either the one or the other, but a being who was present in all places, and who knew all things." Discourses, p. 87.

4. OMNISCIENCE.

The strong language which I have used on the evidence of this attribute belonging to Christ, Mr. Yates characterizes as "*bold assertion.*" But after all that he has said, I think the simple re-statement of my argument might be sufficient to show that my language is not more decided than the case warrants. The argument stands thus:—From 1 Kings viii. 39. "Thou, even THOU ONLY, knowest the hearts of all the children of men;"

and Jer. xvii. 10. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it? I JEHOVAH search the heart, I try the reins; even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings;" the inference is undeniable, and it is one which accords with all our accustomed thoughts of God, that this perfect knowledge of the hearts of men is his *peculiar prerogative*. But in Rev. ii. 23. Jesus Christ quotes the words of the latter passage *in application to himself:* —"All the churches shall know that I am he that searcheth the reins and the hearts; and I will give unto every one of you according to your works." May I not, then, say again,—"If this be not a direct and unqualified claim of a peculiar Divine prerogative, there is no meaning in human language; and to search the Scriptures for clear and satisfactory knowledge, must be a vain and fruitless task?"

To this I had added:—"Even if he had simply said, 'all the churches shall know that I search the reins and the hearts,' this of itself would have been enough for the argument; because the passages above cited, do most emphatically appropriate the searching of the heart to God alone. But the terms in which he expresses himself are much more definite. They evidently proceed upon the express assumption that this *is* the exclusive prerogative of ONE BEING ONLY. They agree with, and confirm, the appropriation to God of the universal and extensive knowledge of the heart, so distinctly marked in the former passages: 'All the churches shall know' (not merely 'that *I search*,' but) 'that I AM HE THAT SEARCHETH the reigns and the hearts.'"

On this remark, Mr. Yates offers the following strictures:— "But he also insists upon the expression '*I am he that searcheth*,' as more expressive than the simpler phrase '*I search*.' His argument proceeds from inattention to the following circumstances. The want of the present tense in Hebrew verbs is supplied by the participle, following the pronoun, agreeing with it in number and person, and having sometimes the definite article prefixed. From the Hebrew, this construction has been transferred into the Greek of the Septuagint and of the New Testament. For example: the expression '*I am he that came*' (it should be *com-*

eth) 'out of the army' (Εγω ειμι ὁ ηκων εκ της παρεμβολης) 1 Sam. iv. 16. means only '*I come* out of the army.' In like manner '*I am he that searcheth*' (Εγω ειμι ὁ ερευνων) signifies nothing more than '*I search*' (εγω ερευνω). This form of expression is what critics call a *Hebraism;* and no book in the whole New Testament has so many Hebraisms as the Apocalypse (Marsh's Michaelis, ch. xxxiii. §. 6.) It would in my opinion have been better if the authors of the common translation, like the editors of the improved version, had accommodated the words of Jesus to the idiom of the English language. This would have prevented Mr. Wardlaw's remark, that the terms ascribed to our Lord 'evidently proceed upon the express assumption, that this is the exclusive prerogative of *one being only.*' " (Pages 227, 228.)

It might be enough to say, in reply to all this, what Mr. Brown has said before me, that because Rev. ii. 23. is "thus obviously an exact translation of a passage in Jer. xvii. 10, where the words are used as expressing something peculiar to Jehovah, the expression is more emphatic than if it had been in the ordinary Greek idiom." (Strictures, p. 59.) But I must go farther. Mr. Yates has done nothing to his purpose, when he has merely shown that the mode of expression in question accords with an idiom of the *Hebrew* language, unless he had, at the same time, shown, that it is *not consistent with the ordinary idiom of the Greek language.* Now this he has not done. When any feature of character, or circumstance of conduct, is *peculiar to one individual*, it is far from being an uncommon *Greek idiom* to introduce this peculiarity by *a participle preceded by the definite article*, as a *descriptive designation of the individual to whom it belongs;* and it then becomes *equivalent to his name.*—"Idem valet participium," (the *idem* refers to what precedes, which regards the effect of the article with an *appellative*, as marking out a person)—"Idem valet participium, Hebræorum more,* nominis loco positum cum articulo: e. g. ὁ τα εθνικα γραψας, *Stephanus*, qui supra dicitur εθνικογραφος· ὁ ποιησας τα Διονυσιακα, *Nonnus Panopolitanus*, *cujus libb.* 48. *Dionysiacῶn titulo Græce extant:* Αλεξ-

* This phrase seems here to mean no more than that the Greek idiom in this particular corresponds with the Hebrew.

ανδρεις ρητωρ ὁ τα ερωτικα παιξας· *Achilles Tatius* qui 8 libr. lusit de Clitophontis et Leusippes amoribus : ὁ τα βουκολικα γραψας, *Theocritus* : ὁ τα Κυπρια γραψας (scilicet επη, vel ποιηματα) *Stasimus*, ὁ την πατριδα Κυπριος· ὁ πειραζων, *Diabolus*." Vigerus de Idiotismis Græcis, page 13, Glasgow edition, 1813. On this principle, I feel myself warranted to contend, that, as we are previously aware that the searching of the heart is one of God's peculiar prerogatives, the phrase ὁ ερευνων νεφρους και καρδιας is a descriptive DESIGNATION of THE DIVINE BEING, and that the assertion εγω ειμι Ὁ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ νεφρους και καρδιας is equivalent to "I AM JEHOVAH."

"It may also be observed," says Mr. Yates, "in reply to Mr. Wardlaw's arguments from this passage, that, although Solomon, *at the dedication of the temple*, (1 Kings viii. 39.) addressed Jehovah as *alone* acquainted with the hearts of men, this does not contradict the supposition, that in consequence of the all-wise procedures of the Deity subsequent to that period, Christ will, *at the day of general judgment*, be endued with all the knowledge of men's thoughts and dispositions, which is necessary to the discharge of his office." (Page 228.)

According to this curious remark, Solomon, it seems, in the language quoted, did not mean at all to express any exclusive attribute or prerogative of Jehovah, but merely that this knowledge of all hearts was peculiar to him *at that time*. What was the case, however, at the time of the dedication of the temple, may not be the case "*at the day of general Judgment!*"—How *cautious* are the words that follow!—Christ will be endued with *all the knowledge of men's thoughts and dispositions which is necessary to the discharge of his office*." If the reader is blinded by this, he is surely willing to be so. There is a very obvious difference between *judging*, and merely *pronouncing sentence*, and between the necessary qualifications for each respectively. Any creature, so far as appears,—an angel for example,—might do the latter, supposing the judgments already decided. But what is implied in "all the knowledge of men's thoughts and dispositions necessary to qualify for the office" of JUDGE? Certainly nothing short of a complete and unerring acquaintance with all

the thoughts of all the countless millions of mankind, that shall have existed from the beginning to the end of time;—with all the dispositions and desires, permanent or momentary, of all their hearts;—and with all the most secret motives of all their words and all their actions. If the reader can suppose such knowledge to be *communicated to a creature*, he is prepared for being a Unitarian: but let him not despise the humble believer in *mysteries*. Yet unless knowledge to the extent described be communicated, the possessor of it may be fitted to *pronounce sentence*, but cannot be qualified to *determine*, with the unerring precision inseparable from our ideas of the final judgment, *the sentences to be pronounced*.

If our interpretation of Rev. ii. 23. has, as I think, been decidedly established;—it will put beyond cavil the meaning of John ii. 24, 25.—"He knew all men, and needed not that any should testify to him of man; for he knew what was in man."

These words Mr. Yates considers as expressing "a profound and intimate knowledge of human nature," which was "absolutely necessary to the character of Christ as a moral and religious instructor," and in which "he was transcendently eminent."—A plain reader, however, whose mind is unsophisticated by prejudice, will recollect, that no other moral and religious instructor, sent by God to men, is ever spoken of in terms at all like these; and that the terms themselves plainly express a universal and intuitive acquaintance with all the secrets of men's hearts.

"According to his own account," adds Mr. Yates, "it was imparted to him by the Father. P. II. chap. vi."—But in P. II. chap. vi. of his work, to which he thus refers, he has adduced no evidence whatever of such knowledge as is here described having been represented by Jesus as imparted to him,—but merely of the *doctrine taught by him* having been delivered agreeably to a commission from the Father.

Mr. Yates speaks with mighty confidence of the force of the argument from the words of Peter to Christ, "Lord, thou knowest all things," (John xxi. 17.) being "*entirely destroyed* by the application of the very same language to Christians in general by the author of this gospel, 1 John ii. 20. 'Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things.'" (P. 229.)

But the meaning of words and phrases depends greatly on the connexion in which they occur. A very slender portion of acumen is requisite, to discover the essential difference between the passages thus quoted as parallel. Every reader may at once perceive, that, in the *latter*, John is speaking of the full and experimental acquaintance with the *doctrine of the gospel* possessed by those whom he addresses, in distinction from apostates, who had gone out from the society of Christians because they were not *of* them, and in distinction from antichristian opposers of the truth. He adds accordingly, (intimating his confidence in them, that their knowledge of the truth was such, in its heavenly origin in its extent and correctness, and in its inward operation, as effectually to secure them against seduction)—"These things have I written unto you concerning them that seduce you. But the anointing, which ye have received of him, abideth in you; and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him."

But what shall we say of the other case? Mr. Yates affirms, that in both cases, "*the knowledge of all things* means only *a very extensive and various knowledge.*" But how will such a view as this suit Peter's argument? "Lord," says he, "thou knowest *all things; thou knowest that I love thee;*"—

1st. Here is *one thing* which Peter was confident his Master knew; and his assurance that he knew *this* thing is founded in his assurance that he knew *all things*. But, without noticing for the present the *nature* of the *one* thing spoken of, unless the term *all* be here used in its universal sense, the inference of the apostle is a complete *non-sequitur*, and his confidence rests on no solid ground. How foolishly would the venerable penitent reason, on Mr. Yates' exposition of his words; "Lord, thy knowledge is very various and extensive; therefore thou knowest that I love thee."

But, 2dly. Mr. Yates (whether designedly or not I cannot tell) has taken no notice of the *particular description of knowledge* to which Peter more immediately refers:—"Lord, thou knowest all things; thou knowest *that I love thee.*" While the terms us-

ed by the apostle, connected with the nature of his argument, convey an unqualified ascription of omniscience, *his own case* shows, that he had a more especial reference to his *knowledge of the secrets of all hearts*. If *this* was not implied, never were words more nugatory. His appeal respects the state of his own heart:—external evidence was against his professions;—strong grounds existed for suspecting their sincerity;—these grounds were impressed on his remembrance, and the reasonableness of the suspicion more than insinuated, in the threefold repetition of the question, "Lovest thou me?" with a look and emphasis no doubt, which at once wrung his heart with remorse, and melted it to tenderness.—In this state of mind, to whom but to the Searcher of all hearts,—to what knowledge short of omniscience, could he make his confident appeal?—I am not fond of the paraphrastic mode of exposition. The following paraphrase of the words by Dr. Guyse, however, seems to convey very correctly their true import:—"Lord, I know there is no deceiving thee, who art fully acquainted with all things, even to the most secret dispositions of the heart: but my great comfort is, that, how justly soever I may suspect myself, and deserve to be suspected by thee and others, thine omniscient eye sees the principle of love which is in my soul towards thee, and the uprightness of my appeal to thee about it."

The reader, then, must be very weak, who is misled by the mere similarity, or even sameness, of phraseology, in circumstances so totally different, or by Mr. Yates' formal reference to Schleusner's Lexicon, for the needless establishment of what every body knows, that the word "*all*" is in numerous instances used to signify *a very great number and variety*.

Mr. Yates is much displeased with me for having affirmed, in substance, that all that the Socinians have to say in support of their peculiar versions of disputed texts (that is, of texts which *they* find it necessary to dispute) is, "not that the new rendering is more consistent with the rules of syntax, or with the ordinary usage of the original language, than the old; but only that the words are *capable of bearing it*,—that it is *possible* for them to be so translated." "If the cause of orthodoxy," says he, "re-

quires to be supported by such assertions as these, no honest man will engage in its defence." (Page 229.)—I have re-considered the assertions;—I have compared them anew with the specimens of Unitarian criticism to which they refer;—and taking into account the nature of these criticisms, the general agreement of translators and critics against them, the *dis*agreement, in some instances, of Unitarians themselves, as to the proper alteration of the received version, and, in general, the *negative* kind of style in which they treat these texts,—I have been tempted to say, like the Roman governor, "What I have written, I have written."—Mr. Yates, however, declares, (and I must believe him,) that "it is his deliberate opinion" (an opinion in which, he says, "all Unitarians, who think themselves capable of understanding the original, will probably agree with him) that, in the very few instances in which they depart from the common translation, they think their versions at least equally fair, natural, and obvious with those of Trinitarians." (P. 229.)—This declaration I am bound to believe, and, at any rate as far as respects Mr. Yates himself, *do* believe. It obliges me to take other ground, and to marvel at the illustration which it furnishes of the influence of prejudice and attachment to system in biassing even a sound and enlightened judgment.

My wonder is not diminished by the following closing sentences of the chapter: "Since we find the doctrines of the strict unity of God, the inferiority of Jesus Christ, and the derivation of his knowledge and power, clearly asserted in many hundred passages of Scripture; and since we think the doctrines of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ, as now held by the orthodox, both absurd in themselves, and contrary to the general tenor and plain language of the Bible; we should be justified in rendering four or five difficult passages in any *allowable* manner, which made them consistent with our primary and indisputable principles. The fact, however, is, that we are not reduced to this necessity." (Page 230.)—These sentences, I say, do not abate my wonder:—because I cannot help thinking, that the "*necessity*," actually felt and operating, has led to the adoption of the principle of criticism here avowed. It is a principle, which, to

say the least, requires to be guarded, and applied to practice, with very great jealousy indeed. Of this Mr. Yates seems to have been sensible: for the principle is here very cautiously stated. It is confined to the "*rendering* of *four or five* difficult passages," as if this were the whole extent of embarrassment and difficulty which the Unitarian system had to clear away; whereas the principle is as directly applicable to the *interpretation* of multitudes of *other* passages, as it is to the *translation* of *these*. The "many hundred plain passages of Scripture," indeed, which are here opposed to four or five difficult ones, assert what all Trinitarians hold, as a part of their system, namely, "the strict unity of God, the inferiority of Jesus Christ, and the derivation of his knowledge and power." The proper interpretation of these passages leaves, on *their* system, no difficulty in the interpretation of the smaller number. The difficulty exists on *Socinian* principles: it exists to a vastly greater extent than "*four or five*" passages; and the principle which is here vindicated in the rendering of these four or five in any *allowable* manner, is actually applied both in the translation and interpretation of many more than these, in a way which will be considered as allowable only by those who are strongly sensible that the natural rendering, and obvious explanation, of such passages, would overturn their system.

CHAPTER VII.

Mr. Yates' strictures on "the passages in which the peculiar works of God are supposed to be ascribed to Jesus Christ," come next in order.

The strong presumptive argument which, in introducing the discussion of this part of my subject, I had drawn from the peculiar manner in which Jesus performed some of his miracles, I should wish the reader to re-peruse, as I have given it myself, Discourses, pages 95—98; Mr. Yates' "*condensed statement*" of it being far from calculated to make a fair impression of its nature and force. Supposing the reader to have thus refreshed his memory, let him now listen to Mr. Yates.—"The arguments which I have here presented in a condensed form, appear to me the most ingenious and eloquent pieces of reasoning in Mr. Wardlaw's volume. But deplorable is the condition of that tottering system, whose advocates, instead of relying on plain and positive declarations of Scripture, are obliged to prop it up by far-fetched inferences, and by imaginary hints and allusions: and it is curious and entertaining to observe how Reason, which is discarded and turned out of doors, whenever her evidence is unfavourable to the popular system, is called up again to the tribunal, and treated with all possible respect, when it is conceived that she can serve the cause of orthodoxy, even by suggesting the most faint and distant analogies." (Page 232.)

On this most singular paragraph, I offer the following brief remarks:

1st. If the argument here ridiculed has nothing more to recommend it than mere *ingenuity* and *eloquence*, let it be at once rejected.

2dly. But, if Mr. Yates means to impress the reader with the conviction, that these "pieces of reasoning" are really, on the whole, the *best*, the *most forcible*, on the point in support of which they are adduced, I again say, *Timeo Danaos*. Although I

think the argument possesses force, and considerable force too, yet, in the scale of comparative importance and conclusiveness, I am far from giving it this pre-eminence. I feel jealous of all such compliments. They glitter on the hilt of a sword. The commendation bestowed on an argument of this nature, seems intended to operate, in the reader's mind, as a deduction from the value of all the rest.

3dly. The insinuation that we do "*not rely on plain and positive declarations of Scripture*," is contrary to truth; and Mr. Yates' language here, when he talks of the "deplorable condition of our system," and of our being "obliged to prop it up by far-fetched inferences, and imaginary hints and allusions," is quite of a piece with that of Mr. Belsham, when he speaks of the controversy on our side being "*reduced*" to the argument from the use of the definite article; and it merits the same reprehension. As to the argument itself in question, the reader must be left to form his own judgment whether it deserves to be ranked among "*far-fetched inferences, and imaginary hints and allusions.*"

4thly. The sarcasm about "Reason," which was intended no doubt to bite, is a very harmless one. I shall leave the reader to feel for its fangs; merely remarking, that the only occasion on which we feel disposed to turn Reason out of doors is when, in the plenitude of her pride and presumption, she attempts, with the aid of her Unitarian adherents, to do the same by *Revelation:* and then we are of opinion that she well deserves this *summary justice.*

I must transcribe another paragraph from Mr. Yates, on account of the sentence with which it concludes:—"I might bid adieu to this argument without any farther observations. But the charge of 'presumptuous impiety' has been brought against the holy and humble Jesus: he is said to have claimed for himself, as his original possession, an unlimited control over the material and moral world. Let the reader call to mind those solemn, explicit, and often repeated declarations, which were formerly brought forward, (Part II. ch. 7. §. 2.) and by which our Lord absolutely disclaimed the possession of inherent power.

saying, that *of himself* he could do nothing, and that *the Father*, dwelling in him, did the works. I confess, that his express assertions, when put into the balance with the eloquent and ingenious pleadings of one whose talents and virtues I highly esteem, weigh more in my mind than the waters of the ocean, when placed in comparison with the drop that hangs upon the bucket." (Pages 232, 233.)

And so unquestionably they should. The only fault of the comparison is, that it is not sufficiently strong. All the "pleadings" of man, however "ingenious and eloquent," when *opposed* to a simple "*express assertion*" of the "faithful witness" must be infinitely less than nothing. But the charge which is here implied, of my framing eloquent and ingenious pleadings, in opposition to the "solemn, explicit, and frequently repeated declarations" of my Lord and master, is a very serious one indeed. Accursed be the pleading,—*αναθεμα εστω*—with all its ingenuity and eloquence, that would contradict his words, or impute to him the impiety of claiming an equality with God, which he did not possess! But if, on the other hand, his inferiority was the official inferiority of a relation to the Father which he had voluntarily assumed, and was thus perfectly consistent, as we believe it to have been, with his possessing, at the same time, the power and majesty of underived Godhead, then equally accursed be the reasonings that would rob him of his essential dignity and glory! When we come to examine a little the part of Mr. Yates' book to which he here so confidently refers, we shall have occasion to touch particularly on this important general question.

The proofs of THE CREATION OF ALL THINGS being ascribed to Jesus Christ, Mr. Yates meets by a reference to a former part of his work, in which, he says, he had shown that in every passage which can possibly be interpreted as attributing the work of creation to Jesus, the idea is expressed of his executing this work as a subordinate agent, a mere instrument, inferior to Jehovah." (P. 234.)—Having made this confident reference, he dismisses the whole in the following strain of happy irony.—"Three of these passages, (John i. 3, 10: Col. i. 16, 17.) together with the words quoted in Hebrews i. 10. as *referring* to the

government of Christ, though *addressed* to Jehovah, form the ground work of such severe and triumphant criticism, extending through ten pages, as will make the hapless Unitarians smart so long as Mr. Wardlaw's critical celebrity shall endure." (Page 234.)—May I request of my reader to re-peruse those *ten pages* (98—108.) which are thus so briefly and so wittily despatched? I fear not the comparison of the reasoning which they contain with that of Mr. Yates in the pages of his volume referred to (94—100) by any reader, lettered or unlettered.

When Mr. Yates states my affirmation that the Scriptures "*give no countenance* to the idea of his executing this work as a subordinate agent, a mere instrument, inferior to Jehovah," he takes no notice of the grounds on which it is made. I must therefore repeat them:

"I have only to add, on this part of the subject, that while creation is thus repeatedly, and in the plainest terms, ascribed to Jesus Christ, the Scriptures give no countenance to the idea of his executing this work, as a subordinate agent, a mere instrument inferior to Jehovah.—The very terms, indeed, in some of the passages already quoted, themselves preclude every such supposition. They are *universal*. The creator of *all things*, of *all created beings*, cannot be himself a creature;—cannot, therefore, be, in any sense, or in any respect, an inferior agent to the Supreme God. He who is *not a creature* must be God: and God is ONE. This idea is strongly confirmed by such expressions as the following in the prophecies of Isaiah:—'Hearken unto me, O Jacob and Israel, my called: I am he; I am the first, I also am the last. *My hand* also hath laid the foundations of the earth, and *my right hand* hath spanned the heavens;' Thus saith Jehovah thy Redeemer, and he that formed thee from the womb; I am Jehovah, that maketh all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens alone, that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself.'"

It is somewhat curious, that, in the former part of his work, after having finished his critical strictures on the different passages, Mr. Yates expresses himself in these terms: "The Greek words employed in these passages, cannot bear to be interpreted so as to ascribe to our Lord the creation of the material world by

his own uncommunicated omnipotence. They directly contradict the notion, *that Christ stretched out the heavens alone, and made the world by himself.*" (Page 98.) In this it is plainly implied, that if it had been said of Christ that he "*stretched out the heavens alone, and made the world by himself,*" it would have justified the conclusion that *no other was employed in the work along with him.* Do not the words, then, when used *by Jehovah*, imply that *no other besides Jehovah* was employed in the work of creation? and if Jesus Christ be *not* Jehovah, do they not consequently express what is *not true?*

Let me now examine a little the strictures themselves. I begin with observing, that here, as in all other places, we are left in the same mysterious uncertainty about Mr. Yates' own sentiments:—"The question to be determined," says he, "is, Whether, supposing that our Saviour created the material universe, he accomplished this undertaking by his own inherent, underived, and unaided omnipotence, or whether he was employed and empowered to fulfil the counsels of a superior." (Page 234.)—"I have already stated, that many Unitarians altogether deny the existence of Christ previously to his conception in the womb of his mother; but that many others agree with the orthodox Christians in asserting, that he lived before his incarnation in a state of glory, and was employed by the Deity as an instrument in creating the material world. The determination of these lesser differences does not belong to our present inquiry: they are to be settled among Unitarians by their own amicable discussions.—The question now before us is, Whether, *granting the pre-existence of Christ*, he enjoyed before his incarnation *underived* power." (Page 98.)—"But the passages which represent Jesus as the Creator of the material world, also suppose the exercise of power previously to his incarnation. These passages are decisively favourable to the Unitarian doctrine, that, if Jesus was concerned in the formation of the heavens and the earth, he was only employed as an instrument in the hands of God his Father." (Page 94.) But whether Mr. Yates is a believer in the existence of Christ before all worlds, and his being their instrumental creator, or not, I am not so much *in the secret* as to inform the curi-

ous inquirer,—although I strongly suspect the negative to be the truth.

Mr. Yates' critical strictures on the text in question relate almost entirely to the proper meaning of the Greek prepositions ΔΙΑ and ΥΠΟ. This therefore, it becomes especially necessary to investigate.

Having quoted John i. 3, 10 : Col. i. 16 : Heb. i. 2 : he says, "*These passages*, as I have now quoted them from the *common translation of the New Testament*, leave it undecided, whether Christ created all things by his own underived, and independent authority, or merely as an instrument directed by the Supreme Being. *In the Greek original*, there is no such ambiguity. The preposition ΔΙΑ, in these passages translated BY, does not signify *by any one as an original cause*, (for this sense is expressed by a different preposition, ΥΠΟ) but it denotes THROUGH ANY THING AS AN INSTRUNENT. For the sake of illustration, I shall take the first example of the occurrence of ΔΙΑ in the New Testament: Matth. i. 22. 'Now all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet,' or, more accurately, 'which was spoken *by* the Lord *through* the prophet.' In the first place, the preposition ΥΠΟ, BY, points out the Lord as the *original author* of the communication; and in the second place, the preposition ΔΙΑ, THROUGH, represents the prophet as the *medium*, through whom this communication was conveyed to mankind. The same distinction is accurately observed in all cases (and they are very numerous) in which the New Testament writers produce quotations from the prophets of the Old. They never introduce a prophecy by saying, that it was uttered THROUGH *the Lord*, (*δια του Κυριου*) and they very seldom, if ever, say, that it was delivered BY *the prophet* (*υπο του προφητου*); but *through* the prophet, and *by* the Lord.

The preposition ΔΙΑ, followed either by a genitive or an accusative case, occurs in the New Testament about 630 times. It is used to denote the *efficient cause of the production of an effect*, (of course governing, in these instances, the genitive) about 290 times. I have examined all the passages where it is found. I have observed, that its general application, when used to point out an ef-

ficient cause, is to represent, not the *primary*, but the *secondary* or *instrumental* cause. This sense of the word seems, indeed, to arise naturally from its original acceptation. It properly signifies motion *through a place*. Hence it has been transferred, by an obvious process, to the *way or method by passing through which* any object is attained, or the *instrument by means of which* any end is accomplished." (Pages 95, 96.)—After having referred to his favourite authorities, Origen and Eusebius, he proceeds as follows:

"For these reasons, I think myself authorized to assert, that when a New Testament writer employs the preposition ΔΙΑ to point out the cause of any effect, he means the *instrumental*, and refers to some other being, either expressly mentioned or contemplated, who is considered as the *first* or *original* cause. What, then, is the real import of the passages before cited, on the supposition that they refer to the creation of the material universe? John i. 3. 'All things were made *through Christ as an instrument*, but *by* God as their original contriver.'—Ver. 10. 'The world was made *through Christ as a subordinate agent.*' The passage from Colossians has the same import, 'All things were created *through* him;' (τα παντα ΔΙ' αυτου και εις αυτον εκτισται·) and the passage from Hebrews, 'By whom He made the worlds,' can only signify, if it relates to the creation of the material universe at all, that God made the stars and planets *through the instrumentality of Jesus Christ.* The Greek words employed in these passages, cannot bear to be interpreted so as to ascribe to our Lord the creation of the material world by his own uncommunicated omnipotence. They directly contradict the notion, that Christ stretched out the heavens alone, and made the world by himself. They clearly imply, whether they be supposed to refer to the formation of the earth out of chaos, or to the RE-formation of its inhabitants through the influence of the gospel, that Jesus Christ was only an *instrument* in the work, and not a principal." Pages 97, 98.

On these statements, (which I have given at such length, because I would not seem to garble, or to shrink from them) I observe—

1st. It is sufficiently well known to every Greek scholar, that ΔΙΑ with the genitive case, signifies the *efficient cause*, whether *primary* or *secondary*, *principal* or *instrumental*. See Hedericus, Schleusner, Parkhurst, Stockius.

2dly. The same is the case with the preposition ΥΠΟ. See the same authorities.

3dly. Mr. Yates, in a note, refers to *one* passage, as the *only one* presenting much difficulty against the *universality* of his rule respecting the use of ΔΙΑ; and, in the close of the note, he hints at the possibility of his opponent's bringing forward perhaps as many as *two or three*. The critical reader may consult the following passages, if his previous acquaintance with the established use of this preposition in the Greek language does not supersede the necessity of this trouble. Matth. xviii. 7: xxvi. 24: Mark xiv. 21: Luke xxii. 22: Acts xii. 9: xix. 26:* Rom. iii. 27: v. 12: vi. 4: xi. 36:† 1 Cor. i. 9: xii. 8. (compared with ver. 9. where the expression is varied, ἐν being used, and with ver. 11.) 2 Cor. i. 19: Heb. ii. 3. (where the reader will observe, that ΔΙΑ and ΥΠΟ are both used, the former of *the Lord*, and the latter of *his apostles;* so that here we have an instance either of ΔΙΑ being the *im*mediate, or of ΥΠΟ being the *mediate* cause) Heb. ii. 10: (a very decisive passage) Heb. vii. 21: xiii. 11: 1 Pet. ii. 14. I am much mistaken if more instances than these *eighteen* might not be adduced, of ΔΙΑ signifying *not* the *instrumental*, but the *primary* efficient cause.

4thly. It is admitted, that ΔΙΑ is more naturally employed to denote the *instrumental* cause than ΥΠΟ; and that this is rightly accounted for from the *original signification* of the former, as given by Mr. Yates. We do not so readily associate with the latter the idea of *medium*. As ΔΙΑ, however, frequently signifies the *primary cause*, so is ΥΠΟ sometimes used for the *secondary*.

* The *hands* might seem at first view to be the *instrumental cause*. The connexion shows, however, that the phrase "*by hands*" means *by human agency*, which in this case was *direct*, without *subordinate instrumentality*.

† Mr. Yates says there is strong evidence of ὑπὸ being the true reading, and refers for this to Griesbach. Yet the evidence was not such as to induce Griesbach even to mark it as *doubtful*.

In the following places it is used as to God's speaking *by* the prophets, Matth. ii. 17 : iii. 3 : xxvii. 35 : Mark xiii. 14.

5thly. If, as Mr. Yates alleges, the idea of any thing being done "*by* any one *as an original cause*," and not merely *through* any thing *as an instrument*, be properly expressed by 'ΥΠΟ, (which certainly is the *general* case) then the miraculous works performed by Jesus, which required, for their accomplishment, the exercise of *Divine power*, were done BY him, not as a mere *instrument*, but by his own *immediate agency*. It is this preposition that is used when these works are spoken of as *done by him*: Luke v. 15; ix. 7; xiii. 17; xxiii. 8. See also Phil. iii. 12.—If 'ΥΠΟ means the *original* or *primary* cause, then Jesus was not the mere *instrument* or *medium* of the cures wrought, but their "*original author*," effecting them by his own power. Assuming Mr. Yates' style, we might say, these mighty works are not represented as done ΔΙ' αυτου, THROUGH him, but 'ΥΠ' αυτου, BY him. Thus Mr. Yates, in fixing the signification of 'ΥΠΟ to the *primary* efficient cause, has forged a weapon against himself. If he refuses to admit the inference drawn in the present case, he must then admit, that these are additional instances of 'ΥΠΟ denoting, in opposition to his too unqualified hypothesis, the *secondary* or *instrumental cause*.

6thly. As to the critical authority of Origen and Eusebius, we have had enough of it. We have seen Mr. Yates, on a former occasion, parading this authority, and then presuming to dissent from it himself; whence I infer, that, notwithstanding his reiterated eulogy of these fathers—of Origen, "who lived in the beginning of the third century, who wrote in Greek, than whom none of the ancient fathers was more learned, more honest, or more industrious," and of Eusebius "the learned, accurate, and laborious author, to whom, among the ancients, the Christian world is chiefly indebted for the testimonies to the genuineness of the New Testament writings, and who could not possibly be mistaken about the common meaning of two prepositions which he used daily and hourly in conversation and in books;" that, notwithstanding all this, he would have done the same again had it suited his purpose. As for Origen, we have seen also how strongly

he affirms the *equality* of the Son with the Father.* Either, then, the *inferiority* implied in the words quoted from his writings by Mr. Yates, must be of an *official* kind, (a circumstance to be determined by their *connexion*, which I have not the opportunity to consult) or else he flatly contradicts himself: and if so, I do not well comprehend the "*honesty*" of the good old father; and, not comprehending his honesty, I can have little dependance on his "*learning*," however great it may have been.†

7thly. On Col. i. 16. Mr. Yates says—"In the longest, and, as it is commonly imagined, the clearest of these passages, (that from Colossians) sufficient evidence is presented, to enable the mere English reader to determine, whether, in the creation of the material universe, Christ displayed underived glory. After stating the fact, that all things were created *through* him, the apostle assigns the *cause* of this fact, in the following terms: 'For *it pleased the Father, that in him should all fulness dwell.*' It appears, that the *reason*, why Christ was employed in the work of creation, was, that such was the pleasure of the Father, and that the Father bestowed upon him a full participation of his power and glory." P. 98.

On this I have to observe, in the *first* place, That, in the words quoted as assigning the *cause* of "all things having been created *through* him,"—the words "*the Father*," are supplementary.—*Secondly*, That, granting the propriety of the supplement, (for I think it is a fair and natural one) the verse does not (as a careless reader of Mr. Yates would suppose) immediately follow the one which ascribes to him the creation of all things. There intervenes the declaration of his being "the head of his body the church, the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in all things he might have the pre-eminence." And in this *his mediatorial capacity*, as the Head of authority and influence in his church, all fulness is represented as dwelling in him, by the

* See pages 180, 181.

† Mr. Yates speaks in very *confident* terms of Origen's *honesty*. I feel no satisfaction in seeing *his* credit, or that of any other man, at all shaken; nor does my argument in the smallest degree require it. The reader, however, may, if he please, consult on this subject Bishop Horsley's Controversial Tracts, Part II chap. i. pages 391—400 and Disquisition V. pages 534—548.

pleasure of the Father, consistently with the whole representation of the scheme of redemption.—And, *lastly*,—What does Mr. Yates mean when he says, that "*the Father bestowed upon him a full participation of his power and glory?*"—Does he mean to say, that the *power of creating out of nothing* was *communicated* to this subordinate agent, himself a creature? And by a "*full participation*" of this power does he mean that it was imparted *fully*—in *all its extent?* I cannot, indeed, conceive, for my own part, that, if *creative power* was *imparted at all*, it could be imparted otherwise than in all its *fulness*. The power of creating *an atom* is the same with the power of creating *the universe*—and the power of creating the universe must be *infinite power;* otherwise, as creation *must* be *limited*, we never *can* have evidence of the creator's possessing such power. If *creative power* be capable of *transference* or *communication* to a creature, I can conceive of nothing else which may not; and must look on him who can believe in this fancy, as a believer in the possibility of the communication of *all Divine perfections;* an idea which would startle even a Trinitarian, with all his insatiable appetite for mystery.

"Why might not the power of *self subsistence*," says Dr. Priestley, "be imparted to another, as well as that of *creating out of nothing?*"—"He must have lost his reason," says Allix, "who imagines, that God can make a creature capable of creating the universe. Grant this, and by what character will you distinguish the creature from the Creator? By what right, then, could God appropriate, as he doth very often in the Old Testament, the work of the world's creation to himself, excluding any other from having to do in it but himself? Why should God, upon this score, forbid the giving worship to the creature, which is due to the Creator? The Arians, who worship Jesus Christ, though they esteem him a creature, and the Papists who swallow whole the doctrine of transubstantiation; they may teach in their schools that a creature may be enabled by God to become a creator! But for us, who deny that any thing but God is to be adored, we reject all such vain conceits, of a creature being any way capable to receive the infinite power of a creator."*

* Judgment of the Jewish Church, &c. pages 193, 194.

With regard to THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD and the FINAL JUDGMENT, Mr. Yates begins his observations by complaining, that I should have represented Unitarians, without distinction, as "doubting or denying that Jesus Christ is appointed to execute these offices at all."—Although it is not exactly true, that I have quoted from Mr. Belsham *only*, as Mr. Yates alleges,—for, *in a note*, expressions to the same purpose with those of Mr. Belsham are quoted from Mr. Lindsay; yet I freely admit, that my language ought to have been qualified. This, I presume, is one of those lesser differences, which are to be settled among Unitarians by their own amicable discussions."

Considering Mr. Yates, then, as *granting* that the dominion of the world and the final judgment are, according to the Scriptures, assigned to Jesus Christ, let us see how he treats the argument thence derived for his "*omniscience*, *omnipotence*, and *independence*."

"In a former part of this treatise," says he, "I have stated and defended the Unitarian doctrine concerning the judgment of mankind through Jesus Christ, which is, that he is empowered and ordained to execute these exalted offices by the one true God. He himself asserted, that '*the Father gave him authority to execute judgment*,' and various explicit declarations of Scripture agree with the doctrine of Paul, that he is '*ordained by God* to be the judge of quick and dead.' These clear assertions we believe; they are not the deductions of human reason; they are authoritatively taught to mankind in the Scriptures of truth; Mr. Wardlaw does not call them in question." (Page 235.)

No, indeed. So far from calling them in question, I have said, in the passage referred to, that "those who maintain this view of his person and character (i. e. who consider him as a '*Divine Mediator*') acknowledge such delegation, as an essential article of their scheme. Believing him to be represented in the Scriptures as voluntarily assuming the form, and acting in the capacity, of a servant, they are not startled at finding this representation consistently supported throughout."—And it is curious to observe, how cautiously Mr. Yates avoids grappling with this great general principle of the double view of the person and cha-

racter of Christ, held by Trinitarians, as the principle, and the only satisfactory principle, of harmony, between seemingly discordant passages.

I had argued besides, that "*delegation cannot confer* any ability for the discharge of the functions of the office delegated;" that "it may bestow *title* and *right*; but it can communicate no *capacity*, no actual *qualification*:" that "it is vain, therefore, to talk of *delegation*; for, if Jesus Christ be indeed LORD OF ALL, and JUDGE OF ALL, the only question is, what are the qualifications essential to the Being who governs, and who is to judge the world? and to this question I answer, without fear of contradiction by any reasonable and unprejudiced mind, OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE, and INDEPENDENCE:"—that, if such qualities must be possessed by the Governor and Judge of the world, they must, from their nature, be *original*, and *inherent*, being entirely unsusceptible of *transference* or *communication*." (Discourse IV. page 112.)

On this argument Mr. Yates expresses himself in the following terms:—"This argument relates to a subject the most sublime and awful, and far removed from our knowledge and experience. I fear, therefore, to maintain my side of the question in the same dogmatical terms, in which Mr. Wardlaw maintains his. But with a conviction, that the Scriptures alone can afford us information on this subject, and with great reluctance to *argue* the point at all on the grounds of mere human reason, I shall venture to say, that the qualifications of omniscience, omnipotence, and independence, do not appear to me essential to the office of the delegated Governor and Judge of mankind. I do not see any reason why the *power* of such a personage should extend beyond the world over which he presides, or why his *knowledge* should comprehend the actions, characters, and deserts, not only of those who come before his tribunal, but of all intelligent beings who have existed in other regions of space, and in other periods of eternity. So far as I can judge, the power and knowledge of such an exalted person may rationally be supposed to be not only *limited*, but also *derived* and *dependent*. It is only requisite, that he possesses the knowledge and power essential to the execution of his office; *how* he possesses them, whether by his own nature,

or by derivation from the Almighty and Omniscient God, appears to be of no moment. I conceive, therefore, that no valid objection can be brought, from the improbability of the doctrine in the view of *unprejudiced reason*, against the plain and obvious sense of those passages of Scripture which describe the offices of Christ in his exalted state, and represent him as discharging them in subordination to God the Father." (Page 236.)

There are parts of this paragraph, which can hardly fail to force a smile ;—but its general effect is, to settle both mind and countenance, in the gravity of serious thought. It is true, that the subject is "sublime and awful, and far removed from our knowledge and experience." Yet who can forbear smiling, when he hears a *Unitarian*, with so much timid caution, and lowly reserve, expressing his "*great reluctance*" "to *argue this point on the ground of reason?*" When a RATIONAL CHRISTIAN speaks thus, we may be well assured that he is sensible of his ground being insecure; that he feels a secret consciousness, that the verdict of Reason must be against him, and, in spite of all the high compliments he pays her at other times, blushes on this occasion, to look his patroness full in the face. On points not less "awful and sublime" and still farther "removed" than this "from our knowledge and experience," Mr. Yates and his brethren can *argue* with abundant freedom, and dogmatize, on what they conceive to be rational principles, with the most confident tone of decision: so that (to use Mr. Yates' own expressions a page or two before, *mutatis mutandis*,) "it is truly curious and entertaining to observe, how Reason, who is called up to the tribunal, and treated with all possible respect, when it is conceived that she can serve the cause of heterodoxy, is discarded, and turned out of doors, whenever her evidence is unfavorable to the Unitarian system."

When we attend for a moment to the nature of the sentiment which Mr. Yates "*ventures*" to advance, we will not be much surprised at his "*reluctance*" to submit it to the decision *of* "*mere human reason.*"

Let it be admitted, then, that "the power and knowledge of the judge of the world need not be supposed to extend beyond

the world over which he presides;" we have formerly seen, what the extent of this knowledge must be; that it must comprehend a perfect and unerring acquaintance with all the thoughts and words and actions, in all their endless variety of circumstances, of every individual person of all the numberless generations of mankind that shall have existed from the beginning to the end of time; and in every successive moment of the existence of each. The question, then, is, Is it possible that *this* knowledge can belong to any being, and that being *not be God?* When we infer from the works of creation which we see, that their Maker is *infinite in wisdom*, our *data* are *limited*, yet our inference is *unlimited.* Is it, then, admitted to be fair, to conclude from a part to the whole? from what we see and know of the universe to the universe itself? and then, from an effect which must, from the nature of the thing, be *limited*, to deduce the *un*limited, or *infinite*, wisdom of the CAUSE? If it be, then I ask further;—If any being is admitted to possess the knowledge of mankind which has just been described, are we not warranted to proceed on the same established principle of reasoning, and from this measure of knowledge to infer, that it cannot stop here; that it must extend further? Are not our *data* as good, in *this* case, as in the *former?* In both, we are supposed to know to a limited extent; and if, in the one case, an unlimited inference be warrantable, so must it also be in the other: and, on the other hand, if the GOVERNOR and JUDGE may possess the knowledge described, and, after all, his knowledge be limited, I see not how the consequence can be evaded, that the FORMER OF ALL THINGS may have produced all the striking proofs of wisdom in the universe, and after all, his *wisdom* be *limited.*

But further: Mr. Yates takes no notice of the *government* of the world. He confines his reasoning to the exercise of *judgment.* If our argument required additional strength, it finds it here. No person, who at all considers what the government of this world is, can for a moment suppose it conducted by any other than *an omniscient Being*, without forfeiting his claim to the possession of understanding. Apart entirely from what relates to the movements and variations of the *material* world, the gov-

ernment of *mankind* implies an incessant and entire acquaintance with all the thoughts, and words, and actions, of all the millions of men in every part of the globe, every successive moment of time; together with the sovereign and universal command of whatever can contribute to affect the volitions of intelligent creatures; an infallible previous knowledge of the effects which the occurrence of particular circumstances, or the suggestion of particular views, will produce on the will of every individual. The multitude of mankind is so great; the variety of character among them so endless; their connexions, and interests, so prodigiously diversified; their desires and volitions so incessantly crossing and interfering; great and small events are so involved in one another, so linked together, in an infinite diversity of ways, as reciprocal causes and effects; that we are utterly lost in our attempts to form any conception of such a control, even with the full conviction upon our minds, of its being the control of an omniscient Being. But, to suppose this government conducted by a mere creature, in the exercise of derived, and limited, and dependent knowledge and power!—the reader will pardon me for not saying all that I think of such a supposition. I presume, however, I may safely repeat, that he must be "*sadly pressed by his system*" who is reduced to the necessity of making and defending it.

The *judgment* of the world *supposes* its previous *government*. To fit the Being, who is to occupy the Throne, for discriminate judgment, all the affairs of mankind must have been under his constant notice and superintendence. Characters cannot be judged, apart from the circumstances by which they have been formed; and these are, beyond all conception, diversified and minute. "*Every work*" is to be "brought into judgment, with *every secret thing* whether good or evil." This comprehends all the thoughts, and words, and actions, of every individual of the human race; in connexion, of course, with all their attendant circumstances. And all this is to be the work of *a fellow creature!* Reader, you may wonder if you please,—I do not,—at the unwonted tone of timid and cautious diffidence which Mr. Yates assumes on this subject. It need not, surely, be surprising, that

he "feared to maintain his side of the question in dogmatical terms." On the peculiarities of Trinitarianism he could pronounce with dogmatism enough :—"If it be not certain that such a doctrine is false, there is no certainty in any subject. It is vain to call it a mystery. It is an absurdity, it is an impossibility." The reader is at liberty, if he chooses, to apply these expressions to the doctrine of a created Governor and Judge of the world. At any rate, never more let the smile of derision be seen on the countenance of Mr. Yates at the simple believer in *mysteries*.

But Mr. Yates, in declining to "*argue*" the point "on the ground of reason," professes to make his appeal to the testimony of Scripture, as "alone able to afford us information on this subject." And what testimony, then, does he adduce? a testimony to the *possibility*, or to the *fact*, (which would imply the possibility) of a creature conducting the government of the world, and the final judgment? No such thing. All that he pretends to prove is, that the authority of Christ is *delegated*, which no one denies; and he begs all that remains of the question. He makes no attempt to disprove the Trinitarian hypothesis, that this delegation arises from the official character of Mediator voluntarily assumed by our blessed Lord; a character in which the Scriptures, as we affirm, declare him to possess the Divine as well as the human nature: a union which, we further affirm, could alone qualify him for the government and judgment of the world; and which is therefore proved by this fact, among other evidences direct and indirect, that the government and judgment of the world are actually committed into his hands.

In note G. after showing, by a quotation from Mr. Belsham, how strongly he felt the difficulty arising from the final judgment being ascribed to Jesus Christ, I expressed myself as follows :—"Divest the Judge of his Divine Majesty; and you render it impossible to feel, in anticipating our appearance before him, that trembling awe which the thought of the future judgment ought always to inspire. We do not feel as if satisfied with his decisions. The necessity of instant unquestioning submission, under which the mind sinks in the contemplation of a Divine

Judge, ceases to impress it. We begin immediately to think of possible errors, and of appeal to higher authority." Having quoted these sentences, Mr. Yates comments on them in the following very solemn terms:—"To my mind nothing can be more shocking than these expressions. For who but the most proud, profane, and hardened wretch, can imagine his appearance before the judgment-seat of Christ without a trembling awe, and 'begin immediately to think of possible errors, and of appeal to higher authority?' I have so good an opinion of the author of these dreadful, and, I trust, *hasty* sentences, as to believe, that, if it shall please God to spare his useful life, and to relieve his mind from that heavy load of prejudice under which it labours, he will tremble even at the idea of having employed such language, and will submit to have his actions tried and his destiny pronounced by any Being, whom God shall have appointed to be his Judge." (P. 237.)

It is my prayer that my own mind, and the minds of others, may be more and more deeply impressed with the prospect of the awful solemnities of the "day of God." And God forbid that any expressions of mine should have an opposite tendency! In the sentences quoted, it was my object, not formally to assign "*reasons* why it was requisite that the delegated Judge of mankind, as well as the Being who confers upon him his commission and authority should be in his own nature nothing inferior to the Supreme God;" (Yates, page 237.) but to state what I apprehended to be a simple *matter of fact*, and a natural and unavoidable feeling of the human mind, on the supposition of a *merely human* or *created Judge*. If, indeed, this Judge were to be *no Judge*, but a mere *pronouncer of Sentences* dictated by the Supreme Jehovah, the case might be different: but if this creature is to be, *bona fide*, in the true and proper sense of the term, THE JUDGE of mankind, I still conceive, notwithstanding the horror with which the renewed avowal of it may fill the mind of my opponent, that some such feeling as that which I have described *is* unavoidable; and for this plain reason, that our minds revolt from the absurdity of any knowledge short of *omniscience* forming a sufficient qualification for *infallible judgment;* and this omniscience, we

know, cannot be possessed by a creature. The sentences in my note immediately preceding those quoted, will satisfy the reader that such was my meaning:—"'Jesus and his apostle,' says Mr. Belsham, 'do not appear to have felt any difficulty in the appointment of a human being to the office of universal Judge.'—True: and the obvious reason is, that the human Being of whom they speak possessed, at the same time, a higher nature than the human. There is no accounting for it otherwise. For the supposition of a *mere man like ourselves* executing the office of universal Judge, is one so monstrous, so contradictory to every idea we can form of what is *fit*, and *reasonable*, and *possible*, as to require for its admission a larger portion of credulity than that which Mr. Belsham and his friends affect to despise. The difficulty is not removed by the supposition of any powers, however enlarged, in whatever way acquired, whether gradually, or by communication for the purpose, if they are still powers, as they must be, limited to the capacity of a being *merely human*. I should even apply the same remark to the most exalted of created natures." I have only to add, that, considering the connexion in which the imputation occurs, it might perhaps have been prudent in Mr. Yates, for his own sake, to have avoided saying any thing about "*loads of prejudice*;" that I am sincerely obliged to him, however, for his good wishes, and return them to himself, with earnest and heart-felt prayers, that "God may give him repentance to the acknowledgment of the truth."

CHAPTER VIII.

I COME now briefly to examine Mr. Yates' scrictures on those passages in which SUPREME WORSHIP is given to Christ.

On the instances of homage paid to Jesus on earth, I satisfied myself with the following general remark:—"In some of these instances, as must strike every reader of the Gospel history, there is so strong a resemblance, so very near an approach, to Divine worship, that we should have expected a creature, actuated by such principles as were formerly described, tenderly alive to a sense of his infinite inferiority, and jealous of the glory of the God that sent him, to have said, on such occasions, as the apostle Peter did to Cornelius—'Stand up, I myself also am a man;' or as the angel to John, when he fell at his feet to worship him;—'See thou do it not; worship God.' But in the life of Christ, as recorded by the evangelists, nothing of this kind is to be found. He accepts all the homage that is offered to him, without a hint of its impropriety, or the slightest monitory intimation of his equality in nature with the persons by whom it is paid."

Mr. Yates' observations, under the *first* particular of his reply to this remark, do not appear to be at all to the purpose. That our blessed Lord frequently directed the minds of the people to the Supreme Jehovah, the Father, as having sent and commissioned him, is true. How could it be otherwise? Who denies that, in the capacity in which he appeared in the world, he was *sent*, and *commissioned*, and had *received* his *authority* and *power;* and that it was necessary that he should substantiate this by sufficient evidence? But, to assert that he claimed and received honour *only* as the ambassador of the Supreme God, is to beg the question; for the evidence adduced of the assertion is founded on a very questionable Unitarian commentary on our Lord's words. "that all men should honour the Son, *as* (that is,

says Mr. Yates, *because*) " they honour the Father; he that honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father that sent him."—The *particular cases* of the homage in question still remain untouched. What Jesus said on *other* occasions will not show the "*expectation*" mentioned in my remark to be otherwise than "*reasonable*" in *these*. Mr. Yates indeed says,—" We do not know that homage was ever offered to him without a higher reference to God, and that he accepted it without a hint of its impropriety." But we do know the simple facts stated in the history; that he *did* receive the external homage there related to have been paid to him, without any such " hint of its impropriety" as was given, on similar occasions, by other ambassadors of God, human, and even angelic.

Mr. Yates' *second* observation in reply, is, that, in his opinion, " the *angel*, whose conduct Mr. Wardlaw contrasts with that of Jesus, *was Jesus himself*:" and in three full pages he assigns his reasons, for this opinion.

No considerate reader will feel any surprise at Mr. Yates' anxiety to establish this opinion; because, were it well founded, the passagas in question would contain an express refusal, on the part of Jesus, of the worship due to God.—But, to show the falsehood of the opinion, it is not at all necessary to travel through the whole book of Revelation. The refutation of it is nearer at hand. I submit to the reader the following remarks; which, I trust, will convince him, not only of the futility of the opinion advanced by Mr. Yates, but of his want of prudent generalship, in bringing these passages into such prominent notice.

At two distinct times, it appears, John offered worship to an angel; and the angel, on both occasions, declined the honour, in terms nearly the same. In both of these instances, *the context* affords the most distinct information that the angel was *not* Jesus Christ.

1. In the beginning of chap. xviith, John tells us, " *there came one of the seven angels who had the seven vials*, and talked with me."—It requires only to read forward thence to chap. xix. 10. to satisfy any person, that *this* was the angel before whom John fell down to worship. It surely will not be said that the Lord Jesus was " *one of the seven angels who had the seven vials*."

2. This angel, when John falls down at his feet to worship him, says, "See thou do it not: I am thy fellow-servant, and (the fellow-servant) of thy brethren that have the testimony of Jesus;" or, "I am a fellow-servant with thee, and with thy brethren that have the testimony of Jesus." Now, although Jesus, in his state of humiliation on earth, is called *the servant of God*, he is no where else in Scripture, *even in reference to that period*, called a *fellow*-servant with the apostles and prophets:—far less is he so called when exalted to glory in heaven. There his language is, "I am the first and the last, and the living One; and I was dead; and behold I am alive for evermore, and have the keys of hell and of death." Is this the same person who is supposed to say, "I am *a fellow-servant* with thee and with thy brethren?" On the contrary, the apostles are frequently styled the *servants of Jesus Christ*. And the mode of expression used by the angel, "I am a fellow-servant with thee, and with thy brethren *who have the testimony of Jesus*," seems, with sufficient clearness, to show, that he means to describe himself as an associate with John and his brethren, *in the service of Jesus himself*.

3. Immediately on John's offering worship to the angel, and his refusing it,—heaven is seen opened, and the sublime vision is exhibited to the view of the entranced prophet, of Him who was called "Faithful and True," "the Word of God," "the King of kings and Lord of lords."—Here is Jesus in all the majesty of dominion and power. Is this still the angel, that was John's fellow-servant, and that had just been showing him the preceding visions? Is this one of the seven angels that had the seven vials?

4. The same thing is not less clear respecting the *second* instance.—In chap. xxi. 9. the same expression occurs as at the beginning of chap. xviith, "And there came unto me one of the seven angels who had the seven vials, full of the seven last plagues, and talked with me, saying"—&c. And here also, reading forward, marking particularly verses 10, 15, 17, of chap. xxi. and verse 1. of chap. xxii, will be sufficient to convince the reader that *this* is *the angel* (whether the same, or another of the seven, is not clear) before whom John prostrated himself to worship, and who refused the homage, as before.

5. The difficulty, arising from the subsequent context, is simply the difficulty which is so often to be found in the prophetic writings, produced by the suddenness of the transition from one person to another, as the speaker, without any premonition of the change. If this difficulty is far from being peculiar to this passage, it cannot surely be allowed to overcome the plain and decisive proofs that the angel before mentioned was, in both instances, another than Jesus Christ.—The note of Grotius, (whom Mr. Yates will admit to be an impartial authority) as quoted by Mr. Brown, expresses the general opinion, and, as I think, the just one. "Sequitur hic dialogus inter Dominum Jesum et Johannem, non appositis personarum nominibus, sed quæ facile ex verbis subintelliguntur. Hic loqui incipit Jesus. Simile habes Esa. vii. xxxvii. xlviii. Jer. v. viii. ix. xv. xxii."—"Here" (that is at the tenth verse) "there follows a conversation between the Lord Jesus and John, in which the names of the parties are not mentioned, but may easily be understood from their words.—*Here* Jesus begins to speak. Parallel cases may be found in Isa. vii. xxxvii. xlviii. Jer. v. viii. ix. xv. xxii."—If the reader will peruse the chapters thus referred to, he will be at no loss to discover in them the parallel instances of sudden change of speaker.

6. In chapter i. 1, 2. the Book is entitled—"The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him, to show unto his servants the things which must shortly come to pass: and he sent and signified it by his angel unto his servant John."

Mr. Yates thinks that he who "sent and signified it" is *God*, and "his angel" *Jesus*. "*In the original*," he says, if not in the translation, "the words '*he sent and signified it*,' appear to refer to *God* rather than Jesus." I can see nothing in the original to prevent the words referring to *Jesus* as their antecedent, with equal propriety as to *God*. I would not be positive, as it is a matter about which commentators differ; but it seems to me *more natural* to connect them with *Jesus*. The meaning seems to be, that "God gave this revelation to Jesus, to show unto his servants;" and that HE, as the great medium of Divine communications to men, *fulfilled the commission*, "sending and signifying it by his angel to his servant John." This view appears to

receive strong confirmation from the language of chap. xxii. 16. "*I Jesus have sent mine angel, to show unto you these things in the churches.*"—Mr. Yates thinks the angel, or *messenger*, here is *John;* and so, I observe, does *Doddridge*. I would be far from denying the possibility of this being right, especially as John is said to have "borne witness of the word of God, and of the testimony of Jesus Christ, and of those things which he saw:" but it appears to me greatly more probable that it is otherwise, and that John should be included in the pronoun *you;*—"to testify unto *you* these things in the churches." As this, however, does not seem a *certain* case, I am disposed rather to decline the argument for the Divinity of Jesus Christ drawn by some from a comparison of chap. xxii. 6. with ver. 16. the more especially, as it is very conceivable, that the same person may be the messenger both of Him who bears the *supreme* authority, and of an inferior *invested with his commission*. If a royal ambassador were vested with power to appoint, in particular cases, a deputy to act for him, that deputy might, without impropriety, be considered, and denominated, at once the messenger of the king, and the messenger of the ambassador acting by the king's authority. But,

7. Error is never consistent. If Mr. Yates were right in thinking the angel who refused worship from the apostle, to be *Jesus himself*, alas! for the principle on which Socinians are accustomed to explain *other instances* of *worship offered to Jesus;* a principle which Mr. Yates himself has adopted and reasoned upon. The address of *Stephen* to Jesus, Unitarians tell us, when he *actually saw him*, does not authorize us to offer prayers to him, now that he is *invisible:* and they offer the same objection to our inferences from such passages as 2 Cor. xii. 7—9; which they try to reconcile with their system, by alleging the probability that Jesus was at the time, actually, or at least in vision, present with the apostle. To this principle Mr. Yates has given his sanction, in his remarks on both these cases of prayer to Jesus. (Pages 249, 250.)—But could either of these cases be a case of *more distinct visible presence*, than the case in the Revelation, on the supposition of Jesus being the angel? The principle itself furnishes but a poor and pitiful refuge;—as if "the mere circumstance of

being visible could impart to a mere creature a transient divinity, and a momentary title to divine honours—a divinity and a title lasting only while the vision lasts."—But, poor and pitiful as it is, this notion of Mr. Yates, about Jesus being the angel who so peremtorily refused the worship of his fellow-servant, sweeps it clean away. So that, after all, by what he labours so hard to establish, he would lose at least as much as he could gain.

Lastly. The notion that Jesus was the angel who refused the worship offered by John, is opposed by all the other evidence of his being the proper object of worship, and by the whole mass of proofs that he is the true God.

I proceed to Mr. Yates' strictures on the instances of worship addressed to him.

On the words of Thomas to Christ, John xx. 28, Mr. Yates repeats, shortly, the view he had given before; that "*my Lord and my God*" means "*my master and my inspired instructor in religion and virtue.*" The reader, I presume, will readily excuse my saying no more of this; and indeed, for my opponent's sake, the less, I think, that is said about it the better. See pp. 141, 142.

With regard to that class of passages, which, in the common translation, contain the phrase "*calling on the name of the Lord,*" Mr. Yates opens his attack in the following terms: "From our author's confident language it is evident, that he saw through this subject in an instant by a glance of inspiration. I am less highly favoured. I have spent a whole day in examining all the passages where the word (επικαλεομαι,) translated '*to call upon,*' occurs, carefully comparing the Hebrew, the Greek, and the English. In the evening, I rest from my labour, with a persuasion that much may be said on each side of the question, and, instead of being able to form a very decided opinion, I am inclined to consider this as one of the difficulties left in revelation, for the purpose of inculcating humility and candour." Page 243.

Astonishing! This is estimating the virtues of humility and candour at a high rate indeed. The difficulty thus left in revelation cannot respect merely the critical meaning of a Greek verb; it must lie in the question itself which is affected by the

determination of the true and proper import of the verb. So that, for the sake of inculcating the virtues of humility and candour, the readers of revelation are to be left, it seems, in uncertainty, and at a loss to ascertain, whether Divine worship be due to Christ, or whether, in offering it, they are guilty of idolatry. The Divine Author of the Bible purposely employs language calculated to keep his creatures in the dark, respecting one of the most important questions that revelation could decide, that, in the exercise of humility and mutual candour, they might make *idolatry* a *matter of forbearance*. This, I confess, is quite a new view of the matter. I only wonder that, if Mr. Yates thought it a just one, he did not apply it more extensively:—to Rom. ix. 5. for example:—The words, he might have said, are *so arranged* that they may be taken *either way:* This is "one of the difficulties left in revelation for the purpose of inculcating humility and candour." So of John i. 1. The word, he might have alleged, might be rendered equally well either *God*, or *a God*:—and this is "one of the difficulties left in revelation for the purpose of inculcating humility and candour." And so of other passages. Now I not only am satisfied that there *is* no such difficulty in determining this question, but that, on a question of this nature, there *can be* no such difficulty. I am no friend to the practice of predetermining in our own minds what a revelation from Heaven must contain. But it is surely not going too far to say, that it would be inconsistent with every idea we can form of the nature and design of such a revelation, to leave those, to whom it is addressed, *purposely*, at a loss to determine who is the proper object of religious worship.

I make no pretensions to "*glances of inspiration*." Nor am I, on the other hand, at all surprised at either the length or the fruitlessness of Mr. Yates' laborious search, or at his resting in the evening from his hard day's work, satisfied with Sir Roger de Coverly's sage conclusion that "*much may be said on both sides*." The truth is, he was searching for what was not to be found, while, at the same time, he was anxious to find it, and reluctant to give up his investigation without some discovery. He was seeking after *other instances*. to support the Unitarian ver-

sion of the passages in question. But, having all day "sought witness and found none," he is obliged to content himself by taking up the passages themselves on the general principles of Greek grammar.

Let us see, then, how he disposes of them.

1. Rom. x. 11—13. If the reader will look at my remarks on this passage, and then at those of Mr. Yates, he will at once perceive, that my opponent has taken care to overlook entirely the very point and pith of the reasoning. It is incapable of reasonable dispute, that Christ is meant when it is said in v. 11. "whosoever *believeth on* HIM shall not be ashamed." It is equally indisputable, that Christ is meant when it is afterwards said, in v. 14. "How then shall they call on HIM *in whom they have not believed?*" And it irresistibly follows, that Christ is "*the Lord*" in the intermediate verses. "*The Lord Jesus Christ*," in v. 9. is "*the same Lord over all*" in verse 12th. *Christ* indeed, is the subject throughout the whole passage. To this Mr. Yates simply replies,—"*The train of St. Paul's reasoning*, affords no ground to believe that he makes mention of the worship of *Christ.*" But he has said nothing to prove his assertion; and the best refutation of it will be the reading of verses 8—14. of the chapter where the words occur.

With regard to the remaining passages (viz. Acts ix. 14, 21 : xxii. 16 : 1 Cor. i. 2.) Mr. Yates says—"It is not disputed that these passages may be so translated" (that is as they are in our common version) "without any offence against critical propriety. But it is also certain, that the original words may equally well, as far as respects *grammar*, be translated thus: 'And here he hath authority from the chief priest to bind all *that are called by thy name;*' 'Is not this he who destroyed them that *are called by this name* in Jerusalem?' 'Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, *taking upon thyself his name:*' 'To the church of God which is at Corinth, to them that are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, with all that in every place *are called by the name of Jesus Christ our Lord.*'" (Pages 244, 245.) He then alleges, in substance, that these passages, being equally susceptible of the one translation or the other, make nothing for

either side, but may with propriety be understood according as our minds are previously satisfied *upon other grounds.*

Mr. Yates produces a list of passages from the Old Testament Scriptures, in which persons are said to be "*called by the name of the Lord,*" prefacing the list with the remark, *To be called by the name of a person,* is a phrase of very frequent occurrence in the Scriptures. It signifies *to belong to that person.*"—It is very unnecessary to go through these passages, because Mr. Yates himself has been so good as to deprive them of all their force in the present argument, by adding, at the close of the list—"Although in these examples the form of expression in the Greek is different, the sense appears to be the same as in the passages which I am now endeavouring to illustrate." But if "*the form of expression in the Greek is different,*" they are nothing at all to the purpose, unless the reader chooses to be satisfied with "*the sense appearing*" to Mr. Yates "*to be the same.*"

The case, then, stands thus:—The phrase used in the passages in question is the customary phrase in Scripture, for *invoking,* or *calling upon the name of the Lord*:—whereas *in every instance* in which *being called by the name of the Lord* is clearly intended, the phraseology employed *is different.* There is, therefore, every reason to conclude, that, in the instances in dispute, had it been the intention of the writers to express the idea of "*being called by the name of the Lord,*" their phraseology would not have been what it is.

The only instance which Mr. Yates has produced in favour of the Unitarian rendering, is one from the epistle of Clement to the Corinthians:—"May the God who surveys all things, the Sovereign of spirits, and the Lord of all flesh, who hath chosen the Lord Jesus Christ, and us in him to be a peculiar people, *give to every soul who is called by his glorious and holy name,* faith, fear, peace, patience, &c." The expression is "δωη παση ψυχη επικεκλημενη το μεγαλοτρεπες και ἁγιον ονομα αυτου:" and Mr. Yates remarks in a note, that "επικεκλημενη in the passive voice, instead of επικαλουμενη, which might be either passive or middle, determines the sense of the verb."—In the *first* place, however, the case would have been more in point, had the *precise words* of the pas-

sages in debate been used, and, at the same time, *obviously* and *certainly* in the sense of *being called by the name of the Lord*, &c. In the *second* place, the words, *give to every one who is called by his glorious and holy name*," do not seem, from the structure of the sentence, to refer, in this instance, to CHRIST at all, but to "the God who surveys all things, the sovereign of spirits, and the Lord of all flesh." Yet Mr. Yates draws from this passage of Clement the following inference: "we know, therefore, that '*to be called by the name of* CHRIST' was a designation employed in the apostolic age to denote *the profession of the Christian religion*."—*Thirdly*, there is much more decisive evidence of the early Christians having *worshipped Christ*, than there is of this designation having been so employed in the apostolic age.—And, *lastly*, the case before us seems to be one instance among many of the justice of the charge brought against Unitarians in general, at which Mr. Yates felt so peculiarly indignant; namely, of their being satisfied if they can only make it out, on evidence however slender, that a passage will *bear* to be rendered in a way consistent with their system. It is easy, indeed, to *say*, "it is certain that the original words may *equally well*, as far as respects grammar, be translated thus." But when the matter stands as has been stated above, with regard to the *general practice* of the Greek language, and especially of the sacred writers, the expression should make him who uses it blush.

There is one general observation which I have here to make, respecting the manner in which Mr. Yates endeavours to explain the remaining passages on this subject. In all the instances in which *God the Father*, and *the Lord Jesus Christ*, are introduced *together*, the great general principle of his reply is, that though both are thus addressed, the one is addressed as the supreme God, and the other as performing the same actions, or bestowing the same blessings, in subordination to the Father, and by means of power and knowledge communicated from him." But when he comes to passages in which *Jesus alone* is addressed, (as in 2 Cor. xii. 7,—9. and Acts vii. 59, 60.) he is bereft of this convenient principle, and constrained to acknowledge that "he is not able, completely to his own satisfaction, to reconcile these

instances of the invocation of Jesus with those numerous and clear directions, which represent *the Father* as the only proper object of religious adoration." (Page 251.) Now, seriously, ought not such instances as these, in which Jesus stands *alone*, as the object of immediate invocation and prayer, to have led Mr. Yates to suspect the soundness of his principle, and to conclude, that, in the cases in which Jesus is *joined with the Father*, he is just as much the object of true and proper worship, as when he is addressed by himself?

But apart from this, let the reader look at those passages again, in which Jesus is united with the Father; let him look, for example, at 1 Thess. iii. 11—13. and at 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17; and let him consult whatever measure of common sense he may possess (and a very small measure will do) to determine whether these passages do not contain *prayers*. To allege that they are not *invocations*, but *devout wishes*, is mere trifling, and only shows the weakness of the cause which obliges its advocates to have recourse to so poor a subterfuge. We do not look for direct apostrophes to the object of supplication in a letter: but what is here expressed by the apostle, in the form of *a wish*, is, beyond all reasonable question, a *supplicatory aspiration* to the throne of Divine grace, in behalf of those to whom he is writing, and contains an intimation to them, of what his prayers were for them in his more secret devotions. The blessings which are desired in these passages, are such as it belongs to God alone to bestow: and they are desired alike from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.

In the latter of the two passages, I had remarked, the evidence is particularly strong from the circumstance of Jesus being put *first* in the order of address.—"Are we to suppose that a mere man, or even the most exalted of creatures, is here associated with the most High God, in a solemn prayer for the communication of comfort and stability to the Christians at Thessalonica? and not only associated with him, but, in the order of address, *put before him?*" On this Mr. Yates observes:—"Mr. Wardlaw endeavours to confirm his argument by remarking that Christ is 'not only associated with God, but, in the order of ad-

dress, *put before him*." He makes the same observation upon another passage, 2 Cor. xiii. 14. where also Christ is mentioned in the order of the sentence before God. This argument at the utmost rests on very dubious ground. It is the idiom of the *English* language, when a verb has more than one nominative, to place that first which is the highest in dignity and eminence. In *Latin* the rule is the reverse; the most important object being mentioned *last*. Whether there be any established practice upon this subject in *Greek*, I must confess myself at present unable to say; but I do not take Mr. Wardlaw's rule upon trust." P. 248.

It is with the *Greek* practice we have at present to do. And as to this, I should think Mr. Yates need not have gone beyond the limits of the very argument he was at the time discussing, to have sufficiently satisfied himself. *On his principles*, Jesus Christ is a *created being*, and not merely in *official relation*, but in *nature*, *inferior and subordinate to the Father;* as a *creature*, indeed, *infinitely* inferior. This being supposed the case, if the "*established practice*" in *Greek* were the same as what Mr. Yates states it to be in *Latin*, it would follow inevitably, that he would invariably be placed *first*. But how stands the fact? He is almost always *last*, having only in two or three instances the precedence. Here, then, *on Mr. Yates' own principles*, are strong data, within the bounds of the very question under discussion, to decide the point as to Greek practice, on which he professes himself at a loss. Let him not attempt to turn the attack, by saying, If such be the case, then you grant the inferiority of Christ to the Father, as proved by the circumstance of his being placed almost always the second in order. On Trinitarian principles, there is no difficulty in accounting for this. In the scheme of redemption, Jesus appears as *Mediator*, sent by the Father, making atonement to the Father, accepted and glorified by the Father. By sinners in their addresses at the throne of grace, it is natural to suppose, and in itself right and unavoidable, that God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ should be contemplated, as they are revealed in this scheme; this scheme being itself the ground on which sinners come to God. But the *official relations* subsisting between the Father and the Son in the scheme of re-

demption, are not inconsistent with *equality of nature;* so that, while, on account of the former, we naturally expect what is the customary order, the *latter* keeps us from being at all startled, or stumbled, by that order being *occasionally* reversed. But supposing, on the contrary, such *inferiority of nature* as the *Unitarian* system maintains to exist,—then, whether the established practice in Greek be to give the precedency to the supreme or to the subordinate, it will be alike difficult to account, in a case such as the present, for the practice being (as it is in more instances than one) directly violated.'

Mr. Yates is pleased to add, with his usual felicity and point; —"Besides, I cannot see how this observation is applicable to prove the Trinitarian doctrine. For, although it cannot be denied, that Christ is often put before God the Father in the *affections* of his worshippers, I never knew that his superiority to the Father was a doctrine taught by *systematic theologians*." (Page 248.) For an answer to the unworthy sneer in the beginning of this last sentence, I refer the reader to my former volume, Pages 251, 252. As to the latter part of the sentence, I shall only say, that if Mr. Yates "*cannot see*" how the observation respecting the priority of Christ in the order of address "is applicable to prove the Trinitarian doctrine," unless Trinitarians hold his "*superiority to the Father*," he only furnishes an illustration of the old proverb, that "none are so blind as those who *will not see*." Let him try his penetration (or rather his candour; for though he sometimes *will not* see, he is not without penetration) on the following simple statement:—Trinitarians account for the Father being *usually* mentioned *first*, from the *official relations* between the Father and the Son in the plan of redemption: they account for Jesus Christ being *sometimes* first, from the consideration of his *equality in nature* with the Father.

"Mr. Wardlaw," says Mr. Yates, "is, as usual, very unfortunate in his minuter criticisms. He observes, with respect to the former of the two passages, that '*the Lord*' in the 12th verse is evidently *the Lord Jesus Christ*. Griesbach, however, has marked this word *doubtful*. If it be omitted, the passage will read thus:—'Now God himself and our Father, and our Lord

Jesus Christ, direct our way unto you, and make you to increase and abound in love one toward another,' &c. The various examples of inattention to the correctness of the Greek text which I have observed, constrain me to think, that Mr. Wardlaw has made his bold assertions (p. 146.) concerning Griesbach's emendations, without taking the trouble to examine whether they were true or false." (P. 248.)

I speak most calmly and deliberately, when I say, that I consider this as worse than contemptible; as containing in it that sin against the claims of candour which consists in catching at a circumstance, than which it is scarcely possible to imagine one more trivial, with a view to throw general discredit, in the mind of the unlearned and inconsiderate reader, on the critical accuracy of an opponent. I do not, in this case, as in *one* instance formerly noticed, plead guilty of even the slightest degree of inattention.

Let the reader observe, 1st, Mr. Yates says Griesbach has marked "*the Lord*" in verse 12 "as *doubtful*;" but he has *not* said, what he *ought* to have said, that the mark affixed to the words is that which denotes the *slightest degree of dubiety which the critic thought it worth his while to mark at all.* * 2dly, I pro-

* " = indicat probabilem omissionem, neque tamen ideo certam, ut nullus dubitationi locus supersit. (Si verba hoc signo notata abessent a textu, nos ea admisissemus in textum, præfixo +.)

" — præfigitur vocabulis, quorum omissio minus est probabilis. (Si verbum cui hoc signum adposuimus abesset a textu, nos reposuissemus illud, adjecto ⁜.)

" ⁜ adpingitur iis verbis quæ probabiliter textui adjicienda sunt. (Si legerentur in vulgari textu, nos ea signo — notassemus.)"

" = signifies probable omission, but not so certain as to leave no room for doubt. If the words so marked had been out of the received text, we should have inserted them, prefixing +.

" — is prefixed to words of whose omission the probability is less. If the word to which this mark is affixed had been absent from the text, we should have restored it, subjoining ⁜.

" ⁜ is placed at those words, as to which there is a probability that they should be added to the text. Had they been previously in it, we should have distinguished them by the mark —."

It is by the mark — that ὁ κυριος is distinguished as "*doubtful*" in the passage in question.

ceeded, and considered myself entitled to proceed, upon the principle, that whatever Griesbach *retained* was *Griesbach's text;* and should have thought it mere trifling, to have noticed, with particular remark, every word to which there might attach the slightest shade of doubt. Conceiving this great critic infinitely better qualified to weigh the claims of different readings than myself, I *assumed*, in the whole course of my Volume, that what he retained in the text there existed sufficient reason for retaining. So that the want of due submission to the authority of Griesbach lies, not with me, but with my opponent, who thus, when it suits him, can argue on the *supposition* of words being spurious, which *he* has seen more than sufficient reason to retain. I say *more than sufficient:* for the reader will perceive, from the explanation of the marks given in the note, that *less* reason would have satisfied him, for keeping them in the text, and even for inserting them had they been wanting.—But, 3dly—"*If* it" (the word κυριος) "be omitted," says Mr. Yates, "the passage will read thus: 'Now God himself and our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ, direct our way unto you, and make you to increase and abound in love one toward another.'" &c. "Most thinking" reader, do you perceive any material difference as to the *argument* from this omission?

Mr. Yates "is not disposed to dissent" from the view given of the apostolic benedictions, as *brief prayers* for the Divine blessing on the churches and individuals to whom they are addressed, because although, "properly speaking, they imply only *benevolent wishes*," yet "almost every wish of a habitually pious man includes a prayer." He observes, however, that "in every instance of such benedictions, a marked distinction is made between '*God the Father*,' who is the only true God, and '*the Lord Jesus Christ*;' who, according to the doctrine stated in other parts of Scripture, exercises his functions, as the guardian and benefactor of the Christian church, in subjection to God, and by means of qualifications imparted from him." (P. 249.) But in this observation it is, as usual, *assumed* without proof, that the distinction between the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, is the distinction between the *true God* and a *mere creature* commissioned and qualified by him.

2. Cor. xii. 7—9. Mr. Yates admits that *Christ* is here the person whom the apostle besought; and that this is consequently a "clear instance of an earnest supplication for aid, addressed to Jesus."—But something or other *must* be said, to evade the inference, or to diminish its force. "It is to be observed," says Mr. Yates, "that, when addressed, he makes a reply in distinct terms, saying to Paul, 'My grace is sufficient for thee, for my strength is made perfect in weakness.' This renders it probable, that, when Paul besought him, he was present with the apostle, either in vision, or personally."—Well;—let this be supposed, and what then? It is still *to Christ* that he addresses his supplication for deliverance;—it is *Christ* that *does* deliver him;—it is the *power of Christ* in which he glories. Unitarians tell us, that, in our veneration and love for *Christ*, we forget what is due to *the Father*. But truly, if Christ was not God, there is, in this thrice-repeated prayer of the apostle, something which it will not be easy to vindicate from the charge of idolatrous forgetfulness of the Father Almighty.—But the mere circumstance of a reply being made "in distinct terms" by "the Lord" to his servant, affords no conclusive evidence of his presence with him at the time, either personally or in vision. The inspired communications made to the holy prophets are almost always introduced in similar terms—"The Lord said unto me,"—"The word of the Lord came unto me," &c.; while there is no reason to suppose either personal or visionary appearance. The answer was, in all probability, imparted *to his mind, by revelation*, in a way of which we, who have had no experience of it, can form no distinct conception.—He besought the Lord *thrice*. Was it *in vision, each of the three times?* Did the apostle just catch the opportunities afforded by Jesus appearing to him, to present his prayer to him,—while, *at other times*, he prayed to the Father, and never to Christ? Did he before, and in the intervals, pray to the Father; and, not succeeding, seize the occasion of presenting his suit to the Son,—a fellow-creature who had influence with God? Or rather, is not this instance of prayer, addressed to Jesus *alone*, in perfect harmony with the other passages, in which he is addressed *in conjunction with the Father?*

In Mr. Yates' remarks both on this passage and on the case of Stephen, Acts vii. 59. there appears an interesting struggle between attachment to a system, and the dictates of candour and common sense. Having entered at large into the case of Stephen in my Discourses, I do not wish to trouble my reader with a mere repetition of what was there said, to which Mr. Yates attempts no reply. He merely states, and states in a very hesitating way, like one who felt his ground unstable, what other Unitarians have stated with greater confidence before him; without *deigning* (shall I say, or *venturing*?) to take any notice of what has been urged in reply.

Two things, however, are remarkable. First of all, it is utterly vain for Trinitarians to maintain any argument that Christ is God, from his being the *object of prayer*:—They may spare themselves the trouble, at least in as far as respects any prospect of convincing Mr. Yates. For he has found out, and avows, that "the example of this dying martyr, *even if it authorised us to pray to Christ*, affords no proof of his supreme divinity."—(Page 251.)—So that we may succeed in proving that Jesus Christ is the *proper object of prayer and supplication*—even to *us*—even when *not* appearing in vision—and yet, after all, fail in proving him to be any thing more than a creature "appointed and empowered by God to direct the affairs of his church, and to guard the lives and preserve the souls of his servants." (Page 251.) Does Mr. Yates, then, agree with Socinus, in thinking Christ *a mere man*, and yet a proper object of invocation?—Or does he agree with Dr. Clarke and the high Arians?—*Adhuc in dubio est.* He is as fearful as ever, of any one finding out what he is; and, like a certain fish, the use he makes of his ink is to render himself undiscoverable.

He further says, "with respect to the second ejaculation, "'*Lord, lay not this sin to their charge*,' it was probably addressed to God, the Judge of all, to whom the expiring saint appears previously and deliberately to have diverted his attention in the solemn act of kneeling down." (Page 251.) Now, can any thing be conceived more *arbitrary* than this? Mr. Yates says it is "*probable*." But it can appear so only to a mind pre-

judiced to a very uncommon degree, by the influence of party sentiments. Can it be possible, that Mr. Yates should scruple to admit that the dying martyr would address a prayer for the forgiveness of his enemies, to the same gracious Redeemer into whose hands he solemnly commits his own departing spirit? Indeed, if the simple reading of the verses does not at once show the reader how hardly pressed Mr. Yates must have felt himself, when he had recourse to a supposition so groundless and gratuitous as this, no reasoning whatever would, I fear, convince him of it.

I should reckon the mind of my opponent, in these circumstances, an utterly hopeless subject, were it not for the admission which immediately follows, of his *not being satisfied* with his own reasonings, respecting both this and the preceding instance of the invocation of Jesus:—an admission of which, notice has already been taken.

We now come to the sublime vision in the fifth chapter of the Revelation, "in which," as Mr. Yates expresses himself, "all rational creatures are represented attributing common honours to God, and to Jesus." (Page 252.)

"It is not true, as Mr. Wardlaw asserts, (page 125,) that he 'is represented *as occupying the same throne with the Eternal.*' On the contrary, while God *sits upon the throne*, in token of his supremacy, (see chapter iv. 2, 8—11. v. 1, 7, 13.) Christ, the Lamb, stands *in the middle space between the throne and the elders*, and afterwards goes up to take the book out of the hand of Him that sits on the throne. See ver. 6, 7." (Page 253.)

Candour requires me to say, after repeated examination of the phrases employed in recording the vision, that, were we to confine our attention to it alone, this observation must be acknowledged correct. The same phraseology is applied, in chapter iv. 6. to "the four living creatures:"—"*In the midst of the throne*, and round about the throne were four living creatures, full of eyes before and behind;" which Doddridge renders, giving the obvious sense, "in the middle of the space between the throne, and the circle about the throne."—When applied, in chap. v. 6, to *the Lamb*,—"I beheld, and lo, *in the midst of the throne*, and

of the four living creatures, and in the midst of the elders, stood a Lamb as it had been slain,"—it is, I observe, generally considered by commentators as meaning "in the middle space between the throne and the four living creatures."—See Doddridge, Guyse, Scott, &c. According to this interpretation, Jesus appears in the vision in his mediatorial capacity, as "the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world," and as holding a relative position corresponding to this view of his character;—having been himself the Divine High Priest, and the piacular Victim.—But there are *other* passages in which Jesus, the Lamb, is plainly and unequivocally described as "occupying the same throne with the Eternal:" chapter iii. 21: vii. 15—17: xxii. 1, 3. These texts clearly represent God and the Lamb, as occupying the same throne;—and it arose from my having such passages in my mind at the time, that I was naturally led to interpret the expression "*in the midst of the throne*" in this vision, as of the same import.

There are two ways of answering the argument derived from the ascription of the same adoration and praise to God and to the Lamb.—The one is, by alleging, "that this is entirely a '*a visionary scene*:' "—that "the homage is paid to a symbolical representation of Christ, by symbolical persons, as visibly present with him: and that this cannot justify the actual worship of Christ, when he is not visible."—This I have particularly noticed in my Discourses, and I trust, sufficiently exposed its absurdity. From his entire silence respecting it, Mr. Yates may be considered, I presume, as giving it up. He confines himself to the other ground, which is certainly more rational and plausible.—He states it in the following terms:—

"But it is argued, that, since God and Christ receive, in this instance, *the same tribute of praise*, they must be equal in eternity, in power, and in glory. Indeed those who maintain the supreme divinity of Christ, commonly represent it as a circumstance of great moment, whenever he is mentioned in conjunction with the Father, and in the same or similar terms with him. It will therefore be proper to consider more particularly, what inferences follow from the application of the same language in the same

sentence to Almighty God, and to some other being. The following passages may serve the purpose. Exod. xiv. 31. 'And the people feared Jehovah, *and believed Jehovah, and his servant Moses.* 1. Sam. xii. 18. 'And all the people *greatly feared Jehovah and Samuel.*' 1. Chron. xxix. 20. 'And all the congregation blessed Jehovah, God of their fathers, and bowed down their heads, and *worshipped Jehovah and the King.*' 2 Chron. xxxi. 8. 'And when Hezekiah and the princes came, and saw the heaps, *they blessed Jehovah, and his people Israel.*' Acts xv. 28. '*It seemed good to the Holy Spirit* (that is, to God) *and to us.*' 1 Thess. ii. 10. '*Ye are witnesses, and God.*'—In these passages, the one true God is 'associated' with his creatures as *the object of faith, fear, worship, and blessing*, and is mentioned in 'connexion' with them, as '*giving counsel and bearing witness.*' " (Page 254.)

One of the passages here referred to I have considered in my Discourses—viz. 1 Chron. xxix. 20. And the *general principle* of the answer to *it* is perfectly applicable to all the rest. In every one of these cases, " *a general word* is used, in its *general* or *indefinite* sense," and we feel no difficulty in regard to any of them, in assigning to the word, though applied to two objects in the same sentence, its "different modifications of meaning." But, " in the case to which these are adduced as parallels, we have the very same act of worship, expressed in the very same words, addressed equally 'to Him that sitteth upon the throne, and to the Lamb.' " (Discourse IV. p. 127.)

When we read the vision, and hear

> " The whole creation join in one
> " To bless the sacred name
> " Of Him who sits upon the throne,
> " And to adore the Lamb ;"

we ask, with astonishment at those who would forbid *us*, Is this not a being whom we are warranted and bound to worship and adore? Must *we* confine our adoration, our sacred acts of religious homage, to " *Him that sitteth on the throne*," and exclude " *the Lamb?*" Or, if we *may* unite his name with that of the Father in our ascriptions of glory and honour, and blessing, and

power, what is the kind, and what the measure, of homage, which we are to consider ourselves as paying to him? Has a book, of which one of the leading designs is to proscribe, and finally to abolish, all *idolatry*, represented the whole creation as uniting in one solemn act of adoration to *God and to the Lamb;* and, by this very representation, called upon *us*, who are *a part* of the creation of God, to adore and honour the Lamb in the very same terms in which we adore and honour the Father; while at the same time it commands us to keep at an infinite distance from every approach to the worship of any creature, enjoining us to "worship *the Lord our God*, and to serve *him only?*" Unitarians, Mr. Yates tells us, "are sometimes heard in their churches on earth, to join the adoring throngs above, in saying with a loud voice, 'Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing:'" (P. 253.) and *sometimes*, too, it is to be presumed, joining with the whole creation in saying "Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb for ever and ever!" Who the Unitarians are, who thus sometimes join the adoring throngs above, in themselves *adoring* the Lamb, Mr. Yates does not say. Does he mean all descriptions of Unitarians, according to his extended application of the term, from the high Arian to the low Socinian? Do they address their *adorations* TO the Lamb, or do they only express their sentiments OF him? If they address their adorations *to* him, what *is* this adoration? It is not *often*, I presume, that such adoration of the Lamb *is* heard among them; and when it is, there must surely be many inward fears and jealousies, and misgivings of mind, lest they should be ascribing to this fellow creature a greater proportion of the devotion of their hearts than what is his due. I have often, for my own part, admired the *wisdom* of the blessed God, as displayed in the scheme of redemption, in *this* respect among many others, that, while it is impossible, considering the vast extent of the obligations of sinners to the REDEEMER, by whose mediation it is that they are restored to the "life" that lies in "God's favour," and to all the blessings of everlasting salvation; while it is impossi-

ble, considering the incalculable magnitude of these blessings, so infinitely transcending all that they can ever be the instruments of conveying to one another, that they should not feel, if he to whom they were under these obligations were a mere *fellow creature*, a danger of dividing their hearts between him and God; that, in these circumstances, the constitution of his person should be such, as to allow *full scope* to all the glowing ardour of gratitude; leaving us at liberty to "pour out our hearts before him" with unrestrained emotion, without the hazard of any approximation to idolatrous feeling; so that, with perfect freedom from every such perplexing and painful apprehension, we may "*honour the Son even as we honour the Father.*"

With regard to the other two passages afterwards quoted by Mr. Yates, viz. 1 Tim. vi. 21. "I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels, that thou observe these things." And 1 Sam. xxv. 32, 33. "And David said to Abigail, Blessed be Jehovah God of Israel, who sent thee this day to meet me; and blessed be thy advice, and blessed be thou." Mr. Yates' mode of reasoning is rather a curious one. He supposes a substitution, in the former, of "*the Holy Spirit*" for "*the elect angels,*" and, in the latter, of the "*Son*" and "*the Holy Spirit*" for "*thy advice*" and "*thou;*" and then, with satirical irony, makes out of them, for the Trinitarians, two "capital and convincing proofs of the doctrine of the Trinity." It is very likely, that Trinitarians *might* have considered such passages as additional proofs of their doctrine; and they would have had good reason for doing so. Mr. Yates' argument stands thus:—There is just as much ground from the passages, *as they actually stand*, to conclude that "*the elect angels*" are *God*, and that *David* and *David's advice* are God, as there would have been ground, *had they stood as Mr. Yates supposes them*, to conclude from them that the *Son* and the *Holy Spirit* are *God*. But, in order to render this *fair*, and to make the Trinitarians look as foolish as Mr. Yates intended they should, the following ought to have been the state of the case:—There should not only have been *no other evidence* besides these passages, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are God, equal with the Father; but, on the con-

trary, as much evidence that they are *not* God, as there is that angels, and David, and David's advice, are not God. We may be perfectly warranted to interpret a text *in agreement with a multitude of others*, while we should not be warranted to interpret it *in opposition to all others*.—But, after all, our argument is *not* founded on the *mere connexion* of "God and the Lamb" in the same sentence, as Mr. Yates represents it, but on the *peculiar circumstances of that connexion;* and, if the reader wishes to know what these are, I have only to request of him to read over again the fifth chapter of the revelation.

Mr. Yates concludes this chapter, by endeavouring to illustrate the sense of the sacred writers, in uniting God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ in their ascriptions of glory and praise, by "the manner in which Mahommedans" (to whom Unitarians have always shown a warm side,) "associate their prophet with the Almighty." He quotes the following "lofty language of praise and supplication;"—Praise be unto the Almighty God, and unto our Lord his prophet Mahommed, whose protection and mercy we crave, and resign ourselves to his holy will."—This language of the followers of the false prophet "proves," says Mr. Yates, "that a person may be conceived to be infinitely inferior to God as his creature and his dependent, and yet, in consideration of the power and glory to which God has raised him, he may be praised, and even petitioned, in connexion with his Creator and the Creator of all." No doubt the language proves, that this "*may be conceived.*" But does it prove that they who so conceive, conceive *rightly?* Is it a *right* conception, that a person "*infinitely inferior*" in nature to the great God, and, with whatever power and glory invested, *still* infinitely inferior, should be associated with "his Creator and the Creator of all," as the object of the same praise and supplication? Because the votaries of the Koran have presumed thus impiously and inconsistently to associate the name of their false prophet with the name of the Almighty, in their acts of homage and devotion, must we impute the same impiety, and the same, or much greater inconsistency, to those "holy men of God who spake as they were moved by

the Holy Spirit;" on whom the gifts of inspiration were conferred, with the express design of exposing, and bearing down, and finally subverting, all idolatry—called so emphatically in Scripture "that abominable thing which God hates?" If I might venture a probable conjecture, as to the origin of the Mahometan practice, I should suppose it to have arisen from the very circumstance of the name of JESUS being so associated in the Holy Scriptures. Finding this the case, and assuming his being no more than a prophet, they have exalted their own prophet to the place which the Bible gives to Christ, impiously honouring him with the same high and sacred associations.

CHAPTER IX.

IN Chapter IX. Mr. Yates examines "the REMAINING ARGUMENTS produced by Mr. Wardlaw, to prove the supreme divinity of Jesus Christ," that he "may do full justice to the evidence of the Trinitarian doctrine, and omit none of its prominent and palpable evidences." Page 257.

John x. 30. On this text see pages 123—130 of this volume.

Phil. ii. 6. "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God."

Mr. Yates declares himself "satisfied, after attending carefully to the ingenious argumentation by which Hammond, and a few others have attempted to justify this translation, that it cannot possibly be deduced out of the original words of St. Paul;" and that "the literal translation of them is, 'Who, being in the form of God, did not esteem it a prey to be as God.'"—"Since," he adds, "there is an evident necessity for some supplement in the last clause, and the substantive verb (εἶναι) "*to be*," is seldom used in the New Testament to denote *mere existence*, we may properly insert the word *honoured*, and read '*to be honoured as God.*' The meaning of the apostle may be thus expressed; ver. 5—8. Imitate the condescension and benevolence of Jesus

Christ, who, although he resembled God in the possession of extraordinary power and wisdom, did not grasp at divine honours, but humbled himself to the performance of servile offices, and, in obedience to the will of his Father, submitted unto death, even the painful and ignominious death of the cross." (Pages 259, 260.)

I embrace the present opportunity of stating my views of this passage a little more fully than it seemed proper to do in a public discourse.

1. Mr. Yates' interpretation of "being *in the form of God*," is the same with that of Unitarians in general:—Jesus "resembled God in the possession of extraordinary power and wisdom." —"He did not *grasp at divine honours*," must mean, that he did not pervert the power with which he was endowed to the purpose of his own aggrandizement and glory; that he did not, that is contravene, in the exertion of that power, the end of his mission. This, then, proceeds on the supposition of the *possibility* at least of his having done otherwise;—on the supposition of divine power having been placed so entirely *at his discretion*, that he *might*, had he been so inclined, have used it for his own honour in opposition to the honour of him that sent him. Let this supposition, then, be fairly examined. We cannot allow it to be *qualified* by any *condition;* as of the Almighty *withdrawing* the communicated power, should any symptom have appeared of an impious inclination to pervert it. For in that case, it was *not* at his discretion, any more than at the discretion of other prophets. And if the supposition be not thus qualified, how gross is the absurdity which it involves!—the power of God placed at the discretion of a creature, who has it in his option, whether it shall be employed *for* the Divine purposes, or *against* them. The *possibility* of the *latter* is clearly involved in the Unitarian *hypothesis:* and if this be *hypothetically possible*, we are warranted, for argument's sake, to *suppose* it realized;—in which case, we shall have *a creature* wielding Almighty power against the Almighty;—the infinite God absolutely outwitted by the agent to whose discretion he has transferred his power!

2. Though "resembling God" "he did not esteem it a prey

to be as God." I have no particular objection to Mr. Yates' explanatory *supplement*,—" to be *honoured* as God."—" He approves of my translation ' to be *on an equality* with God,' and admires the remarks by which I have vindicated it :"—now certainly to be "*on an equality with God*" means, to be on an equality with him as to the *honour* and the homage due to him from his creatures.—But it will not be very easy to reconcile the sentiment that Christ "did not esteem it a prey to be *honoured as God*," with his own explicit declaration, " for the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son ; that all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father : he that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father that sent him ;" John v. 22, 23.—When Mr. Yates, indeed, quotes this passage, (page 239,) he accompanies it with this comment ; " that all men should honour the Son, *as* (that is, *because*) they honour the Father." But a Unitarian " *that is*" is not of sufficient authority to command immediate acquiescence, and to silence every suspicion that the original word (καθως) is to be understood in its more *direct* and *proper* meaning, which is, *in the same*,—or, *in like manner as* :—" *sicut*, *prout*, *velut*." Heder. Lex.

3. I think it appears from the frequency with which the Scripture speaks of Christ as *a servant*, receiving and executing a commission, &c. that his taking upon him " the *form of a servant*," means, agreeably to this prevailing phraseology of Scripture, his voluntarily assuming this relation to the Father,—his actually *becoming a servant*—appearing among men in this character or capacity : in which case " *the form of God*" must have a corresponding signification, and mean his existing in the character or capacity of Deity. This view receives further confirmation from the other phrase here used, " he was made in *the likeness* of men," which very obviously means his becoming in reality a man. Compare Rom. viii. 4.

4. It is sufficiently clear that his " being" (or *subsisting*, υπαρχων) " *in the form of God*" stands here in contrast with his " taking, or assuming, the *form of a servant*." He subsisted, then, " in the form of God," *previously* to his assuming " the

form of a servant." When, then, did he assume the form of a servant? If he was a mere man, it is not easy to say either when or how. Indeed, if he was a mere man, or a mere creature, however exalted, it is difficult to conceive how he could at all, with propriety, be said to assume the form of a servant. No creature can properly be said to assume, or take upon himself, the station, or work, which the supreme God is pleased expressly to assign to him. But if he subsisted previously as God, he took the form of a servant when he "*was made in the likeness of men*," and came to accomplish *a work given him to do*.

5. In admitting that ἴσα θεῷ means "*on an equality with God*," Mr. Yates dissents from the more common Unitarian interpretation, which makes this phrase correspond to μορφῇ Θεου, and both to signify *resemblance* to God, viz. in the possession of miraculous powers: "Who, being in the form of God, did not eagerly grasp at the resemblance to God." Improved Version. The explanation in the notes is, "Who, being invested with extraordinary miraculous powers, did not make an ostentatious display of these powers: or, if the second clause should be translated, with the public version, 'he thought it not robbery to be as God' the sense would be, he did not regard it as an act of injustice to exert upon proper occasions his miraculous powers." Such an *exposition* sufficiently *exposes itself*. Mr. Yates does not adopt it; and my present business is with him. He interprets indeed, "*being in the form of God*," as signifying that Jesus resembled God in the possession of miraculous powers; but the subsequent clause he explains of his not founding upon these powers a claim to equality with God; his not, as he expresses it, grasping at Divine honours."

6. No instance has yet been produced of the original word ἁρπαγμος signifying *a prey, or a spoil*. The only instance I have heard of being ever insisted on as parallel, is one, not of ἁρπαγμος, but of ἁρπαγμα. And, however similar the words may appear, the precise difference between them is, as every Greek scholar knows, that the latter signifies *a prey*, or *plunder*, the former the *act of preying*, or *plundering*. "'Αρπαγμα, quod raptum est, rapina præda rapta.—'Αρπαγμος, ipsa rapiendi actio, raptus." He-

der. Lex. The French translation seems to me to convey the true sense :—"Lequel étant en forme de Dieu, n' a point regardé (comme) *une usurpation* d' être égal à Dieu :"—" Did not account it *an act of usurpation* to be equal with God."

It has been objected that αλλα, rendered "*but*," denotes opposition between the ideas expressed in the two clauses which it separates; and that such a construction as "he possessed equality with God," *but* "emptied himself," or "made himself of no reputation," is unnatural and imperfect; whereas "he did not esteem it a prey to be as God,"—" he did not grasp at divine honours," expresses something which he *might have done*, and *did not*, which is naturally and properly opposed, by the word *but*, to what he *actually did*. "He did not grasp at divine honours, *but*" on the contrary—"divested himself," &c. The answer to this is obvious and simple. The word αλλα, rendered *but*, has not unfrequently the signification of *yet;* and it has this meaning, it would appear, oftener in the writings of Paul than in any other parts of the New Testament :—" ΑΛΛΑ. Conjunctio, tam inter *copulativas* quam inter adversativas a grammaticis numerata :—" 7. *tamen, sed tamen.* John xvi. 20. 1 Cor. iv. 15 : viii. 6 : ix. 2, 12 : 2 Cor. xiii. 4. Col. ii. 5." &c. Schleusner. Understanding it in this sense here, the meaning is complete, and the construction natural :—" Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; *yet* made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant :" i. e. *although* possessing the high dignity of *equal honour* with God, he, *notwithstanding*, divested himself of it, assuming the form of a servant."

8. It has been further objected, that if the two clauses, translated "*being in the form of God*," and "*thought it not robbery to be equal with God*," (εν μορφῃ Θεου ὑπαρχων, and ȣχ ἁρπαγμον ἡγησατο το ειναι ισα Θεῳ,) had been *both* intended to express the *previous dignity* of Christ, the construction would have been different; that instead of ὁς εν μορφῃ Θεου ὑπαρχων, ουχ ἁρπαγμον ἡγησατο το ισα ειναι Θεῳ, αλλα εκενωσεν ἑαυτον· we should have had, ὁς εν μορφῃ Θεου ὑπαρχων, και ουχ ἡγησαμενος ἁρπαγμον το ισα ειναι Θεῳ, εκενωσεν ἑαυτον· or, in English, instead of "Who, being in the form of God,

thought it not robbery to be equal with God; yet divested himself," &c. we should have had, "Who, being in the form of God, and not thinking it robbery to be equal with God, divested himself," &c. The objection has been sanctioned by some Trinitarian critics: "The error of the common version seems to have arisen from the translators considering the *whole* sixth verse as the catascue of the protasis in the fifth; a construction which would have required a copulative, and a second participle; thus, και ουχ αρπαγμον ηγησαμενος κ. τ. λ. To any one who impartially considers the words, it will appear evident, that the catascue lies in the words εν μορφη Θεου υπαρχων, and that the apodosis then immediately commences."* At the hazard of being charged with partiality, I must say, that I see no sufficient ground for this criticism. We may fancy that the construction proposed to be substituted for the common one would be more *elegant*, perhaps more *customary;* but to affirm that it is *required*, is too much. If αλλα be rendered "*yet*," the ordinary contruction appears to me to be perfectly consistent with Greek idiom; and what is more, to bring out, with greater force and emphasis, the sentiment of the apostle, than the other: because, by the use of a particle, expressly employed for the purpose, it fixes the notice of the reader more forcibly to the act of gracious condescension, which it is the special object of the apostle to recommend to attention and to imitation.

Let the English reader compare the two in his own language:—"Who being in the form of God, and not accounting it robbery to be equal with God, made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant:"—"Who, being in the form of God, did not account it robbery to be equal with God; yet made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant."—Although the sentiment expressed in both these sentences is the same, does not the particle "*yet*" in the latter, fasten the attention of the mind more forcibly on the idea of *transition* from one state to another, and the gracious condescension therein displayed?

9. The following (which is nearly the same with that given by Mr. Nares) appears to be a literal version of the original

* Eccl. Rev. Vol. V. Part I. p. 336.

words :—" Who, subsisting in the form of God, did not reckon it robbery to be on an equality with God; yet emptied himself, assuming the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men :—and, having been found in fashion as a man, humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."—In which description, the following things are expressed :—1st. The previous divine dignity of Jesus—" who, subsisting in the form of God, did not reckon it robbery to be on an equality with God :"—2dly. His voluntary *exinanition*, as divines have sometimes styled it—" yet emptied himself :"—3dly. A statement of that wherein this *emptying* consisted—" he emptied himself, assuming the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men :—4thly. His voluntary humiliation of himself, *after* assuming the form of a servant, and being made in the likeness of men :"—" having been found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself :"—And lastly, wherein *this* humiliation consisted, " he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."*

10. Nothing is easier than to slur over difficulties by means of a *paraphrase*, conceived in such general terms as to elude them. This Mr. Yates has, in the present instance, notoriously done. A pharaphrase, such as he has given, has a very imposing effect on the minds of careless readers. They see a sentiment, neatly expressed, and to all appearance tolerably appropriate to the apostle's purpose; and they think it does vastly well. But every *considerate* reader will observe, how much of what the apostle says is entirely omitted in the paraphrase, and how completely the *point* of his phraseology is blunted, and all the difficulty which it presents to the Unitarian system thus easily and pleasantly evaded.

* The original words are,—Ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν, γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ. I am *inclined* to think, that our English word *capacity*, in its signification of " state, condition, character," expresses what the apostle meant here by μορφὴ. It would be reckoned too bold, however, to substitute it for "*form*" in a translation.

11. The truth is, this passage, like many others, affords a striking illustration of the unexampled and arbitrary manner in which words and phrases are treated by Unitarians.—I do not refer to their rendering "οὐχ ἡγήσατο ἁρπαγμον," *he did esteem it a prey;*" for this is the phrase in their translation, for which most at least may be said. But what shall we say of "*being made in the likeness of men*," signifying his being made, not in the likeness of the *human race*, or *kind*, but his being made in the likeness of *common and ordinary mortals?* and then, "being found *in fashion as a man*," must be understood in the same manner.

The language used respecting *Samson*, is commonly referred to by Unitarians as supporting this interpretation. The following is the note of the "Improved Version," on the phrase "in the likeness of men:" "Of common and ordinary mortals. See Mr. Lindsey, ibid. Christ, invested with miraculous powers, was in the form of God; but, declining to use them for his own personal advantage, he appeared like any other frail and weak mortal. So Judges xvi. 7. Sampson says, 'If they bind me, I shall be weak, and be as a man;' i. e. as our translators very properly supply the word, 'as *another* man.'" I should not think this worthy of serious notice, except as a farther exemplification, not only of the slenderness, but the unfairness, of the shifts of Unitarian criticism. In the passage referred to, Samson says, "Then shall I be weak, and shall be כאחד האדם;" which may either simply signify, "as *one of mankind;*" or it may be understood with an emphasis—"AS ONE MAN,"—of which the meaning will be sufficiently plain. The Philistines had found to their cost, that, while possessed of his extraordinary power, he was *ipse agmen;* the might of a numerous host being concentrated in his single arm. But when that forsook him, he became as *a single man.* The expression is the same in verse 11th; and in the 17th verse it is varied. He there says, "I shall become weak, and shall be ככל האדם, "as *any* man," or "as *every* man," or "as *all men.*" The criticism, then, is unfair." But besides this—in what way was it that Samson became as other men? It was by the loss of that in which he

had before excelled other men; by the loss of his supernatural strength; by his "becoming weak." But when did Jesus become as other men in *this* way? He was "in the form of God," say the Unitarians, by the possession of miraculous powers. Was he, then, "made in the likeness of men" by being divested of these powers? This alone could assimilate his case to that of Samson. Yet when was he thus divested of his power?—or when did he voluntarily resign it? Never, certainly.—But he did not "use it for his own personal advantage." Of the *supposition* involved in this of the possibility of his having done otherwise, enough has been said formerly. I have now only to ask the reader, if he thinks it a simple and reasonable interpretation, according to which "being *made in the likeness of men*," and "*found in fashion as a man*," are the phrases used to signify that he *did not employ his miraculous powers to his own personal advantage?* I suppose Mr. Yates was not very well satisfied with this sort of interpretation, the one generally adopted by his brethren; for in his paraphrase he has taken the easier method of omitting the phrases altogether.

12. Notwithstanding all that Mr. Yates has said, my concluding objection against the Unitarian exposition, "*he did not esteem it a prey to be as God*," seems to me to remain in full force; namely, the absurdity of supposing it to be held up as "the peculiar subject of our admiration and astonishment—the example which, of all examples, we are most sedulously to imitate,—that a creature, a man, possessing, by Divine communication, a singular portion of miraculous power and wisdom, did not pervert these high endowments to his own selfish ends! that he was not guilty of the most heaven-daring presumption and impiety! that he absolutely did not so abuse the gifts bestowed upon him, as to enter into a kind of competition for glory with that Supreme Being from whom he derived his wisdom and his power! *Is* this," I have asked,—"*can* this *be*—the singular virtue, which we are called to admire and to imitate, as the brightest model of excellence that ever was exhibited on earth?" Mr. Yates pronounces this one of the *flimsiest* objections in my volume; and is farther pleased to characterize it as "*idle rant*." He represents

it as founded on a partial view of the text: "St. Paul," says he, "in order to give a lively representation of the benevolent condescension of Christ, draws *a contrast* between the conduct which one of his transcendent power and dignity might have adopted, (ver. 6.) and the humble conduct which Jesus did adopt, (ver. 7, 8.) Mr. Wardlaw takes one clause of the sentence, viz. the 6th verse, apart from the rest; and, thus confining the attention of his readers to the former part of the contrast, he asks—'Is it then to be the peculiar subject of admiration and astonishment, &c.;'" and after quoting a part of what I have cited above, he adds: "thus he runs on to the bottom of the page; and I doubt not that many of his thoughtless readers, who prefer this idle rant to the simplicity that is in Christ, will acclaim to his criticisms. But to perceive their extreme futility, it is only necessary to read the sentence *throughout*, so as to bring into notice the *contrast*, which it describes with beautiful and simple eloquence." Pages 260, 261.

Well: the apostle, it seems, in this passage *contrasts* what Jesus *might have done*, but *did not*, with that which he *actually did*. And what was the line of conduct which "one of his transcendent power and dignity *might have adopted*," but which Jesus did *not* adopt? Mr. Yates tells us in his paraphrase: "he did not *grasp at divine honours*." Is not this, then, *a part* at least of the wonderful example of "benevolent condescension" recommended to imitation? that he did *not* thus "grasp at divine honours?" that he did *not* advance a claim to *equality with God?*" that he did *not* prostitute the highest gifts of Heaven—gifts never conferred on another besides himself—by making them the foundation of a blasphemous requisition for himself of the honours peculiar to Deity?—that he did *not*, like another Devil, and a worse one than the first, announce himself on a level with the Most High, set himself at the head of a new rebellion, and, by turning communicated omnipotence—(for what power short of omnipotence could accomplish the works which he wrought?)—by turning communicated omnipotence against the God that had committed it to his discretion, impiously attempt to "divide heaven against itself?" This, it seems, is the *nega-*

tive part of Christ's example. This is what he *might have done*, and *did not do*. I have fallen into a little more "rant:" whether it be "idle" or not, the reader must judge. But I must say more. *Is it true* that Jesus did *not* thus claim *equality with God?* Let us not forget, that, if he was a mere creature, to have done so would have been the very acmè of impiety—the extreme point of wickedness, beyond which we cannot conceive a creature to go. Yet my views lead me to the conviction, that, if Jesus was a mere human prophet, it will be no easy matter to clear him of this fearful imputation. By Unitarians themselves, it cannot be questioned, that, on different occasions, as has before been remarked, he used expressions respecting himself, which led his hearers to pronounce him guilty of the blasphemy of "*making himself equal with God*," and of, "though a man, *making himself God*." And as little can it be questioned, that, in whatever way his replies may be explained, he never did use language (easy as it would have been for him to do so) that *fairly took off this impression from their minds:* although, if he was no more than "a holy man of God," "his soul and all that was within him" must have been stirred up by the charge to indignant grief, and unutterable loathing. It is to my mind an additional ground of conviction, that the Unitarian rendering—"*he did not esteem it a prey to be as God*," is not a just one; that it does not appear to be *consistent with fact*.

13. "It must be remembered also," adds Mr. Yates (page 261.) "that Mr. Wardlaw's charge of 'unnatural and vapid tameness' fixes itself upon the inspired apostle, and not upon those who give the exact translation, and only admissible meaning of his words?"

Here, again, is the favourite style of *petitio*. It is modestly *assumed*, that the Unitarians give "the exact translation, and only admissible exposition of the apostle's words." But the truth of the case is, that the "charge of unnatural and vapid tameness" does *not* fix itself on the apostle; but forms one (and a strong one too) of the collateral evidences, that the Unitarian version is *not* the exact translation, and is *not* the only admissible exposition of his words.

In the first of my discourses on the Divinity of Christ, I dwelt at some length on certain *general considerations*, in which his divine dignity is evidently and strongly *implied;* certain views, which, on any other supposition, are utterly bereft of all their force and propriety, and appear altogether unnatural and unaccountable." (Page 45.) These were—1. The view given in the Scriptures of the love of God, as displayed in the mission, or gift, of Jesus Christ:—2. The representations given in the New Testament of the astonishing condescension and love of the Lord Jesus Christ himself:—3. The depth of interest, the warmth of admiring transport and adoring gratitude, with which the contemplation of this subject inspired the hearts of the New Testament writers:—4. The account given in the New Testament of the exaltation of Jesus at the right hand of God:—5. The high claims of Jesus on the love and obedience of all his followers. These views Mr. Yates has left to the close, and has despatched them with sufficient brevity, and in a manner not likely, I think, to take off much of their impression from the mind of the considerate reader. "Although such arguments as these," he says, "in the way in which Mr. Wardlaw has illustrated them, afford a fine field for eloquent declamation, and are well adapted to excite the wonder, applause, and sympathy, of a listening crowd, they are altogether out of place in a work of scriptural investigation." (Page 261.)—If the declamation referred to has in it *any* portion of *eloquence*, I am fully satisfied it has more of *argument*. There is such a thing as *argumentative declamation;* and it seemed to me the only suitable style for proofs of the kind in question. Why such proofs should be condemned as "altogether out of place in a work of scriptural investigation," I have yet to learn. In such a work, we are surely intitled to take up the representations of things which the Scriptures give us, and to contemplate them in their manifest tendency and design. If the representations now under review were not designed to stir up into exercise the warmest feelings of the soul; if they were not designed to make "our hearts burn within us;" then the writers have shown wonderful ignorance of the constitution of the human mind, and have, besides, most unhappily caught a flame them-

selves which it was not at all their intention to communicate to others. "While *they* muse, the fire burns, and then they speak with their tongues." But in *our* musings on the same topics, we must be all jealous of the least approach to warmth, and must handle them with all the icy coldness of speculative argumentation. I am dissatified with Mr. Yates for uniformly associating, in his statements on this subject, "*fancy*, and *feeling*." That the "sallies of *fancy* should be checked," that "*imagination's* airy wing" should be "repressed," is perfectly right. But there is a wide difference between repressing flighty fancy, and repressing legitimate feeling; between checking the aërial rovings of mere imagination, and checking the just emotions of "wonder, love, and praise." But where lies the charge of *fancy?* I have given the representations of Scripture in Scripture language. The fancy, then, must be found in the interpretation and application of that language. But on this, the reader must be left to decide. May I be permitted to entreat his renewed attention to this part of the argument in my Discourses. I frankly avow, that if there be one part of my volume towards which I feel a greater partiality than another, it is the illustration of these general considerations, (Pages 45—55. I reckon the argument which they contain, in itself sufficient, I had almost said to decide the question; at any rate sufficient to communicate the very highest degree of previous verisimilitude to all the more direct proofs which follow. If the *feeling* which these illustrations breathe shall be thought by any to be more than the case will justify, I have to say for myself, that, so far from being satisfied of this, I only lament its disproportionate inferiority. I am quite aware, that the warmth will be deemed excessive by all within the polar circle of Socinianism: where the inhabitants love to shiver amidst their eternal snows, and where all is apprehension and alarm when the thermometer of devotional feeling threatens to rise above the point of freezing. I am satisfied, that the religious affections should have their origin in an enlightened understanding. *Enthusiasm* is *heat without light;* or the movement of the passions in a degree disproportionate to the illumination of the mind, or to the

magnitude of the subject it contemplates. But, at the same time, I know not what religion is, without feeling; and the question now is, are the representations given in those "general considerations" against which Mr. Yates has thought good to enter his *decided protest*,"—*scriptural*? If they are, they are not in their nature calculated to move, and to move powerfully, the affections and passions of the human soul? Did not the contemplation of them produce this effect upon the writers themselves? Have not *they* given indulgence to the emotions of a glowing heart, in communicating to others the truths which so "effectually wrought" in their own bosoms? And was it not their intention, or rather the intention of the Holy Spirit, under whose influence they wrote, that their readers should not merely perceive their meaning in the truths which they expressed, but catch the same holy ardour which these truths kindled within them while they wrote? If so, why are such "general considerations" to be proscribed, as "*altogether out of place in a work of scriptural investigation?*" Is it not a presumption against any system, that its advocates appear so jealous of emotions which the sacred writers themselves indulged? that the views which they entertain of the same points, instead of kindling the fervour of devotional feeling, serve rather to "freeze the genial current of the soul," and oblige them to exert all their ingenuity, in finding out plausible reasons for their anti-devotional coolness, and the phlegmatic temperament of their boasted *rationality?*

After entering his protest against the method of arguing in question, and observing, that "if the deity of Christ be not taught in *explicit terms*, mere *general considerations* can be of no avail to prove it," Mr. Yates adds a few other remarks, "in reply to this part of Mr. Wardlaw's publication."

These, however, are very brief. They are, in a great measure, confined to the *first* of the *five* general considerations. And I really do not think it very necessary, to spend the time and try the patience of my readers by proving it unscriptural, in estimating the love of God manifested in the mission of Christ, to leave out of account the *original dignity of the person sent*, and to confine our thoughts to "the merciful and beneficent *ends* to be

accomplished in sending him;" especially when we consider, how these ends are reduced and lowered by the system of Unitarian exposition. Neither do I feel it needful, to show at any length how entirely unsatisfactory it is, to account for the attachment of the primitive Christians to their crucified Master, and for all its glowing and practical expressions, by comparing it to the veneration displayed, in subsequent times, to the memory of the martyrs. Whence sprung that veneration? Did it not arise from the relation of these holy men to Jesus Christ, the great object of Christian gratitude, and from the invincible love which they shewed to him, by enduring tortures and sacrificing their lives in his cause? The martyrs themselves, and those who venerated their memories, viewed HIM in a higher character than that of a mere fellow martyr, who had evinced his sincerity, by submitting to death rather than retract his testimony. *His* blood was the blood of atonement; of the great expiatory sacrifice; of "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." And it was faith in *his* blood, as an accepted propitiation, that sustained the martyrs, while they nobly suffered their own to be shed; parting cheerfully with life, even when the death which deprived them of it was inflicted by excruciating agonies, because the haters of their Master would not suffer them to retain it, except on the condition of renouncing his cross, and forswearing their fealty to his name. Mr. Yates is of opinion that the respect and veneration shown to the memories of the martyrs was the same *in kind* with that shown by the apostles and early Christians to the name and memory of Jesus, only *lower in degree;* that Jesus was viewed by them simply as a martyr of a higher order; the principal difference being, that he was the "*author*" (i. e. the *first* messenger to mankind) of that doctrine, for their adherence to which the subsequent martyrs bled. But no. Could these holy men have been made sensible that the veneration paid to them rested on similar grounds with that paid to their blessed Redeemer and Lord, it would have stirred their very bones in the graves at which their votaries assembled. Regard to the memories of these witnesses to the truth, degenerated into a superstitious, idolatrous, and nonsensical veneration for broken pieces of

stone and wood, for sacred dust and "canonized bones," and all the holy relics of martyrology. While we would avoid this stupid extreme, we should also deprecate running into its opposite. Not to revere the names of those who have bled for Christ, who "have not counted their lives dear unto themselves;" not to consecrate them in our memories, and embalm them in the affections of our hearts, were surely to forfeit every claim to Christian sensibility. But still, this reverence must be different, not only in *degree*, but in *kind*, from the reverence which we feel and cherish towards the name of that Redeemer, whose body was broken and whose blood was shed for us. When we take our seats at his table, do we "*remember him*" merely as the great *proto-martyr* in the cause of Christian truth? Is he not brought before our contemplation in a more sublime and peculiar character? as atoning on the cross for the sins of a guilty world? Yes; and it was this view of the cross that animated the martyrs themselves in the trial of fire, and the baptism of blood. It was the remembrance of *his* "cup of trembling" that took the bitterness out of theirs. It was his sprinkled blood that allayed the fury of the devouring flames. It was "peace with God through Jesus Christ our Lord;" it was acceptance through the merits of his obedience and sacrifice, that elevated their souls to all the triumph of hope, at the cross, the gibbet, and the stake. Shall we honour, then, with the same *kind* of veneration, the Saviour and the saved? the believer and the object of his faith? the martyr and the martyr's Lord? the expiring saint, and the living Redeemer to whom he commends his departing spirit? No: the glory of Christ is his own, and can never be shared with an other. In contemplating the cruel deaths of the martyrs, we admire the firmness of faith, the fervour of love, and the sublimity of self-devotion; but still we say, and we are animated by their example to say, "God forbid that we should GLORY, save in THE CROSS OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST!" We revere the names of the martyrs; but there is "ONE NAME alone, under heaven, given among men, by which we must be saved."—At the stake of the martyr we view, with wondering interest, the energy of holy principle, and breathe a prayer for the mantle of Elijah; but at the cross of

Christ, we smite upon our breasts, and say, "God be propitious to me a sinner!" We are abased to dust, and elevated to hope; we trust and we adore.

I shall finish this part of my reply, with an observation or two in vindication of the statement and reasoning contained in one of my Notes, (K.) relative to the rejection by Unitarians of the introductory chapters of the Gospel of Matthew on the authority of the Ebionites. I am the more disposed to do this, from the circumstance that Mr. Brown, in his Strictures, has expressed his opinion that to the charge of having misrepresented Mr. Belsham, I must, so far as he sees, plead guilty. Mr. Brown, however, having subsequently read Mr. Belsham's tract, so far qualifies this opinion in a note that I persuade myself the following brief remarks will at once satisfy him, that I have been guilty of no misrepresentation of Mr. Belsham, but have supported plain truth by conclusive reasoning.

"The editors of the 'Improved version,'" says Mr. Yates, have expressed strong doubts, whether the account of the conception, birth, and childhood of Christ, (Matth. i. 17—ii.) be a genuine portion of St. Matthew's Gospel. Among other arguments, they bring forward this consideration, that the whole passage was wanting in the copies used by the Ebionites, or ancient Hebrew Christians. Dr. Magee replies, that the Ebionites also rejected the three last Gospels and the Epistles of Paul; and that, if the Editors of the 'Improved Version' attribute any weight to their evidence concerning the passage in question, they 'ought to receive their testimony throughout,' and reject all the New Testament except St. Matthew.' Mr. Belsham answers (Address, p. 8, 9.) that it may be perfectly proper to pay regard to the testimony of the Ebionites when it concurs with other facts and probabilities, although their evidence ought to be decidedly rejected, when it is disproved by clear and certain considerations of an opposite tendency; just as we assent without hesitation to Livy's account of the battle of Cannæ, which is confirmed by other historians, although we utterly disbelieve the assertion of the same author that an ox spoke, because this story is unsupported by any concurring evidence. Thus Mr. Bel-

sham argues from a comparison of the testimony of Livy with the Testimony of *the Ebionites*. Mr. Wardlaw (Note K.) represents him as comparing Livy with *St. Matthew*. Although Mr. Belsham's tract contains no such words and no such sentiment, Mr. Wardlaw introduces the following passage, among others correctly cited, in the form of a quotation from that pamphlet; 'The Evangelist Matthew relates that Jesus of Nazareth died on a cross, and I believe him. The same Evangelist Matthew relates that Jesus of Nazareth was born of a virgin; and I believe him not.' This account of the argument is accompanied with charges against Mr. Belsham, of 'bitterness and violence,' 'the most evasive sophistry,' 'obvious and flagrant inconsistency,' 'slily shifting his ground,' 'levity and impiety,' 'parade and unwarrantable presumption.' Upon such grounds, and in such language, has Mr. Wardlaw undertaken to censure a man, who is greatly his superior in years, in talents, in learning, and in celebrity; who, in his lucid and vigorous writings, though he appears admirably qualified to repress blustering bigotry and presuming ignorance, always respects sincerity of intention and a good moral character; and who is, in the highest degree, estimable, for the urbanity of his manners, the integrity of his principles, and the candour and benevolence of his heart." Pages 267, 268.

How, then, stands the case?

1st. Mr. Belsham, like most other Unitarians, professes to reject these chapters *on the authority of the Ebionites*. But these same Ebionites rejected the three other Gospels, and the Epistles of Paul, which, notwithstanding, Mr. Belsham retains. 2dly. It is *not*, then, simply the authority of the Ebionites that is the ground of the rejection of the chapters in question; for this authority, *taken by itself*, is not stronger against these chapters, than against the other repudiated parts of the New Testament. It must be something else. 3dly. And so Mr. Belsham tells us it is:—"In the one case," says he, "I see reason to concur with them, and in the other to differ from them; and I believe that I have good grounds for the discrimination." So also Mr. Yates: "Mr. Belsham answers, that it may be perfectly proper to pay regard

to the testimony of the Ebionites, when it concurs with other facts and probabilities, although their evidence ought to be decidedly rejected, when it is disproved by clear and certain considerations of an opposite tendency." What, then, are these "*reasons*"—these "*good grounds*,"—these "*other facts and probabilities?*" What, in short, is the *something else* that gives the decisive preponderance to the authority of the Ebionites in the one case, and which nullifies that authority in the other? Is there any *other authority*, in this instance, concurring with that of the Ebionites? No; all manuscripts and versions extant, all *critical authority* whatsoever, is on the other side. What, then, is this something? Mr. Belsham *disbelieves* the testimony of Livy when he relates that an ox spoke; and he *disbelieves* the authority of *the Ebionites* when they reject the Gospels of Mark, Luke and John: he *believes* Livy, when he relates the battle of Cannæ; and he *believes* the Ebionites, when they reject the introductory chapters of Matthew. Are these, then, really the points of his comparison? Is the rejection by the Ebionites of the three last Gospels and Paul's Epistles, the unnatural and incredible *prodigy?*—and their rejection of the introductory chapters of the first Gospel the natural and credible *historical fact?* That will never do. What is there that is prodigious or miraculous in the mere fact of the Ebionites discarding the three Gospels and Paul's Epistles, any more than in their discarding the introductory chapters of Matthew? There is no kind of historical or critical evidence for the genuineness of the former, that does not exist, in the same extent, for the genuineness of the latter. Where, then, is the *monstrum horrendum* to be found, which Mr. Belsham places on a level with the *speaking ox?* Will Mr. Belsham deny, or Mr. Yates for him, that when he introduced Livy's speaking ox, he had in his eye, as its parallel, the *prodigy* of *the incarnation;* and that he considered both as alike deserving of instantaneous and unhesitating rejection?—that the *mysterious*, and consequently, *obnoxious*, *nature of the contents of the chapters themselves*, is the real reason why he thinks fit to concur with the Ebionites in their rejection of them? But if it be so, then it is *not true*, that Mr. Belsham "argues from a comparison of the testimony of

Livy with the testimony of *the Ebionites*." There is no *prodigy* in the testimony of the Ebionites. The prodigy is in Matthew's narrative. And the language used by Mr. Belsham, clearly shows, that his comparison is between Livy and Matthew. He says, "only let him permit us to exercise a little common sense in judging of a report, and discriminate what is worthy of belief from what appears to be incredible in the works of the same author." Were the *Ebionites* AUTHORS? In short, nothing will convince me that I have done Mr. Belsham wrong in the note referred to, but his own explicit declaration, that when he introduced Livy's speaking ox, he had not at all in his mind the story of the incarnation, or miraculous conception, as the ground of his concurrence with the Ebionites, in rejecting from the Canon the introductory chapters of Matthew's Gospel.

But, according to Mr. Yates, I have, on this subject, been guilty of a crime for which, were the charge well founded, I should deserve to be "gibbeted in irons," as a warning and a terror to future controvertists, "to deter them from committing the like crime in all time coming." The crime is, in plain English, *forgery*; endeavouring to pass upon the public as Mr. Belsham's what Mr. Belsham never wrote. "Although Mr. Belsham's Tract," says he, "contains no such words, and no such sentiment, Mr. Wardlaw introduces the following passage among others correctly cited, in the form of a quotation from that pamphlet: 'The Evangelist Matthew relates, that Jesus of Nazareth died on a cross; and I believe him. The same Evangelist Matthew relates that Jesus of Nazareth was born of a virgin; and I believe him not.'" Did Mr. Yates seriously think, that I designed to represent these words as a quotation from Mr. Belsham's pamphlet? Did he indeed reckon me capable of such base artifice? of such atrocious villany? I cannot call it by a better name. In point of *principle*, or rather of *want of principle*, it is just as criminal to attempt to pass a *sentiment* as another's when we know we have made it for him, as to pass a *promissory note* as another's, when we know we have made it for him. I feel when I think of such a charge, certain inward risings of the pride of indignant scorn, which a disciple of Jesus should rather seek to re-

press.—Mr. Yates might have perceived, that the *quotations*, in the same note, are all printed with inverted commas *down the margin of the page*, while the words in question have such commas *only at the beginning and end.* These marks were used, merely to distinguish the words from the rest of the page, as being something *supposed to be said.* The manner in which they are introduced, as a parallel to Mr. Belsham's own words about Livy, might have shown this to any man of ordinary judgment or ordinary ingenuousness :—The *connexion* in the note is as follows: "From its being recorded in Livy's history that *an ox spoke*, he (Mr. Belsham) never thinks of inferring *that this passage was not written by Livy himself.* No; he only says: 'Livy relates, that Hannibal crossed the Alps, and beat the Romans at Cannæ; and *I believe him.* The same Livy relates that an ox spoke; but *I believe him not.*' Very well. We have no objection to his saying, provided he does not insist that *our* faith shall be regulated by *his.* 'The Evangelist Matthew relates, that Jesus of Nazareth died on a cross; and I believe him. The same Evangelist Matthew relates, that Jesus of Nazareth was born of a virgin; but I believe him not.'—Let this writer, by all means, 'exercise a little common sense in judging of a report, and discriminate what is worthy of belief from what appears to be incredible *in the works of the same author.*' But let him not, wherever he finds any thing which *he* may be pleased to deem incredible, unwarrantably and presumptuously conclude, that *it forms no part of what the author wrote.*"—Now, did Mr. Yates not perceive that the words which he has represented me as endeavouring to pass for Mr. Belsham's were merely hypothetical? If he did *not*, what had become of his *wits*? If he *did*, what had become of his *candour?* The absence of the latter I *must* believe to have been the defect, because I *cannot* believe that Mr. Yates really thought me guilty of the wretched and contemptible baseness he has imputed to me.—If ever I shall write again on the Unitarian controversy, which, however is not very likely to be the case, I shall certainly take better care both of my points of admiration, and my inverted commas.

PART III.

EXAMINATION OF THE MORE DIRECT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY MR. YATES, IN SUPPORT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF UNITARIANISM.

CHAPTER I.

AGREEABLY to the order I have prescribed to myself, I now go back to Part II. of Mr. Yates' Vindication, to consider the arguments which he there brings forward in support of Unitarian principles, relative to the unity of God and the subordination of Jesus Christ.

Before entering on the particular examination of these, it is of importance to observe, in general, that all evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible, that does not immediately relate to what are, strictly and properly, the *peculiarities* of Unitarianism,—the *precise points of difference*. To set about proving the *divine unity*, for example, is to do a service to *Trinitarians* as well as to *Unitarians*. It is an article of faith which is held by both; and the former will be as highly gratified as the latter, by the excellence and conclusiveness of the reasoning by which it is established. There may be some diversity of opinion respecting the degree of certainty with which the doctrine may be learned by the light of nature; but in the doctrine itself, that GOD IS ONE, as a doctrine fully certified by revelation, and according with every principle of enlightened reason, there is a perfect agreement. The harmony on this point between my opponent and myself, will most satisfactorily appear from a comparison of our respective language.—"But whatever may be the views we entertain, as to the extent of natural evidence in support of the unity of the Godhead; there can be no doubt, that this doctrine forms one of the first and fundamental truths of divine revelation.

It is, in many places of the inspired volume, distinctly and plainly affirmed; and it appears pervading the whole, as one of those great leading principles, to which it owes the peculiarity of its general complexion, and to which all the subordinate parts of the system bear a constant reference." Discourses, page 9. —"Notwithstanding the proof of the unity of God afforded by the harmonious correspondence of parts in the material creation, it is probable that this doctrine would have been unknown, or little regarded, if it had not been taught to mankind by the clear and authoritative voice of divine revelation. In almost every page of the Bible it shines with incomparable lustre. To reveal, establish, and propagate this tenet, to which, however sublime and rational, men have, in all ages, evinced a strong disinclination, was the great end proposed to be accomplished by the inspiration of the Hebrew prophets, and by the splendid series of miracles recorded in the Old Testament. To promulgate the same great truth among heathen nations, and ultimately to effect its universal reception in the world, appears to have been one of the principal purposes which God designed to answer by the mission of our Lord Jesus Christ." Vindication, page 65.—Whatever difference might arise between us upon an explanation of the terms of the last sentence, it is obvious, that in the sentiment that the unity of God is an important truth, and a leading doctrine of revelation, we are one. What, then, is the precise point at issue? It is simply this. Both parties hold the unity of God. But Trinitarians maintain that, according to the Scriptures, this unity is, in a way which is not explained, and which they do not therefore pretend to understand, consistent with *personal distinction*. Unitarians deny that any such distinction of persons is taught in the Scriptures. The point, therefore, which it behoves them to establish is, not *the unity of God*, but simply the inconsistency of this unity with the personal distinction for which Trinitarians contend; or, in other words, that this doctrine of personal distinction has no place in the word of God. All argument and discussion that are not confined to *this one point*, are entirely irrelevant to the question.

As evidence of the unity of God is not evidence of Unitarian-

ism, I shall pass by Mr. Yates' two chapters, "on the evidence for this doctrine from the light of nature, and from the testimony of the Scriptures," with a single remark: In the latter of these chapters, he says, (page 66.) "The word *God* does not denote a *collection* of persons, or a *council* of intelligent agents: it signifies simply *one* person, or intelligent agent. Consequently every text, which affirms that there is but one God, implies that there is but one person in the Godhead." But is this *argument?* Is it not just the old style of *petitio principii?* Does not the question still recur, What is the *kind of unity* which such texts affirm? Is it unity involving distinction, or is it not? If it can be proved that, according to the testimony of the Scriptures, there *is* a distinction in the divine unity, then it will follow that, so far from Mr. Yates' statement being just, every text which affirms the divine unity must be interpreted, in consistency with this doctrine, as meaning that God is *one* indeed—but one, *according to the peculiar modification of unity which belongs to Deity:* a unity, as it should seem from his own word, different from that which can be predicated of any of his creatures, and of which the precise nature is by us incomprehensible. Supposing this were established, (and it is just the point which it should have been Mr. Yates' business to disprove,) every text that affirms the unity of God will involve an affirmation of the Trinity; because, on this supposition, a unity involving a three fold personal distinction is THE *unity* which pertains to the Godhead. No other unity *can* belong to God, than that which *does* belong to him; and that which *does* belong to him must be essential to his nature. He cannot possibly be other than he is.

I pass on to the third chapter of Mr. Yates' Second Part, entitled "EVIDENCE THAT THE FATHER IS THE ONLY TRUE GOD."

Mr. Yates here proceeds on the *assumption* of his having made out, to the satisfaction of the reader, the doctrine of his former chapter: "Having thus shown," says he, "from the clear light of nature, confirmed by the ample testimony of revelation, that all created things were produced by the power, and are directed by the providence of one Infinite Mind, *or Person,*

I proceed to establish another distinguishing article of the Unitarian creed, viz. that this one person is the same, who is repeatedly called in Scripture THE FATHER, and consequently that THE FATHER IS THE ONLY TRUE GOD." Page 69.

Now, suppose it granted (and there are few Trinitarians, it is presumed, who will be disposed to question it) that the appellation " THE FATHER" is, in various instances, used, in the Scriptures, as a designation simply of THE DEITY, THE GODHEAD, THE ONE SUPREME. If Mr. Yates had previously established the point, that God is *one, without personal distinction*, then it would certainly have followed, that *the Father*, in all its occurrences, meant God in this, the Unitarian view of his nature. But *until* this point has been established, the mere employment of this appellation can be a proof of nothing;—because, when used as a designation of the ONE SUPREME, it may just as well signify the One Supreme, subsisting in *three* persons, as the One Supreme subsisting in *one* person:—that is, it may just as well mean GOD in the *Trinitarian*, as GOD in the *Unitarian*, view of his nature. In *this* view of the matter, Mr. Yates might have multiplied his *hundred* passages by another hundred, without having, after all, produced a single proof of his point. He would have proved abundantly, that " *the Father*" is an appellation of the One only God, the Supreme Deity; but he would not have proved at all, that in this One only God, the Supreme Deity, there existed no distinction of persons.

But further; in many, perhaps in by far the greater number, of the passages in which the appellation " *the Father*" occurs, it is an appellation of distinction from *the Son;* to whom there is either an expressed, or an obviously implied, reference. This is the case in a large proportion of Mr. Yates' *hundred texts*. To adduce such texts as proofs that the Father alone is God, to the exclusion of the Son, is the *easiest* no doubt, but hardly the most *satisfactory* way of settling the controversy—the way which we have found Mr. Yates so often adopting—that of taking for granted the thing to be proved. A text may be a proof that the Father is God, without being a proof at all that the Son is *not* God. But unless it be a proof of the latter position, it is nothing

to the purpose ;—it is a proof of what nobody disputes. Instances of *the Father* being an appellation of *the Supreme Divinity*, can never be proofs that *the Son* and *the Holy Spirit* are not essentially included in the Divinity so denominated :—and, on the other hand, instances of the designation *the Father*, used in express or implied distinction from the Son, may be proofs that the Father is God, but cannot be proofs that the Son is *not* God.

But I must go still a step further. While the hundred texts adduced, as they all belong to one *class* or *description*, all come under the same general observation ;—there are some of them which, I think, my opponent has been particularly unfortunate for himself in bringing forward to notice. There is nothing I should more earnestly desire, than the reader's attentive perusal of Mr. Yates' hundred texts. I shall select a few of the kind to which I refer.

The first on his list is Matth. xi. 27, with its parallel, Luke x. 22. " All things are delivered unto me of my Father ; and no man (more properly *no one*) knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any one the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." But, if Jesus was a mere human prophet, this is surely very singular and unaccountable language. The Father and the Son are here represented as having, reciprocally, a full and immediate knowledge of each other, of which *no one else* is possessed. The mode of expression leads us to conceive of the knowledge which the Father has of the Son, as being the same in kind and in degree with that which the Son has of the Father ; no full and immediate knowledge *of either* being possessed by any other being.— " The meaning is," say the Editors of the Improved Version, " that no one but the Father can fully comprehend the object and extent of the Son's commission ; and no one but the Son comprehends the counsels and designs of the Father with respect to the instruction and reformation of mankind." But why is the knowledge of the Father to be interpreted as meaning the knowledge of *a particular part of his counsels*, and not the knowledge of HIMSELF ? The *latter* is surely its most natural import, and it is supported by such parallel passages as John i. 18. " No man

hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him:"—John vi. 46. "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he who is of God, he hath seen the Father."* What was there, we may further ask, in the idea of a human prophet, commissioned to teach to mankind the certainty of a future state, and the necessity of a life of virtue to the attainment of happiness in that state, what was there in this idea that rendered it so peculiarly wonderful, so entirely above created conception; as incomprehensible by any besides Jehovah, as the nature of Jehovah himself? The difficulty here does not consist merely in this prophet placing *his* knowledge of *God* on an equality with *God's* knowledge of *him;* but in his representing *himself* and the *infinite Jehovah* as reciprocally, and equally, the objects of knowledge to each other, in a sense that excludes all other beings, on both sides alike, from any participation in it. Again:—the knowledge of the Son, ascribed to the Father, and the knowledge of the Father ascribed to the Son,

* "To *see the Father* refers not to a perception of the divine presence and glory. The external symbols and pledges of Jehovah's existence and favour were afforded to his servants from the beginning of the world. In this way he was seen by the patriarchs, by Moses, by the prophets, and by all the people of Israel in the wilderness at Sinai, &c. Nor does the phrase *to see the Father*, relate to the direct communications of the Divine mind and will to his servants. God, had 'at sundry times, and in divers manners, spoken in time past to the fathers by the prophets,' who were denominated *Seers*, on account of the discoveries with which they were favoured by the Almighty. The infallible Spirit of inspiration illuminated their minds; dictating to their faithful tongues and pens, as the living Oracles of God. In this sense, the apostles *saw God*, and revealed his mind, more fully than their Divine Master did by his personal ministry, John xvi. 12—15.—*To see God* must, therefore, here intend a contemplation of Deity in his own, immediate proper nature:—to see him in the direct mode of his infinite existence, as the eternal I AM:—to view him, independently of any medium of time, place, or creatures. Neither man, nor angel, nor any finite intelligence, ever did or can *thus see*, i. e. comprehend the unlimited essence of Jehovah; for 'who by searching can find out God? who can find out the Almighty unto perfection?' The Son of God sees the Father, and the Father sees and knows himself. This knowledge is essentially different from the knowledge of all creatures; and consequently must be the exclusive possession and prerogative of God. The Divine Being, though incomprehensible to all others, perfectly knows himself; and the Son claims reciprocal knowledge with the Father." See a paper signed 'Figlinus' in the Evangelical Magazine for May 1816.

are, by the comment of the improved Version, perfectly *identified.* To know "the counsels and designs of the Father respecting the instruction and reformation of mankind," is the very same thing, (especially on Unitarian principles as to the work of Christ) with knowing "the object and extent of the Son's commission."

John v. 23. "That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." Already noticed, pages 237, 238.

John xiv. 8—10. "Philip saith unto him, Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us. Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father? and how sayest thou, then, Show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works."

The words that Christ spoke were not "*of himself:*"—that is, what he taught was not of *his own* mind, or *his own authority* only. A part of his doctrine *related to himself;*—as, for example, in this very passage. But his testimony with regard to himself, it was obviously necessary, should have other attestations besides his own. *Whatever he was* himself, he must not be the *sole witness* of it. Compare John v. 31—37. To prove, accordingly, that the doctrine taught by him was not "*of himself,*" he appeals here, as he does in the passage just referred to, to his miracles, as wrought by the power of the Father—"The Father that dwelleth in me, HE doeth the works:"—that is, HE attests the doctrine to be *his;* and particularly, attests the truth of what Jesus, on this and on other occasions, affirms concerning himself. What, then, is it which he *does* affirm in this passage? that, in *knowing him,* they *knew the Father;* that, in *seeing him,* they *saw the Father. Knowing and seeing* do not here mean, *understanding what was taught concerning the Father.* For Philip's request, "*Show us the Father,*" did not express a desire to be *taught what God was,* but to be favoured with some peculiar manifestation of the divine glory, similar, perhaps, to those visions recorded in some parts of the Old Testament history. It is

to *this* request, that Jesus answers, "He that hath *seen* ME hath *seen* THE FATHER; and how sayest thou, then, *Show us the Father?*—And does not this answer imply, that there was in his character, as seen by them, something altogether above what mere human nature had ever exhibited?—an untainted purity, and a sublime elevation, such as *ought* to have impressed all their minds with the conviction of his being *more than man?* The language contains a reproof for their dulness of apprehension, and slowness of heart to believe. Of the character of Christ, I am satisfied, we can form but very inadequate conceptions. He was "the brightness of the Father's glory." The perfections of Deity were, in him, exhibited to the view of men, and especially of Philip and his fellow-disciples. And his character, according to the appeal which he here makes to them, bore upon it the *impress of divinity* in such a way, as to render them *without excuse* if they did not perceive and acknowledge it. They "beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father." What he adds here, "Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me; or else believe me on account of the works themselves," is the same with what he said to the Jews, John x. 38. in repelling from himself the charge of blasphemy; and we have seen that it was interpreted, and rightly interpreted, by them, as the same in import with the saying on which the charge was founded, "*I and my Father are one.*"

Gal. i. 1. "Paul an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father who raised him from the dead." Not more fortunate for Mr. Yates surely, than the texts already noticed:—for, while it is true that Jesus Christ is here distinguished from God the Father, it is no less true, that he is, in the same terms with God the Father, *distinguished from men.*

Gal. i. 3. "Grace be unto you, and peace, from God the Father, and from our Lord Jesus Christ"—is an instance of Christ being joined with the Father, as the object of supplication for spiritual blessings:—And of the same description are Eph. vi. 23. 2 Tim. i. 2. Tit. i. 4. 1 Cor. i. 3. 2 Cor. i. 2. Eph. i. 2. Phil. i. 2. Col. i. 2. 1 Tim. i. 1, 2. Philem. 3. 1 Thes. i. 1.

1 Thes. iii. 11. 2 Thes. i. 1, 2. In the last two passages, not only are spiritual blessings desired from the Lord Jesus Christ conjointly with God the Father; but the church is addressed as "IN" the Son, as well as "IN" the Father.

Such are a specimen of Mr. Yates' *hundred texts*. Let the reader judge, whether they are fitted to "impress every unprejudiced inquirer with the conviction that *the Father alone ought to be the God of Christians*." (Page 71.)—The passages he has collected, prove the Father to be the true God; but they do not at all prove that Jesus Christ is *not* the true God. So far from this, a number of them contain evidence of the contrary.

"The opinion of Unitarians upon this subject," adds Mr. Yates, "is further confirmed by all those passages which represent the Father *as the proper object of supreme worship*." P. 71. But who denies that "the Father is the proper object of supreme worship?" The question, the sole question, is, Is he the *only* proper object of such worship? We have before proved the contrary; and, until the texts adduced in evidence of the worship of THE SON are better answered than they have yet been, we must continue to *maintain* the contrary. It is rather with a bad grace, indeed, that such a remark is introduced by Mr. Yates, considering the nature of so many of those very texts to which he had just been referring the reader. That "the man Christ Jesus" worshipped the Father, what Trinitarian questions? In this, as in every thing else imitable by us, he "left us an example, that we should follow his steps;" an example which Mr. Yates, with great truth, represents the apostle Paul as imitating and recommending:—"In this respect, as in all others, the apostle Paul was a follower of Christ. To give thanks for all things *to the Father* was his practice, and his precept." But when he adds, "Thus we are authorized by the example and the commands of Jesus our Master, and of the apostle Paul, to consider the Father as the only proper object of supreme adoration; whence we conclude that he is the only God;" he has forgotten his logic. By inserting the word "ONLY," he has thrown into his conclusion a great deal more than is contained in his premises. We have formerly seen, (pages 220—228.) how clear the example of Paul is for the worship of the Saviour; and that one

of the instances of his practice Mr. Yates himself acknowledges he cannot explain to his own satisfaction.

But these hundred texts are preceded by two or three others, which are made to lead the van. They are centurions,—captains of the hundred; and they deserve to be so distinguished. Seriously, and without a figure, they rank among the most plausible of Unitarian evidences, and are entitled to some more particular consideration.

The first of them is 1 Cor. viii. 6. "*To us there is but one God, the Father.*" Mr. Yates quotes this little bit of the text, and satisfies himself with saying, "no language can be more explicit." Let us take the words in their connexion, and then consider what aspect they bear toward his system.—"As concerning, therefore, the eating of those things that are offered in sacrifice unto idols, we know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no other God but one. For though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be gods many and lords many,) yet to us there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." Verses 4—6.

I cannot content myself with standing merely *on the defensive* with regard to this passage; for I am satisfied that it not only *does not oppose* the divinity of Christ, but is *a strong testimony in its favour;* that the thrust aimed with this weapon may not only be *parried*, but the weapon itself wrested from the hand of the adversary, and its point fairly turned against himself. To show this, let the following series of observations be attended to.

1st. The subject of the apostle's reasoning is, the lawfulness of eating meats that had been offered in sacrifice to idols. And on this subject, he first of all admits, in verse 4th, the truth of what the abettors of the practice were disposed to urge in support of its lawfulness, that "an idol is nothing in the world, and *that there is no other God but one.*"

2dly. He goes on, in verse 5, to state this last proposition more at large. It is still the proposition "*that there is no other God but one,*" that he illustrates and affirms. In verse 4th, he

announces it in general terms; and then in verses 5th and 6th, proceeds to establish it. How then does he do this?

3dly. When he says, in verse 5th,—"though there be that are called gods whether in heaven or in earth, as there be gods many, and lords many," it is obvious, that the *gods many*, and *lords many*, are both included in the more general and comprehensive phrase, those "*called gods* whether in heaven or in earth." The same beings, or supposed beings, which he first calls by the single appellation "*gods*," he distributes under the two appellations of *gods* and *lords*. The *lords many*, then, belonged to the number of the *heathen deities*, as well as the *gods many*. He uses both appellations, that he may include them *all*; for by these two appellations the Jews were accustomed, in general, to denominate the divinities of the Gentile nations.

4thly. If this be the case, then, unless we would deprive the apostle's argument of all consistency, we must not consider him as excluding from the claims and honours of deity "*the one Lord Jesus Christ.*" The point to be proved was not, whether there were or were not various beings, of eminent power, in subordination to God; but whether there were any more than one only, that should receive divine homage and worship. He affirms that there is *one only*. But *how* does he affirm this? By opposing to the "gods many, and lords many" of the Gentiles, that is, as we have seen, to the *deities* of the Gentiles, to those "*called gods*, whether in heaven or in earth,"—by opposing to these, not "one God the Father" only, but "one God the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ." The proposition, therefore, "There is no other God but one," (which is the proposition to be established) must be considered as identified in the reasoning, not with the simple proposition "to us there is but one God the Father," but with the complex proposition, "to us there is one God the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ." The "one Lord Jesus Christ" is as directly opposed to the idol deities of the heathen as the "one God the Father," is.

5thly. When the apostle calls the Father, *God*, and Jesus Christ, *Lord*, he makes it, at the same instant, abundantly clear that he did not mean to be understood, as if either *Christ* was

not God, or the *Father not Lord*. For, in the very same exclusive terms in which he affirms there is "*one God the Father*," he also affirms, there is "*one Lord Jesus Christ*." The argument, therefore, which would exclude Jesus Christ from Deity, would equally exclude the Father from Lordship, or dominion. It would subject mankind, or Christians rather, to Jesus Christ *alone*, to the entire exclusion of the Father. There is no evading this consequence. It is vain to say, that Jesus Christ is *Lord in an inferior sense*. This will not do. The affirmation that there is "*one Lord Jesus Christ*," is just as explicit as the affirmation that there is *one God the Father*: and, if it is alleged that the Father is the *Supreme* Lord, and Jesus Christ Lord *by delegation*, then it is *not true* that to us there is but ONE *Lord*.

6thly. This view is confirmed by the language here used respecting the "one Lord Jesus Christ."—"To us there is but one God the Father, *of whom* are all things, and we *in him*; and one Lord Jesus Christ, *by whom* are all things, and we *by him*:" all things which are *of* the Father, are, in their utmost latitude, here affirmed to be *by* the Lord Jesus Christ; and that in the very same terms in which, elsewhere, all things are said to be *by* the Father. Rom. xi. 36. Heb. ii. 10, &c.

I conclude, therefore, in the words of an author before referred to, and from whom I have, in part, taken this argument: "Itaque hoc dictum divinitati Christi veræ non adversatur; sed multo magis eam commendat et confirmat: docetque simul, etsi dari debet, Patrem esse ἑνα θεον, ἐξ οὐ τα παντα, και ἡμεις εις αυτον, et Jesum Christum esse ἑνα κυριον δι' οὐ τα παντα, και ἡμεις δι' αυτου, unum tamen solummodo esse Deum; qui non multiplicatur, quanquam divinitatis jus et imperium his binis tribuitur." Royaard's Diatribe, &c. Page 182. "This text, then, is not in opposition to the proper deity of Jesus Christ; but rather, greatly favours and establishes it. Its doctrine is, that, admitting the Father to be the 'one God, of whom are all things, and we in him' (or rather, '*for* him') and Jesus Christ to be the 'one Lord, by whom are all things, and we by him,' yet there is one God only; who is not multiplied, although the claims and authority of Godhead are ascribed to both.'

A due attention to the observations made on this passage will leave little difficulty as to the next, Eph. iv. 4—6. where the apostle, in enumerating the bonds of Christian unity, says, among other things,—"there is *one Lord*," and "*one God and Father of all*, who is above all, and through all, and in you all."

1. The same observation holds here as on the preceding text, viz. that the argument which would exclude the "*one Lord*" from the claims of *Deity*, would equally exclude the "*one Father*" from the claims of *Lordship*.

2. The same things that are here said of the Father, are elsewhere said of the Son. See John iii. 31. Rom. ix. 5. x. 12. Col. i. 17. Heb. i. 3. &c.

Of these two passages, (1 Cor. viii. 6. and Eph. iv. 4—6.) Mr. Yates says, "They require no comment. They declare the truth to be proved, viz. *that the one God who is above all, is the Father*, in these very words. He, therefore, who derides or denies this Unitarian doctrine, derides or denies the Scripture itself." (Page 69.) The reader, I trust, is satisfied, that a little *comment* is sometimes not amiss; and that it is *possible* to *deny* the Unitarian doctrine, (for as to *derision*, we do not wish to deal in it) without denying the Scripture itself.

The third passage which Mr. Yates thus selects for particular notice, is John xvii. 3. "This is life eternal, that they might know *thee the only true God*, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." This text he characterizes as "held deservedly dear by those who advocate the doctrine of the proper unity of God."—Unitarians, it seems, with all their outcry about prejudice, have their *favourite texts*, as well as their neighbours:—texts which they "hold dear" for their coincidence with their own opinions. They call themselves "advocates of the doctrine of the *proper unity* of God." We cannot allow them the title. The *proper* unity of God, is the unity which *really belongs to him;* the unity which is ascribed to him in his own word. And, whether or not this is a unity in which there subsists distinction, is precisely the question in debate. If the Scriptures affirm it to be so, then *Trinitarians* are the advocates of the *proper*, that is, of the *true*, unity of God.—So dear, however, is the text

under notice, that, in a recent Unitarian publication, the writer says: The attention of every serious person should be directed to this passage. It appears to me to be decisive of the whole controversy. It is absolutely incapable of being reconciled to the doctrine of the Trinity."*—On this text, then, let the reader observe:—

1st. When the Father is addressed as "the true God," and "the only true God," he is so denominated, in distinction from *all false gods*, from the idols of the heathen; to the exclusion of those "quos falsa gentium persuasio introduxerat;"†—"whom the false persuasion of the Gentiles had introduced." To confirm this, let the reader compare 2 Chron. xv. 3, 8. Jer. x. 10. 1 Thes. i. 9.

2dly. We have formerly seen that, by this very writer, the same title of "*the true God*," is expressly given to Jesus Christ;

* "A Statement of the Principles of Unitarian Christianity, addressed to the Inhabitants of Greenock and Port-Glasgow, and to the Friends of Free Inquiry throughout Scotland.—By a Unitarian." Respecting this little work, I have only time to say, that a great proportion of it, especially what regards the unity of God, and the humanity of Jesus Christ, contains proofs of what nobody denies. Let those who, in the cant language of the party, are here denominated "the friends of free inquiry," mark this unfair and illusive mode of arguing. We assert that in the unity of God there is a distinction of persons: we are met by proofs of the unity of God. We assert that Jesus Christ was God as well as man: we are encountered with multiplied evidences of his humanity. The true points of difference on these subjects (for into other subjects it is not my present business to enter) are thus completely evaded. What will "the friends of free inquiry" think of a book, which professes to guide them to Scriptural truth on these important topics, and yet never so much as adverts to any of those numerous passages of the word of God, on which the doctrines of the Trinity and the supreme Deity of Christ, are founded, any more than if no such passages had ever been adduced. It is not enough to say, that the work only professes to contain a Statement of Unitarian principles. The object of it is to show that these principles are *scriptural;* and it is addressed to the friends of free *inquiry*. But it is, from the nature of the case, impossible for a Unitarian to prove his principles on these subjects *scriptural*, except by proving that the principles of Trinitarians are *un*scriptural. It ought to be his business, instead of *proving* the *Unity* of God, to disprove the *Trinity;* instead of *proving* Christ's humanity, to disprove his *divinity*. If he can do this, he will have done every thing: but till he has done this, he has done absolutely nothing, except having deceived his readers.

† Grotius, as quoted by Whitby.

and with the same distinction too from idols. See 1 John v. 20, 21; compared with chap. i. 1, 2; and "Discourses on the Socinian Controvery," pages 35—39; with pages 157—161 of this work. We have seen too, the manner in which John speaks of "THE WORD" in chapter i. 1—3. as well as in other parts of his Gospel history. The Evangelist surely does not contradict himself; and, after having explicitly affirmed in one passage, "the Word was God," exclude him from all the claims of Deity in the other. If, therefore, there be any principle, by the application of which the language of John xvii. 3. may be explained in consistency with the language of John i. 1—3. and of all the other passages which assert the Divinity of Christ, more simply and easily than the language of John i. 1.—3. and of all these other passages can be reconciled with the Unitarian interpretation of John xvii. 3.; that principle ought to be adopted. Such a principle, we are of opinion, is afforded by the *official character* of Jesus Christ. It is in *this* character that he here speaks of himself—"Jesus Christ *whom thou hast sent*." We have before shown, that there is no inconsistency between Jesus possessing *Divine dignity*, and his being *sent*, when he is considered as having voluntarily assumed the official character of Mediator. Now, in this text, the Father is distinguished from *all false deities*, as "the *only true God*," and he is distinguished from *Jesus Christ*, as having "*sent him*:"—and the "knowledge" of the character of God, as the God of salvation, and of the person and work of Christ as the Saviour, the Mediator between God and men, is declared to be "eternal life."

3dly. A parallel case or two will serve to show the inconclusiveness of the Unitarian argument. We have already seen that Jesus Christ is called "the true God," as well as the Father, and that therefore by the phrase "the *only* true God," he cannot intend to exclude himself from the claims and honours of Deity. Speaking of "the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ," Paul says, in 1 Tim. vi. 15, 16.: "Which in his times He shall show, who is the blessed and *only* POTENTATE, the KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS; who *only* hath immortality." Supposing this to refer to THE FATHER, as Unitarians must of course interpret it;

—we know that there is *another* "POTENTATE," even He who "hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written, KING OF KINGS, AND LORD OF LORDS;" and that the Lord Jesus is called "the FIRST and the LAST, and THE LIVING ONE;" who *in the beginning* laid the foundations of the earth, and of whose hands the heavens are the workmanship;" that there is therefore *another* who "*hath immortality.*" The word *only*, then, does not, either when put before "Potentate," or before "immortality," exclude Christ from the possession of these attributes. Again: Solomon says to Jehovah, "Thou *only* knowest the hearts of all the children of men; 1 Kings viii. 39.; yet Jesus says of himself, "I am He that searcheth the reins and the hearts;" Rev. ii. 23. If the exclusive particle *only*, does not, in this case, although not less explicit, deny to Jesus the attribute of omniscience; neither does the phrase "the only true God," applied to the Father, divest him of his proper divinity. Suppose Jesus to have addressed the Father, as "the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords, who only hath immortality;" or as the Being "who alone knew the hearts of all the children of men;"—these forms of adoration would not, we have seen, have excluded himself from the possession of the same attributes; for of himself the same things are actually affirmed: —and yet these forms are in effect equivalent to that by which he *does* address him—"the only true God."

Another favourite text which is here particularized by Mr. Yates, is Mark xiii. 32. where our Lord, speaking of the day of judgment, says, "but of that day and that hour knoweth no one, no, not the angels which are in heaven, *neither the Son*, but the Father."

It is foolish to talk of such passages as if they contained no difficulty. Let us rather frankly admit the difficulty which the mode of expression involves, and endeavour to weigh it in an even balance. "If any other being besides the Father were God," says Mr. Yates, "he would have known the day of judgment. Since, therefore, the Father alone knew this day, it is manifest that He alone is the omniscient God: (page 70.)—and afterwards, when the same passage is introduced on another

branch of his subject; "The Scripture teaches us that the knowledge of Christ was not only *derived*, but also *limited*. For he himself asserted, that he did not know the day of general judgment, Mark xiii. 32. The Father, who alone knew this day, must be the only God. The Son, who knew it not, could not be the supreme God, being inferior to him in knowledge." (Page 91.) On these statements I observe,—

1st. It is admitted, and forms a part of our scheme, that the Lord Jesus Christ, in his official capacity, delivered his instructions to men, *according to a commission which he had received.*— This idea is expressed in the following, among other passages: "God, who, at sundry times, and in divers manners, spoke in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days, spoken unto us by his own Son."—"My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me."—"He that sent me is true; and I speak to the world those things which I have heard of him."—"For I have not spoken of myself; but the Father who sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak:—and I know that his commandment is life everlasting; whatsoever I speak, therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak."* *In this sense* we have no objections to saying that his knowledge was *derived*. He receives his official commission:—he is charged with a message he is to deliver.—But then,

2dly. There are other passages which as plainly describe this same person as *the Searcher of hearts*, and as *knowing all things;* the government and judgment of the world are ascribed to him, to which functions *omniscience* is requisite; and all the proofs together of his supreme Deity, are evidences of his possessing this attribute. Here, then, is a solitary text, the only one which Unitarians have been able to produce as, in direct terms, asserting the limited extent of his knowledge. "He did not know," we are forever reminded, "the day of judgment." It will surely be acknowledged a singular thing, that *this* should be the *sole limitation*. The Governor and Judge of the world

* Heb. i. 1. John vii. 16. viii. 26. xii. 49, 50.

must of necessity be possessed of infallible *prescience*. Without this, the administration of affairs could not be managed for an hour. How then are we to limit this prescience? It seems strange to think, that He who is to conduct the government of mankind, with a view to the final judgment, and who is himself, in the close, to occupy the throne as universal Judge, should be in *absolute* ignorance of the time when the end was to come.—He himself describes the solemn transactions of that approaching day, when the "Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, when he shall sit on the throne of his glory, and when all nations shall be gathered together before him."—He tells us, that "*the hour* is coming, in which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth, they that have done good to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of condemnation." Yet, according to the Unitarian hypothesis, he did not know any more than man or angel, when these things were to be. Nay, more; if the final judgment be meant in the text in question, then he gives a prophetic view of the general state of the world to the close of its history, yet knows not at all when that close is to arrive;—he describes himself as prescribing to his servants their respective charges "to occupy till he should come," and yet not merely leaving *them* in ignorance of the time of his return, but as ignorant of it himself as they. Such considerations render it probable, *a priori*, that the ignorance of which he speaks in the text under discussion, was not *absolute;* but that he speaks of himself in his official capacity, and affirms, that *the time of the final judgment*, the precise period of the duration of the world, did not come within the limits of that commission which he had received of the Father,—formed no part of his official instructions, as a messenger to mankind.

3dly. In Acts i. 7. in reply to the question of his apostles, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" Jesus says, *more generally*, "It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, *which the Father hath put in his own power*." Are we hence to infer, that our blessed Lord was unacquainted, not merely with the day of judgment, but with the

times and seasons in general? This is not pretended, and would be contrary to fact; the very chapter in which the controverted words occur, demonstrating the contrary. But these "times and seasons" "*it was not for them to know.*" The Father had "put them in his own power." Not that *he himself* was ignorant of them, and on that account unable to give the information desired; but it formed no part of his instructions at that time to make them known. They were secret things which belonged to God. May not our Lord, then, in the passage under controversy, be understood as affirming the same thing with respect to *the day of judgment*, which he here affirms respecting "*the times and seasons*" in general?

4thly. It is plain that if *angels* had known "that day and that hour," it must have been *by communication;* that if *men* had known it, it must have been *by communication.* That neither man nor angel knew it, is equivalent to—that God had not communicated the knowledge of it to them. It is of *knowledge received by communication* that our Saviour speaks: and as, in the passages before referred to, and in many others, he is represented, and represents himself, as sustaining an official character, and bearing a commission from the Father to men; the whole of the difficulty consists in considering him in Mark xiii. 32. as speaking of himself in this, his official capacity, and declaring that the time of the judgment was not among the things *communicated to him* as the commissioned messenger of the Father; that it was to remain *a divine secret.**

* In these observations, I have taken no notice of the criticism of Dr. Macknight, who thinks that the verb οἶδεν has here the force of the Hebrew conjugation *Hiphil*, and signifies *to make to know*, or *to declare*. To avoid the obvious inference, that if "*knoweth*" means *maketh known*, when it is used of men and angels, and the Son, it must have the same meaning as to *the Father;* which would make the text affirm, in opposition to fact, that the Father *made known* the day of judgment: to avoid this inference, a second "*that is*" becomes necessary: "none maketh you to know," *that is*, "none *hath power* to make you know it." So that the verb "*to know*," is first made to signify to *make known;* and then, *to make known* means *to have power to make known*. This seems rather too much. Is it not simpler to say *at once*, that *not to know* signifies *not to have official commission to make known?* The only parallel case which the Doctor adduces in support

CHAPTER II.

In the beginning of the fourth chapter of his Second Part, Mr. Yates announces three propositions respecting the Lord Jesus Christ, which in that and the two succeeding chapters he goes on to prove: viz. "that our Lord Jesus Christ was not God, but a distinct Being from him; that he was inferior and subordinate to the Father; and that he received from the Father all his wisdom and power."—"To these doctrines," he observes, "it is commonly objected, that they lower the dignity of the Saviour. Let the considerate reader bear in mind the maxim acknowledged on all hands, and laid down at the commencement of our inquiries, that the truth of religious doctrines ought to be tried, not by the standard of our fancies, wishes, and feelings, but by the word of God." (P. 74.) Agreed:—"To the law and to the testimony."

The first point which he sets himself to prove, is, that "Jesus Christ is not God, but a distinct Being from him:—"If," says

of his view, is 1 Cor. ii. 2. where Paul says, "I determined to know (εἰδέναι) nothing among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified;" i. e. says he, "I determined to make known, to preach nothing among you but Jesus Christ." But although this may be considered as the *effect* of the verb here, it is the effect rather *by consequence* or *inference*, than by its *direct meaning*. It can hardly be said with propriety, that "to *know* nothing," means "to *make known* nothing." It is only a strong expression of the apostle's resolution to appear among them, and to preach among them, *as if ignorant of every thing else*, but the great subject of his ministry. He came among them in the character of *an apostle of Jesus Christ*. As a man, he was acquainted with many other things; and he might be under temptations to display his knowledge. But *as an apostle* he had one message to deliver, and he determined, in his *official capacity*, to know nothing else than that message. In the same way, "the Son" did not "*know*" the day of judgment. He knew it not in his official capacity, as the commissioned ambassador of heaven to men. It formed no part of the divine communications to him in this character. This view has always appeared to me much more rational and satisfactory, than that which is commonly given, that he was ignorant of it *in his human nature*, although he knew it in his *divine:* a mode of explanation with which, I confess, I have never been well satisfied.

he, "with a sincere desire of arriving at the truth, we apply to this source of information, (the Scriptures) we, in the first place, observe numerous passages which represent Jesus Christ *as a distinct being from God.*" (P. 74.) Strings of passages are then produced, in which *God the Father*, and *the Lord Jesus Christ*, are mentioned together, in evident *distinction from each other*. And to those quoted, I doubt not, a great many more might have been added. But, suppose them multiplied indefinitely, what is it that is proved by them? Is it any thing more than this; that there is *such a distinction* between God our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ, *as admits of their being spoken of as two?* The adducing of such texts as proofs of the Unitarian doctrine, proceeds on the assumption, that in the Trinitarian system there is no such distinction held as could admit of their being so mentioned. But surely Mr. Yates knows, that such an assumption is unfounded. Trinitarians, he is well aware, not only maintain a distinction between the ETERNAL FATHER, and the ETERNAL WORD in the nature of Deity; but also a distinction between the Eternal Father and the Word made flesh, the *Divine Mediator*. In so far as he was *man*, they have no objection to admit the phraseology, that he is a distinct *being* from God, because the human nature, created, and, as created, dependent, was, and still is, unconfounded with the Divine, and can never become a part of the essence of Deity. Nothing, therefore, can be more futile, or less to the purpose, than to bring forward lists of texts which, so far as *mere distinction* is concerned, are equally explicable on either hypothesis, and which, in this respect, must stand as they are, whichsoever hypothesis be established as the true one. If the Father alone were God, and Jesus Christ a mere creature, they must have been mentioned *distinctly:* but if the Father be a person in Deity, and the Son a person in Deity; if, in the scheme of redemption, the Father asserts the claims of the Godhead, and the Incarnate Word is the Mediator between God and men; they must in that case also, have been mentioned *distinctly*. All that is needful to the explanation of such texts, is the admission of personal distinction: and as, in the Trinitarian system, such distinction exists, in the senses just mentioned, the recognition of

this distinction in the phraseology of the Scriptures, can never be fairly urged against it. In these circumstances, I should think it quite as trifling and irrelevant for me to set about refuting the argument derived from each of these texts separately, as it was for my opponent to bring them forward into the argument at all. They all belong to the same class. They prove *distinction:* they prove, therefore, what Trinitarians do not deny. They *dis*prove no one *Trinitarian* sentiment; and therefore they cannot *prove* any sentiment that is peculiarly *Unitarian.* For with regard to *precise points of difference*, no argument can *prove* one side that does not *dis*prove the other.

But while Mr. Yates adduces these passages as evidences of distinction, and in *this* view, as we have seen, adduces them to so little purpose, there is another view in which, it seems to me, the enumeration of them is, as in the case considered a little ago, most unfortunate for his own cause. He brings forward, for instance, "*seventeen passages*," "each of which," according to Unitarian phraseology, "expresses a pious and benevolent wish of favour and assistance from two distinct beings." Several of these passages have been adduced by me, in evidence of Jesus Christ being the object of divine worship; and to the observations made on that branch of the subject, I refer the reader. The texts I allude to, were Eph. vi. 23. 2 John 3. 1 Thess. iii. 11. 2 Thess. ii. 16.; and almost all the other thirteen might be added. They are Rom. i. 7. 1 Cor. i. 3. 2 Cor. i. 2. Eph. i. 2. Phil. i. 2. 1 Thess. i. 1. 2 Thess. i. 2. Philem. 3. Gal. i. 3. 1 Tim. i. 2. 2 Tim. i. 2. Tit. i. 4. 2 Pet. i. 2. Let the reader turn to them if he will. It is my wish, indeed, that he should. For I am satisfied, that, if his mind be open to conviction, he will see, in the constant junction of Jesus with the Father, in the prayers of the apostle for both temporal and spiritual blessings, a much more convincing proof on the Trinitarian side of the question, than the mere circumstance of their being named and spoken of distinctly, can ever be on its opposite; this circumstance being alike consistent with both, and incapable, consequently, of being evidence on either.

Distinction, no doubt, is also implied in those passages, next

quoted by Mr. Yates, in which worship is addressed, or enjoined, to God, or to the Father, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ. But what *is* this distinction? It is just the distinction between the *Divine Father* and the *Divine Mediator*. Had Mr. Yates attempted to show that the Trinitarian view of the mediation of Christ, as the mediation of a divine person in the human nature, is incompatible with the "marked distinction" between this Mediator, and God, or the Godhead, as the object of worship, which the passages quoted express, he would have attempted something to his purpose; and had he succeeded, he would have *done* something to his purpose. This, however, he has neither done nor attempted: and yet, till this is done, nothing is done. We hold, that THE ETERNAL WORD "was made flesh," associating his infinite glories with the nature of man; that, by his obedience unto death in the nature he had assumed, he might make sufficient atonement for human guilt, and render the acceptance of sinners, the pardon of their sins, their access to God, and their everlasting happiness, consistent with the immutable perfection, and unsullied honour, of the name, and law, and government, of the Great Supreme. We come, therefore, to the Father, in the name of the Son: we come to the Godhead,—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,—in the name of the second person, in his capacity of incarnate Mediator: we come to the Son himself, as "God over all, blessed forever," on the ground of his own mediation, as "God manifest in the flesh." Till this view is shown to involve absurdity and contradiction, we hold by such passages as those referred to, as most satisfactory exhibitions of the Saviour, as the great medium of the approach of sinners to Deity; we act agreeably to the directions, or to the example, which they contain; and we conceive our view of the Mediator to give to them an energy and an interest of which they are utterly bereft by the self-righteous and frigid scheme of Unitarian theology. For, in what sense Unitarians draw near to God *in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ*, it is not very easy to say.

"Further," says Mr. Yates, "there are various passages of the New Testament, which assert that *Jesus Christ was with God*, (such as John i. 1, 2.) or that *God was with him*, (such as John

iii. 2. Acts x. 38.) These passages, while they teach that Jesus was nearly allied to God in his endowments or his office, at the same time prove that he was a distinct being from God." (Page 76.) But let him, if he can, fairly refute the Trinitarian explanation of such texts; without doing this, he does nothing, nay, he does less than nothing. He brings before the mind of his reader texts which bear a most inauspicious aspect on his own cause. I now allude particularly to John i. 1, 2.; which asserts, not, as Mr. Yates designs to represent it, that Jesus Christ (i. e. *the man* Christ Jesus) was with God; but, that THE WORD, *before being made flesh*, existed "in the beginning," and was *then with God*;" and, in the same breath, with the same laconic simplicity, that this Word "*was God*"—of which enough has already been said:—the latter affirmation proving his *divinity*, and the former his *personality* in the Godhead.

Mr. Yates illustrates his argument from such passages by a supposed parallel case. "To illustrate this phrase by a simple example: It has been conjectured, that Luke, the Evangelist, was the same man who is called in Paul's Epistles, Sylvanus. We may conceive of the question being settled in the following manner. Suppose we were to find in any part of the New Testament this expression, 'Luke was with Sylvanus;' we should immediately conclude that Luke was not Sylvanus, but a different person. In like manner, when we find it asserted, that 'the Word was with God,' or that 'God was with Christ,' we draw the obvious inference, that Jesus Christ was not God, but though favoured with an intimate communion with him, a totally distinct being." (Pages 76, 77.) But this imaginary parallel proceeds on the assumption of there being no difference between the constitution of the person of Christ, and that of Luke or Sylvanus; and of there being no sense in which it could be said that "the Word was *with God*," except that sense which would imply the same kind of distinction between *the Word* and *God*, as between *one man* and *another*, which is begging the question; taking it for granted, either on the one hand, that Jesus was a mere man, which is the thing to be proved; or, on the other, that the unity of Deity is of the same nature with the unity of a man, which is

also the thing to be proved. As to God being "*with Christ*," there is no other distinction implied in such expressions, than that which has been already noticed, namely, the distinction between Jesus as the Divine Mediator, in the assumed form of a servant, and the Father, or the Godhead, as giving testimony to his doctrine and his work.

The same general remarks apply to those passages in which Jesus is spoken of, as *coming from God*, and *going to God*. Indeed, these passages are also unfortunate, at least for the *Socinian* hypothesis. For they seem very clearly to denote *a pre-existent state*. If *coming from God* meant, in such connexion, merely *having his commission from God*, then *going to God*, should mean his *resigning that commission;* but, if this be a forced and unnatural interpretation of the latter phrase, if *it* evidently means something *local*, his going to heaven, represented as the place of the peculiar residence of God, then must his *coming from God*, his "coming forth from the Father, and coming into the world," have a corresponding signification. It must mean, his having come down from a pre-existent state of heavenly glory. The question is, What *was* that state? Was it a state of *Divine* glory? The phrases in question do not imply the contrary; for God, although infinite, is often spoken of in language, such as, when applied to creatures, indicates change of place; among other expressions, as *coming down*. And, seeing an inspired writer teaches us, that the Word's being *with God*, before he appeared in the likeness of sinful flesh, was not inconsistent with his being *God;* neither, surely, are such declarations of his *coming from God*, and *going to God*.

Jesus Christ is called "*the image of God*," "*the image of the invisible God*;" (2 Cor. iv. 4. Col. i. 15.) "the *express image of his person*;" (Heb. i. 3.) and in Phil. ii. 6. is said to have been "*in the form of God*." "To say any person is the image of himself, or in the form of himself," Mr. Yates alleges, "would be absolute nonsense." But may not Christ be styled the "image of the invisible God," because his character, as "the Word made flesh," presents to mankind an embodied exhibition of the perfections of Deity? In one of the passages where he is so de-

nominated, it is said of him, in terms formerly discussed, that "all things in heaven and earth, visible and invisible, were created *by* him, and *for* him, and that he is *before all things*, and that by him all things consist." And, without entering into any critical examination of the precise import of the original terms translated "the *express image of his person*," it may be sufficient to observe, that, in the same verse, he is represented as "upholding all things by the word of his power."

On the phraseology of Phil. ii. 6. enough has been said before.

On the whole, the arguments adduced in this chapter, with a view to prove that Jesus Christ is *not God*, but a *distinct being from him*, instead of proving this, prove no more than that he is *distinct;* that the Eternal Word, or the Incarnate Mediator, is distinct from the Father. *Distinction* between the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, between the Godhead and the Mediator, belongs to both systems. But the distinction affirmed in each, is materially different *in kind*. It behoved Mr. Yates to show not only that the language of the passages he has quoted, was consistent with the *Unitarian* hypothesis, but that it was *not* consistent with the *Trinitarian*. But this he has not attempted. And while he has adduced a great many passages which, as proofs of *mere distinction*, are not at all to his purpose, he has, among them, brought forward some, which, in certain other views of them, afford strong evidence of the equality of Christ with the Father.

Before proceeding to examine the contents of Chapter V. entitled "Evidence that our Lord Jesus Christ is inferior and subordinate to the Father,"—I must beg leave to transcribe a paragraph or two from my former volume.

"But, it may be alleged, there are other passages of Scripture, which speak a very different language from those which have been quoted:—passages, in which Jesus is spoken of as *inferior* to the Father; as *sent* by the Father; as *obeying* and *serving* the Father; as *receiving a commission*, and executing a work *given him to do*.—All this we at once admit; with the very same readiness and cordiality, with which we admit his

having been *a man*.—I address myself at present to those who acknowledge the Scriptures as the word of God; and who are consequently satisfied that they cannot in reality contradict themselves. To such I propose the following simple question: Which of the two views—that which asserts the *mere humanity* of Jesus Christ, or that which affirms the union of his *humanity* with true and proper *divinity* affords the easiest and most complete reconciliation of these apparent contrarieties, and the fairest solution of the difficulty thence arising?—Take, in the first place, the system from which the Deity of Christ is entirely excluded. I need not say how superlatively difficult the attempt must be, to bring the host of texts already quoted, along with others of a similar description, to speak a language in accordance with this hypothesis. Every one who is at all acquainted with the subject is aware, that the attempt has employed, and exhausted, all the possible arts and resources of criticism: with what success, remains afterwards to be seen. Take, on the other hand, the view of the person and work of Christ presented in the following words:—'Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and, being found in fashion as a man, humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.'* *Suppose*, for the present, this translation to be correct, and the ordinary interpretation of the passage to be the just one;—we have, on this supposition, a *double view* of the person and character of Christ, which appears instantly to furnish a natural and satisfactory solution of the whole difficulty. If he be, indeed, both God and man, we have no reason, surely, to be greatly astonished, if we find language respecting him, of seemingly opposite complexions, according as he is spoken of under the one, or under the other view, of his person. When we adopt this principle of interpretation, the apparent confusion becomes order and harmony. If, besides, he voluntarily undertook the office of Mediator, and is represented,

* Phil. ii. 6—8.

in the Scriptures, as performing this work in the willingly assumed capacity of a servant; there can be no doubt, that this view of his Mediatorial character and work does, in fact, afford a very easy and consistent interpretation of almost all the passages in which he is spoken of as *inferior* and *subject;* as *serving* and *obeying* Jehovah; and as *receiving his reward.* On this principle, supposing it just, we cease to wonder at the seeming contrarieties. We perceive them to be merely apparent; nay, to be such as we had every reason previously to expect. If, then, this be a key which fits all the wards of this seemingly intricate lock, turning among them with hardly a touch of interruption, catching its bolts, and laying open to us, in the easiest and completest manner, the treasures of Divine truth: if this be a principle which, in fact, *does* produce harmony and consistency in the word of God, while the rejection of it, on the contrary, gives rise to difficulties without number; is not this, of itself, a strong presumptive evidence that the principle is correct, and well founded?—I shall probably have occasion, in a subsequent Discourse, to touch again on the reasonableness of this principle; a principle which might be reduced into a general rule of interpretation:—that, of *two contending systems, that one ought to be preferred, which not only affords a natural explanation of those texts by which it seems to be itself supported, but, at the same time, furnishes a satisfactory principle of harmony, between these, and those other passages, which have the appearance of countenancing its opposite.*" Discourse II. pages 42—44.

"My last observation is, that we ought to beware of forming our judgment from detached and insulated passages of the word of God:—that we should take the Scriptures in their harmony, comparing one part with another, and using them, as much as possible, as *self-expositors.* You will immediately perceive the particular *bearing* of this remark, in reference to our present subject. In a former Discourse, I noticed the *seeming contrarieties* in the Scripture testimony respecting the person of Christ; and I endeavoured to point out also the *true principle of harmony* among them. A single observation or two shall suffice at present, in addition to what was then said. 'Christ,' says a Unitarian

writer, 'always prayed to this one God, as his God and Father.' He always spoke of himself as receiving his doctrine and his power from him; and again and again disclaimed having any power of his own. 'Then answered Jesus, and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of himself;' John v. 19. 'The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works;' John xiv. 10. 'Go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God;' John xx. 17. '*It cannot surely be God*,' adds he, '*that uses such language as this*.'* Now, without making any particular comment on the language which this writer uses, might I not, on the other side, repeat again the various passages before quoted, in proof of his *Divinity*, and then say, with at least equal confidence, '*It cannot surely be a mere man, of whom such things are said?*' Here, then, is the question brought into short compass. It comes at once to an issue. Here are two classes of passages, both contained in the same book,—both claiming to have their testimony received, as of the same authority. Here are two bands of witnesses. They all seem to speak in language plain and distinctly intelligible. But they appear to contradict one another. What, then, shall we make of them? Whether are we to receive the testimony of the one, or that of the other? Or must we reject that of both? Or shall we apply scourges, and racks, and screws, and all the instruments of torture, to force from the one, or from the other, a declaration, that they did not at all intend to express what their language seems, beyond all doubt, to convey? Or, lastly, is there no principle of reconciliation and harmony between their apparently discordant testimonies? Is there no ground on which both may consistently be believed; since both appear to be supported by the very same measure of credible evidence? Here is the question;—here, I apprehend, the one great point on which the whole controversy turns. And in answer to the question, I still affirm, as before, There *is*

* Priestley's History of Early Opinions, Vol. I. p. 10.

such a principle—there *is* such a ground—and besides it there is *no other*. It is to be found, as formerly stated, in the double view which is given by the apostle Paul, of the person and official character of Jesus, when he says respecting him, that, 'being in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon himself the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and, being found in fashion as a man, humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.' Admit the double view of the person of Christ which is here stated, and the difficulty vanishes. The testimony of the different witnesses, elicited without torture, and interpreted without perversion, becomes *one testimony*. In plain terms, there is, on *this* principle—(a principle which, you may possibly think, I am disposed to press too often upon your attention, but which really merits repetition on account of the extensiveness of its application on this subject, the occasion for the use of it, as, from the nature of the case, might have been expected, perpetually recurring)—there is, I say, on *this* principle, hardly a single text that occasions any difficulty to an attentive and ingenuous reader.—On every consideration, then, of fairness and candour, is not this the view which ought to be preferred, by all who are desirous rightly to obey the injunction in the text, PROVE ALL THINGS." Discourse VI. pages 176—178.

I should, perhaps, ask pardon of the reader, for quoting passages of such length, which he may have read before. But the general principle, which they contain, is one of such peculiar importance on the present part of the argument, that I am desirous of *securing* his attention to it, which a mere *reference* might not do. I have laid, and still lay, much of the stress of the argument upon this principle. Yet, as I formerly noticed, it is a principle against which my opponent has not pointed a single piece of his critical ordnance. He has, in this chapter brought forward lists of passages, in which Jesus Christ is represented as *chosen*, *appointed*, *sanctified*, *inspired*, *anointed*, *given* and *sent* by God, as *receiving and executing a commission*, as *coming in the name of the Lord*, as *the servant of God*. But he has never,

either here or elsewhere, taken any notice, or attempted any refutation, of the general principle, stated in the paragraphs I have quoted, on which such passages are explained by Trinitarians. And, till he has done this, "I am not careful to answer him" further. Let him spoil our key, or prove it a picklock, and then we shall acknowledge our error, and give up the use of it.

What Mr. Yates has written, in this chapter, on the meaning of the title *Son of God*, is altogether irrelevant to the point in debate. This is a title about which, in its application to Jesus Christ, there is considerable diversity of opinion, not only between Unitarians and Trinitarians, but amongst Trinitarians themselves. It has been questioned, whether it relates to him in his Divine nature alone, or in his human nature alone, or in the constitution of his person as God and man, connected with his official character as Mediator. The last of these views I am myself inclined to prefer. But as the difference respects a name merely, any one of the views may be held, along with the firm conviction of the supreme divinity of Him who bears it. Mr. Yates reasons on the assumed principle, that this title plainly implies inferiority and subordination. But, if the title be considered as belonging to him on account of the peculiar constitution of his Mediatorial person, the idea of inferiority may be admitted, on the principles laid down in the preceding quotations; because, as Mediator, although uniting the Divine and human natures, he had assumed *the form of a servant*. And, even in opposition to those who consider the title Son of God as expressing the mode of personal distinction in the Divine essence, Mr. Yates may find it difficult to prove that *sonship* implies inferiority *in nature;* inasmuch as a son must be, in nature, *essentially* the same with his father. That the name or title "Son of God," is a mark of "blissful and glorious distinction is evident," says Mr. Yates, "from the manner in which it is applied both to the disciples of Christ, and to our Saviour himself." (Page 81.) But it is no less evident, that the name is applied in an infinitely higher sense to the Saviour himself, than to his disciples. "The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews," as Mr. Yates afterwards notices,

"proves the superiority of Christ to *angels*, by the evidence of passages in which he is called by this designation." (P. 84.)—And the connexion in which these proofs are introduced, sufficiently shows the sense in which he understood the designation —"*Unto the Son* he saith, Thy throne, *O God*, is for ever and ever." When Jesus spoke of God as his Father, the Jews took up stones to stone him, because he made himself "*equal with God.*" And, although nothing could have been more easy than distinctly to disavow the inference, and although such disavowal was required by every consideration of piety and truth, he never did disavow it. Mr. Yates has not disproved the justice of the interpretation put by the Jews on our Lord's words; he has not disproved the propriety of *any* of the Trinitarian interpretations of the title; for he has neither proved that it implies inferiority *in nature*, nor that the inferiority and subordination which he affirms it *does* imply, cannot be the inferiority and subordination involved in his voluntary assumption of the human nature, and of the form of a servant. Till he has done both these, the title *Son of God* can avail him nothing, but rather, from the connexions in which it is sometimes given to Christ, is all against him. It is in vain, therefore, that Mr. Yates, in this, as in former instances, adduces his proofs by *fifties* and *sixties*. It is in this way that he fulfils his engagement announced in the prospectus of his book, to establish the inferiority of Christ to the Father by "*several hundred plain Scripture testimonies.*" Any person, acquainted with the controversy, might have anticipated what sort of *proofs* these were to be;—proofs of what nobody questions. Wherever Mr. Yates finds Jesus called the Son of God, or God called his Father, he finds a *distinct proof* that Jesus is *not God*. But he establishes no general principle on which these multiplied proofs can be made to *tell* upon his conclusion. He does not seem to think it at all incumbent upon him, to invalidate the principles of Trinitarian interpretation; but argues on, with all coolness, deliberation, and confidence, leaving the ignorant reader to wonder what Trinitarians make of these passages, or whether they have not overlooked them altogether. In a case of this kind, to dwell on each passage distinctly, would be an insult to

the reader's understanding. They are all in the same predicament. The refutation of one is the refutation of the whole. They are like the Spectator's wooden library; where, when you touch a single volume, down comes an entire shelf. Mr. Yates *takes it for granted*, that the title "*Son of God*" implies inferiority and subordination; and then, understanding this inferiority and subordination in the Unitarian way, he has a host of proofs at his call:—the reader has only to *take it for granted* on the other side, that the title "Son of God" implies the equality of Christ with the Father, and the case is immediately reversed: the army of arguments vanishes from the one side, and starts up in hostile array on the other.

On this part of the subject, I cannot but advert to the gratulations with which Mr. Yates has hailed me in another part of his volume, in consequence of my having professed doubts respecting the ordinary doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, and the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, in the essence of Deity. He considers this candid avowal as "affording a gratifying illustration of the progress of good sense and liberality of sentiment in matters of religion;" and congratulates me on my freedom from the prison and the rack; as well as from the shackles of subscription to human articles. For both these species of liberty,—liberty from confinement and torture, and liberty from the trammels of subscription, I desire, along with Mr. Yates, to be duly thankful. The desirableness of the former will be felt and acknowledged alike by all; of the advantage of the latter, I think I have had the satisfactory proof of personal experience. But in his sanguine hopes of my future progress, I fear Mr. Yates must lay his account with disappointment. The present publication has already, in all probability, lowered his expectations; and they are likely to sink still farther, when I assure him, that, instead of being connected, in its origin, with any doubt as to the doctrine of the Trinity, the principal source of my hesitation respecting the common opinion above mentioned, was a desire to clear that great and fundamental article of my faith from plausible objection. While we ought never, in complaisance to the pride of

human reason, either to give up, or to mitigate, those sublime mysteries, confessedly incomprehensible, but which form the very substance of the gospel; yet we should beware of adding to them any thing of our own; and especially when the addition, instead of illustrating and confirming, tends rather to obscure and invalidate, the truth which we are desirous to maintain. Such appeared to me to be the case with regard to the doctrines of eternal generation and eternal procession; and, on examination, I could not find sufficient ground for them in the holy Scriptures. But into the discussion of these topics, I feel no inclination to enter. Although I consider the rejection of this explanation of the *mode* of the Divine subsistence as fitted to clear the great point of our blessed Lord's divinity from the most plausible of the objections and cavils of the adversary,—I am quite aware that others are of a contrary opinion; and from what I know of them, I dare not take it upon me to impute their opinion to mere prejudice. Differing, as I do, from such, about the precise import of the title *Son of God*, we both hold his supreme Divinity, and acknowledge him as the Eternal Word made flesh, to "put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." I have no inclination to enter at present into any debate with these brethren, about the meaning of a name, but give them my hand and heart as fellow-disciples of the Divine Saviour.—I must still, therefore, I presume, be content to rank, in my opponent's list, among the professors of "*pristine nonsense*:" (for, under this appellation, I suppose, he will include the doctrine of the Trinity itself, as well as the Nicene and Athanasian explanations of it)—and I feel no desire to be honoured with a different place. In matters of religious sentiment, I take his scale by the rule of reverse; and make the lowest point of *his* graduation the highest of *mine*. His *pristine nonsense* is my *ancient truth*;—the foundation of my hopes, the source of my joys; to the defence of which, I trust I shall ever be enabled to consecrate those "powers of reasoning and persuasion," to which, as might have been expected, he has been pleased, on this occasion, to present a little of the incense of his praise. It *is* certainly my desire to "conform my belief, not to popular opinions, or human creeds, but to the only infallible test—

the Word of God." And, while I do this, it is my present conviction, that that word must be thoroughly changed, or that I must myself be given up to "strong delusion," before I can renounce the doctrines, which he has assailed.

But there are two or three texts which Mr. Yates has more particularly specified, as proofs of the inferiority and subordination of Jesus Christ which merit a somewhat closer consideration.

The first of these is John xiv. 28. "My Father is greater than I;" of which Mr. Yates says,—"This testimony is so clear and explicit, that it does not admit of illustration."—(Page 79.)

Let us notice, however, in the *first* place, the connexion in which these words stand:—"Ye have heard how I said unto you, I go away, and come again unto you; if ye loved me, ye would rejoice because I said, I go to the Father; for my Father is greater than I." In going to the Father, he was going to "the joy that was set before him;" to the "glory that was to follow" all his sufferings; to the reward of his finished work. This reward, this glory, this joy, he was to receive *as Mediator*, in the capacity of *the servant of the Father*. He had "taken upon him the form of a servant:" he was just about to "become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross:" and "*therefore* God was highly to exalt him." It is in this sense, and in this connexion, that Jesus says, "My Father is greater than I." Even here, therefore, our general principle of interpretation applies. We admit inferiority; not only the inferiority of the human nature of Jesus, but *official inferiority*. And the only question is, whether he is here speaking of himself in his official capacity? If he is, it is surely not unreasonable to conceive that it is to *this* inferiority he refers.

But, *secondly*;—It may sound strangely to speak of these words as a proof that he who used them was more than man, and more than a creature. Yet my mind is not a little impressed with the improbability of a mere human prophet, or even a super-angelic Messenger, assuring his fellow men, or his fellow creatures, as of a thing of which they needed to be informed, that

God was greater than he; that he was *inferior to the infinite Jehovah.* We can hardly, I think, suppose a mere prophet, a good man, or any holy creature, to bring himself thus into comparison with his Creator and his God. It is one of the characteristic sentiments of all such creatures, to feel, and to own, their utter insignificance, and absolute nothingness, before the Divine Majesty. Ascend as high as you please in the scale of created existence, you only give additional strength to the improbability in question: for there will still be an *infinite* disparity between the greatness of God, and the greatness of the most exalted creatures; and the higher you go, the sentiment referred to must be supposed the more powerfully felt. I can scarcely, therefore, imagine the words to have been used by a merely created Messenger; nor is there any sense which I can attach to them, without an apprehension of impiety, but that which refers them to the official, Mediatorial, character of the Son of God; as "coming forth from the Father, and coming into the world;"—"finishing the work given him to do;" and returning to the Father, to receive his reward, in "fulness of joy, and pleasures for evermore."

The same general principle of *official subordination*, without *natural inferiority*, may, without any difficulty or any direction of mine, be applied by the intelligent reader to 1 Cor. iii. 23. "Ye are Christ's, and *Christ is God's;*" and to 1 Cor. xi. 3. "The head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is the man; and *the head of Christ is God.*"—"Christ is God's," as being the Divinely appointed Mediator, all whose work, on earth, and in heaven, has the glory of God for its object. "The head of Christ is God;" by whom he was commissioned and sent, whose will he came to do, who accepted his service, and bestowed his reward.

Mark x. 17, 18. "There came one running, and kneeled to him, and asked him, Good master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life? And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God."

I have already noticed the folly of pretending that there are none of the passages brought forward by Unitarians against the divinity of Christ that present *any* difficulty. The true state of

the question is, Whether the numerous passages understood by Trinitarians as asserting or implying his supreme Deity, are capable of a fair and consistent interpretation on the supposition of his being a mere creature? and, on the other hand, whether the passages understood by Unitarians as asserting or implying his being no more than a creature, are capable of such an interpretation, on the hypothesis of his being God and man in one person, and sustaining in that one person the official character of Mediator?

I am not aware of any passage produced on the Unitarian side of this alternative, that has greater plausibility in it than the one now quoted. In these words, it is alleged, Jesus pointedly disavows supreme Godhead. Let us fairly see, then, how the matter stands.

1st. The epithet "*good*" is evidently susceptible of a higher and a lower sense. In our Lord's reply to this ruler's question, he takes it in the highest acceptation of which it is susceptible, as signifying absolute unqualified perfection. But it is an epithet often applied to *men;* Matth. v. 45. xii. 35. xxv. 21. Luke xxiii. 50. Acts xi. 24, &c. It is generally understood, too, that the Jewish doctors (whose fondness for flattering titles is, on another occasion, exposed and reproved by our Saviour) affected this style of complimentary address.

2dly. The title, it is sufficiently evident from the result, was not intended by the person who used it, to be understood in any higher sense than was applicable to a merely human being,—one whom, at the most, he considered as an eminent prophet.

3dly. It was not, therefore, an address which it was at all possible for any who were present to consider it as *blasphemy* for Jesus to receive; as implying his *making himself God*, whom alone he immediately declares in his answer to be *good*. It could not, from its general use in application to men, be understood as expressing any thing beyond mere humanity; so that there existed no occasion whatever why Jesus, supposing him to have been a mere human prophet, should have declined it, as an address to which the blessed God alone was entitled. His answer, therefore, cannot be viewed as an instance of his revolting

from the ascription to him of a Divine title; because, from the ordinary use of the epithet, there was no danger, or even possibility, of any such conception being formed. It is not easy, in these circumstances, to perceive any reason why Jesus should have given a reply, *disclaiming equality with God*, as Unitarians interpret his words; because neither, on the one hand, was the person by whom he was addressed, ascribing such equality to him; nor, on the other, was there the remotest possibility of his hearers understanding him to claim such equality in accepting the title by which he was accosted.

Is the reply of Jesus, then, capable of any natural and consistent interpretation, on the supposition of his having been himself a Divine person? The two following views of it are submitted to the reader:—

1. Our Lord may be understood as framing his reply *according to the views which he knew the person by whom he was addressed to entertain concerning him.* There is no reason to suppose, that this ruler viewed our Lord as any thing more than a mere man,—a prophet,—"a teacher" (the appellation he employs) "sent from God." Considered in this light, the words of Christ convey a severe and pointed reproof to those who affected such titles of flattery, and sought "the honour that cometh from men."

2. He may be considered as *inquiring the views of this young man*, with regard to him whom he thus so respectfully accosted, "kneeling to him," with an apparently humble acknowledgment of his superior dignity and authority. The reply will then be as if Jesus had said to him:—Why callest thou me good? None is absolutely good but one, that is God. Do you mean by your address to ascribe *this* goodness to me? to acknowledge and honour me in my Divine character? "I and my Father are one." Dost thou believe this? Or is your salutation a mere title of flattering courtesy, to be understood as when addressed to your own Rabbies?

Let the reader, then, recollect that on other occasions, when Jesus was charged with making himself equal with God, he never disavowed the imputation; let him keep in mind also the copious evidence already produced of his really possessing Di-

vine dignity; and say, whether the one or the other of these senses, or a combination of both, should not be preferred to that interpretation which, without any good reason arising from the circumstances of the case, sets the words at variance with his conduct on other occasions, and with all the passages which assert or imply his divinity?

CHAPTER III.

The general principles laid down in the preceding chapter, are, in their full force, applicable to all that Mr. Yates advances in Chapters VI. and VII. of the Second Part of his "Vindication," respecting the wisdom, and knowledge, and power, of Christ, being derived from the Father.

Mr. Yates thus states the difference between Trinitarians and Unitarians, in answering the ancient question, "Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works?"—"The Trinitarians maintain that, as Jesus Christ was really and truly God, he required no communication of knowledge or power from any other being, but was, from all eternity, and by his own nature, infinitely wise, omniscient, and omnipotent. The Unitarians, on the contrary, assert, that he derived his wisdom, his knowledge, and his power, from the same Being who brought him into existence, from the one eternal and almighty God, the Father." (Page 88.) But in this statement, he has been as careful as before to leave out of sight the double view of the person of Christ maintained by Trinitarians. Jesus Christ appears, as Mediator, "in the likeness of sinful flesh." In these circumstances, how were those, to whom he made his appearance, to be assured, that he came, that he taught, and that he acted, *by divine authority?* How, but by his announcing himself possessed of a commission from the Father, and proving that commission by miraculous works? This he did. He declared that all that he taught was

according to the commission he had received; that all that he did was according to the will of Him that sent him; and he appealed to his miracles, as works which the Father had given him to do, and indications of his sanction and approbation.—But what of this? The great general principle of the distinction of natures, and the official character of Jesus Christ, leaves no difficulty here. This general principle it should have been Mr. Yates' business to overthrow. But, instead of doing this, he has taken *one side only* of the Trinitarian view of the Saviour's person. He states that, *as God*, Trinitarians consider his knowledge and wisdom as eternal and underived; in which he is right: but he entirely forgets, that they view him also *as man*, and, officially, *as Mediator;* that, in the human nature, all the knowledge and wisdom of his human soul must of necessity have been derived; and that, in his official capacity, he taught and acted *by commission*, communicating what he had *received to communicate*, and doing what he had been *charged to do*. There is surely no great difficulty in making the distinction between a *personal* and an *official* character. An ambassador from a prince, charged with a certain commission, may possess a vast deal of knowledge, even of the mind of his sovereign, beyond what is involved in his commission, and he may possess a large measure of general knowledge besides. Even of the substance of his commission he might have full knowledge in his personal capacity, before he received it in his official. But, *as an ambassador*, he is charged with a commission. That commission he delivers *as from him that sent him*. And he who, from the circumstance of this ambassador speaking of his commission in his official language, should conclude that he *could* have no knowledge of it *except* in his official capacity, and no personal knowledge, no underived acquaintance with any thing else; would commit the same error with those, who argue, that because Jesus Christ, in his official capacity (which he had voluntarily assumed,) speaks of himself as delivering what he was commissioned to deliver, therefore *all* the knowledge and wisdom he possessed, were, and must have been, derived, and not inherent. The sophism arises from not distinguishing between Jesus Christ, considered *simply as*

God, and Jesus Christ, considered in his official capacity as *Mediator between God and men*—the voluntary servant of the Godhead.

Chapter VII. Part II. in Mr. Yates' "Vindication," is one of the most laboured in the volume. Its object is to prove the Unitarian doctrine, "concerning the origin of Christ's power, viz. that it was given to him." As might have been expected, a great proportion of the reasoning is characterized by the same species of sophism as the reasoning in proof of the derivation of Christ's wisdom and knowledge.—"To prove that any person is a God, no method can be more direct than to show that he is possessed of *underived and independent power*. I conceive, therefore, that we might reduce the whole question concerning the Deity of Christ within this short compass. Did our Saviour possess his power without having received it from any other being, and did he exert it without being subject to the pleasure and control of any other? Or were his authority, his glory, and his majesty, conferred upon him by a superior? The former side of the question is espoused by the Trinitarians, who affirm, that Jesus Christ was omnipotent from eternity, and by his own nature, and that his power is incapable of any increase as well as of any diminution. The latter opinion is espoused with equal firmness by the Unitarians, who assert, that all the power of Christ was *given* to him. It is, therefore, my intention in this chapter, by bringing forward all the passages in the New Testament, which relate to the power of Jesus, to enable every reader to decide for himself the principal question at issue, viz. whether the power of Christ was *given*, or whether it was *underived*." (Pages 92, 93.)

In this general statement, it will appear to the intelligent reader, that, as before, the Trinitarian distinction between Christ *as God*, and Christ *in his complex person* and *official character*, as Emmanuel, is kept entirely out of sight. While the *Unitarian* doctrine is stated to be, that *all* the power of Christ was *given* to him—was *derived* and *not inherent*—the reader is left to conclude, that *Trinitarians* deny his having possessed *any* power of this description—any power, that was, in any sense, *given*, or *deriv-*

ed; and that *all* the power which the Scriptures ascribe to him, is *underived* and *inherent;* than which, as Mr. Yates himself must know, nothing can be farther from truth.

The chapter is divided into three parts :—the first, examining the question of our Lord's independent power "*before his birth of the Virgin Mary :*"—the second, contemplating the exercise of his power *during his abode upon earth :*—and the third, the exercise of his power *subsequently to his ascension to heaven.*

The first part of the inquiry proceeds on the hypothetical assumption of the existence of Christ before his appearance on earth. "The question is, whether, *granting the pre-existence of Christ*, he enjoyed before his incarnation, *underived* power?

Having already considered the principal passages on this head, namely, those in which the creation of all things is ascribed to Christ, and particularly examined the ground taken by Mr. Yates respecting the import of the prepositions ΔΙΑ and ΥΠΟ, it would be impertinent to resume this discussion; and I think it quite unnecessary to enlarge it. I refer the reader to my Fourth Discourse, pages 98—107, and to pages 280—286, of this work, and leave it to himself to judge, whether Mr. Yates has made good his assertions, "that these passages are decisively favourable to the Unitarian doctrine, that if Jesus was concerned in the formation of the heavens and the earth, he was only employed as an instrument in the hands of God his Father:" (page 94.)—and that, "when we direct our view to the first supposed period of our Lord's existence, that preceding his incarnation, we find that every passage in the New Testament which ascribes to him *power* in that period, ascribes it to him as a being inferior to, and dependent upon, the Father." Pages 98, 99.

Of the exercise of our Lord's power during his abode on earth, Mr. Yates says,—"In the course of his public ministry, he exhibited the astonishing and awful proofs of supernatural power, by giving sight to the blind, and reason to the insane, by healing the sick, raising the dead, and by many other stupendous miracles. Here again, the question to be decided is, Whether he performed his mighty acts by underived and independent power,

or whether he was enabled and authorized to exhibit them by God the Father? We may ascertain the truth, partly from the opinions of those who saw our Lord's miracles performed, but chiefly from his own clear declarations." Page 99.

On the argument derived from the *manner* in which Jesus performed some of his miracles,—I refer the reader to pages 194—196, of this treatise, and shall offer very few additional observations on the way in which this argument is treated in this part of Mr. Yates' work.

1. The first is, that Mr. Yates renders it necessary to remind the reader, that the argument is derived, not from *the miracles themselves*, but from the *peculiar manner* in which, *in some instances*, they were performed. When, therefore, Mr. Yates says,—"The more intelligent and impartial Jews, it appears, considered the miracles of Jesus as a proof, that he was "a teacher come from God," which is the exact light in which they are regarded by all Unitarians;—they reasoned, 'No man can do such miracles as Jesus does,' (they did not say, as a Trinitarian would, 'except he be God as well as man,' but) 'except God be with him:'" (page 101.)—when Mr. Yates, I say, speaks thus, he deals unfairly, and ascribes to Trinitarians a mode of reasoning which they disavow.

2. The instances adduced by Mr. Yates to show the impression made upon the spectators of our Lord's miracles, are not the instances adduced by me, as illustrations of my argument.

3. With regard to our Lord's disciples, we are not without evidence that, amidst much darkness and confusion of mind, they yet *did* entertain higher notions of their Master and Lord, than Mr. Yates is willing to admit: we not only find them acknowledging him as "the Son of the living God," but one of them calling him "My Lord and my God," and another appealing to his omniscience, as the searcher of hearts, "Lord thou knowest all things; thou knowest that I love thee." That the miracles of our Lord were *never* regarded by "the beloved John, the zealous Peter," and the other Apostles, as evincing his proper Deity, is, therefore, a *gratis dictum*. On one occasion, Peter was so overpowered with astonishment and dread by one of our

Saviour's miracles, that he fell down at his knees, saying, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."—"The manner in which Peter appears to have been affected," says Dr. Campbell, "and the extraordinary petition he presented to a person of whose benevolence and humanity he had been so oft a witness, clearly show, that he discovered in his Master, on this occasion, something superior to human, which quite overwhelmed him with awe and fear."

When, after quoting John xx. 30, 31, Mr. Yates says, "We see that the beloved disciple, who always spoke of his Master in the most glowing terms of admiration and affection, and who wrote his history, when many were disposed to fall away from the faith, in order to prevent their love from waxing cold, never regarded the miracles of Christ as a proof that he was God, but only as a proof that he was *the Messiah, the Son of God*," (page 102.)—he takes for granted that the title "*Son of God*" does *not* imply his equality with the Father. The comments of the Evangelist himself, however, on the meaning of the appellation, may, perhaps, be more satisfactory to the reader, than that of Mr. Yates. He will find them in John i. 1—3, 10, 14. 1 John i. 1, 2. with v. 20.

4. While in the minds of the disciples themselves there was such a measure of ignorance and perplexity, so strange a mixture of temporal and spiritual notions and expectations, associated with their conviction of his being the Christ, that at times they appear to have been quite confounded, and not to have known well what to think; we need not surely be much surprised, that the Jewish people in general should have failed to draw the inference, which the manner of his performing his miracles was, on some occasions, fitted to suggest. Their ignorance of their own prophets; their consequent ignorance of the Old Testament doctrine as to the person, character, and work of the Messiah;—their rooted prejudices, and worldly-minded desires and hopes; their blindness, and hardness of heart, in resisting the clearest and most impressive evidence of the validity of his claims, and the truth of his doctrine;—all prepare us to learn without surprise, that his real dignity escaped their dark and misguided

understandings. Considering the state of their minds, it is far from being "doubtless," that "the Jews," even although their "nation had been signalized by the display of miracles during many former ages," were "best able to judge of the nature of the testimony" of miracles. The very reverse was the fact.

5. Both during our Lord's life, and after his ascension, his apostles, and other ministers, wrought their miracles *in his name*. It is difficult to conceive that the twelve, and the seventy, should have been impressed with no higher notions of Jesus than as a fellow-man, or a great prophet, when they said to him, "Lord, even the devils are subject to us *through thy name*:" a consideration, by the way, which may serve to give further strength to the observations made under the *third* particular.—Christ says, before his ascension, (Mark xvi. 17.) "And these signs shall follow them that believe: *in my name* shall they cast out devils," &c.; and the Evangelist adds, "They went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with them and confirming the word, by signs following." Ver. 20. These expressions the reader may compare with the following passages, in the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles: Acts iii. 6, 16. iv. 7, 10. ix. 34. xvi. 18. Rom. xv. 18, &c.—It is surely very remarkable, that these mighty works should thus have been done *in the name of Jesus;* that HE should be spoken of as *doing the works;* they the instruments of his power, he the wonder working agent; so that, in disclaiming any power or holiness of their own, as causing the effects produced, they should have ascribed all to the *name and power of Christ;* if, indeed, that name was only the name of a glorified man. In speaking of the view given by Peter, of the miracles of his Master, in Acts x. 38. and Acts ii. 22. Mr. Yates explains his language as meaning that "in fact '*God did the miracles through him*,' God being the real author of the miracles, and Christ the medium through the instrumentality of whom they were accomplished." (Page 102.)—This is perfectly rational, if Jesus was a mere prophet: it places him, as to miraculous power, on the ground which every mere prophet must occupy: but it is hardly consistent with the sentiment held by Mr. Yates, and by Unitarians in general, of his possessing pow-

er at his own disposal, in a way quite peculiar to himself.—But what shall we make of those passages in which miracles are represented, both during his life, and especially after his ascension as done *in his name?* Is he a mere *instrument* or *medium* when this is the case? No. The apostles are now the instruments, and they ascribe the power which produced the effect to their exalted Lord. The very place which THE FATHER occupied in *his* miracles, HE HIMSELF occupies in *theirs*. So that, substituting *Christ* for *God*, and *Peter* or *Paul* for *Christ*, we may adopt Mr. Yates' own words, and say; "*Christ*, in fact, *did the miracles through his apostle*, Christ being the real author of the miracle, and his apostle the medium through whom they were exhibited."

"Having considered the inferences," says Mr. Yates, derived from the miracles of Jesus by those who saw them performed, let us, in the second place, inquire what account he himself gave of the power by which he exhibited them." (Page 103.)—Under this particular, we have proofs adduced, to which many more might have been added, of what nobody questions; viz. that the miracles of Jesus were wrought by the power of the Father, and that he himself, in performing them, openly acknowledged that power. It was indispensably necessary that Jesus should appear as having *God with him*, both in what he taught, and in the work which he executed. And so much has already been said, respecting the sense in which he was *sent* and *commissioned* that this can present no difficulty to the mind of the intelligent and candid inquirer. I shall only, therefore, further remark, that, even on those occasions when he is considered by Unitarians as most explicitly disclaiming underived power, he used language at the same time, which it is not easy to conceive any mere prophet—any mere creature to have employed.—Let us take for illustration a few verses of that remarkable address of our Lord to the Jews, which is recorded in the fifth chapter of the Gospel by John, from the 17th verse.—The Jews having got information of the cure wrought by Jesus at the pool of Bethesda, "persecuted and sought to slay him, because he had done these things on the Sabbath day."—To the charge of having violated the Sab-

bath, our Lord answered, "*My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.*"—His reply is generally understood to signify, that although the Divine Father had set apart the seventh day, after finishing the work of creation, as a day of rest from labour, and of holy worship, to be observed by men, in commemoration of the great Creator's glory,—yet that he had continued from the beginning till that time, carrying on the affairs of the world, maintaining the universe, and superintending, in the exercise of his wisdom and power, all its complicated concerns, without distinction of one day more than another. He was not bound himself by such institutions as he had appointed for his creatures: that Jesus vindicates himself, in this instance, not on the ground of the *merciful nature* of the work he had performed, and the consistency of *such* works with the spirit of the laws relative to the Sabbath, but directly from *the example of the Father.*—But this ground of vindication could hardly, I should think, be good and valid, except on the supposition of the *equality of the parties.* It would be rather a singular defence for any mere man to set up in his own behalf for his having performed some work on the Sabbath day, that God himself was engaged on that day, as well as on other days, in managing the affairs of the universe.

However good and consistent the sense may be which is thus yielded, I am disposed to think that our Lord refers, not to the divine superintendence of creation, but to *his own miraculous works.* The spirit of his vindication appears to me to be this: —"In all the miraculous works which I have 'hitherto' performed, my Father worketh as well as I. *His* power has been in exercise as well as *mine.* Whatever, therefore, will condemn me, will equally condemn God my Father also."

Whatsoever view we adopt, it is plain, in the *first* place, that the Jews could never, on this, or on other occasions, have accused him of blasphemy, for simply calling God his Father. They themselves said "*We have one Father, even God;*" John viii. 41. They *must* have understood him as claiming this relation in a sense peculiar to himself. And so verse 18th informs us they did:—"They sought the more to kill him, because he not only had broken the Sabbath, but said also that God was his

Father," (πατερα ΙΔΙΟΝ ελεγε τον Θεον) making himself equal with God." (ισον εαυτον ποιων τω Θεω.) They understood him then to call God *his Father*, in a sense implying *equality with God.* The mere phrase "MY *Father*," in verse 17th, might, perhaps, from the use of the possessive pronoun in the *singular* number, convey to their minds an *appropriation* of God's paternal relation, in a sense peculiar to himself; yet it seems much more probable that they deduced this inference from what he said respecting the Father and himself: which they seem to have understood as implying *the possession and exercise of common power, and of common independence and authority.*

This they condemned as *blasphemy.* Upon which Jesus "answered them, saying, Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." Ver. 19. Much depends here on the meaning of the phrase "*of himself.*" The following passages will sufficiently show its meaning to be, that he said nothing and did nothing *without commission, without authority;* that all that he said and did had the *sanction* and *concurrence* of the Father; chap. vii. 17. viii. 28. xii. 49, 50. xiv. 10, &c. What follows confirms this:—"The Son can do nothing of himself, *but what he seeth the Father do.*" These words cannot surely mean, that he *repeats what the Father does before him.* They are explained by verse 20th;—"For the Father loveth the Son, and *showeth him all things that himself doeth: and he will show him* GREATER WORKS THAN THESE, that ye may marvel." His MIRACLES, then, were "things which he *saw the Father do;*" which the Father "*did;*" which the Father "*showed him.*" (Compare as to what he *taught*, chap. iii. 11. viii. 38.) The meaning, therefore, of the 19th verse must be, (seeing these miracles were not first performed by the Father, and then repeated by the Son) that the Father and he exerted, in these miraculous works, *a common and concurrent power;* that he was fully acquainted with the mind and will of the Father, knew whatever he was to do before it was done, and exercised his own power along with the Father's, in performing the same works. The *principle* of this interpretation extends to

all acts of divine power in *creation* and *providence;* but it is of his miracles that he more immediately speaks.

By the "*greater works*" of which Jesus speaks in verse 20th, he seems to have meant especially the *raising of the dead* to life:—"*For*," adds he, "as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will." The expression is remarkable—"quickeneth *whom he will.*" There must be the *will* and the *power* of *God*, in order to the quickening of any. Yet Jesus speaks of himself as possessing a *power* sufficient for raising the dead, *under the control of his own will.* I am unable to understand this, unless upon the general principle just now stated, of *the will and power of the Father, and the will and power of the Son, concurring in the production of the same effects.* But this can be true of no one but a Divine person. A creature, in the performance of works which require Divine power, can be nothing more than an *instrument*, utterly destitute of such power in himself.

Let the reader peruse the whole passage, from verse 16th to verse 30th. He will find, that while there is throughout, as was to be expected, constant reference to the mediatorial office and work of the speaker, there is language too, (such as that which has been noticed) which is incapable of any simple and consistent explanation, except on the supposition of his possessing, in this capacity, a nature higher than the human. Let our great general principle, of this twofold nature and character of the speaker, be then applied, as the key of interpretation; and what was felt to be inexplicable in relation to his human nature alone, or to his Divine nature alone, or even to the Divine and human natures together, when considered abstractedly from his official character, becomes harmonious and consistent, when his complex person and mediatorial office are taken into account.

"The third period of our Lord's existence," says Mr. Yates, "in which I proposed to consider the exercise of his power, is that subsequent to his ascension into heaven. The state to which he has been exalted, is described in the New Testament in the most elevated language, but is uniformly represented as

the gift and the appointment of a superior Being, namely God the Father." (Pages 105, 106.)

Take out the word "*Being*," and Trinitarians will not object to this statement. "There is no incongruity in the idea of delegated authority and dominion, when Jesus is viewed as a *Divine Mediator*. Those who maintain this view of his person and character, acknowledge such delegation as an essential article of their scheme. Believing him to be represented in the Scriptures, as voluntarily assuming the form, and acting in the capacity, of a servant, they are not startled at finding this representation consistently maintained throughout. In perfect harmony, therefore, with this view of his relation to the Father, in the work of redemption, they consider all that he did as done *by appointment*, and all that he received, in his exaltation to glory, as received in the form of *reward;* and the reward they account singularly appropriate, consisting, as it does, in his investiture, as Mediator, with the administration of that branch of the Divine government which has for its immediate object the completion of the glorious effects resulting from the work of salvation which he finished when on earth. Admit the principle of his acting, in the scheme of redeeming mercy, in the voluntarily assumed capacity of a servant, and all is plain: instead of disorder, embarrassment, and difficulty, we have a perfect plan, not only interesting in its design, and glorious in its consequences, but consistent and harmonious in all its arrangements;—'well ordered in all things and sure.'" Discourses, page 111.

On this branch of the subject, I reckon it quite unnecessary to do more than transcribe these few sentences; referring my readers at the same time, to the subsequent reasonings in the same Discourse, and to various passages in this work. It may be very convenient for a Unitarian to accumulate proofs of the inferiority of Jesus when upon earth, and of the delegation to him of the power which he exercises in heaven. Chapter can thus be added to chapter; and, all being stated with imposing confidence, and no notice being taken of any other view of the passages, any more than if no other had ever been proposed: both voluminous bulk, and an air of plausibility, may, in this

way, be easily given to the whole. But there is, throughout, what Lord Bacon calls, I think, an *error of the den.* Only one side of the question is presented. The *principle* of Trinitarian interpretation is left unnoticed; and the reader, who is ignorant of the controversy, wonders, in this ignorance, how so much can be said. Yet, till the Trinitarian principle of interpretation is fairly met, and successfully combated, nothing whatever is done. If Trinitarians denied that the Lord Jesus possesses *delegated power and authority*, the passages adduced by Mr. Yates would come against them with irresistible force. But since this is not the case; since Trinitarians *assert* his delegated authority, instead of denying it, the simple question comes to be, whether they are right in the double view they take of the person of Christ? whether there be any scriptural foundation for the distinction between his *natural* and his *official* power? whether there be any inconsistency in supposing him to possess, *as God*, inherent Divine authority, and, in his voluntarily assumed official character, *as Mediator*, to be invested with dominion,—to have "all things put under his feet,"—to be made "Head over all things to the Church?" While this view remains unrefuted, the passages, with their comments, may be multiplied into volumes instead of chapters, and be, after all, just as valid and conclusive proofs of the *Trinitarian* system, as of *its opposite*.

Mr. Yates "closes the evidence for the *derivation* of Christ's power, and his inferiority to the Father, with the remarkable language of the apostle Paul, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, (chap. xv. 24—28.) 'Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith, all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.'" —Even of this remarkable passage, I should have no great

objection to adopt Mr. Yates' interpretation, only viewing Christ in his *official* capacity, *as Mediator* :—" The apostle here teaches, not only that all the power at present exercised by our Saviour is conferred upon him by God the Father, who is said to have ' put all things under his feet,' but that, when the great and benevolent purposes for which he is invested with that power, have been fully answered, and all the designs of his Mediatorial office finally accomplished, he will deliver up the kingdom, and resign the authority granted to him." (Page 112.)—Yes : the mediatorial government of Christ is a branch of the great general administration of the Supreme Godhead. When all its important and interesting purposes have been fully and finally accomplished, it shall, of course, cease, and matters shall, thus far, revert to their previous state :—GOD, that is, THE GODHEAD, shall be all in all. The expression—" *then* shall the Son also be *subject* unto him that put all things under him," can mean no more than simply the *cessation of his mediatorial reign.* If it meant any more than this, then it would follow, that the Son is not *now* subject to the Father : an idea which no Unitarian, at least, can consistently maintain ; unless he be ready to maintain that this creature is absolved from subjection to the Creator, by an act of the Creator himself, and that a part of the Divine dominions is relinquished to the sovereign, uncontrolled command of such a creature,—left to the mercy of a created, and, therefore, of a mutable, will.

In these circumstances, the reader is left to judge how far Mr. Yates, without the smallest attempt to invalidate the Trinitarian principle of interpretation, and before he came to touch a single Trinitarian argument for the divinity of Christ, was warranted to use such language as the following : " We have found it to be the uniform doctrine of the New Testament, that, in all these successive states," (i. e. *before*, and *during*, and *after*, his appearance on earth,) " he is inferior to God the Father, and possesses no power or authority but by derivation from the Father. If, therefore, there be any truth in Scripture, or any intelligible meaning in the words of Christ and his apostles, the Unitarian doctrine is now fully and irrefragably proved. viz. that

all the power by which our Saviour was ever distinguished, did not originally belong to him in his own nature, but was given to him by the only true God, the Father." Pages 112, 113. After this, I think it would have been well for Mr. Yates, to have said as little as possible about CONFIDENCE and DOGMATISM.

CHAPTER IV.

SOME passages in the course of the preceding discussion, have been referred to by Mr. Yates, respecting which I have expressed my opinion, and given my reasons for it, that, so far from being favourable to his system, they contain evidence against it.—In this chapter, I shall enumerate these, referring to the places where they have been previously noticed:—and shall then subjoin a few more testimonies from Scripture, to the doctrine of our Lord's divinity, which were not adduced in my former Volume.

1. John x. 30—38.—See pages 123—130.
2. John xvii. 21.—See pages 130—132.
3. Matth. xi. 27. with Luke x. 22.—See pages 261—263.
4. John v. 23.—See pages 263, 264.
5. Gal. i. 1.—Page 264.
6. Gal. i. 3. Eph. vi. 23. 2 Tim. i. 2. Tit. i. 4. 1 Cor. i. 3. 2 Cor. i. 2. Eph. i. 2. Phil. i. 2. Col. i. 2. 1 Tim. i. 1, 2. Philem. 3. 1 Thess. i. 1. 2 Thess. iii. 11. 2 Thess. i. 1, 2.—which are classed together under one head, on account of their similarity, but each of which affords a distinct instance of prayer for blessings, either temporal or spiritual, addressed to Jesus equally with the Father.
7. 1 Cor. viii. 6.—See pages 266—268.
8. John v. 17—21.—See pages 302—305.

It is not because I feel the slightest necessity for additional proofs, that I now go on to bring them forward. I trust I have

succeeded, to the satisfaction of the impartial reader, in firmly establishing the validity of those which were formerly adduced, by proving that, although they may have been touched in two or three trivial points, they are substantially unaffected by any of the exceptions brought against them. My sole object is to show, that what Mr. Yates alleges about our stock of proofs being exhausted, is not true; but that Bible evidences are still in reserve, not less conclusive than the former. I shall not enter, however, into any enlarged illustration of these; but shall content myself with a few brief remarks upon each, pointing out the light in which they strike my own mind. I shall observe no particular arrangement in bringing them forward.

1. In Psalm lxxviii. 18, and 56, it is said of the Israelites in the wilderness :—"They TEMPTED GOD in their heart, by asking meat for their lust:"—"They TEMPTED and provoked the MOST HIGH GOD, and kept not his testimonies." In drawing instruction and admonition from their conduct and experience, the apostle Paul says, 1 Cor. x. 9. "Neither let us TEMPT CHRIST, as some of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents."—"These texts do both relate to the same rebellious acts of the Israelites in the wilderness. In the former of them, the person whom they tempted is called the *most high God:* in the latter, he is called *Christ:* therefore *Christ* is *the most high God;*"* and the sin of *tempting* CHRIST, against which Christians are admonished, is the very same, in nature and in guilt, with the sin committed by the Israelites in *tempting* JEHOVAH.

2. Isa. viii. 13, 14. "Sanctify THE LORD OF HOSTS himself; and let HIM be your fear, and let HIM be your dread, and HE shall be for a sanctuary; but for a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, to both the houses of Israel."—"He who was to be a stumbling stone, and a rock of offence, is called by Isaiah, the LORD OF HOSTS; and he bids the children of Israel '*sanctify*' (honour, worship, and magnify) '*him*, and make him their fear and their dread.'—*Fear* is here put for the *object* of fear, which is GOD; but the apostles Paul and Peter apply this expressly to CHRIST. Rom. ix. 32, 33. 'They stumbled at *the*

* Jones on the Cath. Doct. of the Trinity, p. 6.

stumbling stone; as it is written, Behold, I lay in Zion a stumbling stone, and rock of offence; and whosoever believeth in him (Christ) shall not be ashamed.'—1 Pet. ii. 7, 8. 'Unto you, therefore, who believe, *he* (Jesus Christ) is precious; but unto them who are disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner, and *a stone of stumbling*, and *a rock of offence*, to those who stumble at the word.' Therefore, JESUS CHRIST is the LORD OF HOSTS; is to be *sanctified*, (*worshipped*, and *magnified*,) and is the *true object* of *religious fear* and *reverence.*"*

3. Psal. xcvii. 7. "Worship him, all ye gods:"—compared with Heb. i. 6. "When he bringeth in his first-begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him."—"That glorious and magnificent description in the ninety-seventh Psalm, is of one, who in several parts of it, is called JEHOVAH, and *worship* commanded to be given to him; 'Worship him all ye gods.' But the apostle says, it was the SON OF GOD who was spoken of in that sacred hymn. Therefore HE is JEHOVAH *to whom divine worship is due*, and *of whom* the glorious things in that Psalm are said, proper to none but the *true God.*"†—"If," says Bishop Horsley, "in argument with any of the false teachers of the present day, I were to allege this text of the Psalm in proof of our Lord's divinity, my antagonist would probably reply, that our Lord is not once mentioned in the Psalm; that the subject of the Psalm is an assertion of the proper divinity of Jehovah, the God of the Israelites, as distinguished from the imaginary deities which the heathen worshipped. This Psalm, therefore, which proposes Jehovah, the God of the Israelites, as the sole object of worship to men and angels, is alleged, he would say, to no purpose, in justification of worship paid to another person. And to any one who might know nothing more of the true sense of this passage than may appear in the words taken by themselves, my

* "A clear display of the Trinity from Divine Revelation; with an impartial examination of some traditions concerning God, in systems contrived by councils, assemblies and synods, and imposed upon mankind as articles of faith, &c. By A. M. a Layman.—London, 1773."

† Ibid.

adversary might seem to have the better in the argument. I think I should seem to myself to stand confuted, if I knew no more of the meaning of my text, or rather of the inspired song of which it makes a part, than an inattentive reader might collect from a hasty view of its general purport. But observe the references on the margin of the Bible, and you will find that a parallel passage occurs in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the first chapter at the sixth verse. Turn to this passage of the Epistle, and there you will find this text of the Plalmist cited by St. Paul to this very purpose, namely, to prove that adoration is due from the blessed angels of God to the only-begotten Son:—for thus he reasons: 'When he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him.' The only passage in the Old Testament, as the Hebrew text now stands, is this seventh verse of the ninety-seventh Psalm. The words of the Psalmist, indeed, are these, 'Worship him, all ye gods.' The apostle, that he might clearly exclude a plurality of gods while he asserts the Godhead of the Son, thinks proper to explain the Psalmist's words by substituting, 'all the angels of God' for 'all the gods.' But it is very evident, that the first-begotten was, in the apostle's judgment, the object of worship propounded by the Psalmist, otherwise these words of the Psalmist, in which he calls upon the angels to worship Jehovah, were alleged to no purpose in proof of the Son's natural pre-eminence above the angels. For either the Son is the object of worship intended by the Psalmist, or the Son himself is to bear a part in the worship so universally enjoined."*

4. Isa. liv. 5. "Thy Maker is thy Husband, the Lord (Jehovah) of hosts is his name: and thy Redeemer, the Holy One of Israel; the God of the whole earth shall he be called."—"The *Husband*, or *Bridegroom*, of the church, and her *Redeemer*, is here called the LORD OF HOSTS, and the GOD OF THE WHOLE EARTH. But *Jesus Christ* is *Husband* or *Bridegroom*, and *Redeemer* of the church.—Eph. v. 23. 'The husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church.'—Rev. xix.

* Nine Sermons on the nature of the evidence by which the fact of our Lord's resurrection is established, and on various other subjects. Pages 228—231.

7. 'Let us be glad and rejoice, and give honour to him; for the *marriage of the Lamb* is come, and *his Wife* hath made herself ready.'—Rev. xxi. 9. 'Come hither, and I will show thee the Bride the LAMB'S wife.'—Gal. iii. 13. '*Christ* hath *redeemed* us from the curse of the law.'—Col. i. 14. 'In whom we have *redemption* through his blood," &c.—JESUS CHRIST, therefore, is the LORD OF HOSTS, the GOD OF THE WHOLE EARTH."*

5. Psal. lxviii. 17, 18. "The chariots of GOD are twenty thousand thousands of angels; JEHOVAH is among them, as in Sinai, in the holy place. Thou hast ascended up on high, thou hast led captivity captive, thou hast received gifts for men."—Eph. iv. 7, 8. "But unto every one of us is given grace, according to the measure of the gift of Christ. Wherefore he saith, When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men."—According to the Psalmist, it was GOD, JEHOVAH, that ascended up on high:—according to the apostle, it was CHRIST.

6. Zech. xii. 10. "And I" (namely JEHOVAH) "will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplication, and they shall look upon ME whom they have pierced:"—John xix. 34. "One of the soldiers with a spear pierced his (Christ's) side; that the Scripture should be fulfilled—'They shall look on HIM *whom they pierced*.'"—JESUS CHRIST, therefore is JEHOVAH.

7. Jude, verses 24, 25. "Now unto him who is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory, with exceeding joy; to God alone our Saviour, through Jesus Christ our Lord,† be glory and majesty, dominion and power, (as) from eternity, so now, and to eternity, Amen."—That which God the Father is, in these words, represented as able, and alone able, to do, is declared elsewhere to be done by Jesus Christ:—"CHRIST loved the church, and gave himself for it, that HE might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water

* Clear Display of the Trinity, &c. by A. M.

† I follow, in translating this verse, the text of Griesbach, although the common version would afford an argument still more powerful.

by the word; that he might *present it* TO HIMSELF (αυτος εαυτω, Griesbach) a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that it should be holy, and without blemish."—Christ, then, is, in power, and purpose, and operation, one with the Father, and shares with him the glory arising from the final salvation of the church.

8. The principle which applies to so many passages of the *New* Testament, of Jesus Christ being spoken of under the two characters of a Divine person, and "the Mediator between God and men," the servant of Jehovah, furnishes the most reasonable ground of interpretation for some parts of the *Old*. Isaiah, chap. L.—The chapter begins with "THUS SAITH JEHOVAH;" and there is not the least intimation of any change of speaker.—The same speaker, so far as appears, who says in the third verse, "I clothe the heavens with blackness, and I make sackcloth, their covering," says, in the sixth, "I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair: I hid not my face from shame and spitting."—The same speaker, resuming the style of Deity, says of his enemies, in the close of the chapter, "This shall ye have of MY hand, ye shall lie down in sorrow:" —and goes on, in the beginning of the chapter following, to say of Abraham, "I CALLED HIM alone, and blessed him and increased him."—Suppose this speaker throughout to be Messiah "*in* the form of God," and Messiah "in the form of a servant, and the likeness of men," and all is simple and harmonious: whereas the supposition of a change of speaker at verse 4th, where the style of inferiority commences, and a change again, where this style ceases, requires very considerable violence; the more especially, as the things that are said in verses 4—9. are in many respects inapplicable to the prophet himself, while they are strikingly applicable to the promised Redeemer.

9. Isaiah xl. 9—11. In the preceding verses of the chapter, we have the proclamation of the predicted forerunner of THE MESSIAH:—"The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of JEHOVAH, make straight in the desert a high-way for our God." The application of these words to CHRIST we have formerly considered. But the same person

whom the forerunner was to announce is the subject of the proclamation in the 9th verse,—"Say unto the cities of Judah, BEHOLD YOUR GOD!" And it is He whose Divine authority and pastoral care are described in the following verses:—"Behold, the Lord God (or the Lord JEHOVAH) will come with strong hand, and his arm shall rule for him: behold his reward is with him, and his work before him. He shall feed his flock like a shepherd: he shall gather the lambs in his arms, and carry them in his bosom, and shall gently lead those that are with young." To confirm the reference of these words to Christ, the reader may compare them with Isa. xlix. 8—10. Ezek. xxxiv. 23. xxxvii. 24. John x. 11—16. Heb. xiii. 20. 1 Pet. ii. 25. v. 4. &c.

10. Zech. ii. 8, 9. "For thus saith the Lord of hosts;—"After the glory hath he sent me unto the nations that spoiled you: for he that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of his eye. For behold I will shake my hand upon them, and they shall be a spoil to their servants; and ye shall know that the Lord of hosts hath sent me."—"The language of this proclamation first claims our attention. The Lord of hosts is the speaker; (v. 8.) yet he speaks as one that is sent: at the same time he says, 'I will shake my hand upon them;'—'by this ye shall know that the Lord of hosts hath sent me.' The language shows, that not the prophet, but he that spake by him, was intended. There are evidently two persons called here 'the Lord of hosts;' one who is sent, and the other He who sent him: even the Son of God, and the Father who sent him, as his willing Messenger, to be the Saviour of his people. Thus *relatively*, as well as in his human nature, he condescended to be inferior to the Father, though he claimed to be *naturally* equal, as ONE with Him in the unity of the Godhead. And had not the prophet, or rather the Holy Spirit who spake by him, considered the promised Messiah as JEHOVAH SABAOTH, IMMANUEL, such language would not have been used; for it would have had an evident tendency to mislead us. This must necessarily be understood of Christ, who, being God equal with the Father, was sent, as he was Mediator, to dwell in his church."*

* Scott's Commentary on the place.

11. Matth. xxiii. 37. "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them who are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!"

On this passage observe, in the first place;—it appears irresistibly evident, that Jesus refers in it to the preceding history of the Jewish people, and to the whole course of the Divine dealings with them by the prophets. The expression "*how often*," can never, with any propriety, be restricted to the occasional warnings of his public ministry, which lasted only three years, and during which Jerusalem was very seldom favoured with his personal presence. The whole context confirms the observation. He had just been reminding them of the conduct of their fathers to the messengers of God, and assuring them that the blood of all the prophets, from Abel to Zacharias, should be required of that generation. He draws the character of Jerusalem from her past history, "Thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee." It was He that sent these prophets: it was by their monitory voice that he "would have gathered the children of Jerusalem together:" it was *then* that they *would not*." His language corresponds exactly with that addressed to them by Jehovah of old:—"They have not hearkened to my words, saith the Lord, which I sent unto them by my servants the prophets, rising up early and sending; but *ye would not hear*, saith the Lord."*

2dly. In the preceding context, Jesus, having mentioned, in terms of cutting irony, the hypocritical protestations of the Pharisees of his day, that "if they had lived in the days of their fathers, they would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets," says to them; "Wherefore, behold *I* send unto *you*, prophets and wise men and scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify and some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city." What is this but saying: You are vehement in these protestations; you disavow the bloody deeds of your

* Jer. xxix. 19. also chap. vii. 13, 25—27. xxv. 4—7, &c.

rebellious forefathers: I will put to trial the sincerity of these professions: I will bring you to the test, and let you discover, when you are placed in similar circumstances, whether you are not children of these persecutors, in *character*, as well as by natural lineage: I, who sent the prophets to your fathers, will send prophets also to *you;* and your conduct to them will show what is in your hearts, and identify you with your ungodly and cruel progenitors, giving you the opportunity, "ye serpents, ye generation of vipers," to "fill up the measure" of their sins.

3dly. These remarks are further confirmed by the resemblance between the manner in which our Lord expresses himself, and the style of the Old Testament Scriptures in reference to the care and protection of Jehovah.—Ruth ii. 12. "A full reward be given thee of Jehovah, the God of Israel, under whose wings thou art come to trust:"—Psal. xvii. 8. "Hide me under the shadow of thy wings."—Psal. xxxvi. 7. "Therefore do the sons of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings:"—Psal. lvii. 1. "In the shadow of thy wings will I make my refuge, until these calamities be overpast:"—Psal. lxi. 4. "I will trust in the covert of thy wings:"—Psal. xci. 4. "He shall cover thee with his feathers, and under his wings shalt thou trust.

4thly. Make the supposition, unreasonable as it is, that our Lord, in this passage, refers only to the period of his own public ministry;—then we still ask, what mere human prophet, what mere created messenger, could ever use terms like these, with regard to *his own* protecting power? Surely there was no wing but the wing of omnipotence, under which Jerusalem could find security. It was under *this* wing, without doubt, that Jesus "would have gathered her children." Yet he speaks expressly of his inviting them *to himself;* offering them *his own* protection; stretching forth the wing of *his own* power and grace, to cover them from harm.

I cannot but consider this passage as containing most conclusive evidence that Jesus of Nazareth was Jehovah, the God of Israel. I do not think it is capable of a fair and reasonable explanation on any other hypothesis.

12. Luke xxi. 15. "For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist." Let the reader compare with this text, Exod. iv. 11, 12. Prov. ii. 6. Jer. i. 9. Acts ii. 4. Jam. i. 5. "In these texts it is declared, that it belongeth to Jehovah alone, to make, or to open man's mouth, or to give wisdom. Yet Jesus, during his lowest humiliation on earth, in the most express and explicit terms, promised to give his disciples 'a mouth and wisdom which none of their adversaries should be able to gainsay or resist.' Such texts are seldom adduced in argumentative discourses on our Lord's deity, or on the doctrine of the Trinity; but they are of immense importance in these controversies; and the inference from them cannot so easily be evaded as that may which is deduced from express declarations on these subjects. For the learned and ingenious opponents of these great mysteries of Christianity, have long been employed in searching for some other reading, or some plausible criticism, on these texts, which form apparently the grand pillars of our system; but they are more vulnerable when the assault is less expected. Most certainly, however, our Lord here promises to perform the work of God, which other Scriptures declare to belong incommunicably to him.—Yet the same things are also ascribed to the Holy Spirit: and *unbiassed* common sense will show any man what the conclusion must be, according to the sacred oracles."*

13. Col. iii. 13. "Forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any; even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye."

Christians are, in these words, exhorted to forgive those by whom they have been injured; and the exhortation is enforced by the example of Christ in forgiving themselves. But, if there be any propriety in the comparison between Christ's conduct and the conduct recommended, the wrongs forgiven by Christ must be viewed as having been committed *against himself*.—Now, let us recollect who they were who are here addressed. They were chiefly *Gentile converts*, who never had any intercourse with the Jewish Messiah, and never, consequently, any

* Scott's Commentary.

opportunity of doing him personal injury. Yet the sins, it appears, which these Gentiles had committed previously to their embracing the faith of the gospel, *were committed against Christ. He* was disobeyed ;—*he* was dishonoured. But how was this possible, unless Christ was the Supreme God, the Creator, Lawgiver, and Ruler of the world, of whose authority all sin is the violation ?—To this it is no sufficient reply to allege, that Christ might, *in the name of God, communicate the intimation of pardon*, or be himself the *instrument of obtaining it :* for, on that supposition, the cases stated in the text are very far from being parallel ; and those whom Paul exhorts might have replied with truth, that Christ had set no such example, none of them having ever transgressed against *him*. The whole force and influence of the comparison lies clearly in this,—that, Christ having freely forgiven them wrongs so great committed against *him*, it became them, as his followers, to forgive each other the wrongs committed against themselves. According to the judgment of the Apostle, then, Jesus Christ must be He against whom men trespass, even although they have not known him, and have never been blessed with any revelation of the Messiah, the Saviour of the world :—which could not be the case, unless he stood to them in the relation of their God, to whom they were subject and accountable as the creatures of his hand.*

It was at one time my intention to have entered into some discussion relative to the Angel who appears so frequently in the Old Testament history, and who *speaks*, and is *spoken of*, and *spoken to*, under the appellation and character of Jehovah.—This work, however, has already extended so very far beyond my original expectation, that I am now still disposed, as before, to decline entering on this branch of the subject.

I shall close this chapter with a single general observation. In putting to death " the Lord of glory," the Jews perpetrated a crime of nameless atrocity ;—so clear and so numberless were the evidences which he exhibited of the validity of his claims.—Yet, by the law of Moses, the sin of blasphemy exposed the transgressor to death : and, if Jesus could have been convicted

* See Royaards' Diatribe de Divinitate Jesu Christi vera, pages 170—172.

of the sin, that law would not only have justified, but would have imperiously required, a capital infliction. Now, if he was a mere creature, and yet "made himself equal with God," he *was* guilty, and flagrantly guilty too. We know that, on different occasions, he expressed himself in such a way, that the Jews thought he *did* claim this equality with God. Was, this, then, a purely malicious interpretation of his words? Was there nothing in his mode of speech that was at all fitted to convey any such impression to their minds? If there was *not*, the guilt was entirely their own. But if there *was*, then, in proportion as this was the case, their guilt was evidently extenuated. And was not this guilt still further extenuated, if, when they had fallen into the mistake, and brought forward their charge, the imputation, instead of being instantly and explicitly disowned and repelled, was met in such terms, as served to confirm, rather than to dissipate, the impression of its truth? When, indeed, we take into view all that Jesus said of himself, we cannot be surprised that the Jews should have understood him as they did; and the principles of those who assert him to have been a mere man, or a mere created messenger of God, furnish the most plausible apology which can be produced, in mitigation of their guilt, in "denying the holy One and the just, and killing the prince of life."

CHAPTER V.

In drawing toward a conclusion of this work, (which, I am rather apprehensive, may be no unpleasant prospect to the reader,) I must again solicit attention to the real magnitude and importance of the difference between the doctrines which it defends, and those of my opponent and the party to which he belongs. Mr. Yates concludes his introduction in the following terms :—"I think it probable, that the chief effect produced by this controversy will be a conviction, in the mind of candid and sensible judges, that the differences of sentiment between the two contending parties, are much less than is commonly supposed. In perusing the Discourses of my opponent, it has often occurred to me, that his orthodoxy is little more than *Unitarianism in a mist;* and if our readers shall still think, that there is any thing real or substantial in those mysterious tenets superadded by Mr. Wardlaw to the plain truths, in holding which we are both agreed, I trust such persons will however acknowledge, that, under the government of a Being infinitely wise and good, it is impossible that the everlasting happiness of mankind should depend upon their perception of such dim points and dusky distinctions." (P. 8, 9.)

Elsewhere, Mr. Yates admires "the powers of reasoning" displayed by his opponent, pronounces his statements "clear and intelligible," and "heartily joins in the universal confession, that the Trinitarian system could not have been more ably defended." Was the paragraph which I have quoted, dictated by a kind anxiety to preserve the brain of his friend from the prejudicial effects from such commendation? Certainly the Trinitarian system, instead of "ably," must have been most miserably defended, and the statements relative to it must have been any thing but "clear and intelligible," if, after all, the orthodoxy of its defender has appeared little better than "*Unitarianism in a mist.*" This, by the way, would not, perhaps, have been an

unappropriate title page designation to Mr. Yates' own work; in which, as we have seen, we are continually enveloped in a mist of negatives, without any distinct and determinate view of what Unitarianism is. The attempt to reduce the magnitude, or to lighten the weight, of the differences between us, is as vain a one as could well be made. They respect all that is essential and fundamental in Christianity. With as much wisdom might you try to unite the poles, or to bring east and west together. It is not at all a case, in which, by mutually explaining, and softening down, the sentiments of the contending parties may be made to meet, or even to approximate. It is mere childish affectation of liberality, to talk as if they could. The two systems, which of them soever be the right or the wrong, stand as antipodes to each other, with the whole world between them. If it be Christianity, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are God, equal with the Father, and entitled to supreme adoration and homage; that man is a fallen, guilty, and depraved creature, and, as such, utterly incapable of obtaining acceptance with God, on the ground of his own obedience, or righteousness; that the great design of Christ's coming into the world was, to atone for human guilt by the sacrifice of himself; and that his sufferings and death were thus vicarious and expiatory, and his resurrection from the dead the evidence of their efficacy, as well as the pledge of life to all who trust in his finished work; that the influence of the Divine Spirit is necessary for the illumination of the understanding in the things of God, and for the renovation and progressive sanctification of the soul; that the present life is the only period during which sinners of the human race can be brought to "repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," and to consequent salvation; that the good works of believers form no part of the ground of their justification before God, and their enjoyment of eternal life, but, they themselves being previously "accepted in the Beloved," their works also, springing from a heart renewed by grace, are accepted and approved, as fruits and evidences of that "faith which worketh by love:" if these, and other kindred doctrines, be Christianity, how, in the name of common sense, is it possible, that their op-

posites should be Christianity too? Is it not infantile weakness, for the abettors of either of these opposite systems to be angry with the supporters of the other, because they decline giving them the appellation of *Christians?* Why are we to convert this sacred name into a mere epithet of unmeaning compliment? The inconsistency is equal on both sides. It is just as absurd for Mr. Yates to bestow it on me, as it would be for me to bestow it on him. If my opponent be a Christian, I am a deluded idolater, miserably deceived in the object of my worship, and the foundation of my hope! Why should we disguise this matter, and delude ourselves and one another, by taking a name in common, when we have hardly a principle in common? I am quite prepared for the ordinary charge of illiberality and narrow-mindedness. But the charge, in such a case, has no foundation in Scripture, or in common sense; and I therefore disregard it, and cheerfully yield the world's plaudits to those who, so unphilosophically, as well as so unscripturally, confound under one common term, things so essentially different.

Mr. Yates speaks in a much more sensible and manly manner, in his sermon "On the duty and manner of deciding the more important religious controversies," than in the extract from his "Vindication," which has led to these observations. There we find nothing about the differences of sentiment being "much less than is commonly supposed," or consisting in "dim points, and dusky distinctions." Of the controversy respecting the Trinity, he there says;—"In its immediate views, it involves no less a question than that concerning the proper object of supreme worship: in its connexions and results, it leads to the most interesting and important inquiries respecting the character of God, and the capacities, duties, and hopes of his creatures:" (page 8.) and afterwards: "Ardently interested to discover the import of this Divine revelation, they will esteem it their duty to study the Scriptures seriously, judiciously, and impartially, in order to ascertain whether Jesus Christ has directed men to worship the Father as the only true God, or whether he has also directed them to worship himself and the Holy Spirit, as equal to the Father in power and glory. *No two opinions can be more*

opposite and distinct. Upon so important and fundamental a question, the language of revelation cannot be ambiguous. On whatever side the error lies, it is an error of great magnitude. All these considerations will weigh with the reflecting Christian, to engage him in the diligent and impartial examination of this question." Page 13.

If it be so, (and I heartily concur in the sentiment) that "on so important and fundamental a question, the language of revelation cannot be ambiguous," does it not follow, and ought not the consequence deeply to impress all our minds, that those, whosoever they be, who differ from revelation, must be wilfully and criminally blind? What, then, shall we make of the sentiment, (so prevalent and so well fitted to lull the mind in perilous security) that "under the government of a Being infinitely wise and good, it is impossible that the everlasting happiness of mankind should depend upon the perception of such dim points and dusky distinctions?"—Here, too, let Mr. Yates himself furnish the corrective:—"What regard," says he, in his sermon already referred to, "will, at the judgment seat of Christ, be paid to our opinions, considered apart from our dispositions and our practice, we are not, perhaps, very clearly informed. *It is certain, however, that the general tenor of the New Testament annexes the greatest importance to firmness and purity of faith, as a medium of everlasting salvation:*—and, as clear and correct conceptions upon the principal truths of religion contribute greatly, *in the present state*, to improve the moral character, and to extend the benevolent, and exalt the devotional, affections, we may reasonably conclude, that they will also produce a very sensible effect upon our welfare and advancement *in the heavenly world.*" P. 14. Let me then warn my fellow Christians, to beware of every attempt, however imposing and plausible, to seduce their minds into a light estimate of essential truths. Deeply impressed with the holiness and justice of God; the purity and righteousness of his law, in its requirements and in its sanction; the unutterable malignity and demerit of sin; and the guilt and helplessness of your state as sinners;—you have felt your need of such a salvation as the gospel makes known; a salvation, wrought by a Divine Saviour,

suited, in its *freedom*, to your state as unworthy sinners, and adequate, in its *greatness*, to the full extent of your guilt; a salvation, in perfect harmony with the demands of the Divine law, "magnifying and making it honourable;" a salvation, in full accordance with all the attributes of the Divine character, "glorifying to God in the highest." Let me beseech you, then, "that with purpose of heart ye cleave unto the Lord."—"As ye have received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk ye in him; rooted and built up in him, and stablished in the faith as ye have been taught, abounding therein with thanksgiving. Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in Him."* While men continue so insensible to the corruption of their nature, and to the extent of their sinfulness and guilt, as to fancy that their *good life* is to be the ground of their acceptance with God, and their final salvation, it is not to be wondered at, that they should feel no need for an atonement, for the grace of a Divine Saviour, and the enlightening and renewing influences of a Divine Spirit. Let a Unitarian once be brought to see *himself* aright, in the glass of the Divine word, and he will, at the same moment, feel the inadequacy of his system to the awful exigencies of his situation, and will "flee for refuge, to lay hold upon the hope set before him" in the gospel.

In this "Reply," I have purposely confined myself to two leading articles of discussion, namely the TRINITY, and the SUPREME DIVINITY OF JESUS CHRIST.—This has arisen, not from any idea that the other points of difference in this controversy are less susceptible of an easy and solid defence, but from a conviction, that, if these points are admitted to have been satisfactorily established, the admission of the others will follow of course;—first, because the adoption and application of the same general principles of reasoning, which have been employed in establishing the one, will immediately conduct to the same conclusion respecting the other; and secondly, because there is such a harmonious connexion of parts in the system of Divine truth, and such a measure at least of the same harmony in the system also of

* Col. ii. 6—10.

error, that the reciprocal transference, from the one to the other, of any one in the series of differential articles, would immediately introduce confusion and self-contradiction into both; whereas, on the other hand, we learn from experience, as well as from the nature of the thing, that if any one of these leading articles of distinction, in either system, be once fairly received into the mind as a part of its creed, the rest, in one shape or another, will follow in its train. The mind that is satisfied of the divinity of Christ, is not likely to resist the same claim on behalf of the Holy Spirit, or to hang long in suspense over the pages of the Bible, respecting the great and fundamental doctrine of ATONEMENT. So intimately, indeed, are these parts of the Christian system interwoven with each other, that the evidence which directly establishes each, may be fairly considered as bearing indirectly, yet forcibly, on the establishment of the rest.

I have hitherto declined, and I must still adhere to the same line of procedure, entering on any discussion of the opinions of *the Fathers*, with a view to ascertain the doctrine of the primitive, or apostolic church. There is nothing in Mr. Yates' chapter on the "prevalence of Unitarianism in the early ages of the Christian church, &c." which is likely to startle, even for a moment, the mind of any reader, who is at all conversant with this branch of the subject. Intelligent readers will be disposed, I think, to consider it as one of the flimsiest portions of his volume, and will only marvel, that, with so very little to say, he should have touched this topic at all; and still more, that he should have presumed on settling, in two or three pages, a question which had cost other learned men the labour of volumes.—Referring my readers, who may have inclination and patience to prosecute this inquiry, to such works as those of Lardner and Priestley on the one part, and Horsley and Jamieson on the other, I shall dismiss the subject, with two or three brief general remarks.

Mr. Yates alleges, that "although Mr. Wardlaw declines entering upon the question respecting the faith of the primitive Christians, in various parts of his volume he takes it for granted that the early church was Calvinistic, thus clothing his doctrines in the venerable vestments of antiquity, and countenancing them

by the authority of those who had the best opportunities for receiving them in their unadulterated simplicity." (Page 259.)—I know not to what particular parts of my volume, my opponent may here refer. My object, all along, has been to show, *that the doctrines of the* ORIGINAL APOSTOLIC CHURCHES, *as these doctrines are laid down in* THE SCRIPTURES THEMSELVES, *were* NOT UNITARIAN, BUT THE CONTRARY. In endeavouring to establish this, I defy Mr. Yates to show that I have taken any thing for granted. I have made my appeal to the Bible; and, if I have succeeded in making good my point from that source of evidence, I willingly relinquish to other hands (fully confident, however, as to the result) the investigation of the varying opinions of succeeding times. The only "venerable vestments of antiquity" in which I feel any desire to clothe my doctrines, are the white robes of apostolic authority: and, instead of searching for my creed among the scanty and uncertain documents of early ecclesiastical history, I wish to go myself, and to conduct my readers, to the only fountain of uncontaminated truth: instead of travelling out of my way, to consult vague and equivocal oracles, misled by the plausible assurance, that, "they had the best opportunities of receiving the doctrines of Christianity in their unadulterated simplicity," I lay my hand on THE BIBLE, and say, Here we *have* these doctrines, "in their unadulterated simplicity;" and "on questions so important and fundamental, the language of revelation cannot be ambiguous."

There is another ground, on which I feel myself justified in letting the inquiry into ecclesiastical antiquity alone. Mr. Yates says respecting it, "This inquiry is, in its results, *almost as favourable to Unitarian principles as the examination of the Scriptures themselves.*" (P. 276.) If, therefore, I have succeeded in showing how very unfavourable the latter is, why should I trouble myself with the former?

"Although, therefore," says Mr. Yates, (page 282) "I concede to Mr. Wardlaw, that his doctrine has been supported by all the governments of Christendom since the end of the fifth century, I maintain that this circumstance tells little indeed in its favour." And so do I, most stoutly. I make as little ac-

count of the support of earthly governments to any system of doctrines, as furnishing either evidence or presumption of their truth, as Mr. Yates can possibly do: and, having never made any reference whatever to such authority, I make him welcome to take back his concession, and even (of so little value do I esteem it) to place it, if he can, to the credit of Unitarianism.

"During the four first ages," adds he, "we have the most abundant evidence that Unitarianism was the only acknowledged form of Christianity." And then, on the credit of this assertion, supported by the flimsy evidence aforesaid, he sets the trump of fame to his lips, and sounds a eulogy of *Unitarians*, triumphantly proclaiming the obligations of the whole Christian world to their purity, and faithfulness, and zeal, which, *under this false name*, is a just and eloquent tribute to the memory of apostles, and primitive Christians, and early martyrs. To *them* let the reader apply it, with a thankful and admiring heart:—

"To Unitarians, then, we are indebted for the preservation of the gospel, when its very existence was threatened by the fiercest persecution. They were Unitarians, who not only adorned Christianity by their lives, but defended it by their deaths. Without their efforts and sacrifices, the Scriptures would have been destroyed, the gospel lost. In short, to them, under God, we owe almost all the religion and virtue, which now exists in the world. I humbly conceive," adds the enraptured panegyrist, (and his claim on behalf of his party is not certainly extravagant, if all this be true) "I humbly conceive, that these facts should produce, in Christians of every sect, some *respect* for Unitarianism."—"*These facts!*" "Aye," but, "there's the rub." If these were *facts*, Unitarians would be entitled to a great deal more than "*some respect.*" If "Christians of every sect" were convinced that these were "*facts*," they would be "Christians of every sect" no longer: their *respect* for Unitarianism would be such, that they would become Unitarians themselves. But, unfortunately, they have more than their doubts about "*these facts*," and are disposed to think, that Mr. Yates and his friends would require to make out their point a little better, before they venture to claim for Unitarians all the purity of gospel light, all

the beauty of primitive holiness, all the mighty results of early zeal, and all the crowns of triumphant martyrdom. If such was the character of Unitarianism of old—"Oh! how fallen, how changed!" Let "Christians of every sect" be on their guard: and let them take home to themselves, with the necessary alterations, the appropriate admonition addressed by Mr. Yates to "the Unitarians of modern times"—"inciting them to emulate all the great and amiable virtues of these first members of their sect, to guard against a second corruption of their principles, and to maintain, with zeal, sincerity, and mutual affection, that great cause, in which so many thousands of their primitive brethren expired."

Within these few years, the Unitarians have attempted to make an inroad on the educational prejudices and errors of Scotland; and they have been very active in prosecuting their object. They have instituted "the Scotch Unitarian Christian Association;" of which the fourth anniversary has lately (in the beginning of last month, May 1816,) been held in this city. Its objects, briefly stated, are, the preservation of correspondence and union among Unitarian Societies; the pecuniary assistance of such Societies as may require it, for the support of public worship; the maintenance of Unitarian missionaries; and the circulation of Unitarian tracts. Were we to take their own accounts of the success which has attended their exertions, we should certainly think it had been very considerable. The readers of their annual Reports, however, had better make a little inquiry before they admit into their minds, as facts, those conceptions of the numbers and the prospects of the party, which they are carefully framed to produce. Either the writers of them are adepts in that species of quackery, which puffs off the extensive reception experienced by its nostrums, for the encouragement of others to come forward and buy; or else, they have very thoroughly learned the Scripture lesson, "not to despise the day of small things." In the Report of the third annual meeting held at Edinburgh in May 1815, we are informed, *inter alia*, that "delegates were present from Glasgow, Paisley, Carluke, Dundee, Crieff, Dunfermline, &c." and that, "besides con-

gregations having been established at Glasgow, Edinburgh, Carluke, Paisley, and Dundee, there were many friends to the cause at Aberdeen, Arbroath, Blackford, Crieff, Dalry, Falkirk, Gallashiels, Greenock, Hamilton, Jedburgh, Kilwinning, Kirkaldy, Lanark, Melrose, Newburgh, Perth, Port-Glasgow, Saltcoats, Tillicoultry, &c. &c. The letters from these places were then read. The accounts from most of them were very encouraging, and gave additional motives to the friends of the Institution to proceed in the good work they had begun."

This is, no doubt, a somewhat formidable list; and when a person reads of *delegates* and *congregations*, and *very encouraging accounts*, he is apt to be not a little startled. If any reader, however, in guessing at the amount of meaning conveyed by such words, shall be disposed to conjecture, respecting any one of the places enumerated,—"*peradventure there may be fifty found there*," he may come down to *forty*, and thence, perhaps, to *thirty*, before he reaches the highest number; and when he has descended to *twenty*, and to *ten*, he will not have arrived at the lowest. One of the towns mentioned as having *a delegate* present, was left, I have been informed, empty of its Unitarianism, when the said delegate took his departure to attend the meeting. Invited for this purpose to Edinburgh he complied with the invitation, and appeared there as the representative of —*himself!*—and gave withal, it may be presumed, a "very encouraging account" of the progress of Unitarianism in the place where he had *got* and *given* his commission of delegation. In another of these towns, there has been discovered a solitary old woman professing Unitarian principles, who is not acquainted with any "of that way" in the place, besides herself. In more places than one, although they have made several attempts to gain a footing, their success has been so very small, that inquirers after them have hardly been able to discover their existence; from which, (as it is not, in general, their nature, to "blush unseen,") we may, I presume, infer, that in such places they are not at least in sufficient numbers to keep one another in countenance. In several of these stations I have heard of three, in one of five or six, in another of from eight to twelve, in another of

seventeen, in another of twenty; the largest number of which I have heard in any place is between twenty and thirty, and even this only in one instance; and some of the persons included in the number, hardly avowed Unitarians, but only "*tanquam suspecti.*" The inquiries which have produced such results, have been made at the *most considerable* of the places enumerated, which it is, perhaps, more than justice to take as a standard for the rest. Double, if you please, the amount in every one of them; and still, surely, there must be some little quackery, in puffiing them off as "very encouraging accounts."

I do not mention these things, because I think there is no ground for apprehension, or because I am disposed to contemn and set at nought their efforts. No one who knows his own heart, and who believes the Bible account of human nature, will feel confidence in saying, respecting any error whatever, in any given circumstances, that there is no danger of its making progress. "No human voice," Mr. Yates rejoices, "can say, Halt! to the march of intellect." But alas! this is true of its *retrograde*, as well as of its advancing, march! "There is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death." A man may call evil good, and good evil, may put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter, may put darkness for light, and light for darkness." The very "light that is in him may be darkness." He may turn his back on the confines of truth, and make hasty and haughty strides into the regions of error, exulting in the confidence that "no human voice can say, Halt!" to his progress. There is not, perhaps, a single point of error, to which there is not some corresponding point in the variety of human corruption;—some principle or passion to which it presents a tempting gratification. One of the great leading tendencies of the Unitarian system is, the *exaltation of man.* It flatters the conscious dignity of his nature, by treating as "an old wives'-fable" the doctrine of original depravity. It flatters his pride of intellect, by making Reason the arbitress of the dictates of Revelation.—It flatters his pride of self-righteousness, by assuring him, that his own virtue is to procure his acceptance with God. By denying the deity and atonement of Christ, it releases the mind

from the overwhelming impression of the infinite malignity of sin. By exhibiting "a God all mercy," softening down the "terrors of the Lord," and proclaiming an assurance, that none shall finally perish, but that all shall ultimately arrive at the enjoyment of everlasting happiness, it alleviates the sinner's apprehension of danger, makes him feel more at his ease with God, as a Being whose countenance, instead of the frown of an offended Judge, wears towards all his creatures the smiles of paternal love, and who will not be severe to mark or to punish the frailties of his erring children. By denying the existence and influences of the Holy Spirit, it offers incense to the self-sufficiency of man, and to the omnipotence of human resolutions and human efforts, in working out a self-procured salvation.

If these things be so;—if Unitarianism be thus consonant with so many of the principles of corrupt nature, how comes it to pass that it does not meet with a more general reception? That its converts are comparatively few; that, with not many exceptions, its preachers proclaim their doctrines to empty pews and echoing walls;—are matters of unquestionable notoriety. Why is it so? It is all owing, Unitarians will say, to the strength of early prejudice, to the natural predilection of the human mind for marvels and mysteries, and its consequent aversion to the simplicity of reason and truth. That, in some instances, such causes do operate, it would be unreasonable to deny. That religion is, with too many, a matter of educational prejudice, and not of personal inquiry and personal experience, cannot, alas! admit of a doubt. And it is equally true, that some minds are fond of mystery, and like every thing the better the more mysterious it can be rendered. But there are causes, I apprehend, of more extensive and powerful operation.

The first of these is, the very pretension of Unitarianism to be *the doctrine of the Bible*. The whole system of its general principles, and particular tenets, stands so plainly and diametrically opposed to the clearest dictates of the sacred volume, that this of itself is enough to disgust ninety-nine in the hundred of all who are able to read. They shake their heads and say, "No, no; this will never do. True or false, this is not the doctrine taught

in the Bible :—these men should honestly confess that they did not learn their system there, and either abandon it, or renounce revelation."—"Your system," might a Deist say to a Unitarian—"Your system is no doubt free of most of the mysterious absurdities of orthodox theology. It is much more rational and manly, and approaches to the simplicity of our own creed. But why impose upon us, and impose upon yourselves, by calling it the system of the Bible? Your eyes have been opened to see the falsehood and folly of that contradictory jargon, that is received as gospel by simple, or unhappily prejudiced, believers. One reason of our rejecting the pretensions of the Bible as a Divine revelation, is, that it *does*, beyond all reasonable question, contain the doctrines which you have had the good sense to disavow. But, to be consistent, you must go a step farther. Reject the book; and, giving up all your attempts to torture it into consistency with your more rational sentiments, frankly confess, that the doctrines which it contains are enough to sink it, and all its evidences, together." There may be many things in a scheme of doctrine very palatable to human corruption, and, in so far, calculated to procure for it an extensive reception; while yet there is such a palpable and flagrant opposition between it and the book from which it professes to be taken, as at once to shock the judgment of the great majority of men, effectually to counteract their wishes for its truth, (if such they may secretly have formed) and to ensure its general rejection. On this ground, the speculative acquaintance with the contents of the Bible, which pervades Scotland, (even although so extensively heartless and inefficacious) will form one strong barrier to the progress of Unitarian principles among its population.

But beside, there are wants in the condition of mankind, which Unitarianism does not meet. However reluctant men may be to acknowledge themselves utterly "lost," and "without strength;" yet there exists a prevailing consciousness of sin, and guilt, and condemnation. The gospel, in its exhibitions of an atoning Mediator, meets this natural feeling. There is an obvious congruity between the general idea of such a Saviour, and the secret dictates of conscience in the human breast. In some,

these dictates, becoming powerful and awakening, lead the sinner, through the blessing of God, to a glad and grateful reception of the free salvation which is offered to him in the gospel. In others, they are repressed and resisted; the love of sin and of the world maintains the ascendency, and opposes the result to which a consciousness of guilt might otherwise lead. Yet, while sin and the world have the vote of the heart, this vote is given in opposition to certain secret intimations of the judgment. The understanding does not, from conviction, join in the course which the heart pursues, but is only kept at bay; and such persons, although, from unwillingness to "crucify the flesh with its affections and lusts," they do not embrace the gospel, yet still perceive the harmony between the general idea of a guilty and condemned sinner, and the general idea of a mediating and atoning Saviour, and would consider any thing else than the gospel, as unsuitable and tantalizing. Even those, (and they are not few,) who attempt an unscriptural compromise between the freedom of gospel grace, and dependence on their own fancied deservings, refusing, with the air of offended pride, to renounce the latter, while yet, along with them, they are fain to retain the merits of a Saviour, to serve as occasion may require, if, unfortunately, the balance should dip on the wrong side, and the scale of their sins outweigh the scale of their virtues; even they will be the enemies of a system which entirely sweeps away from them this convenient resource.—And with regard to the immense multitude, the largest class of all, who pass through life with the vacuity of thoughtless indifference as to all that relates to religion, toiling in the businesses of this world, absorbed by its pleasures, or amusing themselves with its vanities, it is not likely that many of them will put themselves to the trouble of inquiry. They will pursue their wonted course, leave those whom it may concern to settle religious controversies; and, with all the magnanimity of infatuated folly, let eternity shift for itself. When such persons *have* been attracted by the novelty and the imposing pretensions of Unitarianism, and have been induced to embrace the profession of its principles, we have heard Christians utter expressions of surprise and grief. There is, perhaps, little cause for the latter

feeling; and there is still less for the former. Why should we be surprised that worldly men should embrace a system, which amalgamates so well with the world, and the adoption of which can hardly be said to imply any transition from one state, or from one course, to another? And as to grief—we may be grieved, indeed, that they have not embraced better principles, but we can hardly be grieved, surely, that they have not continued what they were. Even the excitement of thought, is, I should think, a favourable point gained. Subsequent consideration may, through the Divine influence, lead them to another mind.

But it is, above all, to the providence and the grace of God that we must look, for the prevention of the progress of error.—The Unitarians are very boastful of their "day of small things" in Scotland. Long may it continue such! long, I trust, it shall continue such. It is not of *their* doctrine that God hath said, "It shall accomplish that which I please, and prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." It is not to *their* "planting," or to *their* "watering," that he has promised to "give an increase." They have sown their "handful," not of "corn," but of tares; and they are looking for a plentiful crop. But "the Lord of the harvest," we trust, will disappoint their expectations. Their seed wants the showers of Divine blessing; and never, either on the mountains or in the valleys of Caledonia, shall it "shake with prosperous fruit." It shall be "as the grass on the house-tops, which withereth before it groweth up; wherewith the mower filleth not his hand, nor he that bindeth sheaves, his bosom."

Far different, however, are the sanguine anticipations of Mr. Yates:—"Considering," says he "the clear, abundant, and unanswerable, evidence to the truth of the Unitarian doctrines, the tolerant and liberal spirit, the diffusion of information upon general subjects, the habits of inquiry, and the turn for speculation, as well as the usual good sense, which prevail among the middling and lower orders of society throughout Scotland, it appears to me, that the extensive propagation of Unitarian sentiments may reasonably be expected." (Page 292.) The Scottish people, that is, are all that is good, and Unitarianism is all that is good; therefore Unitarianism must needs find favour in the eyes of the

Scottish people. If, indeed, the evidence to the truth of Unitarianism were as "clear, abundant and unanswerable," as Mr. Yates affirms it to be, the excellences ascribed to our countrymen would, no doubt, eminently qualify them for discerning and appreciating its force; but if, as we have endeavoured to show, the evidence be the contrary of all this, the same excellences, happily, will equally well fit them for the detection of its fallacies, and for estimating the validity of its refutation.

"The only material cause," in Mr. Yates' judgment, "which is likely to obstruct the progress of Unitarian principles in Scotland, seems to be this; that, as many of those who embrace Unitarian principles will be men more disposed to inquire after truth, than to apply it steadily to practice when found, and as the discussion of controverted questions in theology, has a natural tendency to weaken the devotional feelings, the converts to Unitarianism may become careless and indifferent about their religious duties, and adopt habits of useless, roving speculation, to the neglect of their hearts and lives." (Page 292.) In what he immediately adds, he is clearly in the right, and is entitled to credit for his candour: "Instead of concealing this formidable evil, it is infinitely wiser to bring it fully into view, so that we may be on our guard against it." But the admission made in the first clause of the preceding extract, is particularly deserving of attention:—"*many of those who embrace Unitarian principles, will be men more disposed to inquire after truth, than to apply it steadily to practice when found.*" This singular admission, it is presumed, must be founded either in the nature of the thing, or in past experience. And whether the one, or the other, or both of these, be the ground on which it rests, it seems evidently to imply, that there is something about the Unitarian system which recommends it more to the head of the roving speculatist, than to the heart of the humble and devout inquirer; to the *would-be* theologian, and the metaphysical amateur, rather than to the man who is "renewed in the spirit of his mind," and desirous to "perfect holiness in the fear of God." In this view, the admission harmonizes remarkably with the style in which former Unitarian writers have expressed themselves:—

"It cannot be denied," says Dr. Priestley, "that many of those who judge so truly concerning particular tenets in religion, have attained to that cool, unbiassed temper of mind, in consequence of becoming more indifferent to religion in general, and to all the modes and doctrines of it."—"Men who are indifferent to the practice of religion," says Mr. Belsham, "and whose minds, therefore, are least attached to any set of principles, will ever be the first to see the absurdity of a popular superstition, and to embrace a rational system of faith."—And do not these admissions, and that of Mr. Yates, still correspond, in a remarkable manner, with existing facts? Who are, in general, the converts to Unitarianism? Do they not still, as when Mr. Fuller published his comparative view of the Calvinistic and Socinian Systems, consist chiefly of "*a speculating sort of people among professing Christians?*"—Where are the hardened sinners whose consciences it has awakened? Where are the profligates whom it has reclaimed? Where are the worldlings whom it has spiritualized? Where are the Jews, the Deists, the infidels, whom it has brought to the faith and obedience of the truth? And, even with regard to those who have, from time to time, gone over to its adherents from the various denominations of professing Christians, what improvement, we may ask, has the transition produced? Has it increased their humility? Has it warmed and elevated their devotion? Has it purified their affections from the debasing alloy of the world, and made them more heavenly-minded? Has it enlivened their delight in communion with God, and heightened their attachment to the exercises of the closet, the family, and the sanctuary? Has it rendered them more thankful in prosperity, more resigned and patient in adversity? Has it enlarged their practical benevolence? Has it made them more "fervent in spirit" for the glory of God, and the good of men?—more "sober, just, holy, temperate?"—better husbands and wives; better parents and children; better brothers and sisters; better masters and servants; better members of society;—in a word, *better men*, than they were before?—I make my appeal to the consciences of these converts to Unitarianism themselves, and, with all humility and affection,

intreat them to examine themselves, and to compare, in their own experience, the respective tendencies of the system which they have renounced, and of that which they have espoused. And I make my appeal, at the same time, to all my fellow Christians who have had any opportunities for personal observation. "Among the various Socinian converts, have we ever been used to hear of any remarkable change of life or behaviour, which a conversion to their peculiar principles effected? I hope there are few Calvinistic congregations in the kingdom, but what could point out examples of persons among them, who, at the time of their coming over to their doctrinal principles, came over also from the course of this world, and have ever since lived in newness of life. Can this be said of the generality of Socinian congregations? Those who have had the greatest opportunity of observing them, say the contrary. Yea, they add, that the conversion of sinners to a life of holiness, does not appear to be their aim; that their concern seems to be, to persuade those who, in their account, have *too much* religion, that less will suffice, rather than to address themselves to the irreligious, to convince them of their defect."*

If the efficacy of Unitarianism, as an instrument of moral and spiritual improvement, is to be estimated by the effects which it is seen to produce among ourselves, we shall be at a loss for grounds to account for, or to justify, the recent eagerness of its proselyting spirit. Differences of *sentiment*, in the opinion of most Unitarians, are of little essential account in the matter of salvation; and conversion to the principles of Unitarianism, has, it would appear, no such influence upon the converts as to make any material change for the better in their *character*. Whence then, the active zeal of its friends? To what is this zeal directed? What valuable ends do they expect to accomplish by it?

* Fuller's "Calvinistic and Socinian Systems examined and compared, as to their Moral Tendency;" a work which cannot be too often or too strongly recommended to the attention of the reader; a work, to which the palm must still be assigned among the productions of its able and lamented author; a work "to which," in the language of Dr. Johnson respecting Lord Lyttleton's observations on the conversion of Paul, Unitarianism "has never yet been able to frame even a specious "answer."

Of what mighty consequence is a mere change of sentiment and profession, if the change does not materially, if at all, affect, either the safety or the character of him who undergoes it? Those who hold the divinity and atonement of Christ and the doctrine of acceptance with God through his merits and mediation, are consistent in their zeal, because they consider these Scripture truths as essentially connected with the salvation of sinners; because they can look around on their congregations, and, enumerating in their minds the various characters who "shall not inherit the kingdom of God," can say with Paul, "Such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God;" and because they expect the same renovations of heart, and transformations of character, as the result of "the preaching of the cross," in "every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation."—But where are those trophies of *Unitarian* success—where those evidences of Divine blessing upon their labours, by which they are incited to "compass sea and land to make one proselyte?" We cannot allow them to go back for these to apostolic times; to take for granted the Unitarianism of the primitive church; to claim for their party all the early triumphs of the cross; and, on *this* ground, to exult in the anticipation of triumphs yet to come. Unitarianism, according to Mr. Yates, was then "unadulterated;" that is, as he afterward explains the term, "unincumbered and unobscured by Trinitarian errors." But does not Unitarianism appear, in the system of Mr. Yates and his friends, sufficiently divested of these errors,—sufficiently "unadulterated?" And, as similar causes, operating upon simliar materials should produce similar effects, might we not reasonably expect to see some of the same results arising from the propagation of unadulterated Unitarianism in our own day, which are alleged to have arisen from it in days of yore? The tree must be known by its *present* fruits. If these fruits are not the same with those which grew of old, we may be assured that Unitarianism is not a slip of the true vine. Wherever *that* has been planted, its fruits have been invariably the same.

Mr. Yates "considers Unitarianism as the remedy which Infinite Wisdom has provided for all moral evil;" and expresses his conviction, that no unbiassed mind can "doubt its sufficiency to accomplish this purpose, when properly understood and applied."* In bringing this estimate of Unitarianism to the test of fact, he first of all refers to the wonderful changes produced by it in the state of society, while it was yet unadulterated." But this, as I have just noticed, we consider as more than debatable ground. We claim it distinctly and decidedly for the opposite system; and substantiate our claim by a direct appeal to apostolic testimony in the Scriptures; the only sure way of ascertaining the doctrines by which the "wonderful changes" in question were really produced. He next appeals to "the benefits which its principles have continued to diffuse through the world, even while incumbered and obscured by the addition of Trinitarian errors."† But, in opposition to this, we have two counter appeals. First, to *Scripture:* If these "*Trinitarian errors*" have been successfully shown to be *Scriptural truths*, to them must those benefits be imputed, which Mr. Yates represents them as having impeded, and Unitarianism as having produced in spite of their counteracting influence. Secondly, to *fact:* The benefits referred to by Mr. Yates, are those which have accrued to the world from the propagation of Christianity in the ages subsequent to the primitive. Now what, in point of fact, have been the doctrines chiefly insisted upon by those who have followed the apostles in "turning the world upside down?" Have they been the points in which Unitarians and Trinitarians are agreed? Or have they not rather been those on which they are *toto cælo* at variance? Have not the depravity, guilt, and condemnation of mankind, the deity and atonement of the Saviour, justification by grace through faith in his merits and sacrifice, and the enlightening and sanctifying agency of the Divine Spirit; have not these, and such as these, been the great themes of preaching, wherever any material effects have been produced on

* Dedication of Sermon on the duty and manner of deciding religious controversies.

† Ibid.

the personal characters and the social condition of men? Has it not been that "preaching of the cross" which is, by Unitarians, as well as by the philosophers of this world, esteemed foolishness, that has all along proved "the power of God unto salvation?" It is silly, indeed, to speak of Unitarianism with the *addition* of Trinitarian errors; as if, in their *substrata*, in their fundamental articles, the two systems were the same, and the propagation of Trinitarianism were only the propagation of Unitarianism with the accompaniment of certain erroneous additions; whereas, in fact, they are so completely dissimilar, as to constitute different religions; and the successful propagation of the one, whichsoever it be, must be the entire subversion of the other.

But Unitarianism has been disincumbered of these "additional errors," and has been brought to the test of fact and experience, in what its advocates declare to have been its primitive simplicity: and where, we again ask, is any thing resembling the "*wonderful changes*" which it is so confidently alleged to have effected "in the beginning of the gospel?" Are its weapons now, as of old, "mighty through God, to the pulling down of strong holds, casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ?"* It has as yet, indeed, only been tried at home—in Christian countries. Let it, then, be tried abroad. Carry it far hence unto the heathen. Let active zeal send forth its missionaries to the regions of darkness and of the shadow of death. I will not ask for instantaneous and extensive revolutions in the views and characters of men; for altars overturned, temples deserted, and bonfires of magical books. These, I should be told, distinguished the days of miraculous evidence. But I *will* ask, first of all, for the manifestation of apostolic benevolence and apostolic zeal, among those who arrogate to themselves the exclusive possession of apostolic principles,—of the gospel in its original purity and simplicity. Paul's "spirit was stirred in him, when he saw the

* 2 Corinthians x.

city (Athens) wholly given to idolatry." Let us see some stirrings of this deep concern for the glory of a dishonoured Deity, and of this melting compassion for the souls of deluded and perishing men. Can those principles be the same with Paul's, which allow the professors of them to sit still in listless apathy, while they view a world given to idolatry? making no attempts themselves to turn men from idols to the living God, and deriding, as visionary enthusiasm, the missionary efforts of others?

It is useless to ask for the *effects* of such attempts, while the attempts themselves have not been made. But the preaching of "Christ crucified"—the preaching of a Divine Redeemer, atoning for the guilt of men by the sacrifice of himself, *has* been tried, and has not been tried in vain. The effects produced have been the same in kind, although more limited in their extent, with those which resulted from the labours of the first preachers of the cross. The gospel has been proved "its own witness." It has found a testimony in the consciences, and has opened and entered the hearts of men of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation. It has been "the rod of the Redeemer's strength," by which he has established his reign "in the midst of his enemies." At this moment, through the zealous exertions of his servants, who are fighting this "good fight of faith," the people are "falling under him" in willing subjection. Over many of those who were "filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who, knowing the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them:"* over many such, happily, we have reason to adopt the language of the apostle of the Gentiles, "God be thanked that ye *were* the servants of sin: but now, being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life."† Instead of bring-

* Romans i. 29—32. † Romans vi. 17, 22.

ing forward such effects as these to prove the identity of the Unitarian with the apostolic doctrine, Mr. Yates speaks of his "witnessing, in the conduct of many of its professors, its admirable efficacy to cherish all the noblest and best affections, and to advance human nature toward its highest excellence."* I am not, as may be presumed, personally acquainted with *many* of the professors of Unitarianism. The character of my opponent himself, I rejoice to say, is one which I have never heard a lip opened to accuse or to slander. I believe it to be, as to moral deportment, highly correct and exemplary. Beyond himself, I would rather be silent; as I do not wish to point injurious reflections, or to excite invidious comparisons. I leave it to my readers, according to the extent of their personal knowledge, and their opportunities of information, to form their own judgment, as to the "admirable efficacy" which is ascribed by Mr. Yates to the Unitarian doctrines. Of the excellent persons to whom he alludes, I know nothing, and shall therefore say nothing; further than to observe, that the moral characters of many of the Unitarians, perhaps of some of the best among them, have been formed previously to their embracing the sentiments of that party; and of such, the excellences, whatever they may be, are not fairly imputable to the influence of their new principles. But even as to them, and as to the body at large to which they have joined themselves, report speaks very falsely, if they be in general distinguished for that *godliness*, *devotion*, and *spirituality of mind*, which stand so prominent in the characters of the saints of holy writ. It were unreasonable, indeed, to expect that it should be otherwise, if what Mr. Yates says be true, that "many of those who embrace Unitarian principles, will be men more disposed to inquire after truth, than to apply it steadily to practice when found."—"If Unitarians," he adds, "in the midst of that joy which often overpowers them upon the first breaking in of the light, be careful not to split upon this rock; if they be as anxious to improve their *hearts*, as to inform their *understandings*; if they not only strive after the attainment of correct *ideas*, but attend yet more to the cultivation of the devotional, the moral,

* Dedication to Sermon, &c. as before.

and the sympathetic *feelings*, &c. &c.; then Unitarianism will assuredly triumph over the united opposition of prejudice, interest, and passion; it is gone forth conquering, and to conquer." (Vindication, pages 292, 293.) The admonitions thus tendered are excellent: but the supposition that makes them necessary, does not say much for the spiritual nature, or the regenerating influence, of Unitarianism. What sort of "*light*" must this be, the entrance of which into the mind exposes the *heart* to the danger of being forgotten? Of what description is this overpowering joy, which is so entirely unconnected with the *devotional* and the *moral feelings*, as to produce the imminent hazard of their being overlooked and neglected? Is it not the joy of a man of science upon a new discovery, rather than the joy of a sinner on finding a Saviour? The light of the gospel is holy light; the joy which it inspires, holy joy. The truth as it is in Jesus makes its way to the heart, with gladdening, no doubt, but, at the same time, with humbling and purifying, influence, at the same instant that it enters the understanding. It prostrates the soul in self-abased and grateful adoration. It fills the eyes with the mingled tears of penitential sorrow, and of sacred and animated delight,—the "peace of God that passeth all understanding,"—"the joy of God's salvation." Instead of leaving the sinner in danger, "in the midst of the joy that overpowers him," of forgetting that he has a heart to be rectified, as well as an understanding to be enlightened, "the entrance of God's word," while it "giveth light," is the invariable means of "renewing the spirit of the mind," and turning the heart to God.

But to enlarge on the practical tendencies of the two systems of doctrine, would lead me to write another volume; and the ground has been pre-occupied to incomparably better purpose in the work of Mr. Fuller, before referred to. I shall conclude my remarks on this topic, with two short extracts from that admirable publication:—

"Let us examine more particularly what sort of people they, in general, are, who are converted to Socinianism. It is an object worthy of inquiry, whether they appear to be modest, humble, serious Christians; such as have known the plague of their

own hearts; in whom tribulation hath wrought patience, and patience, experience; such as know WHOM they have believed, and have learned to count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Jesus their Lord; such as, in their investigation of sentiments, have been used to mingle earnest and humble prayer, with patient and impartial inquiry; such, in fine, as have become as little children in their own eyes? *If they be*, it is a circumstance of consequence, not sufficient, indeed, to justify their change of sentiments, but to render that change an object of attention. When persons of this description embrace a new set of principles, it becomes a matter of serious consideration, what could induce them to do so. But *if they be not*, their case deserves but little regard. When the body of converts to a system are mere speculatists in religion, men of little or no seriousness, and who pay no manner of attention to vital and practical religion, it reflects neither honour on the cause they have espoused, nor dishonour on that which they have rejected. When we see persons of this stamp go over to the Socinian standard, it does not at all surprise us; on the contrary, we are ready to say, as the apostle said of the defection of some of the professors of Christianity, in his day, '*They went out from us, but they were not of us.*'"

"Will Dr. Priestley undertake to prove, that *a loose, dissipated, and abandoned life, is a more general thing among the Calvinists, than among their opponents?* I am persuaded he will not. He knows that the Calvinists, in general, are far from being a dissipated or an abandoned people, and goes about to account for it; and that in a way that *shall reflect no honour upon their principles.* 'Our moral conduct (he observes) is not left at the mercy of our opinions; and the regard to virtue which is kept up by those who maintain the opinions above-mentioned, is owing to the influence of other principles implanted in our nature.'* Admitting this to be true, yet one would think the worst principles will, *upon the whole*, be productive of the worst practices. They whose innate principles of virtue are all employed in counteracting the influence of a pernicious system, cannot be expected to

* Consid. on Diff. Opin. p. III.

form such amiable characters, as where those principles are not only left at liberty to operate, but are aided by a good system. It might, therefore, be expected, I say again, if our principles be what our opponents say they are, that a loose, dissipated, and abandoned life, would be a more general thing among us than among them.

"I may be told, that the same thing, if put to us, would be found equally difficult: or that, notwithstanding we contend for the superior influence of the Calvinistic system to that of Socinians, yet we should find it difficult to prove, that a loose, dissipated, and abandoned life, is a more general thing among Socinians, than it is among Calvinists. And I allow that I am not sufficiently acquainted with the bulk of the people of that denomination, to hazard an assertion of this nature. But if what is allowed by their own writers (who ought to know them) may be admitted as evidence, such an assertion might nevertheless be supported.—'Rational Christians are often represented (says Mr. Belsham) as indifferent to practical religion.' Nor does he deny the justice of this representation, but admits, though with apparent reluctance, that 'there has been some plausible ground for the accusation;' and goes about to account for it, as we have seen in Letter IV.; in such a way, however, *as may reflect no dishonour upon their principles*. The same thing is acknowledged by Dr. Priestley, who allows that '*a great number* of the Unitarians of the present age, are only men of good sense, and without much practical religion;' and that 'there is a greater apparent conformity to the world in them, than is observable in others.' Yet he also goes about to account for these things, as Mr. Belsham does, in such a way *as may reflect no dishonour upon their principles*. It is rather extraordinary, that when facts are introduced in favour of the virtue of the general body of the Calvinists, they are not denied, but accounted for in such a way, that their principles must share none of the *honour;* and when facts of an opposite kind are introduced in proof of the want of virtue among Unitarians, they also are not denied, but accounted for in such a way, that their principles must have none of the *dis*honour. Calvinism, it seems, must be immoral, though Calvinists be virtuous,

and Socinianism must be amiable, though Socinians be vicious. I shall not inquire whether these very opposite methods of accounting for facts be fair or candid. On this, the reader will form his own judgment: it is enough for me that the facts themselves are allowed."*

In anticipating the prevalence of Unitarianism in Scotland, Mr. Yates is commendably anxious to "prevent those divisions in churches, dissensions in families," and other incidental evils, that are likely, in many cases, to accompany a change of religious sentiment. He deprecates, and all should unite with him here, every attempt to suppress heresy by persecuting statutes, (a measure, by the way, which, whatever Bishops may advise, the government of the country has of late laudably shown the very opposite of an inclination to adopt;) as well as all ignorant misrepresentation, and angry and terrifying remonstrances. And then, with all due formality, and preparatory eulogy, he brings forward his own healing, or rather preventive, measure. The measure, in sooth, is this:—"That the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland should no longer enforce subscription to the Westminister Confession of Faith; at least, that they should permit exceptions to be made to so much of it as relates to the Trinity, and thus allow conscientious Unitarians to become ministers in the Establishment, upon the same footing with Trinitarian candidates."—This measure, gentle reader, is recommended, with all gravity, as "simple, easy, righteous, and conciliatory," and as one "which, after calm and attentive deliberation, all wise, and most good, men, will cordially approve:" that is, (since all such *good* men as are at the same time *wise* are comprehended under the first denomination) which *all* will approve, except a few weak minded enthusiasts, whose hearts are better than their heads. I have not heard that the hint, thus modestly given, has been adopted by any of the *wise*, that is of the *moderate*, party in the Establishment; that any overture has been proposed in any of the Presbyteries or Synods, for transmission to the General Assembly; or that the matter has, in any

* The Calvinistic and Socinian Systems examined and compared, &c. Sixth Edition, Letter IV. pages 57, 58, and Letter VI. pages 110—112.

shape, been brought under the notice of that "venerable Court." Either the case must be considered as a hopeless one, or there must be less *wisdom* and *goodness* in the Establishment, than Mr. Yates anticipated.—He seems, indeed, to have better hopes of the Dissenters than of the Church. "If that much respected body," says he, "shall not see fit to pass an act to this effect, I am not without hopes, that the example will be set them by some of the sects of Presbyterian Dissenters, those taking the lead who are most distinguished by their attachment to the Scriptures in preference to creeds of human invention." Does Mr. Yates, then fancy, that the Dissenters are less firmly attached to what they profess to consider as the great and essential articles of the Christian faith, than the clergy and members of the Established Church?—And is it his opinion, that this attachment is likely to be loose and unsteady, in proportion as Christians are hostile to subscription to "creeds of human invention?" In both these fancies he will find himself mistaken. The Presbyterian Dissenters have been eminently instrumental in preventing the progress of error, and maintaining the purity of gospel doctrine, in Scotland. And although I dissent from some points of doctrine and modes of expression, in the Confession of Faith to which they profess adherence, and also, on grounds which I need not at present state, from the propriety of subscription to human creeds at all; yet, I trust, they will never submit their articles to be mended by these *soi-disant* rationalists, and accommodated either to the taste or to the conscience of Unitarians. Before this can be done, they must either have become "conscientious Unitarians" themselves, or, which is certainly not much better, have broken terms with conscience altogether, and discarded her sacred authority. How absurd to talk of adapting the Scottish Confession of Faith to the conciences of both parties, by "permitting *exceptions* to be made to *so much of it as relates to the Trinity.*" I cannot but think how the metamorphosis would amaze the venerable Divines of Westminister, before a *conscientious* Unitarian could have done with his amendments!—With regard to the Independents and Baptists, who "pursue the principle of making the Bible the only standard of their faith and practice," although

there has been a great deal too much among them of "strife and debate" and division, about matters of comparatively inferior moment, and although individuals have now and then displayed a spirit of self-conceited speculation, and have "turned away their ears from the truth;" yet are they united, and, by the influence of time chastening and softening a disproportionate zeal about smaller matters, they will become more and more united, in attachment to the great doctrines that constitute "THE GLORIOUS GOSPEL OF THE BLESSED GOD;" and will present a combined front of opposition, wielding, in their holy warfare, "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God," against the progress of those, whom, with their views of the Bible, they must necessarily consider as "enemies of the cross of Christ."

I have thus finished my task. I have "examined my opponent's work with all the freedom which a regard to truth requires;" and I now leave the decision betwixt us to those "impartial judges," to whom he has made "his confident appeal."

The talents of my opponent are highly respectable; and so, I believe, are his attainments in classical erudition, in philosophy, and in general literature. His own estimate of the value of these, and of certain other qualifications of a more adventitious nature, may be learned from the Note at page 273, of his "Vindication," respecting a Sermon published by the Rev. A. Symington of Paisley, on the same text with his own on "the grounds of Unitarian dissent." While he speaks of that gentleman as "possessing many qualifications for great respectability and usefulness in the Christian ministry," he, at the same time, adds, —"He does not seem to have the means, or the habit, of applying to those sources of information, by which alone it is possible to determine the import of disputed passages of Scripture. I humbly conceive, that ministers so situated, while they follow their own judgment in the zealous and faithful use of the other talents, equally important and valuable, with which they are favoured by Providence, ought to leave the emendation of the Greek text, the translation of it into English, and even, to a certain degree, the interpretation of it, when translated, to those persons,

either among Unitarians or the orthodox, who, by the requisite labour and study, have become intimately acquainted with the original language of Scripture, and who are versed in the impartial application of the sound and established principles of Biblical criticism." This, it will be allowed, is quite high enough. With Mr. Symington I have not the pleasure of any personal acquaintance. According to the testimony of others, however, he was a front-rank man among his competitors at the University :—the sphere of his present labours does not certainly seclude him from easy access to various sources of aid in the researches of Biblical criticism :—and the sermon referred to, discovers talents that qualify him to avail himself of such means, and is very far from warranting the supercilious sentence by which Mr. Yates would interdict him this field of labour. How far the judge who has pronounced the interdict, has shown himself " versed in the *impartial* application of the sound and established principles of Biblical criticism," the reader is left to determine from the preceding pages.

So far as I have ever heard, there has been but one opinion respecting the proposal made by my opponent in his letter to me, published at the end of his " Vindication," that I should revise his manuscript, and make my animadversions, in a friendly way, in his own pages. That opinion has coincided with my own, as expressed in my answer to his letter :—and it is not likely to undergo any change, when the extent of these animadversions is now perceived. Judging from the strain of his letter, it would appear that Mr. Yates anticipated nothing at all like this. He seems to have thought, either that his own work was so irresistible, in the clearness and cogency of its reasonings, that it could not fail to carry immediate conviction to the mind of his opponent; or that the differences between us were such, that a few slight mutual explanations might be sufficient for their removal;—so that we might appear before the public, in a copartnery Volume, with all the courtly courtesy of reciprocal concessions, and, at the close, in all the harmony of brotherly agreement. I anticipated the reverse of all this, and have not been deceived.

In the prospectus of his "Vindication," my opponent advertised the public, that he had spared no pains to make it decisive of the questions under debate: and, at the close of the work itself, besides the vaunting declaration that his exposure of the defects of my former volume "must wholly destroy its credit in the apprehension of all impartial judges," he thus also congratulates himself upon the issue of his labours:—"Every reader will be able, by the cool and dispassionate examination of what I have written, to decide for himself these momentous questions. The impression made upon my own mind by considering the various evidences, which I have brought together, is, that if it be not certain that the commonly received doctrine of the Trinity is false, there is an end of all religion, and no certainty upon any subject." (Page 284.)—*You*, Reader, I hope, are of a different mind.

On the back of the title page of his Sermon on the decision of religious controversies, Mr. Yates has published the following notice:

"I take this opportunity of correcting the following inaccuracies of statement, in my '*Vindication of Unitarianism.*' They are all that I have yet been able to discover. Any, which may come to my knowledge hereafter, I shall in like manner rectify, as soon as occasion is presented. Those who have copies of the '*Vindication*,' are requested to correct with the pen, as follows:

"P. 128, line 4th, from bottom; erase, 'or any person,' and

"P. 130, erase the remarks immediately following John xiv. 16, 17. from 'In this passage,' to 'of the address.' For the ground of this emendation, see John iii. 16.

"P. 180, l. 14, for '*John* Elwall,' read '*Edward* Elwall."

"P. 212, erase the *Note*. See Schleusner, 'V. Πρὸς, No. 2."

If this, as I desire to believe, has been the dictate of a truly candid mind, I trust that the same candour, upon the perusal of the preceding reasonings, will lead to acknowledgment of errors much more extensive and radical than these.

END.